Longstreet

[cash]

Correct about the artillery fuses. The victories that Lee and his men previously achieved were vast from a strategic perspective; such as defensive victories, victories by outflanking the enemy, tactical losses that resulted in an enemy retreat, or occasional breakthrough charges that broke the enemy's back. Without hindsight, Lee had hoped Meade would vacate his position, but in the back of his mind had to have known Meade was not going to retreat, especially after day 2. After all, Lee was in Meade's backyard. Therefore, in his mind, the way through victory was by way of frontal assault. Lee had to ask himself, if Alexander's artillery was accurate, would it have been effective enough to greatly weaken Meade's position for a Confederate breakthrough. How many historic battles has this happened prior to Gettysburg?

Why did he have to know Meade would not retreat? If Lee was able to capture Cemetery Hill Meade would be forced to retreat because Cemetery Hill was the key to the entire position.

 

[Lost Cause]

Longstreet was very effective on Day Two. They captured the Peach Orchard, the Wheatfield, Devil's Den, and came within a whisker of winning the entire battle. Lee had seen his men push the Federals out of strong positions before. Look at Chancellorsville.

Gary Gallagher says Pickett's

Why did he have to know Meade would not retreat? If Lee was able to capture Cemetery Hill Meade would be forced to retreat because Cemetery Hill was the key to the entire position.

Because if there was an inkling that Meade would retreat after the charge regardless if it ended in victory or defeat, it would've made the charge beneficial (ie after malvern Hill).

 

[ole]

Noob question:

I don't have a detailed knowledge of the terrain but was it important that they used roads? The grounds appears to undulate but not enough deter an army on the march.

I expect a Homer Simpson sized D'oh! but all knowledge is good.

It is extremely important that they use roads. They had wagons and artillery to move, which don't move well over long distances without roads. Also, while infantry doesn't necessarily need roads to march over, if they don't use roads they tend to arrive much more worn out.

Cash gave one reason. Another would be that marching off road would spend much of their marching day removing or climbing over fences.

 

[cash]

Because if there was an inkling that Meade would retreat after the charge regardless if it ended in victory or defeat, it would've made the charge beneficial (ie after malvern Hill).

I'm not sure I understand your point.

 

[rpkennedy]

Noob question:

I don't have a detailed knowledge of the terrain but was it important that they used roads? The grounds appears to undulate but not enough deter an army on the march.

I expect a Homer Simpson sized D'oh! but all knowledge is good.

For armies of the time (and, in many ways, still today), roads are necessary to move large numbers of men efficiently. As Cash pointed out, there would have been large numbers of cannon and wagons that required roads to move around.

In addition, moving troops cross-country, while potentially shorter, could present serious problems. For one thing, you would need exceptional maps to know where you're going as well as a number of officers who can properly read a compass and map and calculate routes efficiently. And that doesn't talk about the terrain itself which included large numbers of fences, creeks, hills, etc. which will slow down a column. In the end, the fastest and most efficient way to move a lot of troops is using the road network (which is why everyone converged on Gettysburg in the first place as 8 roads met in the vicinity of the town).

R

 

[Lost Cause]

I'm not sure I understand your point.

I will elaborate more clearly. I revert back to the seven days campaign where Lee tenaciously drove McClellan from Richmond. It did not matter whether Lee won or lost the battles from a tactical perspective as long as McClellan kept retreating. Fast forward to Gettysburg day three. The only way Lee was going to defeat Meade was by drawing him away from the high ground through a direct attack or by outflanking him. IMO Pickett's charge was going to fail regardless of who coordinated it from a tactical perspective. To Meade's and the AOP's credit, they were not going to allow the charge to succeed. Therefore, Lee would need to out flank Meade to a more strategic location and force Meade to strike him. Lee did not have the resources for continual attacks in the campaign like Grant did during Overland.

 

[War Horse]

Longstreet did not agree with Lee's plans and there is nothing new about that. They often disagreed and Longstreet on several occasions was able to convince Lee to listen to him. At Second Manassa on August 29th Lee wanted an all out attack, Longstreet demurred. Longstreet requested delaying the attack until further reconnaissance. After more through study Lee was disappointed but accepted Longstreet's recommendation for a night time reconnaissance. He sent Hoods Texas Brigade. They set out at 6:30 PM the result was the Confederates found Porter and the Union Army well established resulting in Lee postponing the offensive. Longstreet was a deliberate, careful tactician who was unwilling to throw his men into a situation without knowledge of the terrain or strength of the enemy. Lee and Longstreet's relationship had grown and they respected one anothers opinion.

