Longstreet

[cash]

Longstreet did not agree with Lee's plans and there is nothing new about that. They often disagreed and Longstreet on several occasions was able to convince Lee to listen to him. At Second Manassa on August 29th Lee wanted an all out attack, Longstreet demurred. Longstreet requested delaying the attack until further reconnaissance. After more through study Lee was disappointed but accepted Longstreet's recommendation for a night time reconnaissance. He sent Hoods Texas Brigade. They set out at 6:30 PM the result was the Confederates found Porter and the Union Army well established resulting in Lee postponing the offensive. Longstreet was a deliberate, careful tactician who was unwilling to throw his men into a situation without knowledge of the terrain or strength of the enemy. Lee and Longstreet's relationship had grown and they respected one anothers opinion.

On the third day of Gettysburg, Longstreet did have knowledge of the terrain and the enemy's strength. Longstreet did disagree with Lee's Offensive (This was not uncommon at all as the two debated at many engagements) however, he did follow his orders, unfortunately as at 2nd Manassa Longstreet was right. I believe Longstreet's Plan of a right flanking movement was by design just his means of getting the AONV out of there and to better ground where ever that ground might be. As long as it was not that ground.

Longstreet was wrong at Gettysburg.

Where was that better ground? "Wherever it might be" might be nice in a fairy tale, but in reality there has to be a place to go. Where was it?

 

[cash]

I agree that AONV needed to find better ground. The longer the army remained in the North the more Lincoln was going to press Meade for action.

What were Meade's orders at the time?

This falls in Lee's favor for a desperate Northern attack. Lee's problem would have been maintaining adequate supplies for his army.

Again, refer to the orders given to Meade at the time.

 

[cash]

True and this was at the forefront of Lee's thoughts. He knew he could not sustain his army for a prolonged period of time north of the Potomac which could be why he stayed and fought on the 3rd. He wanted a decisive victory and thought the war would end that day if he destroyed the AOP. Only an opinion

No, he didn't think the war would end that day. That's the influence of Michael Shaara's novel and the movie based on it.

 

[cash]

I agree, Lee should have known he could not defeat "Those people" with a single decisive victory.

You make Lee out to be a delusional dreamer.

Lee didn't think that battle would end the war. Get that notion out of your head. His target was the populace of the loyal states and the political elections that fall and the next year.

 

[Lost Cause]

You make Lee out to be a delusional dreamer.

Lee didn't think that battle would end the war. Get that notion out of your head. His target was the populace of the loyal states and the political elections that fall and the next year.

I do think Lee was delusional in thinking Pickett's assault was going to be successful. I do admire him, however, for taking blame after the defeat. You, again, missed my point for him staying up North. The longer he stayed there the more Lincoln and the local populace would be unnerved. Meade would have to act.

 

[Lost Cause]

Longstreet was wrong at Gettysburg.

Where was that better ground? "Wherever it might be" might be nice in a fairy tale, but in reality there has to be a place to go. Where was it?

So there is no good ground between Gettysburg and the VA border? Quite the assertion.

 

[Lost Cause]

And what roads would they use to go around the flank? What position would they take up? Where is the mythical "Mount Longstreet" where they would take up this supposedly strong position between Meade and Washington?

Lee had the resources for one more attack, and he was in contact with the enemy. There was no feasible way to move around Meade's flank.

If your assertion that Lee's attack was correct on day 3, how could he have achieved victory in your opinion ?

 

[screnshaw]

My issue with Longstreet as re: Gettysburg has always been what I perceive as his petulant attitude on Day 2, which imo led to a less-than-his-best performance in the assault of that day.

 

[Lost Cause]

My issue with Longstreet as re: Gettysburg has always been what I perceive as his petulant attitude on Day 2, which imo led to a less-than-his-best performance in the assault of that day.

Agreed

 

[FarawayFriend]

No, he didn't think the war would end that day. That's the influence of Michael Shaara's novel and the movie based on it.

As a beginner and with all due respect: I have read many times and in sources which are not endangered to be influenced by Shaara or the movie "Gettysburg" that Lee hoped that Gettysburg would be the decisive battle of the Civil War, e.g.:
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/goss.pdf (very interesting read, btw)

So, maybe he could not hope that Gettysburg would become the very last battle, but he sure must have thought that a victory at Gettysburg would help end the war. Or is that wrong?

