McClellan's autobiography

[67th Tigers]

At the risk of going even further off topic, I would like to suggest that McClellan's greatest difficulty was his unshakeable belief that war was too important to be left to the judgment of politicians. "War in these modern days is a science, and it should now be clear to the most prejudiced that, for the organization and command of armies, and the high combinations of strategy, perfect familiarity with the theoretical science of war is requisite. To count upon success when the plans or execution of campaigns are entrusted to men
who have no knowledge of war, is as idle as to expect the legal wisdom of a Story or a Kent from a skillful physician."

This was his oration to the cadets at West Point on the dedication of the war memorial.

It is not pointed at the politicians but rather at the generals. It exhorts the cadets to learn their trade well. McClellan had a lot of problems with some old fogies who learnt their trade inductively rather than deductively, and could not handle a division or a corps. By 1864, this deadwood had mostly been pruned (with Burnside being the obvious exception). Hancock, Warren and Sedgwick were far more capable than Sumner, Heintzelman and Keyes.

In fact, it was McClellan's judgement by mid-May '62 that Sumner and Keyes were completely out of their depth, and should be removed as corps commanders. He probably would have replaced them with Franklin and FJ Porter respectively if he was so authorised. Both of these were far better commanders, and FJ Porter arguably one of the best corps commanders of the war.

 

[Belfoured]

This was his oration to the cadets at West Point on the dedication of the war memorial.

It is not pointed at the politicians but rather at the generals. It exhorts the cadets to learn their trade well. McClellan had a lot of problems with some old fogies who learnt their trade inductively rather than deductively, and could not handle a division or a corps. By 1864, this deadwood had mostly been pruned (with Burnside being the obvious exception). Hancock, Warren and Sedgwick were far more capable than Sumner, Heintzelman and Keyes.

In fact, it was McClellan's judgement by mid-May '62 that Sumner and Keyes were completely out of their depth, and should be removed as corps commanders. He probably would have replaced them with Franklin and FJ Porter respectively if he was so authorised. Both of these were far better commanders, and FJ Porter arguably one of the best corps commanders of the war.

Franklin and Porter were both demonstrably mediocre. But, to his credit, Franklin at least did not indulge in seditious correspondence with an anti-administration newspaper editor while on active duty.

 

[trice]

I believe this is far less a complaint about any particular subordinate than it is a semi-veiled complaint about the way the subordinates - the corps commanders especially - had been foisted upon him by the administration, i.e., Lincoln and Stanton.

Perhaps --- but what you are saying when you say this is that McClellan was bitterly complaining about the President exercising his constitutional authority in a completely normal manner.

Army commanders do not get to choose their Corps commanders without the permission of their superiors. They can offer opinion and propose nominees -- but they have no authority in the matter. McClellan is no different than any other soldier. He must act as any soldier must. That includes dealing respectfully with his superiors and following their orders.

Does anyone think Grant wanted McClernand in his command? Would Hooker or Burnside or Pope or Meade have liked to get rid of a commander and replaced them with their own choice? How many would Bragg have sacked if he had carte blanche?

The problem with McClellan is that he wants to be in charge, without restriction. Even when he obeys orders he complains about them, loudly and inappropriately. He fosters an attitude of disrespect among his staff -- so much so that McClellan's friend Burnside regarded it as akin to insubordination and treason. McClellan would have been far better served by trying to work with Lincoln as Grant did, or as Lee worked with Davis.

 

[James N.]

... Army commanders do not get to choose their Corps commanders without the permission of their superiors. They can offer opinion and propose nominees -- but they have no authority in the matter. McClellan is no different than any other soldier. He must act as any soldier must. That includes dealing respectfully with his superiors and following their orders...

Lee whom you mentioned seems to have had no similar cause for complaint. True, he inherited a mixed bag of subordinate division commanders (since there was as yet no corps structure) after Seven Pines but he corrected that situation as soon as possible after the Seven Days. As far as actual commanders of army corps the choices were entirely his own, even if he was sometimes served poorly by some of them. After the rapturous, even fawning reception he initially received from the administration Little Mac surely expected at least as much.