On the third day of Gettysburg, Longstreet did have knowledge of the terrain and the enemy's strength. Longstreet did disagree with Lee's Offensive (This was not uncommon at all as the two debated at many engagements) however, he did follow his orders, unfortunately as at 2nd Manassa Longstreet was right. I believe Longstreet's Plan of a right flanking movement was by design just his means of getting the AONV out of there and to better ground where ever that ground might be. As long as it was not that ground.

 

[Lost Cause]

I agree that AONV needed to find better ground. The longer the army remained in the North the more Lincoln was going to press Meade for action. This falls in Lee's favor for a desperate Northern attack. Lee's problem would have been maintaining adequate supplies for his army.

 

[War Horse]

It would really help if written orders existed .

Ever since the" lost "orders that were wrapped up in cigars Lee stopped providing written orders to his suborinates for fear they would fall into the wrong hands .

We will never know for sure if Longstreet was given specific instructions .

I tend to agree that Longstreet experienced some kind of breakdown .

One thing we all should agree on : Longstreet had little faith the July 2nd attack would succeed and NO FAITH whatsoever that July 3rd would be successful .

I can't imagine the stress he must of been under knowing he was sending all those men to their deaths . All his thoughts of loyalty ,duty , honor etc etc...all that responsibility put him at odds with himself . Plus his children had recently all died . His mental and emotional state is unimaginable to me ....and to most people of this era .

Had Longstreet been 100% I believe he would of been able to influence Gen Lee and events would have turned out different .

JEB, I agree the sorrow of losing his three children definitely affected his performance in battle. That was never more evident than in the battle of Seven Pines when he took the wrong road and delayed the attack. His children died in late February of 62 and the battle of Seven Pines took place on May 31th 1862 and Longstreet was ordered to take position by way of Nine Mile Rd instead he was found marching on the Williamsburg Rd. His orders were verbal and he never admitted to being wrong. However a considerable entanglement of troops resulted. After the engagement he redeemed himself and fought with distinction earning Lee's confidence and becoming his tactical consultant or at least sounding board.

 

[War Horse]

I agree that AONV needed to find better ground. The longer the army remained in the North the more Lincoln was going to press Meade for action. This falls in Lee's favor for a desperate Northern attack. Lee's problem would have been maintaining adequate supplies for his army.

True and this was at the forefront of Lee's thoughts. He knew he could not sustain his army for a prolonged period of time north of the Potomac which could be why he stayed and fought on the 3rd. He wanted a decisive victory and thought the war would end that day if he destroyed the AOP. Only an opinion

 

[Lost Cause]

JEB, I agree the sorrow of losing his three children definitely affected his performance in battle. That was never more evident in the battle of Seven Pines when he took the wrong road and delayed the attack. His children died in late February of 62 and the battle of Seven Pines took place on May 31th 1862 and Longstreet was order to take position by way of Nine Mile rd instead he was found marching on Williamsburg rd. His orders were verbal and he never admitted to being wrong. However a considerable entanglement of troops resulted. After the engagement he redeemed himself and fought with distinction earning Lee's confidence and becoming tactical consultant or at least sounding board.

Longstreet was frequently delayed going into battle. I am not sure if I would equate the loss of his children to being misdirected. The roads can be confusing, even by today's standards. Jackson's performance was subpar throughout the campaign. Lee gave leeway with Longstreet and Jackson in carrying out his orders because he had the confidence they would make the right decisions. In contrast, that backfired with Ewell and Hill later in the war.

 

[Lost Cause]

True and this was at the forefront of Lee's thoughts. He knew he could not sustain his army for a prolonged period of time north of the Potomac which could be why he stayed and fought on the 3rd. He wanted a decisive victory and thought the war would end that day if he destroyed the AOP. Only an opinion

I agree, Lee should have known he could not defeat "Those people" with a single decisive victory.

 

[War Horse]

Longstreet was frequently delayed going into battle. I am not sure if I would equate the loss of his children to being misdirected. The roads can be confusing, even by today's standards. Jackson's performance was subpar throughout the campaign. Lee gave leeway with Longstreet and Jackson in carrying out his orders because he had the confidence they would make the right decisions. In contrast, that backfired with Ewell and Hill later in the war.

