McClellan's autobiography

[67th Tigers]

Well, its clear you have a vested interest in defending Little Mac that requires you to ignore a lot of reality. The comparison between Yorktown and Vicksburg is simply ludicrous for a variety of reasons, first and foremost being geography. Vicksburg was sited such that all observers viewed it as a tough nut to crack. You also ignore the sizes of the respective forces.

Indeed, but it's nowhere near as tough as the Warwick Line or the Richmond defences. I'll just refer you to this thread.

Grant when he first landed on the eastern shore in Mississippi was actually outnumbered in his theater of operations, but by quick and decisive movements he was able to fight several significant battles, capture a state capital, and put Vicksburg under a death grip from which there was no escape.

Ah yes, the old "in the theater of operations" chestnut, meaning every rebel within 200 miles of Vicksburg, but excluding Federal troops hundreds of yards away on the other side of the river. The guy who originally made that claim even included the forces at Port Hudson (threatened by Banks' army) as "in theatre" to make the case.

In fact, Grant's field army was about 55,000 PFD, or roughly the same strength as McClellan's field force 6th-10th April '62. Pemberton had, excluding troops 200 miles away at Port Hudson The rebel force was thus:

At Fort Pemberton, 106 miles NNE from Vicksburg: Loring's Division with Moore's Brigade: 7,227 PFD by the last return
Snyder's Bluff (12 miles NNE from Vicksburg) and Vicksburg proper: Smith's Division with Hebert's Bde: 7,021 ditto
At Port Gibson (30 miles SSW from Vicksburg, the closest forces): Forney's Division under Bowen: 4,564 ditto
Buford's Brigade (just arrived at Jackson, 47 miles east of Vicksburg): 2,735 ditto
Stevenson's Division as the mobile reserve (near Vicksburg): 10,476 ditto

The available force to confront Grant is thus Forney's (Bowen's) and Stevenson's Divisions, 6 bdes totaling ca. 15,000 PFD. Loring is starting back from Fort Pemberton, near Grenada, and Smith's forces are manning the river defences at Vicksburg and Synder's Bluff. When the whole mobile force (Loring, Forney (Bowen), Buford and Stevenson) were concentrated they'd be around 25,000 PFD. The defence of Vicksburg commenced with the enemy only having 17,000 PFD (inc. Smith).

By the end of the siege, Grant's ca. 55,000 PFD had grown to 72,100 PFD with heavy reinforcements, who were kept from assaulting by a mere 10,000 effectives.

Mac had overwhelming numbers, moved exceedingly slowly, has much simpler geographic conditions that were pretty straightforward, and ultimately allowed the CSA forces to escape.

McClellan's force at the beginning of Yorktown was nearly identical to Grant's force across the Mississippi, and was actually faced by a much larger force of ca. 20,000 effectives ca. 5th-6th April, and, by Magruder's count 27,500 effectives a couple of days later.

In short, with a similar force to Grant, McClellan faced a force nearly twice the size than Grant faced in the opening week of the campaign, or similar to what Grant would have faced if he waited for Loring to reinforce (which he historically did). More importantly, McClellan is facing (in the early campaign) a prepared defensive position of greater strength with far more artillery.

Their is simply no comparision. You also forget that Grant had already established a record as fighter by taking Henry and Donaldson and fighting at Shiloh,

Grant was not involved in Ft Henry, which was taken by the Navy without any army involvement.

Whilst Fort Donelson, with 17,000 PFD, fell, it is very questionable whether Grant should be credited with this. I mean, he got the credit, but he performed terribly. Without McClernand this would probably have been a rout.

Shiloh certain does not reflect well on Grant at all, and nor does Iuka.

In fact, Champion Hill is the first time Grant actually really commands a battle. He gets too far forward and loses control over half his army.

 

[JerryD]

Indeed, but it's nowhere near as tough as the Warwick Line or the Richmond defences. I'll just refer you to this thread.



Ah yes, the old "in the theater of operations" chestnut, meaning every rebel within 200 miles of Vicksburg, but excluding Federal troops hundreds of yards away on the other side of the river. The guy who originally made that claim even included the forces at Port Hudson (threatened by Banks' army) as "in theatre" to make the case.