 

[Belfoured]

Perhaps --- but what you are saying when you say this is that McClellan was bitterly complaining about the President exercising his constitutional authority in a completely normal manner.

Army commanders do not get to choose their Corps commanders without the permission of their superiors. They can offer opinion and propose nominees -- but they have no authority in the matter. McClellan is no different than any other soldier. He must act as any soldier must. That includes dealing respectfully with his superiors and following their orders.

Does anyone think Grant wanted McClernand in his command? Would Hooker or Burnside or Pope or Meade have liked to get rid of a commander and replaced them with their own choice? How many would Bragg have sacked if he had carte blanche?

The problem with McClellan is that he wants to be in charge, without restriction. Even when he obeys orders he complains about them, loudly and inappropriately. He fosters an attitude of disrespect among his staff -- so much so that McClellan's friend Burnside regarded it as akin to insubordination and treason. McClellan would have been far better served by trying to work with Lincoln as Grant did, or as Lee worked with Davis.

I wonder, for example, just how ecstatic Meade was about taking over an army in which two of his corps were commanded by Dan Sickles and Oliver Howard. He lucked out when Sickles paid the price for his own foolish insubordination a few days later and then when Howard got sent west that Fall. Or Rosey with the likes of McCook and Crittenden.

 

[trice]

Lee whom you mentioned seems to have had no similar cause for complaint. True, he inherited a mixed bag of subordinate division commanders (since there was as yet no corps structure) after Seven Pines but he corrected that situation as soon as possible after the Seven Days. As far as actual commanders of army corps the choices were entirely his own, even if he was sometimes served poorly by some of them. After the rapturous, even fawning reception he initially received from the administration Little Mac surely expected at least as much.

Lee inherited a bunch of different commanders in June of 1862.. He used the system to get rid of those he really did not want as quickly as he could. That meant he presented a case to his boss, Davis, and convinced his boss to let him do it. Even then, Lee sometimes got the short end of the stick.

Example: Lee got rid of Beverley Robertson immediately after 2nd Manassas (as in before the Confederates crossed the Potomac on their way to Antietam) by sending him to NC. After Antietam, Lee got rid of D. H. Hill. In 1863, Hill (now commanding in NC) out-maneuvered Lee in what used to be called the "Old Army Game": Hill sticks Lee with Robertson just in time for Brandy Station and the Gettysburg Campaign. After Gettysburg, Lee shuffled Robertson off again just as quick as he could.

McClellan constantly complains about having to work within the system. He does not want to have to explain himself or make a case to his boss -- he is aggravated by having a boss. Ignore the fits he tosses around and the torrid rhetoric. McClellan could have gotten a lot more done by working with his bosses -- as Lee and Grant did.

 

[Belfoured]

Lee inherited a bunch of different commanders in June of 1862.. He used the system to get rid of those he really did not want as quickly as he could. That meant he presented a case to his boss, Davis, and convinced his boss to let him do it. Even then, Lee sometimes got the short end of the stick.

Example: Lee got rid of Beverley Robertson immediately after 2nd Manassas (as in before the Confederates crossed the Potomac on their way to Antietam) by sending him to NC. After Antietam, Lee got rid of D. H. Hill. In 1863, Hill (now commanding in NC) out-maneuvered Lee in what used to be called the "Old Army Game": Hill sticks Lee with Robertson just in time for Brandy Station and the Gettysburg Campaign. After Gettysburg, Lee shuffled Robertson off again just as quick as he could.

McClellan constantly complains about having to work within the system. He does not want to have to explain himself or make a case to his boss -- he is aggravated by having a boss. Ignore the fits he tosses around and the torrid rhetoric. McClellan could have gotten a lot more done by working with his bosses -- as Lee and Grant did.

Bruce Catton's work is dated in many respects and some of his conclusions need revision. But in Mr. Lincoln's Army he nailed a fundamental flaw in McClellan that is overwhelmingly supported by McClellan's correspondence. Driven possibly by massive insecurity, he concluded that the wave of public adulation in the media and his ascent to high command in August 1861 meant that he was a messiah of sorts who had been ordained by fate and his own attributes to save the Union. When somebody knows better and more than literally everybody else, you don't work with - let alone subordinate yourself to - the President, the G-in-C, the Secretary of War, or any other "inferior". Did the administration appointing him to CO and then G-in-C at age 35 play some part in cementing this delusion of grandeur? Possible. That doesn't make it any less what it is.