I agree, the point I was trying to make is that if at anytime the loss of his children could have played a roll in his poor performance it would have been at the battle of Seven Pines due to the short span of time from the children's actual deaths. Only three months passing. Records show he returned to the army a much different man and his sorrow knew no depth. At the time Johnston was the commanding general. Lee was still Davis's war advisor.

 

[ole]

I will elaborate more clearly. I revert back to the seven days campaign where Lee tenaciously drove McClellan from Richmond. It did not matter whether Lee won or lost the battles from a tactical perspective as long as McClellan kept retreating. Fast forward to Gettysburg day three. The only way Lee was going to defeat Meade was by drawing him away from the high ground through a direct attack or by outflanking him. IMO Pickett's charge was going to fail regardless of who coordinated it from a tactical perspective. To Meade's and the AOP's credit, they were not going to allow the charge to succeed. Therefore, Lee would need to out flank Meade to a more strategic location and force Meade to strike him. Lee did not have the resources for continual attacks in the campaign like Grant did during Overland.

Let's simplify. Lee's supply was tenuous. There was no way to move around the AotP to the right. His army could not simply dig in and hope for Meade to move against them. He was between a rock and a hard place. He had to move. One way or another.

I read that as he either had to attack or go home. Lee was not nowhere near close to quitting and going home. So he had to attack.

In hindsight, it would seem to be that he would have survived better if he had just called the whole thing off and gone home. But that ain't Lee. He wouldn't leave, and the AoNV got severiously mauled.

Was that a fault?

 

[ole]

Longstreet was not wrong in wanting to go around the Union left flank. However, he underestimated the difficulty of doing so.

Someone posted, maybe in this thread, that the roads east did not favor such a move. And moving to the right would expose his left to some mobile, antagonistic forces.

Lee's planning was solid. Gettysburg was not part of the plan. Well, it was part, but that part didn't work out. Lee didn't get to confront the AotP on ground of his choosing, which was a major part of the plan.

Marching through Pennsylvania was not going to be a walk in the park. And marching back through already pillaged territory is often forgotten.

 

[War Horse]

Let's simplify. Lee's supply was tenuous. There was no way to move around the AotP to the right. His army could not simply dig in and hope for Meade to move against them. He was between a rock and a hard place. He had to move. One way or another.

I read that as he either had to attack or go home. Lee was not nowhere near close to quitting and going home. So he had to attack.

In hindsight, it would seem to be that he would have survived better if he had just called the whole thing off and gone home. But that ain't Lee. He wouldn't leave, and the AoNV got severiously mauled.

Was that a fault?

Not a fault a determination. A very costly one!

 

[thomas aagaard]

JEB, battle of Seven Pines took place on May 31th 1862

I also think we have to remember that this is still rather early i the war. The generals were still learning how to command large armies.

 

[rpkennedy]

Not a fault a determination. A very costly one!

To paraphrase Shelby Foote, the massive casualties that the AoNV had during the course of the war was the price the Confederacy paid for having Lee as a commander. He was going to win battles but he was going to take serious casualties doing it.

R

 

[War Horse]

To paraphrase Shelby Foote, the massive casualties that the AoNV had during the course of the war was the price the Confederacy paid for having Lee as a commander. He was going to win battles but he was going to take serious casualties doing it.

R

Exactly he could not replenish as could the Union. I think there is the most defining difference between Lee, Grant and Longstreet. The later was much more cautious. Not that Lee's hit them hard strategy was wrong. The CSA to be successful could not afford a long drug out war. On more than one occasion the opportunity presented itself but slipped away

 

[cash]

I will elaborate more clearly. I revert back to the seven days campaign where Lee tenaciously drove McClellan from Richmond. It did not matter whether Lee won or lost the battles from a tactical perspective as long as McClellan kept retreating. Fast forward to Gettysburg day three. The only way Lee was going to defeat Meade was by drawing him away from the high ground through a direct attack or by outflanking him. IMO Pickett's charge was going to fail regardless of who coordinated it from a tactical perspective. To Meade's and the AOP's credit, they were not going to allow the charge to succeed. Therefore, Lee would need to out flank Meade to a more strategic location and force Meade to strike him. Lee did not have the resources for continual attacks in the campaign like Grant did during Overland.

And what roads would they use to go around the flank? What position would they take up? Where is the mythical "Mount Longstreet" where they would take up this supposedly strong position between Meade and Washington?

Lee had the resources for one more attack, and he was in contact with the enemy. There was no feasible way to move around Meade's flank.