Untangling Anderson's Division at Sharpsburg

[Andy Cardinal]

One of the most confusing (at least to me) and understudied troop movements at Antietam involves the arrival and deployment of Major General Richard H. Anderson's division near Sharpsburg on the morning of September 17th. Most of the reason for this is the lack of reports from Anderson's division.

Anderson's men marched through the night from Harpers Ferry and reached the Sharpsburg area around or shortly after dawn. Initially placed in reserve north of town, portions of the division were soon directed toward the Confederate center-left as the fighting escalated around the Sunken Road. Yet tracing exactly where each brigade moved — and when — becomes surprisingly difficult (again at least for me).

I've been working through the movements of the division and would welcome thoughts, corrections, source suggestions, or interpretations from others who have studied this sector of the battlefield.

Of course, Anderson's wounding early in the action, before the division deployed, was perhaps the most important factor in the division's performance. Brigadier General Roger A. Pryor was the ranking brigade commander and was obviously in over his head. But also, he probably had no idea what Anderson's orders or intentions were.

Anderson's wounding certainly complicated command and control. Lee, Longstreet, and/or DH Hill never seemed to exert any control over the division, although all three were in the general area. All three exerted control over batteries in the Sunken Road area, for example

Brigade actions after Anderson's wounding appear only loosely coordinated at best, raising the broader question: Was Anderson's division expected to be committed as a unified formation, or was it essentially fed into crisis points brigade by brigade?

If so, what orders did Longstreet (or Lee, or Hill) give Anderson as his division approached? As far as I know, this is unknowable, but Krick speculates an intention to attack French's left flank (area where the observation tower is today). Although ultimate actions indicate this might gave been the plan, each brigade's initial approach doesn't seem to me to support the idea.

Hartwig speculates that Longstreet ordered Anderson to report to Hill, and Hill told him to advance directly toward the Sunken Road to support his own brigades.

My own opinion is an attack on French's right flank, driving between French and Greene would have made sone sense, since if successful, the Confederates would have regained control of the Dunker Church plateau. I find no evidence that this was considered, even though Longstreet had recently ordered Rodes to attack in this area, and Kershaw's and Manning's brigades had also attempted attacks that had been repulsed.

In future posts I will add a brief working overview of the brigades and my current understanding of their deployment sequence. I've used 5 major secondary sources, which are not always in agreement:

1. Carman (edited by Tom Clemens)
2. Krick's Sunken Road essay in Gallagher's book of essays
3. Armstrong's Opposing the Second Corps at Antietam
4. Hartwig's I Dread the Thought of the Place
5. Brigades of Antietam.

 

[RedRover]

View attachment 580559​

One of the most confusing (at least to me) and understudied troop movements at Antietam involves the arrival and deployment of Major General Richard H. Anderson's division near Sharpsburg on the morning of September 17th. Most of the reason for this is the lack of reports from Anderson's division.

Anderson's men marched through the night from Harpers Ferry and reached the Sharpsburg area around or shortly after dawn. Initially placed in reserve north of town, portions of the division were soon directed toward the Confederate center-left as the fighting escalated around the Sunken Road. Yet tracing exactly where each brigade moved — and when — becomes surprisingly difficult (again at least for me).

I've been working through the movements of the division and would welcome thoughts, corrections, source suggestions, or interpretations from others who have studied this sector of the battlefield.

Captain Feltus of the 16th Mississippi, says Featherston's brigade advanced into action behind General Pryor's brigade. Then notes the brigades were intermingled in the fighting and movements. So perhaps there is no untangling.

The Brigade of North Carolinians apparently being that of "G.B." Anderson.

Gen. G.T. Anderson in his brigade report, states that parts of Wilcox's, Featherston's and Pryor's brigades, participated in a charge with his men at one point. Apparently intermixed. D.H. Hill's report mentions near the close of the battle, G.T. Anderson's command was near Pryor's brigade when they fired their last shots at a Maine Regiment...

