McClellan's autobiography

[67th Tigers]

I do not think you can reasonably describe the entire contest between the armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia in 1864 and 1865 as a "siege". That word does describe what happens once Lee is forced into permanent defense around Petersburg, but it hardly captures the war of attack - counter-attack that went on before then or the sad ending that comes once the siege of Petersburg is over.

McClellan's greatest problem was that he had no sense of politics; you see that in his constant refusal to understand the difference between the personal acclaim that comes with publicity and the power that comes to a military leader from being someone whom the politicians can trust. McClellan expected somehow to be able to dominate the politicians, even though they were in charge; like Napoleon he did not consider it necessary to form any alliances of sustained interest. In a country like France in the 1790s, where democracy was itself an experiment, it was possible for a successful, popular general to ignore political representatives; for a country fighting a civil war with both sides acting through elected civil authorities, that was folly of vanity.

The operations before Petersburg weren't really a siege. One can argue that Lee's 50,000 troops neutralised Grant's 100,000 (all that was left of ca. 250,000 troops because of how reduced that force became after the bloodletting of the Overland Campaign and the detachment to the Valley)

Lee in July 1862 was as pinned to Richmond as he was to Petersburg in July 1864. In fact, McClellan pinned more troops than Grant, by a large margin. You should note that Grant abstained from making any serious effort against Petersburg or Richmond for almost a year. He spent much time asking for more troops (i.e. 6th and 19th Corps), because he couldn't cut the railroads without them, and noted that he didn't have sufficient troops to make an offensive, but he had more than needed for a strict defensive. In mid-July his suggestion of withdrawing so he could send off troops to Sherman, because he'd given up on the idea of capturing Richmond, were not well received.

When Grant got the troops he'd spent H2 of 1864 asking for, he launched a successful offensive a mere 4 months after their arrival, although of course this was the winter, and Grant sensibly didn't try and move troops whilst the roads were bad, much like McClellan in 1861-2.

 

[Johnny Shafto]

Like Mother always said: "If you can't say anything nice..."
Regards
David

Or if you're not willing to say it to their face….

 

[Belfoured]

The operations before Petersburg weren't really a siege. One can argue that Lee's 50,000 troops neutralised Grant's 100,000 (all that was left of ca. 250,000 troops because of how reduced that force became after the bloodletting of the Overland Campaign and the detachment to the Valley)

Lee in July 1862 was as pinned to Richmond as he was to Petersburg in July 1864. In fact, McClellan pinned more troops than Grant, by a large margin. You should note that Grant abstained from making any serious effort against Petersburg or Richmond for almost a year. He spent much time asking for more troops (i.e. 6th and 19th Corps), because he couldn't cut the railroads without them, and noted that he didn't have sufficient troops to make an offensive, but he had more than needed for a strict defensive. In mid-July his suggestion of withdrawing so he could send off troops to Sherman, because he'd given up on the idea of capturing Richmond, were not well received.

When Grant got the troops he'd spent H2 of 1864 asking for, he launched a successful offensive a mere 4 months after their arrival, although of course this was the winter, and Grant sensibly didn't try and move troops whilst the roads were bad, much like McClellan in 1861-2.

And so - very predictably and repetitively - on it goes. When one prunes away all the smoke, fog, dust, and funny mirrors, what we have is McClellan plodding slowly, slowly, slowly up the Peninsula against a significantly outnumbered opponent (I know - the roads were wet), eventually (after 6 weeks or so) parking himself 6 or so miles from Richmond, using up another 3+ weeks, and then - magically as he was on the (alleged) verge of finally, at long last, launching, all while his foe had been allowed to significantly increase his own strength, albeit never to the fantasy levels stated by McClellan - he is struck decisively by Lee and forced to retreat some 25 miles - leaving him much farther away from Richmond than he had been. And there, hunkered down, he "pinned" Lee while generating yet more spin about his intentions to attack, accompanied as always by skull and cross bone caveats about varying numbers of additional troops he would need against Lee's fictional 180,000-200,000. On the other hand, starting in May 1864 Lee was consistently maneuvered south some 60 or so miles to precisely where he had stated he did not want to end up and where he had predicted that the outcome was unavoidable, with an army that had suffered so many casualties that it no longer had the ability to undertake offensive operations - apparently unlike the army that had not been battered by its opponent and was able to undertake an aggressive and victorious offensive in late June 1862. So far as we know, McClellan never accepted Lee's surrender before he was dismissed in November 1862. But I'm sure that somebody can cook up an "effective surrender" before then that the historians and everybody else has missed.