In fact, Grant's field army was about 55,000 PFD, or roughly the same strength as McClellan's field force 6th-10th April '62. Pemberton had, excluding troops 200 miles away at Port Hudson The rebel force was thus:

At Fort Pemberton, 106 miles NNE from Vicksburg: Loring's Division with Moore's Brigade: 7,227 PFD by the last return
Snyder's Bluff (12 miles NNE from Vicksburg) and Vicksburg proper: Smith's Division with Hebert's Bde: 7,021 ditto
At Port Gibson (30 miles SSW from Vicksburg, the closest forces): Forney's Division under Bowen: 4,564 ditto
Buford's Brigade (just arrived at Jackson, 47 miles east of Vicksburg): 2,735 ditto
Stevenson's Division as the mobile reserve (near Vicksburg): 10,476 ditto

The available force to confront Grant is thus Forney's (Bowen's) and Stevenson's Divisions, 6 bdes totaling ca. 15,000 PFD. Loring is starting back from Fort Pemberton, near Grenada, and Smith's forces are manning the river defences at Vicksburg and Synder's Bluff. When the whole mobile force (Loring, Forney (Bowen), Buford and Stevenson) were concentrated they'd be around 25,000 PFD. The defence of Vicksburg commenced with the enemy only having 17,000 PFD (inc. Smith).

By the end of the siege, Grant's ca. 55,000 PFD had grown to 72,100 PFD with heavy reinforcements, who were kept from assaulting by a mere 10,000 effectives.



McClellan's force at the beginning of Yorktown was nearly identical to Grant's force across the Mississippi, and was actually faced by a much larger force of ca. 20,000 effectives ca. 5th-6th April, and, by Magruder's count 27,500 effectives a couple of days later.

In short, with a similar force to Grant, McClellan faced a force nearly twice the size than Grant faced in the opening week of the campaign, or similar to what Grant would have faced if he waited for Loring to reinforce (which he historically did). More importantly, McClellan is facing (in the early campaign) a prepared defensive position of greater strength with far more artillery.



Grant was not involved in Ft Henry, which was taken by the Navy without any army involvement.

Whilst Fort Donelson, with 17,000 PFD, fell, it is very questionable whether Grant should be credited with this. I mean, he got the credit, but he performed terribly. Without McClernand this would probably have been a rout.

Shiloh certain does not reflect well on Grant at all, and nor does Iuka.

In fact, Champion Hill is the first time Grant actually really commands a battle. He gets too far forward and loses control over half his army.

Well, considering almost 30,000 troops surrendered at Vicksburg, and Loring's division was cut off at Champion's Hill and prevented from entering Vicksburg, its safe to say that like most everything you write, your claim of CSA strength is very suspect.

As to your other comments, its pretty much a waste of time trying to convince you to the contrary since you are so wedded to the McClellan as military genius who was faultless in all things, so I elect to decline the opportunity to try and leave you with the understanding that we certainly disagree on the character and aptitude of Little Mac. I think his place in history is well earned and established, and will leave it at that.

 

[67th Tigers]

Well, considering almost 30,000 troops surrendered at Vicksburg, and Loring's division was cut off at Champion's Hill and prevented from entering Vicksburg, its safe to say that like most everything you write, your claim of CSA strength is very suspect.

About 29,000 parole slips were issued, but certainly a number of men had two issued, and I can remember finding one with three on a search. The 29,000 is certainly an overcount, but the question is by how much? Having examined the roll, it seems the bulk of the overcount is that it appears everyone in hospital was counted twice; once with their regiment and once with the hospital. Probably the number actually captured is closer to 24,000.

 

[trice]

Grant was not involved in Ft Henry, which was taken by the Navy without any army involvement.

Whilst Fort Donelson, with 17,000 PFD, fell, it is very questionable whether Grant should be credited with this. I mean, he got the credit, but he performed terribly. Without McClernand this would probably have been a rout.

Shiloh certain does not reflect well on Grant at all, and nor does Iuka.

In fact, Champion Hill is the first time Grant actually really commands a battle. He gets too far forward and loses control over half his army.

This is a ton of misdirection you are trying to peddle here so that you can take shots at Grant.

