McClellan's autobiography

[jackt62]

I think McClellan would have done better in the Civil War if he had started out with a steady path of hard work and a more junior position. It might be impossible to picture him starting out below a rank of Brigadier, but I think he needed to work his way up the ladder to improve: a brigade first, then a division, a corps spot before an Army command and most of those before he became the commanding general. He still would have had his natural ability, but he might have learned a little humility and developed a better feel for co-operating with others if he had.

Agreed. Grant, Sherman, and Lee (to name the most notable), had to undergo a learning curve before they developed the skill sets that they are now well known for. By contrast, McClellan was quickly thrust into major command without the benefit of suffering setbacks of one sort or another as Grant had at Belmont, Sherman in Kentucky, and Lee in western Virginia. McClellan's lack of lower level experience and his oversize ego did not make for a winning formula. Perhaps a bit more humility, and more humbling at a less senior position would have been better for McClellan in the long run.

 

[Cavalier]

@Nathan Stuart Its not an original thought, maybe I got it from Catton, but he seems to have lacked the "killer instinct". I have pretty much agreed with that but I want to be convinced that history and I have misjudged him.

I have thought that one could see the hand of Napoleon in many of the things Lee did. I was never able to see much of that in McClellen. Maybe at heart, he was something other than a soldier?

John

 

[Nathan Stuart]

I am not certain, but McClellan might have had an unusual focus on Napoleon and his exploits (different to having a 'Napoleon Complex').

I recall that the press gave him the nicknames/labels of 'Little Mac' and 'Young Napoleon'.

 

[67th Tigers]

Here is a great example of McClellan's issues.

Winfield Scott was in his mid-70s when the war broke out. He should have long-since retired. He had only five years left to live, was too fat to ride a horse, and was infamous for his vanity. He was an impediment to the Union war effort.

And yet Scott's Anaconda Plan, despite mockery from the press, was a good strategic outline of how to fight the war.

McClellan is simultaneously mostly correct, but also too dismissive - all while being a jerk about it.

Ironic that McClellan would criticize another general as "incompetent or a traitor" since that same criticism would be levied against Mac.



And yet those candid private remarks more accurately reflect your opinions and the "real you" than self-censored, carefully-considered public remarks you make on CWT or to your boss.

We don't know whether the Anaconda Plan would have worked, because it was never tried. There is a fundamental misunderstanding of the Anaconda Plan, because a key aspect of it was no military invasion of the southern states. This was unacceptable to Lincoln and to Chase, and hence they turned initially to McDowell and Franklin to work round Scott, and then to McClellan.

In the aftermath of Bull Run, Scott had a complete mental collapse. He ceased functioning as the army commander and retreated into fighting McClellan's attempts to build an army with the obvious objective of invading Scott's beloved Virginia. There was no effective General-in-Chief.

The secretary-of-war also took the Military Administration Act of 1836 and general tradition very seriously. He was not in the line of command and by regulations, in wartime, could not be.

There is an argument to be made, and I'd largely agree with it, that McClellan was acting well beyond his nominal rank in the period August-October 1861. However, he was doing this at the behest of President Lincoln. Lincoln bypassed Scott and Cameron and in ca. 1st August, asked McClellan to submit a strategic plan for the war. This he did on the 2nd, it being his "Strategy of Overwhelming," and that started the rift between Scott and McClellan.

McClellan expected the rebels to do the most sensible thing militarily, and concentrate a large army in front of Washington to attack it. This was well within the Confederacy's capabilities. That they didn't was because Jeff Davis was contending with "states rights" and couldn't get the states to release their forces to strike a blow against Washington. McClellan didn't, and couldn't, know this, and nor did many others.

The Scott-McClellan relationship deteriorated massively as Scott continued to frustrate McClellan's overly aggressive tendencies (as Scott saw it). McClellan became increasingly frustrated with Scott trying to block any action, and after three months resolved to have him removed, which he did. You might want to suggest this was insubordinate, but it was certainly for the good of the country.

We can have a certain sympathy for Scott, who had been ousted from role of General-in-Chief twice before, and spent the four years before the Civil War with no command assigned to his house in New York, i.e. exactly what would happen to McClellan in November '62. Scott was always highly strung and egotistical, and this certainly made him worse.


* Probably wrongly. The regulation predated the creation of the office of General-in-Chief, and clearly originally meant an army or department commander could form divisions and corps on their own authority. The corps aspect was removed completely in 1857, leaving no-one but the President legally able to form a Corps de Armee.