 

[67th Tigers]

And so - very predictably and repetitively - on it goes. When one prunes away all the smoke, fog, dust, and funny mirrors, what we have is McClellan plodding slowly, slowly, slowly up the Peninsula against a significantly outnumbered opponent (I know - the roads were wet), eventually (after 6 weeks or so) parking himself 6 or so miles from Richmond, using up another 3+ weeks, and then - magically as he was on the (alleged) verge of finally, at long last, launching, all while his foe had been allowed to significantly increase his own strength, albeit never to the fantasy levels stated by McClellan - he is struck decisively by Lee and forced to retreat some 25 miles - leaving him much farther away from Richmond than he had been. And there, hunkered down, he "pinned" Lee while generating yet more spin about his intentions to attack, accompanied as always by skull and cross bone caveats about varying numbers of additional troops he would need against Lee's fictional 180,000-200,000. On the other hand, starting in May 1864 Lee was consistently maneuvered south some 60 or so miles to precisely where he had stated he did not want to end up and where he had predicted that the outcome was unavoidable, with an army that had suffered so many casualties that it no longer had the ability to undertake offensive operations - apparently unlike the army that had not been battered by its opponent and was able to undertake an aggressive and victorious offensive in late June 1862. So far as we know, McClellan never accepted Lee's surrender before he was dismissed in November 1862. But I'm sure that somebody can cook up an "effective surrender" before then that the historians and everybody else has missed.

A predictable response, that's basically bluster.

I like how you manage to gloss over that whole Yorktown thing. Pray tell, how many miles through the Petersburg fortifications did Grant advance in July '64? August? September? October? etc.

I am remind that I ask people how they'd compare Grant's Vicksburg Operations vs McClellan's at Yorktown, because a blow by blow would be:


April '62 (month 1): Sherman advances from Fort Monroe and never gets near the Yorktown-Warwick line. He is decisively repelled at Big Bethel and retreats. Grant lands on the Rappahannock, but is forced to retreat back to Washington when his base is raided by Stuart's cavalry.

May '62 (month 2): McClernand basically does what Burnside historically did at Roanoke Island etc., with the aim of cutting through from Suffolk to the south. After success this is nixed and Grant assembles his whole force at Fort Monroe.

June-August '62 (months 3-5): Grant moves his army onto the Gloucester Peninsula and investigates a series of canals to allow the gunboats to get above Yorktown.

September '62 (month 6): The gunboats run past Yorktown at the end of the month, but can do nothing.

October '62 (month 7): McClernand on the Gloucester Peninsula marches his troops to meet the gunboats, whence they are carried to Eltham's Landing and occupy it. Grant moves the rest of his army to join him. After a week or so they cut across the Peninsula and seal Magruder's rearguard of ca. the historical 5th April garrison in. They advance down to Yorktown and besiege the fort proper, but assaults fail.

November-December (months 8-9): Grant gets heavily reinforced, and in early December Magruder is compelled to surrender Yorktown with 10,000 troops.

 

[trice]

The operations before Petersburg weren't really a siege. One can argue that Lee's 50,000 troops neutralised Grant's 100,000 (all that was left of ca. 250,000 troops because of how reduced that force became after the bloodletting of the Overland Campaign and the detachment to the Valley)

You have argued it, very often. It just is not an accurate picture of the real-life situation in 1864.

Lee in July 1862 was as pinned to Richmond as he was to Petersburg in July 1864. In fact, McClellan pinned more troops than Grant, by a large margin.

Only by insisting that your own vision and conclusion is the only possible analysis of the situation. Lee would not agree with you, for example: he did not feel pinned to Richmond by McClellan in July of 1862 -- he was actively exploring the opportunity to turn and attack Pope while McClellan was sitting on the James at Harrison's Landing.

You should note that Grant abstained from making any serious effort against Petersburg or Richmond for almost a year.

This is just wrong.