On Ft. Henry:

• the Tennessee River was in flood due to heavy rain.
• On February 4th, Grant had landed one division of troops (Smith) on one side of the river to take Ft. Heiman and one division (McClernand) on the other side to take Ft. Henry.
• Tilghman (the Confederate commander) realized he could not hold: Ft. Heiman was abandoned on the 4th.
• Tilghman sent Col. Heiman with most of his force from Ft. Henry to Ft. Donelson on the 5th, leaving their artillery and equipment behind.
• Tilghman stayed in the flooding Ft. Henry (only nine guns remained above water) with a few artillerymen to buy time for Heiman to get the retreating troops to safety at Ft. Donelson. Tilghman told his gunners he would resist for only one hour before surrendering.
• McClernand's advancing troops were delayed by the rain
• Foote's 7 gunboats arrived on the morning of the 6th. He advanced to attack the fort about 12:30 PM. He opened fire at 1700 yards.
• After about 75 minutes of fire, Tilghman surrendered. He had only one gun still in action, the powder magazine was flooded, and he had only a few rounds left. Foote's 4 ironclads had closed the range to about 400 yards (the other 3 were firing from long range).
• a small launch rowed in through the fort's sally port to accept Tilghman's surrender. (around 1:30-1:45 PM?)
• Grant arrived around 3 PM and McClernand about 3:30 PM.

So we have you saying "Grant was not involved in Ft Henry, which was taken by the Navy without any army involvement". If you don't count the two divisions of troops that Grant had landed to take the forts, which caused Ft. Heiman to be abandoned and caused most of the Confederates (about 3,000) to retreat, or the fact that Ft. Henry would have been surrounded by Grant on the afternoon of the 6th, maybe three hours or so from when the naval attack began -- well, if you want to just hide from the entire reason why Tilghman was sacrificing himself to cover his retreating men so you can attack Grant, you condemn yourself.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Joe Johnston, regarding Yorktown: "No one but McClellan could have hesitated to attack."

 

[Belfoured]

This is a ton of misdirection you are trying to peddle here so that you can take shots at Grant.

On Ft. Henry:

• the Tennessee River was in flood due to heavy rain.
• On February 4th, Grant had landed one division of troops (Smith) on one side of the river to take Ft. Heiman and one division (McClernand) on the other side to take Ft. Henry.
• Tilghman (the Confederate commander) realized he could not hold: Ft. Heiman was abandoned on the 4th.
• Tilghman sent Col. Heiman with most of his force from Ft. Henry to Ft. Donelson on the 5th, leaving their artillery and equipment behind.
• Tilghman stayed in the flooding Ft. Henry (only nine guns remained above water) with a few artillerymen to buy time for Heiman to get the retreating troops to safety at Ft. Donelson. Tilghman told his gunners he would resist for only one hour before surrendering.
• McClernand's advancing troops were delayed by the rain
• Foote's 7 gunboats arrived on the morning of the 6th. He advanced to attack the fort about 12:30 PM. He opened fire at 1700 yards.
• After about 75 minutes of fire, Tilghman surrendered. He had only one gun still in action, the powder magazine was flooded, and he had only a few rounds left. Foote's 4 ironclads had closed the range to about 400 yards (the other 3 were firing from long range).
• a small launch rowed in through the fort's sally port to accept Tilghman's surrender. (around 1:30-1:45 PM?)
• Grant arrived around 3 PM and McClernand about 3:30 PM.

So we have you saying "Grant was not involved in Ft Henry, which was taken by the Navy without any army involvement". If you don't count the two divisions of troops that Grant had landed to take the forts, which caused Ft. Heiman to be abandoned and caused most of the Confederates (about 3,000) to retreat, or the fact that Ft. Henry would have been surrounded by Grant on the afternoon of the 6th, maybe three hours or so from when the naval attack began -- well, if you want to just hide from the entire reason why Tilghman was sacrificing himself to cover his retreating men so you can attack Grant, you condemn yourself.

When a poster cites himself as an authoritative source, I think we know what fantasy realm we're in. The fact that Grant figured out how to actually engage in effective combined operations with the USN must be grating for McClellan acolytes.

 

[Belfoured]

Joe Johnston, regarding Yorktown: "No one but McClellan could have hesitated to attack."

One direct, succinct statement can often pierce the fog and obfuscation created by convoluted spin, manipulation of charts, and pruning of records.