General Longstreet's official report says near the close of the battle, Captain Millers' battery fired over the heads of R.H. Anderson's troops, and they and the artillery held the federals in check until nightfall. I have the idea that the federals coming up opposite were probably some of Slocum's Division, supported by Pleasonton's horse artillery, etc.

On the afternoon of September 18, General Winfield Scott Hancock reported the Confederates opposite his front were commanded by Gen. Pryor (Anderson's Division).

Of course, Anderson's wounding early in the action, before the division deployed, was perhaps the most important factor in the division's performance. Brigadier General Roger A. Pryor was the ranking brigade commander and was obviously in over his head. But also, he probably had no idea what Anderson's orders or intentions were.

General Anderson did not relinquish command after his wound, "until the emergency passed" apparently, though as noted the command fell to Pryor with General Wrights' wounding. From Anderson's biographer...

The Life of Lieutenant General Richard Heron Anderson of the Confederate States Army

www.google.com

Anderson's wounding certainly complicated command and control. Lee, Longstreet, and/or DH Hill never seemed to exert any control over the division, although all three were in the general area. All three exerted control over batteries in the Sunken Road area, for example

Brigade actions after Anderson's wounding appear only loosely coordinated at best, raising the broader question: Was Anderson's division expected to be committed as a unified formation, or was it essentially fed into crisis points brigade by brigade?

If so, what orders did Longstreet (or Lee, or Hill) give Anderson as his division approached? As far as I know, this is unknowable, but Krick speculates an intention to attack French's left flank (area where the observation tower is today). Although ultimate actions indicate this might gave been the plan, each brigade's initial approach doesn't seem to me to support the idea.

According to the biographer, Anderson's division was given orders to support D.H. Hill's line at about 11 A.M. on the 17th.

This is confirmed by Gen. D.H. Hill's official report, that Gen. Anderson's division did in fact do so, with Gen. Anderson reporting to General Hill after several urgent requests for reinforcement he sent to General Lee...

The Rebellion Record: in two divisions, omitting "Diary of events"

www.google.com

General Lee reports the same about R.H. Anderson's Division...

My own opinion is an attack on French's right flank, driving between French and Greene would have made sone sense, since if successful, the Confederates would have regained control of the Dunker Church plateau. I find no evidence that this was considered, even though Longstreet had recently ordered Rodes to attack in this area, and Kershaw's and Manning's brigades had also attempted attacks that had been repulsed.

In future posts I will add a brief working overview of the brigades and my current understanding of their deployment sequence. I've used 5 major secondary sources, which are not always in agreement:

1. Carman (edited by Tom Clemens)
2. Krick's Sunken Road essay in Gallagher's book of essays
3. Armstrong's Opposing the Second Corps at Antietam
4. Hartwig's I Dread the Thought of the Place
5. Brigades of Antietam.

Many of the official reports mentioning Anderson or his brigades, are in this volume.

The War of the Rebellion

Official records produced by the armies of the United States and the Confederacy, and the executive branches of their respective governments, concerning the military operations of the Civil War, and prisoners of war or prisoners of state. Also annual reports of military departments, calls for...

www.google.com

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Many of the official reports mentioning Anderson or his brigades, are in this volume.

The War of the Rebellion

Official records produced by the armies of the United States and the Confederacy, and the executive branches of their respective governments, concerning the military operations of the Civil War, and prisoners of war or prisoners of state. Also annual reports of military departments, calls for...

www.google.com

Only 3 reports were filed for the 5 brigades and 22 regiments that fought in the Sunken Road area -- Gibson, Feltus, and Herbert. Herbert's report wasn't included in the OR.

Other than Walker, I am jot aware of any other secondary account that indicates Anderson stayed in the field for long after his wound. There is also very little agreement as to when his wounding actually took place.

His most recent biographer writes: "Anderson himself fell with a wound to the thigh that toppled him from his horse and took him completely out of action that day after he fainted from loss of blood. Command of the division fell to Brigadier General Pryor, the former Virginia politician whose skills proved unequal to the crisis. Pryor wisely appealed to Longstreet for artillery support, but his direction of the troops otherwise proved too weak and ineffective." [Soldier of the South, p 135]

Hartwig indicates his wound occured as the division was reaching the field, just after he met with Hill. The infantry had not yet reached or had just begun crossing the Hagerstown Pike.