Grant was in command of the entire US Army war effort against the Confederacy (as was McClellan up until March 11, 1862 -- when the President decided that McClellan would be unable to handle that duty when he took the field). Lincoln had more faith in Grant's proven ability and track record in 1864, so he left Grant in command of the Army in 1864 when the campaign started.

Grant's 1864 Campaign included Meade, Banks, Sherman, Burnside, Sigel, Butler, Rosecrans and a host of others from the Gulf of Mexico to the Atlantic coast, from Virginia to Tennessee and Georgia, to Louisiana, Texas and Missouri. Apparently, the government thought Grant had the bandwidth to handle all this (and Grant actually proved he could handle it) in 1864. In 1862, they did not think McClellan could handle such a task.


You are endeavoring here to look at only a tiny part of real history in an effort to distort real history. You want to compare a sliver of what Grant did to everything McClellan did in a narrow window of your own creation. Somehow you think this is realistic when it is not. Somehow you think it makes McClellan look good when it actually makes McClellan look bad. To top it off, you blatantly distort even the real events that happened in the tiny sliver of Grant you want to deal with just to try to make McClellan look better.

Example: Assuming that what you mean by "Grant abstained from making any serious effort against Petersburg or Richmond for almost a year" is the period after Grant/Meade halted their attacks at Petersburg on June 18, 1864, here are some things you are trying to blot out as not "making any serious effort against Petersburg or Richmond". This just for the fighting around Richmond and Petersburg in the first four months of that "almost a year".

• Jerusalem Plank Road (June 21–23) - 2,962 Union casualties
• Wilson–Kautz Raid (June 22 – July 1) - 1,445 Union casualties
• First Battle of Deep Bottom (July 27–29) - 488 Union casualties
• The Crater (July 30) - 3,798 Union casualties
• Second Deep Bottom (August 14–20) - 2900 Union casualties (approximate)
• Globe Tavern (August 18–21) - 4,296 Union casualties
• Second Reams Station (August 25) - 2,046 Union casualties
• New Market Heights (September 29–30) - 3,372 Union casualties
• Peebles Farm (September 30 – October 2) - 2,889 Union casualties
• Darbytown and New Market Roads (October 7) - 458 Union casualties
• Darbytown Road (October 13) - 437 Union casualties
• Fair Oaks and Darbytown Road (October 27–28) - 1,603 Union casualties
• Boydton Plank Road (October 27–28) - 1,758 Union casualties

Those actions, by themselves, total 28,452 Union casualties. For comparison, the Battle of Gettysburg comes in at 23,049 Union casualties.

Example: While those actions are going on around Richmond-Petersburg, Lee and Grant are fighting other actions. Lee has detached Early to the Shenandoah where he has defeated Hunter (part of Grant's command). Hunter has been defeated and retreated West, Early has advanced up the Shenandoah into Maryland where Early beat Lew Wallace in the Battle of Monocacy (1,294 Union casualties), advancing to the outskirts of Washington (Battle of Fort Stevens, 373 Union casualties) before being stopped by VI Corps (the reinforcements Grant sent). Grant also sends Sheridan with his cavalry, then puts Sheridan in command, and by October the threat of Early has been eliminated at battles like Third Winchester (September 19), Fisher's Hill (September 21-22), Tom's Brook (October 9) and Cedar Creek (October 19).

Your whole goal here is simple. You want McClellan to be hailed as a genius, so you turn and twist to try to cast innuendo at Grant. Please stop this. Be more realistic and stop trying to hide real history with your posts.

 

[Belfoured]

A predictable response, that's basically bluster.

I like how you manage to gloss over that whole Yorktown thing. Pray tell, how many miles through the Petersburg fortifications did Grant advance in July '64? August? September? October? etc.

I am remind that I ask people how they'd compare Grant's Vicksburg Operations vs McClellan's at Yorktown, because a blow by blow would be:


April '62 (month 1): Sherman advances from Fort Monroe and never gets near the Yorktown-Warwick line. He is decisively repelled at Big Bethel and retreats. Grant lands on the Rappahannock, but is forced to retreat back to Washington when his base is raided by Stuart's cavalry.

May '62 (month 2): McClernand basically does what Burnside historically did at Roanoke Island etc., with the aim of cutting through from Suffolk to the south. After success this is nixed and Grant assembles his whole force at Fort Monroe.