 

[rpkennedy]

My issue with Longstreet as re: Gettysburg has always been what I perceive as his petulant attitude on Day 2, which imo led to a less-than-his-best performance in the assault of that day.

With his two divisions, he wrecks the 3rd Corps, inflicts heavy casualties on elements of the 2nd and 5th Corps, and comes near to destroying the flank of the AotP. He did son of his best fighting of the war on July 2nd.

R

 

[rpkennedy]

So there is no good ground between Gettysburg and the VA border? Quite the assertion.

One needs to have a goal and a specific route before moving, especially in enemy country. Wandering around the countryside is a recipe for disaster.

R

 

[Lost Cause]

One needs to have a goal and a specific route before moving, especially in enemy country. Wandering around the countryside is a recipe for disaster.

R

That could have been obtained without generalizations.

 

[rpkennedy]

That could have been obtained without generalizations.

The problem with Longstreet's plan is that he had no specific plan. He had no position in mind nor a route to get there. Without that, he was just throwing ideas out there while Lee had a plan in place.

As I said, it wasn't a well thought out idea.

R

 

[cash]

I do think Lee was delusional in thinking Pickett's assault was going to be successful. I do admire him, however, for taking blame after the defeat. You, again, missed my point for him staying up North. The longer he stayed there the more Lincoln and the local populace would be unnerved. Meade would have to act.

We know today that it wouldn't be successful because we know how things turned out. We know now that the artillery fuses malfunctioned and the shells burst further than they should have burst, which cut down significantly on casualties to Union artillery and infantry. We know now that the leadership of the Army of the Potomac was finally up to the task. We know now that Lee's men couldn't drive the Federals off their position. Lee didn't know that. Given what he knew at the time, there is no way he was delusional. That's mere hindsight.

And I refer you once again to the orders given to Meade.

 

[cash]

So there is no good ground between Gettysburg and the VA border? Quite the assertion.

You tell me where it is. You claim there was good ground. The burden of proof is on the person making the positive assertion.

 

[Jamieva]

With his two divisions, he wrecks the 3rd Corps, inflicts heavy casualties on elements of the 2nd and 5th Corps, and comes near to destroying the flank of the AotP. He did son of his best fighting of the war on July 2nd.

R

All of that without most of the promised support he was supposed to receive from Hills Corps. Hood and Mclaws forces did a real wrecking ball job on that day but people overlook that when they go after Longstreet for Gettysburg

 

[cash]

As a beginner and with all due respect: I have read many times and in sources which are not endangered to be influenced by Shaara or the movie "Gettysburg" that Lee hoped that Gettysburg would be the decisive battle of the Civil War, e.g.:
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/goss.pdf (very interesting read, btw)

So, maybe he could not hope that Gettysburg would become the very last battle, but he sure must have thought that a victory at Gettysburg would help end the war. Or is that wrong?

Certainly Lee hoped for a decisive battle, but a decisive battle doesn't necessarily end the war in one day. A victory in an important Northern state, showing the Army of the Potomac could not protect Northern states from the Army of Northern Virginia, with Meade being forced to retreat from Pennsylvania would be disastrous for Republicans that fall, when the governorships of Ohio and Pennsylvania were being contested. Imagine Clement Vallandigham as Governor of Ohio. He would withdraw Ohio troops from the war effort. What kind of a blow is that to the Union? Andrew Curtin is out in Pennsylvania and Democrat George W. Woodward is not governor. He doesn't pull Pennsylvania troops out, but he doesn't give anywhere near the same level of support for Lincoln and his policies. It's even possible this leads to Lincoln's defeat in November the following year. Then think of what happens if Lee sets fire to the coal area of Pennsylvania, cutting off the supply of coal to the Union Navy. What does that do to the blockade?

 

[Jamieva]

Even if Lee finds "better ground" that he can get to between Gettysburg and the VA border how long can he sit and wait there? And you want him to place himself between the AotP and the garrison forces of DC? Not sound military strategy

 

[cash]

If your assertion that Lee's attack was correct on day 3, how could he have achieved victory in your opinion ?

I said it was correct based on what he knew at the time. That's important. If he was able to take Cemetery Hill, it would force Meade to retreat, as Cemetery Hill is the dominant position and the key to the entire battlefield. You have to go back to what Lee knew at the time. At the time, he thought the VI Corps was at the Union's left flank, not where it actually was.