Freeman wrote that after Anderson was wounded, his division "ceased to act as a unit," which is evidenced by the way the brigades went into action.

I have read Hill's report and, yes, Hill told him to support his position. That is a relatively vague order which could mean many different things. I would imagine there was more spoken that didnt make it into Hill's report.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Carman-Cope Map 10:30 a.m.​

Brigadier General Roger Pryor's brigade
14th Alabama, 2nd Florida, 5th Florida, 8th Florida, 3rd Virginia.

The remnants of Mahone's brigade, commanded by Colonel William Parham, was attached to Pryor's brigade on September 17.

Pryor's brigade led Anderson's advance toward the Sunken Road sector around 10 a.m. The brigade crossed open ground under severe artillery fire from Tompkins's battery on the Dunker Church plateau.

Reaching the Hagerstown Pike south of Piper's Lane, the column moved north, turned into the lane, passed the Piper barn, and filed left (north) until the head of the column reached the west side of the Piper orchard.

The brigade was deployed with the 2nd Florida on the left, with the 8th Florida to its right, followed by the 5th Florida, 3rd Virginia, 14th Alabama, and Parham's brigade on the right.

The brigade remained halted, some of it sheltered in a ravine near the orchard, while confusion over orders and leadership transitions delayed further movement. The brigade's command structure collapsed as losses among the regimental leaders was high. Hartwig suggests confusion over orders, uncertainty about assignment, and/or command paralysis after command casualties.

Accounts differ as to whether or not the brigade immediately deployed in line or remained in column while halted.

As a result, Pryor's brigade contributed little to the decisive fighting at the Sunken Road, moving forward and joining the fighting too late to make much of a difference.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Colonel Alfred Cumming
​

Wilcox's Brigade -- Colonel Alfred Cumming
Wilcox's brigade was temporarily commanded by Colonel Alfred Cumming. Cumming was colonel of the 10th Georgia (Semmes's brigade, McLaws's division). Wilcox had commanded a division while retaining command of his brigade at Second Manassas. Anderson had marched his division from Richmond during Manassas and missed the battle. The two commands were combined under Anderson's command as part of the Harper's Ferry mission. Instead of accompanying his brigade, the ill Wilcox checked into a Hagerstown hotel to recuperate. It is unclear (or I have been unable to find) why Anderson tabbed Cumming to command the brigade while Willcox was ill. Perhaps the reason was that Cumming was a West Point graduate (1849).

The brigade followed Pryor's advance as far as the Hagerstown Pike. Crossing the pike under severe Federal artillery fire, the brigade then diverged from Pryor's route and moved 400 yards east into the Piper farm fields south of the lane rather than toward the Piper orchard and Sunken Road.

The brigade halted on or near the ridge south/southeast of Piper's house, taking cover behind the reverse slope of the ridge.

Bailey George McClelen (10th Alabama) account:
"I passed several Confederates who had fallen before getting close enough to the enemy to do an execution. I passed one whose head had been severed from his body by a shell just in advance of me. In the double quick, I lost my hat which I could not stop to get and I did not want to lose my place in the ranks at such a critical time. I went the balance of the day bare headed."

Featherston's Brigade -- Colonel Carnot Posey
Featherston's brigade—commanded at Antietam by Colonel Carnot Posey—followed behind Wilcox/Cumming's brigade and took position near it on the ridge south/southeast of Piper's house.

Advancing across open ground under intense Federal artillery fire, the Mississippians suffered from shellfire and visible demoralization before reaching the ridge.