 

[67th Tigers]

I had planned on reading Sears bio on him, then his memoirs. Sears has a very low opinion of him and provides lots of examples why. For example, he seemed to have only a passing relationship with the truth.

It's good that you know Sears has only a passing relationship with the truth.

His numbers of enemy combatants was constantly in flux and many times seemed to be pulled out off his....bottom.

They were the best estimates available, calculated from the best intelligence available. They were generally extremely accurate when the spy network was working well, but unfortunately inputs from outside of McClellan's sphere (i.e. the west and the Shenandoah) were far less accurate.

He also was very disingenuous in terms of how he discussed his own troop levels, in terms of not counting anyone who didnt shoulder a musket, while not applying the same methodology to CSA forces.

It is not clear he did this, and anyway, the rebels did have essentially all their troops manning weapons, because the supply and support functions were passed onto slaves who did not appear on most returns.

This is why Lincoln commented that sending troops to him was like trying to shovel flies across a barn yard....not many seem to make it.

Perhaps, but the same was true of Grant, Meade etc.

Lincoln was obsessed with the difference between the number on the rolls and the number of actual effectives. He had this odd notion that straggling and desertion was because the generals didn't keep throwing the troops into brave frontal assaults against rebel entrenchments. He finally got a general that did what he wanted in the form of Grant, and it was a disaster.

 

[JerryD]

It's good that you know Sears has only a passing relationship with the truth.



They were the best estimates available, calculated from the best intelligence available. They were generally extremely accurate when the spy network was working well, but unfortunately inputs from outside of McClellan's sphere (i.e. the west and the Shenandoah) were far less accurate.



It is not clear he did this, and anyway, the rebels did have essentially all their troops manning weapons, because the supply and support functions were passed onto slaves who did not appear on most returns.



Perhaps, but the same was true of Grant, Meade etc.

Lincoln was obsessed with the difference between the number on the rolls and the number of actual effectives. He had this odd notion that straggling and desertion was because the generals didn't keep throwing the troops into brave frontal assaults against rebel entrenchments. He finally got a general that did what he wanted in the form of Grant, and it was a disaster.

LOL,,,nice try, but it was McClellan who had the passing relationship with the truth. On the troop estimates, Sears show that even on the same day his estimates would widely vary, and on at least a few occasions Sears demonstrated that McClellan had no intelligence other McClellan's own imagination.

He also had a habit of claiming the slightest accomplishment was the grandest achievement in the history of mankind. A slight exaggeration there, but not by much.

 

[Belfoured]

LOL,,,nice try, but it was McClellan who had the passing relationship with the truth. On the troop estimates, Sears show that even on the same day his estimates would widely vary, and on at least a few occasions Sears demonstrated that McClellan had no intelligence other McClellan's own imagination.

He also had a habit of claiming the slightest accomplishment was the grandest achievement in the history of mankind. A slight exaggeration there, but not by much.

In fact, the post stating that Sears has a "passing relationship with the truth" is ironic for any number of reasons. The interesting aspect of McClellan's consistently inflated numbers for his opponents is whether he actually believed that fiction or, as the late Joseph Harsh speculated may have been the case, he deliberately inflated them to the administration.

 

[Belfoured]

It's good that you know Sears has only a passing relationship with the truth.



They were the best estimates available, calculated from the best intelligence available. They were generally extremely accurate when the spy network was working well, but unfortunately inputs from outside of McClellan's sphere (i.e. the west and the Shenandoah) were far less accurate.



It is not clear he did this, and anyway, the rebels did have essentially all their troops manning weapons, because the supply and support functions were passed onto slaves who did not appear on most returns.



Perhaps, but the same was true of Grant, Meade etc.

Lincoln was obsessed with the difference between the number on the rolls and the number of actual effectives. He had this odd notion that straggling and desertion was because the generals didn't keep throwing the troops into brave frontal assaults against rebel entrenchments. He finally got a general that did what he wanted in the form of Grant, and it was a disaster.

"He finally got a general that did what he wanted in the form of Grant, and it was a disaster."

It's really too bad that didn't work out for the Union. I have little doubt that in hindsight Lincoln wished he could have November 5, 1862 back.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

We don't know whether the Anaconda Plan would have worked, because it was never tried. There is a fundamental misunderstanding of the Anaconda Plan, because a key aspect of it was no military invasion of the southern states. This was unacceptable to Lincoln and to Chase, and hence they turned initially to McDowell and Franklin

I said it was a "good strategic outline." Emphasis on outline. The basic idea of blockading the Confederacy and reopening the Mississippi River being a primary objective of operations are ideas dismissed by many early in the war in favor of swift, aggressive action ("On to Richmond!") that proved impractical.