 

[Belfoured]

About 29,000 parole slips were issued, but certainly a number of men had two issued, and I can remember finding one with three on a search. The 29,000 is certainly an overcount, but the question is by how much? Having examined the roll, it seems the bulk of the overcount is that it appears everyone in hospital was counted twice; once with their regiment and once with the hospital. Probably the number actually captured is closer to 24,000.

Even that is 24,000 more than McClellan captured by surrender. This numbers thing works in both directions. For example, Leon Tenney has carefully shown how McClellan suffered significantly more casualties than long-assumed in his Seven Days defeat while he was on the defensive.

 

[trice]

Joe Johnston, regarding Yorktown: "No one but McClellan could have hesitated to attack."

That would be Joe Johnston, McClellan's good friend and former superior officer in Mexico, making the comment after he had arrived at Yorktown, while he was examining the lines with John Magruder, the man who had commanded at Yorktown when McClellan "hesitated to attack".

Magruder had pointed out to Johnston the weakness in his lines that had been discovered by a Yankee probe (Hancock's brigade), but had not been followed up. This was what Johnston was commenting on.

 

[Belfoured]

That would be Joe Johnston, McClellan's good friend and former superior officer in Mexico, making the comment after he had arrived at Yorktown, while he was examining the lines with John Magruder, the man who had commanded at Yorktown when McClellan "hesitated to attack".

Magruder had pointed out to Johnston the weakness in his lines that had been discovered by a Yankee probe (Hancock's brigade), but had not been followed up. This was what Johnston was commenting on.

That's the same Joe Johnston who had intimidated McClellan prior to the Peninsula with the 150,000 or so troops he "had" at the time, supported by those painted logs at Manassas. I think Johnston had a pretty good "feel" for McClellan as an opponent by Spring 1862.

 

[trice]

That's the same Joe Johnston who had intimidated McClellan prior to the Peninsula with the 150,000 or so troops he "had" at the time, supported by those painted logs at Manassas. I think Johnston had a pretty good "feel" for McClellan as an opponent by Spring 1862.

Immediately after Joe Johnston surveys the lines at Yorktown and makes that comment, he returns to Richmond for a conference with Jefferson Davis, Secretary of War Randolph, and Robert E. Lee. The purpose is to decide what to do now.

Johnston is opposed to moving his army down to Yorktown. He proposes two ideas:

1. Abandon the Yorktown position, withdraw to Richmond, concentrate all available troops there, and counterattack McClellan after he has advanced to Richmond (lengthening his supply lines and weakening his force by detachments)
2. Advance toward Washington with all available troops -- crossing the Potomac to the West of the city. Leave Magruder to hold Yorktown and tie up McClellan while the Confederates threaten Washington.

Joe Johnston brings two people to that meeting with him, Longstreet and G. W. Smith. Johnston favors idea #1, but he has prepped Smith to push idea #2, the advance toward Washington, strongly. Smith pushes that so aggressively he will talk of moving to Baltimore and Philadelphia. Longstreet also seems to favor idea #2 (although not so boldly as Smith presents it).

Davis, Lee and Randolph all favored reinforcing Yorktown with Johnston's army and fighting down in the Peninsula. Johnston felt there was no suitable defensive position between Yorktown and Richmond (apparently because he thought the width of the York River above Yorktown would allow the Union Navy to outflank him). Lee felt that there were several good defensive positions on the Peninsula for a smaller army to use.

Five of these six people knew George B. McClellan. Davis had been a strong supporter of McClellan when he was the US Secretary of War. Joe Johnston and Lee had been senior officers on Scott's staff in Mexico when McClellan was a junior; Joe Johnston was a close friend of McClellan. G. W. Smith had commanded the engineer company in Mexico and McClellan had served under him; Smith was perhaps McClellan's closest friend in the Army. Longstreet says in his book that he knew McClellan -- they were in both Taylor's army and Scott's army during the War with Mexico, so I suppose it was there. Randolph is the only one who seems to have never met McClellan.