James Johnston Kirkpatrick (16th Mississippi) account:

"We march down to the ford and cross the river, making no unnecessary delays, and start by nearest route for Sharpsburg. Artillery opened at sunrise. Tired and sleepy, we still march on, and as we come in proximity of the battle ground, the scores of wounded passing to the rear remind us that bloody work is going on. A little further on the left of the pike ... halt and "load at will." No sooner done than in again. The enemy's batteries give us shot and shell in abundances, causing muscular contractions in the spinal column of our line. But all the dodging did not save us. Occasionally, a shell, better aimed than the rest would crack through our line, making corpses and mutilated trunks. A piece gave me a severe bruise in the shoulder. The brigade is halted in front of an old barn."

 

[RedRover]

Only 3 reports were filed for the 5 brigades and 22 regiments that fought in the Sunken Road area -- Gibson, Feltus, and Herbert. Herbert's report wasn't included in the OR.

Other than Walker, I am jot aware of any other secondary account that indicates Anderson stayed in the field for long after his wound. There is also very little agreement as to when his wounding actually took place.

His most recent biographer writes: "Anderson himself fell with a wound to the thigh that toppled him from his horse and took him completely out of action that day after he fainted from loss of blood. Command of the division fell to Brigadier General Pryor, the former Virginia politician whose skills proved unequal to the crisis. Pryor wisely appealed to Longstreet for artillery support, but his direction of the troops otherwise proved too weak and ineffective." [Soldier of the South, p 135]

Hartwig indicates his wound occured as the division was reaching the field, just after he met with Hill. The infantry had not yet reached or had just begun crossing the Hagerstown Pike.

General D.H. Hill's report, a primary source, says Anderson was soon wounded after reporting to him; but by the time Pryor assumed command of the division, "the Yankee fire had now nearly ceased;" however long the interval. Best potential evidence I've seen is the report of Gen. R.E. Rodes, who noted seeing some of Pryor's brigade taking cover behind him, rather than moving onto the front line. He says this was just as the murderous firing was growing "desultory and slack"... He found Gen. Pryor within moments, who directed them to their correct position in front.

Veterans of Mahone's brigade, including the Sixth Virginia, were attached to Pryor's brigade during the battle, recalled that in advancing to reinforce Hill's line in front, the heavy federal artillery fire struck into them. As a result "some ran forward and reached the line of battle, but the larger portion sought shelter."

A Record of Events in Norfolk County, Virginia

www.google.com

Confederate Staff officer William W. Chamberlain among them recalls on p. 32-33, the specific details of the movement of Pryor's brigade forward, and its getting scattered by heavy artillery fire as it did so...
Also notice of General Anderson's wounding before his division moved up to Hill's line. Chamberlain manned the 6-pounder near the Piper barn, etc. with some men of G.T. Anderson's Georgia Brigade, and at one point positioned about the 14th NC of G.B. Anderson's brigade at one time. Thence back again when he found its original position occupied by General Wright's brigade of R.H. Anderson's division.

Memoirs of the Civil War between the northern and southern sections of the United States of America, 1861-1865 : Chamberlaine, William W., 1836?- : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Book digitized by Google from the library of Harvard University and uploaded to the Internet Archive by user tpb.

archive.org

General Longstreet's memoirs, "Manassas to Appomattox," which notes this, observing only "parts" of Anderson's brigades got up on the front line during the emergency. And Pryor was not "advised" of his authority over the whole division upon the evacuation of both Generals Anderson and Wright. Longstreet states thereafter Pryor (who as noted assumed command when the firing lulled) then labored to assemble the brigades "at points most suited to their convenience, in rear of D.H. Hill's brigades."

Ultimately, General Longstreet's official report names General Pryor for particularly distinguished service at "Sharpsburg" alongside General Anderson...

...

Freeman wrote that after Anderson was wounded, his division "ceased to act as a unit," which is evidenced by the way the brigades went into action.

Sounds pretty standard. The troops were all mixed up and intermingled. Hills and Andersons. It's puzzled me why Freeman etc. decide that Anderson's division in the same situation as the others, is somehow ineffective. When Col. Floyd of the 8th Florida came up to the army during the action to join his regiment with Pryor's brigade, Anderson's division, he says he inquired of staff officers for their position, to which he got only the replies: "No man can, unless by accident, find his brigade in the field..."

