Longstreet

[cash]

My issue with Longstreet as re: Gettysburg has always been what I perceive as his petulant attitude on Day 2, which imo led to a less-than-his-best performance in the assault of that day.

I think I may agree, though first I'd like to know your view on how he could have done better. As it was he came very close to victory, and it was only through a combination of luck and guts that the Union Army was able to repulse his attacks.

 

[cash]

With his two divisions, he wrecks the 3rd Corps, inflicts heavy casualties on elements of the 2nd and 5th Corps, and comes near to destroying the flank of the AotP. He did son of his best fighting of the war on July 2nd.

R

Yes, he did, and I'm interested in the viewpoints of what he could have done better. I have an idea of my own.

 

[cash]

That could have been obtained without generalizations.

Where? Where do they go?

 

[Lost Cause]

Where? Where do they go?

Catoctin Mountain via Emmitsburg Road. Meade had orders not to engage look how that turned out. Fortunately for the Union Army he and his subordinate generals were not Burnside. I believe Lee was delusional only in that he thought his army was invincible. hindsight was not needed when Lee has to only look back at Malvern Hill and Fredericksburg. Going back to the artillery fuse discussion, hypothetically we will assume they were on target. For my education, please provide an example when artillery successfully softened the defensive line enough to have to caused a victory prior to July 3.

 

[cash]

Catoctin Mountain via Emmitsburg Road. Meade had orders not to engage look how that turned out. Fortunately for the Union Army he and his subordinate generals were not Burnside. I believe Lee was delusional only in that he thought his army was invincible. hindsight was not needed when Lee has to only look back at Malvern Hill and Fredericksburg. Going back to the artillery fuse discussion, hypothetically we will assume they were on target. For my education, please provide an example when artillery successfully softened the defensive line enough to have to caused a victory prior to July 3.

Catoctin Mountain does nothing for Lee.

This was an unprecedented bombardment of artillery. Nothing like it had been seen before. Assuming it breaks up the Union artillery and does significant damage to the Union infantry, combined with the intermittent cover the assaulting force had from the terrain, they have a decent chance of being able to arrive with sufficient force to seize Cemetery Hill.

 

[Jamieva]

And based on the slacking of fire coming from the Union side, combined with the smoke obscuring the view, they thought it was working

 

[screnshaw]

1-Longstreet refused to allow McLaws to go with Capt. Johnston to reconnoiter the ground on which the attack was planned, clearly irritated at the time that Lee was either a-going ahead with the attack despite his argument to the contrary, b-discussing the specifics with one of his subordinates without his presence, or c-both. As far as I'm aware, Pete never gave any explanation or reasoning for this. Johnston's faulty reconnaissance might not have been a problem had McLaws accompanied him.
2-Longstreet's delay in preparing for the attack- ie-his 'One boot off' comment, despite Lee's clearly stated desire that he go ahead and begin his preparations for the attack after Johnston's delivery of his reconnaissance report.
3-When McLaws told Longstree of the unforseen heavy concentration in the peach orchard, he refused to go look for himself, refused to allow McLaws to wait for artillery support and ordered him to go forward.
4-When Hood reported the impossibility of an attack on the Union lines as he had discovered them. Longstreet stuck to his orders to attack up the Emmitsburg Rd, because 'General Lee had said so.'
5-Even when, after three requests from Hood, Longstreet rode over to deliver the order in person and thus saw the Union deployments, he again gave his robotic response that they must obey the orders of General Lee.
6-When Hood really NEEDED McLaws's help, Longstreet was holding them back, and ended up sending in the forces piecemeal, instead of in a coordinated way. The battle plan called for a progressively right to center attack. What happened instead was delay between the units, which allowed them to tire and be concentrated AGAINST, which resulted in at no time during the day having the full strength of any division being given at once.

Lee's common custom allowed great latitude with his corps commanders, and if Longstreet had been his normal self when he saw the actual deployments of the enemy, he would either have given alternative orders as to the direction of the attack, or, at the very least, notified Lee of the situation.

 

[cash]

1-Longstreet refused to allow McLaws to go with Capt. Johnston to reconnoiter the ground on which the attack was planned, clearly irritated at the time that Lee was either a-going ahead with the attack despite his argument to the contrary, b-discussing the specifics with one of his subordinates without his presence, or c-both. As far as I'm aware, Pete never gave any explanation or reasoning for this. Johnston's faulty reconnaissance might not have been a problem had McLaws accompanied him.

Johnston was an accomplished engineering officer, and he already wasn't by himself. More horsemen meant more opportunity for discovery, so I don't really fault Longstreet for this one.

2-Longstreet's delay in preparing for the attack- ie-his 'One boot off' comment, despite Lee's clearly stated desire that he go ahead and begin his preparations for the attack after Johnston's delivery of his reconnaissance report.

Delay approved by Lee

3-When McLaws told Longstree of the unforseen heavy concentration in the peach orchard, he refused to go look for himself, refused to allow McLaws to wait for artillery support and ordered him to go forward.
4-When Hood reported the impossibility of an attack on the Union lines as he had discovered them. Longstreet stuck to his orders to attack up the Emmitsburg Rd, because 'General Lee had said so.'
5-Even when, after three requests from Hood, Longstreet rode over to deliver the order in person and thus saw the Union deployments, he again gave his robotic response that they must obey the orders of General Lee.

I agree with these.

6-When Hood really NEEDED McLaws's help, Longstreet was holding them back, and ended up sending in the forces piecemeal, instead of in a coordinated way. The battle plan called for a progressively right to center attack. What happened instead was delay between the units, which allowed them to tire and be concentrated AGAINST, which resulted in at no time during the day having the full strength of any division being given at once.