June-August '62 (months 3-5): Grant moves his army onto the Gloucester Peninsula and investigates a series of canals to allow the gunboats to get above Yorktown.

September '62 (month 6): The gunboats run past Yorktown at the end of the month, but can do nothing.

October '62 (month 7): McClernand on the Gloucester Peninsula marches his troops to meet the gunboats, whence they are carried to Eltham's Landing and occupy it. Grant moves the rest of his army to join him. After a week or so they cut across the Peninsula and seal Magruder's rearguard of ca. the historical 5th April garrison in. They advance down to Yorktown and besiege the fort proper, but assaults fail.

November-December (months 8-9): Grant gets heavily reinforced, and in early December Magruder is compelled to surrender Yorktown with 10,000 troops.

"A predictable response, that's basically bluster."

A stellar case of projection ....

 

[Belfoured]

You have argued it, very often. It just is not an accurate picture of the real-life situation in 1864.


Only by insisting that your own vision and conclusion is the only possible analysis of the situation. Lee would not agree with you, for example: he did not feel pinned to Richmond by McClellan in July of 1862 -- he was actively exploring the opportunity to turn and attack Pope while McClellan was sitting on the James at Harrison's Landing.


This is just wrong.

Grant was in command of the entire US Army war effort against the Confederacy (as was McClellan up until March 11, 1862 -- when the President decided that McClellan would be unable to handle that duty when he took the field. Lincoln had more faith in Grant's proven ability and track record in 1864, so he left Grant in command of the Army in 1864 when the campaign started.

Grant's 1864 Campaign included Meade, Banks, Sherman, Burnside, Sigel, Butler, Rosecrans and a host of others from the Gulf of Mexico to the Atlantic coast, from Virginia to Tennessee and Georgia, to Louisiana, Texas and Missouri. Apparently, the government thought Grant had the bandwidth to handle all this (and Grant actually proved he could handle it) in 1864. In 1862, they did not think McClellan could handle such a task.


You are endeavoring here to look at only a tiny part of real history in an effort to distort real history. You want to compare a sliver of what Grant did to everything McClellan did in a narrow window of your own creation. Somehow you think this is realistic when it is not. Somehow you think it makes McClellan look good when it actually makes McClellan look bad. To top it off, you blatantly distort even the real events that happened in the tiny sliver of Grant you want to deal with just to try to make McClellan look better.

Example: Assuming that what you mean by "Grant abstained from making any serious effort against Petersburg or Richmond for almost a year" is the period after Grant/Meade halted their attacks at Petersburg on June 18, 1864, here are some things you are trying to blot out as not "making any serious effort against Petersburg or Richmond". This just for the fighting around Richmond and Petersburg in the first four months of that "almost a year".

• Jerusalem Plank Road (June 21–23) - 2,962 Union casualties
• Wilson–Kautz Raid (June 22 – July 1) - 1,445 Union casualties
• First Battle of Deep Bottom (July 27–29) - 488 Union casualties
• The Crater (July 30) - 3,798 Union casualties
• Second Deep Bottom (August 14–20) - 2900 Union casualties (approximate)
• Globe Tavern (August 18–21) - 4,296 Union casualties
• Second Reams Station (August 25) - 2,046 Union casualties
• New Market Heights (September 29–30) - 3,372 Union casualties
• Peebles Farm (September 30 – October 2) - 2,889 Union casualties
• Darbytown and New Market Roads (October 7) - 458 Union casualties
• Darbytown Road (October 13) - 437 Union casualties
• Fair Oaks and Darbytown Road (October 27–28) - 1,603 Union casualties
• Boydton Plank Road (October 27–28) - 1,758 Union casualties

Those actions, by themselves, total 28,452 Union casualties. For comparison, the Battle of Gettysburg comes in at 23,049 Union casualties.

Example: While those actions are going on around Richmond-Petersburg, Lee and Grant are fighting other actions. Lee has detached Early to the Shenandoah where he has defeated Hunter (part of Grant's command). Hunter has been defeated and retreated West, Early has advanced up the Shenandoah into Maryland where Early beat Lew Wallace in the Battle of Monocacy (1,294 Union casualties), advancing to the outskirts of Washington (Battle of Fort Stevens, 373 Union casualties) before being stopped by VI Corps (the reinforcements Grant sent). Grant also sends Sheridan with his cavalry, then puts Sheridan in command, and by October the threat of Early has been eliminated at battles like Third Winchester (September 19), Fisher's Hill (September 21-22), Tom's Brook (October 9) and Cedar Creek (October 19).