Regardless, in the afternoon, Hill reported that it was General Pryor, as commander of Anderson's Division (once advised that he was in command of it apparently), who managed to "gather quite a respectable force" behind the stone wall on the Hagerstown pike, near G.T. Anderson's remnant, when they repulsed the advance of the 7th Maine of Slocum's division, etc.

Generals Lee and Longstreet seem satisfied Anderson's division (a part of it) after the "emergency" of the battle, remained in position (under Pryor), to face the federals opposite until night...

As noted, General Hancock found Pryor in command of the line opposite his front the next day.

I have read Hill's report and, yes, Hill told him to support his position. That is a relatively vague order which could mean many different things. I would imagine there was more spoken that didnt make it into Hill's report.

Not vague in a military way. From Victor's "Military Handbook" (1862), A supporting line supported another line...

The line, and its supports, were best to also have a reserve if possible. There were many units of Lee's army had fought at Antietam without any supports or reserves. Hood's division comes to mind.


Some other period examples. Lord Cardigan of the Light Brigade fame in the Crimea:

From Gettysburg, General Lane notes supporting Longstreet's line in the attack...

The line, and its supports, were best to also have a reserve, which if necessary might cover the flanks, or reinforce the line as necessary. Lee's lines at Antietam were stretched very thin. General Hill lamented that he did not have Anderson's support earlier in the day.

​

Accounts differ as to whether or not the brigade immediately deployed in line or remained in column while halted.

W.W. Chamberlaine and Hebert of Anderson's division both note the troops were moving toward the bloody lane moving by file/by the right flank, when they were whacked by the artillery fire which much disordered them about the orchard. Hebert notes deploying into line in the cornfield beyond, into action.

Maj. Hilary Herbert's Antietam After-Action Report - Emerging Civil War

While the actions of Richard H. Anderson’s division on September 17, 1862 are generally known, pinning down specifics has always been difficult. Mostly, that is due to the fact that only one after-action report from the entire division (and it is not from Anderson himself) was reproduced in the...

emergingcivilwar.com

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Pryor's brigade, leading the division, crossed the Hagerstown Pike and approached the Piper farm shortly after 10:00. Chamberlain's account is an excellent description of this movement toward the barn and then to the orchard. Here he says he rested a few minutes and then attempted to rally the men of his regiment, who had been scattered during the advance to the orchard. While doing this, he was ordered to the to find Anderson and ask for reinforcements. He was told that Anderson had been wounded.

Wright's brigade (which I haven't detailed yet) advanced toward the Sunken Road and reached it probably around 10:30. Pryor's brigade was still in the orchard at this time. Prior's, Cumming's, and Posey's brigades did not move forward until approximately 10:45. So there is a gap of anywhere from 15-30 minutes between those brigades reached the area of the Piper farm buildings and when they advanced to support Hill's position in the road.

This gap of time may all be explained by Anderson's sounding and Pryor's assuming command. I would say if Anderson was still on the field at this point, this does not reflect well in him. Those 15-30 were crucial and his brigades were by and large stationary. Pryor's, Cumming's and Posey's brigades reached the Sunken Road position sometime between 10:45 and 11:00, and the Confederate position collapsed a few minutes after that (by about 11:15 at the latest).

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Sorry for the delay before continuing this thread -- been busy with daughter's graduation, etc.

Brigadier General "Rans" Wright
​

Wright's Brigade -- Brigadier General Ambrose R. Wright
Wrights brigade is interesting for a couple of reasons. The first is, it was the inly brigade to go into battle with their regular brigade commander in command. The other four brigades:

Armistead's brigade -- detached to the West Woods.

Pryor's brigade -- Pryor assumed command of the division while the division was moving toward the Piper farm and Colonel John Hately of the 5th Florida commanded the brigade.

Mahone's brigade, commanded by Colonel William Parham, was so reduced that it was attached to Pryor's brigade and fell under Hately's command.

Wilcox's Brigade was commanded by Colonel John C. Cummings, who not only was not the brigade's regular commander, but didn't even belong to the brigade or even the division. Cumming was colonel of the 10th Georgia in Semmes's division.