Longstreet's account of the meeting in From Manassas to Appomattox:

General Johnston, assigned to the Department of the Peninsula and Norfolk, made an inspection of his new lines, and on his return recommended that they should be abandoned. Meanwhile, his army had been ordered to Richmond. He was invited to meet the President to discuss military affairs, and asked General G. W. Smith and myself to go with him. The Secretary of War and General R. E. Lee were with the President when we met.​

​

It was the first time that I had been called to such august presence, to deliberate on momentous matters, so I had nothing to say till called on. The views intended to be offered were prefaced by saying that I knew General McClellan; that he was a military engineer, and would move his army by careful measurement and preparation; that he would not be ready to advance before the 1st of May. The President interrupted, and spoke of McClellan's high attainments and capacity in a style indicating that he did not care to hear any one talk who did not have the same appreciation of our great adversary. McClellan had been a special favorite with Mr. Davis when he was Secretary of War in the Pierce administration, and he seemed to take such reflections upon his favorites as somewhat personal. From the hasty interruption I concluded that my opinion had only been asked through polite recognition of my presence, not that it was wanted, and said no more. My intention was to suggest that we leave Magruder to look after McClellan, and march, as proposed to Jackson a few days before, through the Valley of Virginia, cross the Potomac, threaten Washington, and call McClellan to his own capital.​

​

It strikes me that four military men who knew McClellan all seemed sure that he would move slowly and methodically in whatever he did. Johnston, Smith and Longstreet all felt they could rely on two or three weeks to move on Washington before McClellan attacked at Yorktown. Lee's concerns were about fighting a delaying action up the Peninsula to gain time for the troops from conscription to be organized plus holding onto the Navy Yard and the CSS Virginia as long as possible. None of them was particularly concerned about hard and fast aggressive moves from McClellan.

 

[Belfoured]

Immediately after Joe Johnston surveys the lines at Yorktown and makes that comment, he returns to Richmond for a conference with Jefferson Davis, Secretary of War Randolph, and Robert E. Lee. The purpose is to decide what to do now.

Johnston is opposed to moving his army down to Yorktown. He proposes two ideas:

1. Abandon the Yorktown position, withdraw to Richmond, concentrate all available troops there, and counterattack McClellan after he has advanced to Richmond (lengthening his supply lines and weakening his force by detachments)
2. Advance toward Washington with all available troops -- crossing the Potomac to the West of the city. Leave Magruder to hold Yorktown and tie up McClellan while .

Joe Johnston brings two people to that meeting with him, Longstreet and G. W. Smith. Johnston favors idea #1, but he has prepped Smith to push idea #2, the advance toward Washington, strongly. Smith pushes that so aggressively he will talk of moving to Baltimore and Philadelphia. Longstreet also seems to favor idea #2 (although not so boldly as Smith presents it).

Davis, Lee and Randolph all favored reinforcing Yorktown with Johnston's army and fighting down in the Peninsula. Johnston felt there was no suitable defensive position between Yorktown and Richmond (apparently because he thought the width of the York River above Yorktown would allow the Union Navy to outflank him). Lee felt that there were several good defensive positions on the Peninsula for a smaller army to use.

Five of these six people knew George B. McClellan. Davis had been a strong supporter of McClellan when he was the US Secretary of War. Joe Johnston and lee had been senior officers on Scott's staff in Mexico when McClellan was a junior; Joe Johnston was a close friend of McClellan. G. W. Smith had commanded the engineer company in Mexico and McClellan had served under him; Smith was perhaps McClellan's closest friend in the Army. Longstreet says in his book that he knew McClellan -- they were in both Taylor's army and Scott's army during the War with Mexico, so I suppose it was there. Randolph is the only one who seems to have never met McClellan.

Longstreet's account of the meeting in From Manassas to Appomattox:

General Johnston, assigned to the Department of the Peninsula and Norfolk, made an inspection of his new lines, and on his return recommended that they should be abandoned. Meanwhile, his army had been ordered to Richmond. He was invited to meet the President to discuss military affairs, and asked General G. W. Smith and myself to go with him. The Secretary of War and General R. E. Lee were with the President when we met.​

​

It was the first time that I had been called to such august presence, to deliberate on momentous matters, so I had nothing to say till called on. The views intended to be offered were prefaced by saying that I knew General McClellan; that he was a military engineer, and would move his army by careful measurement and preparation; that he would not be ready to advance before the 1st of May. The President interrupted, and spoke of McClellan's high attainments and capacity in a style indicating that he did not care to hear any one talk who did not have the same appreciation of our great adversary. McClellan had been a special favorite with Mr. Davis when he was Secretary of War in the Pierce administration, and he seemed to take such reflections upon his favorites as somewhat personal. From the hasty interruption I concluded that my opinion had only been asked through polite recognition of my presence, not that it was wanted, and said no more. My intention was to suggest that we leave Magruder to look after McClellan, and march, as proposed to Jackson a few days before, through the Valley of Virginia, cross the Potomac, threaten Washington, and call McClellan to his own capital.​

That was borne out by Lee's assessment of McClellan's removal at the time it occurred in November 1862, as recounted years later by Longstreet: "he regretted to part with McClellan, for, he added, 'we always understood each other so well. I fear they may continue to make these changes till they find someone whom I don't understand.'"