 

[trice]

@Nathan Stuart I had thought that the praise heaped on him early in the War might have gone to his head.

So many of these guys, even the professionals like McClellen, had so little experience actually commanding troops in battle it surprises me that they did as well as they did. As a comparison, I believe that many of the French Generals under Napoleon spent their entire adult lives making war.

If I am not mistaken there is, or was, a school of thought among some historians that he really did believe the bloated figures he gave as to the strength of the Confederate forces opposing him. I can't say that I admire his abilities as a general though, at least not yet. I think the remarks by @trice on post #36 were very insightful.

John

On Napoleon's generals: both yes and no. Marshal Davout (probably the best of the Marshals and maybe the only one Napoleon might be as good as he was) was from a family of soldiers, going back generations (an old French Army saying was "straight as a sword is a Davout"). OTOH, Marshal Murat -- often thought of as the ideal cavalry commander -- was studying to be a priest when the French Revolution started. Marshal Soult intended to become a lawyer, but joined the Army at 16 to help his mother out financially in 1785 (he was a sergeant when the Revolution started. Marshal Massena had been a cabin bot, a merchant, enlisted in the French Army as a private and was a warrant officer in 1789 when the Revolution started (he was also probably/possibly a smuggler).

But men like these, with varied backgrounds, started serving as commanders in the French Army in the 1790s and many were still there fighting in 1814-15 when Napoleon came to the end. Along the way they saw just about anything an enemy might throw at them and found the grit and sand needed to take a hit and keep on going. If he'd had another five or ten years of working his way through wars and warfare, I think McClellan might have been a better/more complete/better commander who could work with others better.

Command in combat is a specialized area, though. In the narrowing pyramid at the top, many otherwise skillful and talented men fall by the wayside. McClellan might have come through with flying colors or gone down in flames.

 

[67th Tigers]

"He finally got a general that did what he wanted in the form of Grant, and it was a disaster."

It's really too bad that didn't work out for the Union. I have little doubt that in hindsight Lincoln wished he could have November 5, 1862 back.

It's too bad Lincoln didn't give McClellan essentially a year to siege Lee out, like he did in 1864-5.

 

[DanSBHawk]

It's too bad Lincoln didn't give McClellan essentially a year to siege Lee out, like he did in 1864-5.

Maybe he would have if McClellan had applied and maintained some actual pressure against the confederates.

 

[trice]

@Nathan Stuart Its not an original thought, maybe I got it from Catton, but he seems to have lacked the "killer instinct". I have pretty much agreed with that but I want to be convinced that history and I have misjudged him.

I have thought that one could see the hand of Napoleon in many of the things Lee did. I was never able to see much of that in McClellen. Maybe at heart, he was something other than a soldier?

John

When I try to imagine a model for McClellan, I do not see Napoleon I (McClellan might have seen that; in the Nineteenth Century, being the next Napoleon was a lot like being "the next Mickey Mantle" was in the late 1960s and 1970s.)

The comparison that comes up in my mind for McClellan is actually the Austrian field marshal Count Leopold Joseph von Daun (1705-1766). He commanded against Frederick the Great of Prussia at the battles of Koln, 2nd in command at Leuthen, and commanded against Frederick again at Torgau. Von Daun had a number of personal issues that seem similar to some of McClellan's. Von Daun was very talented. Frederick the Great was better.

 

[Cavalier]

@trice I hadn't thought about comparing him to any Austrian Generals but it does make sense now that you mention it.

I'm more familiar with the Napoleonic era Austrians. And most of them were nothing to write home about, in my opinion anyway. Defeating the Great Frederick even once would be something of an accomplishment I would think. Its been a very long time since I've done any reading on the Seven Years War and I regret now getting rid of the Duffy books I did have once. However there is always the inter library loan so I will look more into von Daun.

I would think comparing McClellan to Arch duke Charles would be a compliment to Little Mac. Just an opinion of course.

Thanks, John

 

[JerryD]

It's too bad Lincoln didn't give McClellan essentially a year to siege Lee out, like he did in 1864-5.