Featherston's brigade was commanded by Colonel Carnot Posey of the 16th Mississippi.

It is perhaps no surprise then (interesting point #2) that Wright's brigade was the only one of Anderson's brigades to move directly into action. It was the inly brigade that appeared to enter the fighting with an apparent purpose. This is made even more interesting in that Wright's brigade was the last of Anderson's brigades to cross the Hagerstown Pike and advance toward the Piper farm.

The third interesting point is the route the brigade took to go into action. Wright crossed the Hagerstown Pike north of Piper's lane (basically following Pryor's route), passed north of Piper's barn, and moved behind Pryor's stalled brigade into Piper's orchard. There his men encountered the first of several stout fences enclosing the orchard and surrounding fields. Tearing down the heavy oak pickets under concentrated artillery fire proved costly and slowed the advance significantly.

The brigade formed in line: 3rd Georgia on the right, then 48th Georgia, 44th Alabama, and 22nd Georgia on the left.

With only about 400–450 men, Wright's brigade nevertheless advanced aggressively northeast through the orchard and Piper's cornfield toward the exposed right flank of G. B. Anderson's brigade at the Sunken Road.

This somewhat convoluted route -- crossing the pike to the north and then moving toward the southern end of the line (actually moving in a southeasterly direction) subjected the brigade to an intense artillery crossfire from Tompkins's battery on the Dunker Church plateau and the Federal batteries in the other side of Antietam Creek. Once the brigade reached the rising ground near the Piper cornfield, Federal infantry fire struck with equal severity.

During the advance Wright's horse was struck squarely by an artillery shell and literally blown apart beneath him. Wright himself survived but was soon severely wounded in the leg. Command passed first to Colonel Robert Jones of the 22nd Georgia, who was almost immediately shot through the lung, and then to Colonel William Gibson of the 48th Georgia.

Despite the carnage, the brigade pressed on.
The left of Wright's line initially emerged into the rear of the 30th North Carolina and was driven back by severe Federal musketry fire. The brigade then rallied farther right and finally occupied the Sunken Road beside G. B. Anderson's battered North Carolinians. By this point Wright's brigade had already lost nearly half its strength.

Inside the Sunken Road the situation deteriorated rapidly. Wright's men found themselves:
under continued enfilading artillery fire,
compressed into an overcrowded defensive position, and facing mounting Federal pressure from Kimball's brigade, especially the 7th West Virginia and 132nd Pennsylvania.

Interesting point #4 -- Wright expected reinforcement from Pryor on its left, but they were still motionless in and around Piper's orchard. Believing the Federals in front were wavering, Wright — watching from a litter after being wounded a second time — ordered or encouraged a charge against the exposed Federal left flank.

Many of G. B. Anderson's thought Wright was drunk and refused Wright's order or request to join the charge, refusing to leave the cover of the Sunken Road. Other of the North Carolinians advanced briefly. The charge therefore went forward only partially supported. It failed.

Wright/Gibson's survivors staggered back into the road after suffering severe losses.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Some questions I have

It is impossible to know because of a lack of documentary evidence, but I'd love to know how Wright's brigade came to attack where it did. Did he receive orders from Richard Anderson before Anderson was wounded? Did Hill order him to the right? Did Wright act on his own initiative.

Every other brigade in the division came to a stop and stood in place for a relatively significant period of time, but Wright's did not.

Some authors have suggested that Anderson intended to put his entire division into action on the right before he was wounded. Wright's actions would seem to support this idea. Perhaps Anderson relayed orders to Wright before he left the field, but if so those orders obviously did not reach the other brigade commanders. Wright's expectation of support from Pryor's brigade also seems to support this idea, but no one in Pryor's brigade seemed to know anything about it.

Finally, if Anderson's intention was for Wright to attack on the right from the start, why have him cross the Hagerstown Pike north of the Piper farm. They were exposed to a destructive and demoralizing artillery crossfire all the way from the pike to the Sunken Road. It would seem crossing the pike further south would have shortened the distance (and therefore the time) in getting to the right flank and also provided somewhat more shelter from the artillery fire.