 

[edfranksphd]

That's the McClellan version of Baghdad Bob "explanations." He had the opportunity in June 1862 and instead was beaten to the punch by Lee as he sat waiting for the roads to dry out and whining about McDowell, was outmaneuvered, and was forced to retreat 25 miles where he hunkered down. Lee was incapable of pulling the same stunt in summer 1864 by the time he was outmaneuvered and forced to retreat with his army sufficiently damaged that it no longer could stage an offensive operation.

So Wade Hampton's attack w/5000 cavalry seemed pretty offensive, as did detachment of Early's 10,000 toward Lynchburg which sent Hunter sprinting into the W VA mountains never to be seen again, followed by Early's march up the valley, joined by another 8000 rebs so that by the time this non-offensive got to Frederick, MD in July 1864, there was nobody to stop 18000 rebs from DC. These seem like pretty offensive operations, no, or perhaps I don't understand the definition of an "offensive operation."

 

[Belfoured]

So Wade Hampton's attack w/5000 cavalry seemed pretty offensive, as did detachment of Early's 10,000 toward Lynchburg which sent Hunter sprinting into the W VA mountains never to be seen again, followed by Early's march up the valley, joined by another 8000 rebs so that by the time this non-offensive got to Frederick, MD in July 1864, there was nobody to stop 18000 rebs from DC. These seem like pretty offensive operations, no, or perhaps I don't understand the definition of an "offensive operation."

Try this: After Lee dispatched Early on June 12 he was no longer effectively part of the ANV and became an independent force. That also was essentially a raid. By offensive operation I mean something such as Lee pulled with his Army in June 1862. No longer possible when Grant crossed on June 14 and Lee ended up at Petersburg.

 

[th'anchoriticsybarite]

This assumes McClellan was capable of putting Lee into a siege in the first place, of which there is no evidence. Not to mention Grant had a long record of accomplishments, of which McClellan had nearly none.

Of course it would have been impossible for McClelland even to contemplate laying siege to Richmond, outnumbered as he was by a factor of 2.5 to 1 by Lee. It would have been almost unthinkable for ANY general outnumbered by a quarter of a million to barely 100,000 to simply assume a defensive posture and defend an attack. And launch his own attack, have you been drinking? And as far as laying siege well maybe if God could be prevailed upon to lend not only his right hand but his left as well.

And McClelland having made the brilliant strategic move to avoid all the riverine defenses provided by the direct overland route from DC to Richmond had to personally supervise each and every step taken by every single soldier in his army as the marched up the Peninsula towards Richmond. Don't you understand the danger of even approaching the formidable defenses he had to burst through, bristling almost every yard with artillery which could have made mincemeat of any attack he might possibly conceive.

And even when his opponent withdrew, be it Johnston or Lee and he could occupy those selfsame trenches and found logs masquerading as artillery, even then it was a shrewd stratagem adopted by said opponent to lure him into a false sense of complacency which would leave him open to their counter attack.

Even given the lack of success by Johnston when he finally made some offensive moves likewise when Lee continued the offense, the real attack with the enormous force available to his opponent had not been employed and would not until the CSA commander finally decided to commit the entirity of his huge army in a decisive battle where he would be hard pressed just to survive. Even up to the last battle of the Peninsula campaign, Malvern Hill where Lee squandered his men like a wheat farmer scattering wheat, totally disdainful of casualties (because he had such a huge army he could afford the losses).

I am the last person in the world to be expected to speak well of Lil Mac, but even I have to admit that both he and every other single commander of the AoP believed the Pinkerton intelligence reports as if they were gospel. Apart from that I really believe he may have been the worst general to command US troops in the history of the nation.