This assumes McClellan was capable of putting Lee into a siege in the first place, of which there is no evidence. Not to mention Grant had a long record of accomplishments, of which McClellan had nearly none.

 

[trice]

@trice I hadn't thought about comparing him to any Austrian Generals but it does make sense now that you mention it.

I'm more familiar with the Napoleonic era Austrians. And most of them were nothing to write home about, in my opinion anyway. Defeating the Great Frederick even once would be something of an accomplishment I would think. Its been a very long time since I've done any reading on the Seven Years War and I regret now getting rid of the Duffy books I did have once. However there is always the inter library loan so I will look more into von Daun.

The Austrians of that day seem to have based their operations on a preponderance of artillery used from strong defensive positions (which they were very good at finding and and organizing in depth). The Prussians always had a smaller army and less artillery -- used for rapid maneuver and aggressive actions. Frederick wanted to dominate the field and was smart enough to understand that his advantages lay in the quality of his troops and officers. Frederick attacked by concentrating a large portion of his army against a small portion of the enemy, relying on speed to win the local battle before the slower-moving Austrians could concentrate their superior numbers. In a general way, Frederick vs. Von Daun seems a lot like Lee against McClellan (although Frederick suffered from a big numerical difference in just about every fight).

The Battle of Kolin pits Frederick with about 34,000 men and 90 guns against Von Daun with about 54,000 and 154 guns. The Austrians hold on and after long bloody hours the heavy casualties leave the Prussians hanging on by a thread (Prussian losses 13,733; Austrian 8,114). Frederick withdraws, giving up his campaign. Von Daun does not pursue. We might almost see a comparison to Antietam.

I would think comparing McClellan to Arch duke Charles would be a compliment to Little Mac. Just an opinion of course.

Thanks, John

Archduke Charles was very good. McClellan should have been proud if he was in that category.

 

[trice]

It's too bad Lincoln didn't give McClellan essentially a year to siege Lee out, like he did in 1864-5.

It would have been nice if McClellan had built an actual wartime record of success like Grant did.

Grant captured/destroyed a Confederate army in the Henry & Donelson Campaign. He did it again in the Vicksburg Campaign. He broke the siege of Chattanooga and Knoxville, crunching up another Confederate army. This record of success is what actually led to Grant getting the command of the US Army and is the major reason why Grant was given such trust by the Lincoln administration. By comparison, what had McClellan done to justify his advancement to command of the US Army?

 

[LetUsHavePeace]

It's too bad Lincoln didn't give McClellan essentially a year to siege Lee out, like he did in 1864-5.

I do not think you can reasonably describe the entire contest between the armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia in 1864 and 1865 as a "siege". That word does describe what happens once Lee is forced into permanent defense around Petersburg, but it hardly captures the war of attack - counter-attack that went on before then or the sad ending that comes once the siege of Petersburg is over.

McClellan's greatest problem was that he had no sense of politics; you see that in his constant refusal to understand the difference between the personal acclaim that comes with publicity and the power that comes to a military leader from being someone whom the politicians can trust. McClellan expected somehow to be able to dominate the politicians, even though they were in charge; like Napoleon he did not consider it necessary to form any alliances of sustained interest. In a country like France in the 1790s, where democracy was itself an experiment, it was possible for a successful, popular general to ignore political representatives; for a country fighting a civil war with both sides acting through elected civil authorities, that was folly of vanity.

 

[Belfoured]

It's too bad Lincoln didn't give McClellan essentially a year to siege Lee out, like he did in 1864-5.

That's the McClellan version of Baghdad Bob "explanations." He had the opportunity in June 1862 and instead was beaten to the punch by Lee as he sat waiting for the roads to dry out and whining about McDowell, was outmaneuvered, and was forced to retreat 25 miles where he hunkered down. Lee was incapable of pulling the same stunt in summer 1864 by the time he was outmaneuvered and forced to retreat with his army sufficiently damaged that it no longer could stage an offensive operation.

 

[Belfoured]

This assumes McClellan was capable of putting Lee into a siege in the first place, of which there is no evidence. Not to mention Grant had a long record of accomplishments, of which McClellan had nearly none.

I think you slammed the door shut on that spin in two succinct sentences. One thing that characterizes the arguments of McClellan disciples is that they live eternally in the hypothetical world of "ifs" because they lack actual accomplishments to point to. Of course, if one relies only on McClellan's letters/autobiography and Grant's letters/memoirs, McClellan looks like one of the great captains in history and Grant like a competent subaltern.