Longstreet

[rpkennedy]

Wondering about whether or not Longstreet could have changed Lee's mind assumes that Longstreet was right.

I don't think he was.

I tend to agree. What Longstreet wanted to do simply wasn't feasible nor likely to succeed.

R

 

[Lost Cause]

Wondering about whether or not Longstreet could have changed Lee's mind assumes that Longstreet was right.

I don't think he was.

Are you referencing Day 2, 3, or both ?

 

[UKMarkw]

I tend to agree. What Longstreet wanted to do simply wasn't feasible nor likely to succeed.

R

The problem with that statement is the Lee often did things that were not feasible or likely to succeed but they were and they did. Rule number one, do not divide your forces. Lee did this and succeeded. Whether or not Longstreets plan would have worked belongs in the what if section.

By day two the AoP was becoming entrenched and solidified and for the most part held the high ground, it would make sense to me to withdraw and put myself between AoP and Washington and make them come for me on my ground. IMO

 

[rpkennedy]

The problem with that statement is the Lee often did things that were not feasible or likely to succeed but they were and they did. Rule number one, do not divide your forces. Lee did this and succeeded. Whether or not Longstreets plan would have worked belongs in the what if section.

By day two the AoP was becoming entrenched and solidified and for the most part held the high ground, it would make sense to me to withdraw and put myself between AoP and Washington and make them come for me on my ground. IMO

The problem with Longstreet's plan is that it wasn't particularly well thought out. He wants to move south and get around the AotP and my questions are "How?" and "Where to?". The only road immediately south potentially usable was the Emmittsburg Road which doesn't lead in the right direction and using that road assumes that the AotP stays put and doesn't use the Taneytown Road to move itself between Washington and the AoNV. The only other option is to move west, passing South Mountain and, again, that is going in the wrong direction and assuming the AotP isn't going to move to interpose itself.

And none of that discusses moving the army in the face of a prepared enemy, which is seriously problematic at best.

R

 

[UKMarkw]

The problem with Longstreet's plan is that it wasn't particularly well thought out. He wants to move south and get around the AotP and my questions are "How?" and "Where to?". The only road immediately south potentially usable was the Emmittsburg Road which doesn't lead in the right direction and using that road assumes that the AotP stays put and doesn't use the Taneytown Road to move itself between Washington and the AoNV. The only other option is to move west, passing South Mountain and, again, that is going in the wrong direction and assuming the AotP isn't going to move to interpose itself.

And none of that discusses moving the army in the face of a prepared enemy, which is seriously problematic at best.

R

Noob question:

I don't have a detailed knowledge of the terrain but was it important that they used roads? The grounds appears to undulate but not enough deter an army on the march.

I expect a Homer Simpson sized D'oh! but all knowledge is good.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Wondering about whether or not Longstreet could have changed Lee's mind assumes that Longstreet was right.

I don't think he was.

I don't think he was either, but that does not mean Lee was any the more correct, because of that fact alone.
In any case, Lee's prmary problem was not his planning,but his command, of the battle.

 

[Lost Cause]

Noob question:

I don't have a detailed knowledge of the terrain but was it important that they used roads? The grounds appears to undulate but not enough deter an army on the march.

I expect a Homer Simpson sized D'oh! but all knowledge is good.

That would have been difficult without Stuart.

 

[cash]

Are you referencing Day 2, 3, or both ?

Both.

 

[cash]

Noob question:

I don't have a detailed knowledge of the terrain but was it important that they used roads? The grounds appears to undulate but not enough deter an army on the march.

I expect a Homer Simpson sized D'oh! but all knowledge is good.

It is extremely important that they use roads. They had wagons and artillery to move, which don't move well over long distances without roads. Also, while infantry doesn't necessarily need roads to march over, if they don't use roads they tend to arrive much more worn out.

 

[Lost Cause]

Day 2 was arguable, the charge on day 3 should not have happened.

 

[cash]

I don't think he was either, but that does not mean Lee was any the more correct, because of that fact alone.
In any case, Lee's prmary problem was not his planning,but his command, of the battle.

Lee's primary problem was that on this day the Army of the Potomac's leadership was up to the task.

 

[cash]

Day 2 was arguable, the charge on day 3 should not have happened.

We know that because we know the outcome. It was the right decision based on what Lee knew at the time.

 

[Lost Cause]

We know that because we know the outcome. It was the right decision based on what Lee knew at the time.

Unsupported frontal assaults had proven time and time again to fail prior to the battle even without the benefit of hindsight.

 

[cash]

Unsupported frontal assaults had proven time and time again to fail prior to the battle even without the benefit of hindsight.

It wasn't an unsupported frontal assault. It was an assault where the infantry had undulating ground, supported by artillery preparation and the artillery that was in the Peach Orchard. The execution was flawed, but the plan was a reasonable one.

They had more support on July 3 than they had on the highly successful day of July 1.

 

[cash]

Time and time again, Lee had seen his men drive the Federals from their positions. What reason did he have to think this would be any different?

 

[Lost Cause]

It wasn't an unsupported frontal assault. It was an assault where the infantry had undulating ground, supported by artillery preparation and the artillery that was in the Peach Orchard. The execution was flawed, but the plan was a reasonable one.

They had more support on July 3 than they had on the highly successful day of July 1.

My unsupported reference was geared toward the infantry. They had both flanks in the air. As far as artillery, that was a big gamble. Lee had to have Malvern Hill in the back of his mind and the quality of artillery shells were notoriously sub-standard. Lee's belief that his army was invincible was an oversight on my opinion.

 

[cash]

My unsupported reference was geared toward the infantry. They had both flanks in the air. As far as artillery, that was a big gamble. Lee had to have Malvern Hill in the back of his mind and the quality of artillery shells were notoriously sub-standard. Lee's belief that his army was invincible was an oversight on my opinion.

Not the shells. The shells were fine. The problem with the artillery was the fuses, which no one knew about at the time. Lee's belief that his army was invincible was backed up by what he had seen them do. He had no reason at the time to believe they wouldn't succeed. We only know they wouldn't because we knew they didn't. The execution was flawed, but the plan was reasonable.

 

[Lost Cause]

Correct about the artillery fuses. The victories that Lee and his men previously achieved were vast from a strategic perspective; such as defensive victories, victories by outflanking the enemy, tactical losses that resulted in an enemy retreat, or occasional breakthrough charges that broke the enemy's back. Without hindsight, Lee had hoped Meade would vacate his position, but in the back of his mind had to have known Meade was not going to retreat, especially after day 2. After all, Lee was in Meade's backyard. Therefore, in his mind, the way through victory was by way of frontal assault. Lee had to ask himself, if Alexander's artillery was accurate, would it have been effective enough to greatly weaken Meade's position for a Confederate breakthrough. How many historic battles has this happened prior to Gettysburg?

 

[OpnCoronet]

I wonder what gave Lee confidence that Longstreet, would be any more effective on day three, commanding a hastily formed ad hoc, corps(2/3d's of which did not know him or he them), than him commanding his own corps on Day Two?

 

[cash]

I wonder what gave Lee confidence that Longstreet, would be any more effective on day three, commanding a hastily formed ad hoc, corps(2/3d's of which did not know him or he them), than him commanding his own corps on Day Two?

Longstreet was very effective on Day Two. They captured the Peach Orchard, the Wheatfield, Devil's Den, and came within a whisker of winning the entire battle. Lee had seen his men push the Federals out of strong positions before. Look at Chancellorsville.

Gary Gallagher says Pickett's Charge is very easy to understand. Just look at May 3.