In a recent article in the reborn North & South magazine, they had a discussion about the quality of George Meade as an army commander. One thing that came out was that the US Army's intelligence, not the civilian Pinkerton agency, was so professional that on the eve of the battle of G'burg they could give Meade a snapshot of the entire Confederate strength east of the Appalachians. Unfortunately even he, the only Union general who could truthfully state that he had defeated Lee on the field of battle, did not understand that he had faced an opponent who merely equaled his own strength. I believe Meade's reluctance to assume an immediate offensive was not so much due to the fact of his political leanings or even being overawed by the great Lee. I think he was still largely influenced by all the previous intelligence of a huge Confederate ANV.

 

[67th Tigers]

Try this: After Lee dispatched Early on June 12 he was no longer effectively part of the ANV and became an independent force. That also was essentially a raid. By offensive operation I mean something such as Lee pulled with his Army in June 1862. No longer possible when Grant crossed on June 14 and Lee ended up at Petersburg.

What an excellent attempt to argue that Lee was pinned by declaring the portion of his forces he sent to do other tasks whilst neutralising the main army was "no longer effectively part of the ANV and became an independent force."

I'm sure you'll extend this argument to agree that Lee was pinned in July 1862, and that Jackson's forces was "no longer effectively part of the ANV and became an independent force."

Surely you wouldn't have a double standard?

 

[67th Tigers]

Franklin and Porter were both demonstrably mediocre. But, to his credit, Franklin at least did not indulge in seditious correspondence with an anti-administration newspaper editor while on active duty.

A strange definition of mediocre, and since you can demonstrate this, perhaps you'd like to given us the mathematical analysis, or other evidence, that led you to this conclusion?

 

[th'anchoriticsybarite]

What an excellent attempt to argue that Lee was pinned by declaring the portion of his forces he sent to do other tasks whilst neutralising the main army was "no longer effectively part of the ANV and became an independent force."

I'm sure you'll extend this argument to agree that Lee was pinned in July 1862, and that Jackson's forces was "no longer effectively part of the ANV and became an independent force."

Surely you wouldn't have a double standard?

The only significance to Early's raid was the simple fact that given the immediate specific situation, there existed one specific opportunity to do tremendous damage to the North because Grant had stripped DC of the manpower needed to maintain the fixed defenses around it. Had Early been more focused on accomplishing his task of taking DC in stead of exacting retribution on the North in general, he might easily have brought the war to a successful conclusion in a striking coup de main by literally capturing the Union government.

 

[67th Tigers]

Of course it would have been impossible for McClelland even to contemplate laying siege to Richmond, outnumbered as he was by a factor of 2.5 to 1 by Lee. It would have been almost unthinkable for ANY general outnumbered by a quarter of a million to barely 100,000 to simply assume a defensive posture and defend an attack. And launch his own attack, have you been drinking? And as far as laying siege well maybe if God could be prevailed upon to lend not only his right hand but his left as well.

Not a lot of this is true.

McClellan spent a lot of time early on creating an intelligence organisation. What he inherited from Scott and McDowell was abysmal, and in the early months the quality of intelligence started low and rapidly increased as the intelligence apparatus under Colonel Andrew Porter was established. By November 1861, the organisation was extremely accurate.

For the six month period November '61 to the end of the Yorktown siege, McClellan's intelligence apparatus was providing uncannily accurate intelligence. They gave constant, accurate enemy strengths, detected the quaker guns on the reserve side of Fort Lee etc.*

From May forward, there appears to be a degradation of the quality of intelligence. Notably, rebel counter-intelligence in Richmond was very successful in catching Federal spies. Still the quality of intelligence on the Richmond garrison was quite good. In late June the garrison was estimated at 150,000 aggregate present against a true figure of ca. 128,000. The overestimation was largely cause by one man inside the intelligence apparatus - Orville Babcock. He added 36 non-existent infantry regiments to the count.

Intelligence from outside McClellan's domain told him that Beauregard's Army was sending reinforcements to Richmond, and that Jackson had 30-40,000 in the Shenandoah.

Bizarrely, the one man he said on in the intelligence apparatus after McClellan was removed was Orville Babcock. He continued to feed overestimations into the system. For example, at Gettysburg the BMI (using Babcock's figures) told Meade that Lee had 92,000 infantry effectives, 12,000 cavalry and 270 guns. This is a much bigger overestimate than any given to McClellan.