Your whole goal here is simple. You want McClellan to be hailed as a genius, so you turn and twist to try to cast innuendo at Grant. Please stop this. Be more realistic and stop trying to hide real history with your posts.

Here's a great example of the persistent fogging of facts and complicating the simple - the "blow by blow" "analogy" of the Vicksburg Campaign and the Peninsula Campaign. What happened at the end of each? Grant took Vicksburg. McClellan retreated 25 miles from the objective and holed up. I don't recall him attending a surrender ceremony in Richmond. It's disconcerting that the poster apparently can't assimilate the difference while he continues to cite and link his own conclusions.

 

[LetUsHavePeace]

My interest in Grant and McClellan is in their politics and how each man handled his political choices. In 1864 McClellan and the Democrats may have had a chance to win the Electoral College contest if Fremont had stayed in the race and McClellan had been the Peace candidate. By going against the Democratic Party's platform and declaring himself to be in favor of continuing the war, McClellan gave the electorate no choice. All 3 candidates - Lincoln, Fremont and McClellan - were in favor of the same policy of continuing the war. The platform presented by Clement Vallandigham and Fernando Wood would most certainly have carried New York (even as a war candidate McClellan lost by less than 7 thousand votes) and probably carried Connecticut, Maryland, New Hampshire and Pennsylvania. Instead, Lincoln and Johnson won what their supporters could claim as a resounding victory.

 

[67th Tigers]

Here's a great example of the persistent fogging of facts and complicating the simple - the "blow by blow" "analogy" of the Vicksburg Campaign and the Peninsula Campaign. What happened at the end of each?

What happened in each when the supply base was hit and neither general could feed their army? They moved the army to somewhere it could be fed. If the standards used to measure McClellan were applied to Grant, he should have been recalled in February.

That's the rub; if McClellan was given the same latitude as Grant then there's every reason to believe he would have outperformed Grant.

Your entire line of argument above is that McClellan was critical in the interference in his military operations by politicians to the point of near sabotage. By bringing Grant into this, who was less successful than McClellan within a given timeframe, but allowed the latitude to keep trying, you've largely made McClellan's own point for him.

Of course, you try and construct a strawman of McClellan's own argument, but that's par for the course.

 

[67th Tigers]

My interest in Grant and McClellan is in their politics and how each man handled his political choices.

McClellan being a peace candidate was never in his nature. McClellan never sought office, and would not bend his moral compass to achieve it. Hence he repudiated the peace plank almost reflexively. He was a fairly straightforward soldier. Indeed, of the three challengers to Lincoln (Grant, Fremont and McClellan) he was probably the least political.

 

[JerryD]

What happened in each when the supply base was hit and neither general could feed their army? They moved the army to somewhere it could be fed. If the standards used to measure McClellan were applied to Grant, he should have been recalled in February.

That's the rub; if McClellan was given the same latitude as Grant then there's every reason to believe he would have outperformed Grant.

Your entire line of argument above is that McClellan was critical in the interference in his military operations by politicians to the point of near sabotage. By bringing Grant into this, who was less successful than McClellan within a given timeframe, but allowed the latitude to keep trying, you've largely made McClellan's own point for him.

Of course, you try and construct a strawman of McClellan's own argument, but that's par for the course.

Well, its clear you have a vested interest in defending Little Mac that requires you to ignore a lot of reality. The comparison between Yorktown and Vicksburg is simply ludicrous for a variety of reasons, first and foremost being geography. Vicksburg was sited such that all observers viewed it as a tough nut to crack. You also ignore the sizes of the respective forces. Grant when he first landed on the eastern shore in Mississippi was actually outnumbered in his theater of operations, but by quick and decisive movements he was able to fight several significant battles, capture a state capital, and put Vicksburg under a death grip from which there was no escape. Mac had overwhelming numbers, moved exceedingly slowly, has much simpler geographic conditions that were pretty straightforward, and ultimately allowed the CSA forces to escape. Their is simply no comparision. You also forget that Grant had already established a record as fighter by taking Henry and Donaldson and fighting at Shiloh, while Mac had spent this time basically thumbing his nose at Lincoln while building what Lincoln called Mac's bodyguard. So there is actually no reason why Mac should have been given the same latitude as Grant, since he had not done anything yet other than spending months and months drilling troops and holding grand reviews.