 

[RedRover]

Here's a brief account from the Third Georgia Volunteers of Wright's brigade.

Southern Historical Society Papers

www.google.com

A description of General Wright at the battle was given in the Atlanta Journal, November 2, 1901, by C.H. Andrews.

 

[rpkennedy]

Some questions I have

It is impossible to know because of a lack of documentary evidence, but I'd love to know how Wright's brigade came to attack where it did. Did he receive orders from Richard Anderson before Anderson was wounded? Did Hill order him to the right? Did Wright act on his own initiative.

Every other brigade in the division came to a stop and stood in place for a relatively significant period of time, but Wright's did not.

Some authors have suggested that Anderson intended to put his entire division into action on the right before he was wounded. Wright's actions would seem to support this idea. Perhaps Anderson relayed orders to Wright before he left the field, but if so those orders obviously did not reach the other brigade commanders. Wright's expectation of support from Pryor's brigade also seems to support this idea, but no one in Pryor's brigade seemed to know anything about it.

Finally, if Anderson's intention was for Wright to attack on the right from the start, why have him cross the Hagerstown Pike north of the Piper farm. They were exposed to a destructive and demoralizing artillery crossfire all the way from the pike to the Sunken Road. It would seem crossing the pike further south would have shortened the distance (and therefore the time) in getting to the right flank and also provided somewhat more shelter from the artillery fire.

An interesting anecdote about Wright is that after he was hit in the leg, he insisted that his men carry him forward to the Sunken Road rather than to the rear when they advanced to Anderson's right. It was in the road when Wright was shot in the chest and his men carried him out when the Sunken Road line collapsed.

Ryan

 

[Andy Cardinal]

An interesting anecdote about Wright is that after he was hit in the leg, he insisted that his men carry him forward to the Sunken Road rather than to the rear when they advanced to Anderson's right. It was in the road when Wright was shot in the chest and his men carried him out when the Sunken Road line collapsed.

Ryan

Many of the North Carolinians in the road assumed Wright was drunk, but I believe that what appeared to be erratic behavior was due to his wounds. Aside from the chest wound, he was by one account thrown 12 feet the air when his horse was killed by a shell.

 

[rpkennedy]

Many of the North Carolinians in the road assumed Wright was drunk, but I believe that what appeared to be erratic behavior was due to his wounds. Aside from the chest wound, he was by one account thrown 12 feet the air when his horse was killed by a shell.

It's funny because a number of Georgia sources are pretty effusive in their praise for Wright's courage. Many of his men loved his actions at Antietam, no matter how erratic they were.

Ryan

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Here's a brief account from the Third Georgia Volunteers of Wright's brigade.

Southern Historical Society Papers

www.google.com

A description of General Wright at the battle was given in the Atlanta Journal, November 2, 1901, by C.H. Andrews.

Thanks for sharing this

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Brigadier General Roger Pryor
​

Anderson's brigades finally go into action
Pryor's brigade -- As Wright's attack collapsed, Pryor's brigade finally advanced through Piper's orchard and cornfield toward the Sunken Road.
The movement immediately dissolved into chaos.

The brigade came under devastating artillery and musketry fire: Lt. Col. G. A. Coppens of the 8th Florida was killed, Captain Waller succeeded him and was killed carrying the colors, Hately was shot through both thighs, Colonel Joseph Mayo of the 3rd Virginia was wounded, Captain W. D. Ballantine commanding the 2nd Florida went down, and command passed repeatedly down the line. Leadership virtually disappeared.

Some portions of the brigade pushed too far forward beyond the lane before being repulsed. Others crowded directly into G. B. Anderson's already congested sector.

Posey's brigade -- Posey's Mississippians followed directly behind Pryor through the orchard and cornfield. As they emerged behind the Sunken Road defenders, confusion became so extreme that the Mississippians mistook North Carolinians in the road for Federals and fired into their backs.

Lieutenant Franklin H. Weaver of the 4th North Carolina stood up with the colors to stop the firing and was immediately killed.