* The gun positions which held the quaker guns at Centreville were the reverse side of Fort Lee, i.e. the side facing away from the Federals and overlooking the rebels own camp. They had been armed until January '62, when the armament was moved to the Potomac to protect against a threatened movement of Hooker over the river. They were reported to be black painted logs in late January.

The only significance to Early's raid was the simple fact that given the immediate specific situation, there existed one specific opportunity to do tremendous damage to the North because Grant had stripped DC of the manpower needed to maintain the fixed defenses around it. Had Early been more focused on accomplishing his task of taking DC in stead of exacting retribution on the North in general, he might easily have brought the war to a successful conclusion in a striking coup de main by literally capturing the Union government.

This is special pleading.

 

[th'anchoriticsybarite]

Not a lot of this is true.

McClellan spent a lot of time early on creating an intelligence organisation. What he inherited from Scott and McDowell was abysmal, and in the early months the quality of intelligence started low and rapidly increased as the intelligence apparatus under Colonel Andrew Porter was established. By November 1861, the organisation was extremely accurate.

For the six month period November '61 to the end of the Yorktown siege, McClellan's intelligence apparatus was providing uncannily accurate intelligence. They gave constant, accurate enemy strengths, detected the quaker guns on the reserve side of Fort Lee etc.*

From May forward, there appears to be a degradation of the quality of intelligence. Notably, rebel counter-intelligence in Richmond was very successful in catching Federal spies. Still the quality of intelligence on the Richmond garrison was quite good. In late June the garrison was estimated at 150,000 aggregate present against a true figure of ca. 128,000. The overestimation was largely cause by one man inside the intelligence apparatus - Orville Babcock. He added 36 non-existent infantry regiments to the count.

Intelligence from outside McClellan's domain told him that Beauregard's Army was sending reinforcements to Richmond, and that Jackson had 30-40,000 in the Shenandoah.

Bizarrely, the one man he said on in the intelligence apparatus after McClellan was removed was Orville Babcock. He continued to feed overestimations into the system. For example, at Gettysburg the BMI (using Babcock's figures) told Meade that Lee had 92,000 infantry effectives, 12,000 cavalry and 270 guns. This is a much bigger overestimate than any given to McClellan.

* The gun positions which held the quaker guns at Centreville were the reverse side of Fort Lee, i.e. the side facing away from the Federals and overlooking the rebels own camp. They had been armed until January '62, when the armament was moved to the Potomac to protect against a threatened movement of Hooker over the river. They were reported to be black painted logs in late January.



This is special pleading.

What's so special. Have you never seen the pictures of Lincoln on the parapets of the fort watching the Confederates advance? Had he been captured do you not think this would have had a tremendous impact on the conduct of the war.

 

[Belfoured]

What an excellent attempt to argue that Lee was pinned by declaring the portion of his forces he sent to do other tasks whilst neutralising the main army was "no longer effectively part of the ANV and became an independent force."

I'm sure you'll extend this argument to agree that Lee was pinned in July 1862, and that Jackson's forces was "no longer effectively part of the ANV and became an independent force."

Surely you wouldn't have a double standard?

Actually, I have a mileage standard. Grant and Lee were in immediate proximity of each other at Petersburg. McClellan and Lee were c. 20+ miles apart from each other as McClellan sat hunkered down and estimated Lee's strength in late July at the absurd 200,000 level.

 

[Belfoured]

A strange definition of mediocre, and since you can demonstrate this, perhaps you'd like to given us the mathematical analysis, or other evidence, that led you to this conclusion?

We've been through the Porter analysis in another thread, going over his mediocre performance at Hanover CH/Slash Church despite a 2:1 force advantage and what John Hennessy characterized as his "mediocre" performance at 2 BR, including among other things losing two brigades on his way to the battlefield on August 30. As for Franklin, I'll rest on McClellan's own assessment in September 1862 as well as Franklin's brilliant performances at Fredericksburg, Sabine Pass, and the Red River Campaign.

"Mathematical analysis". What on earth are you talking about?

 

[Belfoured]

Not a lot of this is true.