I am actually sympathetic to arguments in Mac's favor about the effect of withholding McDowell's corps from him, but the arguments you are advancing just dont stand up to rational analysis.

I'd like to know why you have such a vested interest in defending Little Mac. I always marvel at the people on this forum who adopt a favorite officer (be it McClellan, Lee, Grant, Longstreet, Forrest, or any others) and become their advocate, and thus lose all credibiity when discussing their pets. Are you related? Or just feel he has gotten a bum rep for political or other reasons, ala Longstreet? I used to work with a lawyer who was a direct descendant of Burnside, but he was actually rather critical of Ambrose.

 

[LetUsHavePeace]

McClellan being a peace candidate was never in his nature. McClellan never sought office, and would not bend his moral compass to achieve it. Hence he repudiated the peace plank almost reflexively. He was a fairly straightforward soldier. Indeed, of the three challengers to Lincoln (Grant, Fremont and McClellan) he was probably the least political.

I agree about McClellan being "the least political". What I find puzzling is why? He and Fremont were a nearly perfect match in terms of ambition; both men thought they should be President. Lincoln and Grant seem haphazard by comparison; other than Julia's reported belief that her husband would be a great man, there is little evidence that either man burned with a desire to achieve the highest office and the great honor that the republic could bestow.
Neither Fremont nor McClellan "failed" for lack of trying; what I find fascinating is how Lincoln and Grant - both, by their records, mediocre achievers at lawyers and soldiers and businessmen - so palpably succeeded.

 

[JerryD]

I agree about McClellan being "the least political". What I find puzzling is why? He and Fremont were a nearly perfect match in terms of ambition; both men thought they should be President. Lincoln and Grant seem haphazard by comparison; other than Julia's reported belief that her husband would be a great man, there is little evidence that either man burned with a desire to achieve the highest office and the great honor that the republic could bestow.
Neither Fremont nor McClellan "failed" for lack of trying; what I find fascinating is how Lincoln and Grant - both, by their records, mediocre achievers at lawyers and soldiers and businessmen - so palpably succeeded.

Getting off topic here, but I would not underrate Lincoln's ambition.

 

[Belfoured]

Well, its clear you have a vested interest in defending Little Mac that requires you to ignore a lot of reality. The comparison between Yorktown and Vicksburg is simply ludicrous for a variety of reasons, first and foremost being geography. Vicksburg was sited such that all observers viewed it as a tough nut to crack. You also ignore the sizes of the respective forces. Grant when he first landed on the eastern shore in Mississippi was actually outnumbered in his theater of operations, but by quick and decisive movements he was able to fight several significant battles, capture a state capital, and put Vicksburg under a death grip from which there was no escape. Mac had overwhelming numbers, moved exceedingly slowly, has much simpler geographic conditions that were pretty straightforward, and ultimately allowed the CSA forces to escape. Their is simply no comparision. You also forget that Grant had already established a record as fighter by taking Henry and Donaldson and fighting at Shiloh, while Mac had spent this time basically thumbing his nose at Lincoln while building what Lincoln called Mac's bodyguard. So there is actually no reason why Mac should have been given the same latitude as Grant, since he had not done anything yet other than spending months and months drilling troops and holding grand reviews.

I am actually sympathetic to arguments in Mac's favor about the effect of withholding McDowell's corps from him, but the arguments you are advancing just dont stand up to rational analysis.

I'd like to know why you have such a vested interest in defending Little Mac. I always marvel at the people on this forum who adopt a favorite officer (be it McClellan, Lee, Grant, Longstreet, Forrest, or any others) and become their advocate, and thus lose all credibiity when discussing their pets. Are you related? Or just feel he has gotten a bum rep for political or other reasons, ala Longstreet? I used to work with a lawyer who was a direct descendant of Burnside, but he was actually rather critical of Ambrose.