 

[67th Tigers]

That's the same Joe Johnston who had intimidated McClellan prior to the Peninsula with the 150,000 or so troops he "had" at the time, supported by those painted logs at Manassas. I think Johnston had a pretty good "feel" for McClellan as an opponent by Spring 1862.

Did he have 150,000 troops. Cricky! I've never read that, and that's not what McClellan's intelligence reports said.

Johnston did have a fairly good feel for McClellan. Hence he praised McClellan for not being rushed into assaulting an impregnable position. Johnston's understanding of the position was the same as everyone elses', and a correct one. Yorktown and the Warwick line was impregnable to an assault, but if the Navy attacked with ironclads, or McClellan established siege artillery positions, the position would be untenable. Hence he skedaddled when a change of Navy commander led to them actually bombarding the Yorktown wharves, and McClellan's artillery getting into position.

 

[Belfoured]

Did he have 150,000 troops. Cricky! I've never read that, and that's not what McClellan's intelligence reports said.

Johnston did have a fairly good feel for McClellan. Hence he praised McClellan for not being rushed into assaulting an impregnable position. Johnston's understanding of the position was the same as everyone elses', and a correct one. Yorktown and the Warwick line was impregnable to an assault, but if the Navy attacked with ironclads, or McClellan established siege artillery positions, the position would be untenable. Hence he skedaddled when a change of Navy commander led to them actually bombarding the Yorktown wharves, and McClellan's artillery getting into position.

"Did he have 150,000 troops. Cricky! I've never read that, and that's not what McClellan's intelligence reports said."

Glad to be of service. I invite you to read McClellan's own official report submitted August 4, 1863 at fourth page (Vol V OR, chap. XIV at p. 9), in which he quotes at length from a letter that he said he had forwarded to the Secretary of War in "the latter part of October" 1861. And there it is - "the enemy have a force on the Potomac not less than 150,000 strong". The quoted letter then continues by stating that this force was "well drilled and equipped, ably commanded and strongly intrenched." I'm sure Joe Johnston would have been more than pleased with "ably commanded" even though he had nothing remotely in the ballpark of 150,000. Perhaps you're conflating McClellan's estimate of Johnston's strength with the way he whittled down his own strength in the same letter, from pfd c. 150,000 to literally half that - 76,000.

As for what Johnston did on the Peninsula, he well knew that he was outnumbered - hence the withdrawal towards Richmond. Oddly, nobody - until now, at least - has taken Johnston's statement as a resume builder for McClellan.

 

[LetUsHavePeace]

At the risk of going even further off topic, I would like to suggest that McClellan's greatest difficulty was his unshakeable belief that war was too important to be left to the judgment of politicians. "War in these modern days is a science, and it should now be clear to the most prejudiced that, for the organization and command of armies, and the high combinations of strategy, perfect familiarity with the theoretical science of war is requisite. To count upon success when the plans or execution of campaigns are entrusted to men
who have no knowledge of war, is as idle as to expect the legal wisdom of a Story or a Kent from a skillful physician."

 

[Belfoured]

At the risk of going even further off topic, I would like to suggest that McClellan's greatest difficulty was his unshakeable belief that war was too important to be left to the judgment of politicians. "War in these modern days is a science, and it should now be clear to the most prejudiced that, for the organization and command of armies, and the high combinations of strategy, perfect familiarity with the theoretical science of war is requisite. To count upon success when the plans or execution of campaigns are entrusted to men
who have no knowledge of war, is as idle as to expect the legal wisdom of a Story or a Kent from a skillful physician."

I think that's part of the problem. Another - as has been alluded to in a few posts - is a measure of narcissism in a guy who never really went through any "school of hard knocks" or "learning from mistakes". In order to learn from a mistake, you have to acknowledge the mistake in the first place. McClellan's letters and documents essentially show somebody who just knew better than everybody else.