Posey's men then surged into and beyond the road in another costly frontal effort against French's Federals. Many were cut down in what one Confederate called the "overflow" beyond the lane.

Rather than restoring order, the arrival of Posey's brigade intensified the congestion and confusion.

Cumming's and Wilcox's brigade --Cumming/Wilcox's brigade entered last.

Wilcox's brigade fragmented badly during its advance. The 10th and 11th Alabama moved into the cornfield behind Wright and Pryor, while the 8th and 9th Alabama crossed farther east and occupied advanced rail-fence positions overlooking Federal lines. This split appears to have been driven partly by terrain and partly by battlefield confusion.

The Alabamians initially benefited from some concealment in ravines near the southern extension of the Sunken Road, but once they reached higher ground they too came under devastating artillery and musketry fire. Only scattered elements reached the road itself. Most lay down in the cornfield or along fences and fought from there.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Collapse of the Confederate position -- By the time Anderson's entire division had entered the fight, the Confederate defense at the Sunken Road was already unraveling.

The division's brigades had not arrived as a coordinated striking force. Instead they entered battle sequentially: Wright first, then Pryor, followed by Posey, and finally Cumming/Wilcox.

Each brigade suffered severe artillery fire, catastrophic officer casualties, fragmented deployment, and mounting confusion.

The Sunken Road itself became dangerously overcrowded. Hill's and Anderson's brigades intermixed, commands overlapped, friendly fire erupted, and coherent control largely disappeared.

The Confederates did succeed in temporarily thickening the line and inflicting additional losses on the Federals. But they could not restore cohesion or mount a coordinated counterattack.

The tragedy of Anderson's division was that it reached the battlefield with enough manpower to matter, yet without the command structure necessary to employ it effectively. Anderson's wounding created a vacuum that Pryor could not fill, and no senior Confederate commander—Lee, Longstreet, or D. H. Hill—imposed coherent direction on the arriving brigades.

Instead, the last substantial Confederate reserve north of Sharpsburg was fed into the Sunken Road sector in a series of disconnected, unsupported assaults under converging artillery and infantry fire. Anderson's s arrival briefly prolonged the defense of Bloody Lane. It could not save it.

 

[67th Tigers]

Any clues as to the strength? DH Hill notoriously understated his own division, and he's the only source for Anderson's 5 brigades.

The 2nd September strengths for those brigades were roughly:

RH Anderson's Division (- Armistead)

Wright: 1,468

44th AL: 435​

3rd GA: 362​

22nd GA: 266​

48th GA: 402​

Mahone: 1,500

6th VA: 440​

12th VA: 411​

16th VA: 318​

41st VA: 329​

Wilcox's Division

Wilcox: 1,392

8th AL: 495​

9th AL: 268​

10th AL: 290​

11th AL: 270​

Featherston: 1,565

12th MS: 311​

16th MS: 583​

19th MS: 394​

2nd MS Bn.: 208​

Pryor: 2,625

14th AL: 268​

2nd FL: 444​

5th FL: 773​

8th FL: 644​

3rd VA: 492​

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Nothing concrete for September 17. I am not sure any real numbers can found other than estimates. Parham's brigade (Mahone, wounded at Second Manassas) was so decimated from casualties at Cramptons Gap and men lost during the march from Harper's Ferry that it was consolidated with Pryor's brigade before going into battle. I have seen a reference to as few as 82 men remaining in the brigade by the time it reached Sharpsburg (via Antietam on the Web), but don't know the source for that number.

 

[rpkennedy]

Nothing concrete for September 17. I am not sure any real numbers can found other than estimates. Parham's brigade (Mahone, wounded at Second Manassas) was so decimated from casualties at Cramptons Gap and men lost during the march from Harper's Ferry that it was consolidated with Pryor's brigade before going into battle. I have seen a reference to as few as 82 men remaining in the brigade by the time it reached Sharpsburg (via Antietam on the Web), but don't know the source for that number.

That number is from Ezra Carman, IIRC.

Ryan