Because of the long-accepted views about McClellan, he seems in particular to attract theorists who have a need to "revise" all of the history in full and show that they are actually more knowledgeable. Some of the revisionism about McClellan by qualified historians such as Harsh and Rafuse is worthwhile and persuasive. But they are careful to work within the record and don't venture into the realm of counter-hero worship by distorting the record, presenting speculation as fact, and chucking common sense. The proof in any of these cases is the ability of the person proposing the theory to list the subject's mistakes/failings. When you get "crickets" you know what you're dealing with. The analogy would be somebody who is a proponent of Grant and who rejects any notion that he was surprised by Johnston's attack on the morning of April 6.

 

[Belfoured]

McClellan being a peace candidate was never in his nature. McClellan never sought office, and would not bend his moral compass to achieve it. Hence he repudiated the peace plank almost reflexively. He was a fairly straightforward soldier. Indeed, of the three challengers to Lincoln (Grant, Fremont and McClellan) he was probably the least political.

When did Grant "seek office" during the war? And McClellan set the stage for the Presidential run in 1864 by announcing his membership in the Democratic Party in Fall 1863 despite still being on active duty. Saint George the Valiant of Philadelphia.

 

[trice]

McClellan being a peace candidate was never in his nature. McClellan never sought office, and would not bend his moral compass to achieve it. Hence he repudiated the peace plank almost reflexively. He was a fairly straightforward soldier. Indeed, of the three challengers to Lincoln (Grant, Fremont and McClellan) he was probably the least political.

This is vastly overdone.

When McClellan was relieved by Lincoln in 1862, you might expect he would go home to the Philadelphia area (where he grew up; he had a place in Trenton NJ at the time) or out to Chicago (where he had lived in 1857-61 while in the RR industry). He did not.

He moved to New York City, to the Fifth Avenue Hotel, and then his friends in the Democratic Party bought and gave him a $20,000 four-story mansion on West Thirty-First Street just off Fifth Avenue (the most fashionable and expensive neighborhood in the city). McClellan lived there in that gift-house for two years (after which he bought and moved into a very nice estate called Maywood out in West Orange, New Jersey -- roughly where Seton Hall University is today).

Here are some of the people he was associating with in New York in 1862-1863-1864:

• Samuel L. M. Barlow (long-time friend, Wall Street Lawyer, NY Democratic Party power)
• Horatio Seymour (Democratic Governor of NY)
• August Belmont (chairman of the Democratic National Committee, financier)
• John Van Buren (son of the former President, chairman of the NY Democratic Party)
• Dean Richardson (Democratic Party strategist)
• William Aspinwall (rich and influential Democratic power)
• John Jacob Astor (rich and influential Democratic power)
• William B. Duncan (rich and influential Democratic power)
• Manton Marble (editor of the anti-Lincoln Democratic New York World paper)
• William C. Prime (editor of the anti-Lincoln Democratic Journal of Commerce)

McClellan's father sneered at politicians, and the son adopted that attitude for a start. McClellan's trip to observe the Crimean War seems to have driven him further into despising politicians -- and this attitude was a large part of his undoing in 1861-62. But when he thought he could use the politicians to further his own desires, McClellan was more than willing to belly up to the bar with them and take what he could get. In 1863-64, McClellan is simply playing a game, saying publicly that he has no desire to be President while clearly working behind the scenes to see if he can make a run. Please stop trying to make a saint out of this man to such an unreasonable level.

 

[Belfoured]

This is vastly overdone.

When McClellan was relieved by Lincoln in 1862, you might expect he would go home to the Philadelphia area (where he grew up; he had a place in Trenton NJ at the time) or out to Chicago (where he had lived in 1857-61 while in the RR industry). He did not.

He moved to New York City, to the Fifth Avenue Hotel, and then his friends in the Democratic Party bought and gave him a $20,000 four-story mansion on West Thirty-First Street just off Fifth Avenue (the most fashionable and expensive neighborhood in the city). McClellan lived there in that gift-house for two years (after which he bought and moved into a very nice estate called Maywood out in West Orange, New Jersey -- roughly where Seton Hall University is today).