McClellan spent a lot of time early on creating an intelligence organisation. What he inherited from Scott and McDowell was abysmal, and in the early months the quality of intelligence started low and rapidly increased as the intelligence apparatus under Colonel Andrew Porter was established. By November 1861, the organisation was extremely accurate.

For the six month period November '61 to the end of the Yorktown siege, McClellan's intelligence apparatus was providing uncannily accurate intelligence. They gave constant, accurate enemy strengths, detected the quaker guns on the reserve side of Fort Lee etc.*

From May forward, there appears to be a degradation of the quality of intelligence. Notably, rebel counter-intelligence in Richmond was very successful in catching Federal spies. Still the quality of intelligence on the Richmond garrison was quite good. In late June the garrison was estimated at 150,000 aggregate present against a true figure of ca. 128,000. The overestimation was largely cause by one man inside the intelligence apparatus - Orville Babcock. He added 36 non-existent infantry regiments to the count.

Intelligence from outside McClellan's domain told him that Beauregard's Army was sending reinforcements to Richmond, and that Jackson had 30-40,000 in the Shenandoah.

Bizarrely, the one man he said on in the intelligence apparatus after McClellan was removed was Orville Babcock. He continued to feed overestimations into the system. For example, at Gettysburg the BMI (using Babcock's figures) told Meade that Lee had 92,000 infantry effectives, 12,000 cavalry and 270 guns. This is a much bigger overestimate than any given to McClellan.

* The gun positions which held the quaker guns at Centreville were the reverse side of Fort Lee, i.e. the side facing away from the Federals and overlooking the rebels own camp. They had been armed until January '62, when the armament was moved to the Potomac to protect against a threatened movement of Hooker over the river. They were reported to be black painted logs in late January.



This is special pleading.

And on it goes -the desperate effort to maneuver magic beans in order to justify McClellan's persistently absurd estimates of enemy strength. Assuming you've now been enlightened that, yes indeedy, he told the Secretary of War in October 1861 that Johnston had three times what he actually had ("at least 150,000"), that's not McClellan's best Fall 1861 fantasy. Go back a month earlier to mid-September 1861, when he told Cameron that Johnston had "probably 170,000!". The exclamation point, by the way, is in the original.

But it's all the fault of Babcock, Pinkerton, etc, etc, etc - not the guy who insisted on personally controlling analysis of the "data".

 

[LibertyH76]

I have not read any thing on McClellan autobiographical or what not but I am currently listening to Catton's Terrible Swift Sword and it has a common theme, McClellan has great skill in organizing and caring for his army but lacks the will to use it. Like a classic car someone wants to polish and show off but not drive for risk of scratching it. When he does use his army, it is so slow or spitefully that it brings no benefit but he cannot resist to praise his efforts due to his ego. He also repeatedly calls for someone to save his army when he has the numerical advantage. Just refuses to get his hands dirty so to speak.
I live close to the Rock Island Arsenal and our city has a neighborhood called McClellan Heights but I can't seem to find him worth too much of my time. Seems like from the various books I have read, I know enough.

 

[James N.]

I have not read any thing on McClellan autobiographical or what not but I am currently listening to Catton's Terrible Swift Sword and it has a common theme, McClellan has great skill in organizing and caring for his army but lacks the will to use it. Like a classic car someone wants to polish and show off but not drive for risk of scratching it. When he does use his army, it is so slow or spitefully that it brings no benefit but he cannot resist to praise his efforts due to his ego. He also repeatedly calls for someone to save his army when he has the numerical advantage. Just refuses to get his hands dirty so to speak.
I live close to the Rock Island Arsenal and our city has a neighborhood called McClellan Heights but I can't seem to find him worth too much of my time. Seems like from the various books I have read, I know enough.

Just like other personalities in other periods a good deal of the opinions concerning Little Mac's generalship are tainted by politics. It would be well to recall that he was not only a Democrat general serving a Republican administration that was full of Radicals he also became the Democratic candidate for President in 1864, so was set up as a target politically for those several years on both accounts. Although not a reliable basis on which to judge his military performance, I have always been favorably impressed by the opinion his men had of him and his care of and relations with them, also evident in Catton's various accounts.