 

[James N.]

... Let's start with McClellan's May 8, 1862 letter to Stanton about Williamsburg:

"I ask permission to reorganize the Army Corps. The present arrangement is very bad and it has almost resulted in a disastrous defeat. I request full authority to relieve from duty with these army commanders of corps or divisions who prove themselves incompetent."

Who on earth could he have been referring to? Or is the letter to Stanton just "private" and not throwing anybody "under the bus"?

I believe this is far less a complaint about any particular subordinate than it is a semi-veiled complaint about the way the subordinates - the corps commanders especially - had been foisted upon him by the administration, i.e., Lincoln and Stanton.

 

[Belfoured]

I believe this is far less a complaint about any particular subordinate than it is a semi-veiled complaint about the way the subordinates - the corps commanders especially - had been foisted upon him by the administration, i.e., Lincoln and Stanton.

I think we'll have to disagree about that - and you're correct that he believed that these corps commanders had been foisted on him. He refers to the fact that this had "almost resulted in a disastrous defeat" and followed it up with a request for authority to relieve those who "prove themselves incompetent." It's a complaint about a specific battle - in which Sumner had exercised overall command - and I doubt that Stanton/Lincoln were puzzled by who he was referring to or decided that he believed that the "structure" was responsible, regardless of who was assigned to that structure - say, for instance, Porter or Franklin. McClellan conveyed his point quite clearly but the text on its face gave him "plausible deniability" that it was about Sumner. This also needs to be read in the context of his communications with Lincoln over the next ten days about the perception he was playing favorites, etc., resulting in Porter and Franklin getting additional corps commands.

 

[trice]

I think that's part of the problem. Another - as has been alluded to in a few posts - is a measure of narcissism in a guy who never really went through any "school of hard knocks" or "learning from mistakes". In order to learn from a mistake, you have to acknowledge the mistake in the first place. McClellan's letters and documents essentially show somebody who just knew better than everybody else.

I do not think we can find many commanders on either side admitting that they were at fault or had messed up in official letters, reports or other documents. The same is probably true for the post-war auto-biographies. I can only think of a couple off the top of my head.

Robert E. Lee's offer to resign after Gettysburg

Ulysses S. Grant in his Personal Memoirs flirts with saying it: "I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made. I might say the same thing of the assault of the 22d of May, 1863, at Vicksburg. At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed, the advantages other than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side. ..."

I do not think I know of anything similar from McClellan -- but as I said it is rare to find such things coming from commanders. What I think is different about McClellan is the way he rushed to blame others (particularly his superiors) for any issue that might reflect back on him.

 

[Belfoured]

I do not think we can find many commanders on either side admitting that they were at fault or had messed up in official letters, reports or other documents. The same is probably true for the post-war auto-biographies. I can only think of a couple off the top of my head.

Robert E. Lee's offer to resign after Gettysburg

Ulysses S. Grant in his Personal Memoirs flirts with saying it: "I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made. I might say the same thing of the assault of the 22d of May, 1863, at Vicksburg. At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed, the advantages other than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side. ..."

I do not think I know of anything similar from McClellan -- but as I said it is rare to find such things coming from commanders. What I think is different about McClellan is the way he rushed to blame others (particularly his superiors) for any issue that might reflect back on him.

I agree. I certainly would never look for it in official reports or correspondence. The comparison would be Lincoln's "fessing up" to Grant after the surrender of Vicksburg. But looking at private letters and post-war recollections is a little different. Grant is a good example - his references in the Memoirs to his growing fear as he approached a Rebel camp in 1861 and to the regretted assault at Cold Harbor stand out. We're not looking for perfection, to say the least - to the end Grant would not confess to being surprised on April 6. The "acknowledgement" and the "lesson learned" also need not be verbal, of course. It can be deduced from actions. The problem with McClellan's (voluminous) private correspondence and Own Story is that one gets quite the opposite impression - everybody else was wrong, but not him. Hence the need to tell Ellen that those in whose judgment he trusts told him he had fought Antietam "magnificently". Hence the opening in Own Story that "twice" "I saved the capital" (which raises an interesting counting question, but that's for another time). I have little doubt that similar material can be found from others, The problem with McClellan is volume/incessant presence.