Here are some of the people he was associating with in New York in 1862-1863-1864:

• Samuel L. M. Barlow (long-time friend, Wall Street Lawyer, NY Democratic Party power)
• Horatio Seymour (Democratic Governor of NY)
• August Belmont (chairman of the Democratic National Committee, financier)
• John Van Buren (son of the former President, chairman of the NY Democratic Party)
• Dean Richardson (Democratic Party strategist)
• William Aspinwall (rich and influential Democratic power)
• John Jacob Astor (rich and influential Democratic power)
• William B. Duncan (rich and influential Democratic power)
• Manton Marble (editor of the anti-Lincoln Democratic New York World paper)
• William C. Prime (editor of the anti-Lincoln Democratic Journal of Commerce)

McClellan's father sneered at politicians, and the son adopted that attitude for a start. McClellan's trip to observe the Crimean War seems to have driven him further into despising politicians -- and this attitude was a large part of his undoing in 1861-62. But when he thought he could use the politicians to further his own desires, McClellan was more than willing to belly up to the bar with them and take what he could get. In 1863-64, McClellan is simply playing a game, saying publicly that he has no desire to be President while clearly working behind the scenes to see if he can make a run. Please stop trying to make a saint out of this man to such an unreasonable level.

If you read McClellan's correspondence with the likes of Morgan, Niven, Fitch, et al., one can see similarities to MacArthur c. 1944. McClellan was well aware of interest among the War Democrats - especially in NY - in nominating him during 1864 and did nothing to dissuade them. Much followed from his open letter supporting Woodward for Governor of Pennsylvania in October 1863. MacArthur, of course, well knew that Vandenburg and others were prepared to draft him as the GOP candidate in 1944 but backed off when it threatened to become public while he was in active command in the SW Pacific.

 

[trice]

This is vastly overdone.

When McClellan was relieved by Lincoln in 1862, you might expect he would go home to the Philadelphia area (where he grew up; he had a place in Trenton NJ at the time) or out to Chicago (where he had lived in 1857-61 while in the RR industry). He did not.

He moved to New York City, to the Fifth Avenue Hotel, and then his friends in the Democratic Party bought and gave him a $20,000 four-story mansion on West Thirty-First Street just off Fifth Avenue (the most fashionable and expensive neighborhood in the city). McClellan lived there in that gift-house for two years (after which he bought and moved into a very nice estate called Maywood out in West Orange, New Jersey -- roughly where Seton Hall University is today).

Here are some of the people he was associating with in New York in 1862-1863-1864:

• Samuel L. M. Barlow (long-time friend, Wall Street Lawyer, NY Democratic Party power)
• Horatio Seymour (Democratic Governor of NY)
• August Belmont (chairman of the Democratic National Committee, financier)
• John Van Buren (son of the former President, chairman of the NY Democratic Party)
• Dean Richardson (Democratic Party strategist)
• William Aspinwall (rich and influential Democratic power)
• John Jacob Astor (rich and influential Democratic power)
• William B. Duncan (rich and influential Democratic power)
• Manton Marble (editor of the anti-Lincoln Democratic New York World paper)
• William C. Prime (editor of the anti-Lincoln Democratic Journal of Commerce)

McClellan's father sneered at politicians, and the son adopted that attitude for a start. McClellan's trip to observe the Crimean War seems to have driven him further into despising politicians -- and this attitude was a large part of his undoing in 1861-62. But when he thought he could use the politicians to further his own desires, McClellan was more than willing to belly up to the bar with them and take what he could get. In 1863-64, McClellan is simply playing a game, saying publicly that he has no desire to be President while clearly working behind the scenes to see if he can make a run. Please stop trying to make a saint out of this man to such an unreasonable level.

In case anyone is wondering about a source for the gift of the house on Thirty-First Street to McClellan:

 

[Belfoured]

In case anyone is wondering about a source for the gift of the house on Thirty-First Street to McClellan:
View attachment 427268

I note that in your other post you mentioned New York World editor Manton Marble (the same guy who was engaged in sedition-like correspondence with McClellan's friend Fitz John Porter in Summer/Fall 1862 and who played a role in fomenting the July 1863 draft riot). In addition to McClellan's direct correspondence with those who were promoting his "draft" as the War Democrat nominee during 1864, Marble was actively working that angle on his end. The implication that the Angel of Democracy emerged in McClellan's drawing room and shocked him with the news that he had been summoned is complete fiction.

 

[Belfoured]

Getting off topic here, but I would not underrate Lincoln's ambition.

It is off topic, but I don't think anybody who is being objective would disagree. Few leaders lack ambition and it actually may be a requirement - in good and appropriate measure, of course.