The key to what he was doing, though, was that he was siphoning troops away from the Union right. He didn't need a breakthrough on the Union left. He needed it on the Union right, and the way to get that was to get troops from the right transferred to the left.

Lee's common custom allowed great latitude with his corps commanders, and if Longstreet had been his normal self when he saw the actual deployments of the enemy, he would either have given alternative orders as to the direction of the attack, or, at the very least, notified Lee of the situation.

I think you're spot on with #3, 4, and 5. But not so with #6. Victory in the battle would come with the confederates taking Cemetery Hill. That was the key terrain. Hood and McLaws weren't going to win the battle, and Longstreet's timing sending his men in was meant to keep the Federals siphoning men from Cemetery Hill, and it almost worked. I think #1 adds danger to the mission with no guarantee of increased success, and #2 was approved by Lee. Had they gone in at the planned time, we don't know what would have happened, but Sickles would have been in a more defensible position.

 

[screnshaw]

Johnston was an accomplished engineering officer, and he already wasn't by himself. More horsemen meant more opportunity for discovery, so I don't really fault Longstreet for this one.

I hear ya on this one. My issue was always more with the way Longstreet did it. McLaws said to Lee he wanted to go recon with Johnston, Lee said fine, Pete, without even looking at Lee, immediately, and tersely, said no, with no explanation. I've always believed he was just ticked about his disagreement with Lee and was showing his butt. It really wasn't all that unusual for general officers to go along on a recon.

Delay approved by Lee

I was actually referring to right after Johnston gave his report to Lee. Lee told Longstreet 'I think you had better move on.' I believe Lee obviously expected Longstreet to get moving on prepping for the attack. Lee then rode off to confer with Ewell. After Lee was gone is when Longstreet made the remark about not liking to attack with one boot off, and just stood pat.

When Lee was on the left, he was waiting for sounds of Longstreet's attack, and rode back when they didn't come, which is when he then ordered him to attack, and then agreed to a delay while one of the brigades(I forget which one) was brought up. I think because they were supposed to be close.

Victory in the battle would come with the confederates taking Cemetery Hill. That was the key terrain. Hood and McLaws weren't going to win the battle, and Longstreet's timing sending his men in was meant to keep the Federals siphoning men from Cemetery Hill, and it almost worked.

I couldn't agree with you more on this.

 

[cash]

I hear ya on this one. My issue was always more with the way Longstreet did it. McLaws said to Lee he wanted to go recon with Johnston, Lee said fine, Pete, without even looking at Lee, immediately, and tersely, said no, with no explanation. I've always believed he was just ticked about his disagreement with Lee and was showing his butt. It really wasn't all that unusual for general officers to go along on a recon.

I agree Longstreet had a bit of a tantrum that didn't reflect well.

I was actually referring to right after Johnston gave his report to Lee. Lee told Longstreet 'I think you had better move on.' I believe Lee obviously expected Longstreet to get moving on prepping for the attack. Lee then rode off to confer with Ewell. After Lee was gone is when Longstreet made the remark about not liking to attack with one boot off, and just stood pat.

When Lee was on the left, he was waiting for sounds of Longstreet's attack, and rode back when they didn't come, which is when he then ordered him to attack, and then agreed to a delay while one of the brigades(I forget which one) was brought up. I think because they were supposed to be close.

I'm with you. While he wouldn't have caught Sickles in his big mistake of moving forward, it would have been better coordinated with Ewell's attack.

 

[Alaskazimm]

The roads can be confusing, even by today's standards.

Quite true and even on those selfsame roads. When I was in high school we drove down into VA and MD visiting quite a few battle sites. Looking back I wish I was more informed of the battles since I didn't get a lot out of it. But I digress.
One day we were looking for Spotsylvainia Courthouse and even though my father was/is a very good navigator we got turned around and wound up driving down the wrong road, the Orange Plank rd iirc. Took about 1/2 hour to realize that and correct the mistake.

 

[thomas aagaard]

It really wasn't all that unusual for general officers to go along on a recon.

And it got Jackson killed...

 

[War Horse]

Longstreet was wrong at Gettysburg.

Where was that better ground? "Wherever it might be" might be nice in a fairy tale, but in reality there has to be a place to go. Where was it?

I'm not as studied as you on the matter. However I continue to study and I find more than myself find Longstreets and Hoods proposals feasible.

Below is taken by Terrence L. Salada and John D. Wedo. It is a very interesting read. Point is we all have our opinions.

Published opinions on General Longstreet's suggestion run the gamut. Tucker
writes that "Longstreet should not have been discredited for holding a contrary--and, as it
developed, a superior--view." (4) Harry W. Pfanz in Gettysburg: The Second Day writes
that it "made a lot of sense in the abstract." (5) Douglas Southall Freeman in Lee's
Lieutenants: A Study in Command Volume 3: Gettysburg to Appomattox refers to lack of
cavalry and "days of delay" in a move to the right; he proposes no route. (6) Jeffrey D.
Wert in General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Soldier, A
Biography, writes, "Longstreet's proposal of a vague flank movement was impractical,
and Lee rightly dismissed it at the time." (7) Finally, Bowden and Ward call it Lee's
"worst choice." (8) One can guess that personal opinions are similar.

If anyone would like to read the entire essay it can be found at this link. I am enjoying the spirited posts of everyone involved.

http://generalmeadesociety.org/pdf/longstreet paper to meade soc aug 2012.pdf

 

[Jamieva]

I think Lee lost a lot of confidence in Longstreet's ability to talk him out of an idea when he basically talked Lee into Malvern Hill based on Longstreet's recon.

 

[FarawayFriend]

Excellent, War Horse!
Longstreet will smile in heaven.

 

[JEB]

What about Longstreet's attack on Sickles salient ?

Why wasn't Sickles salient attacked simulaneously from two sides ???

EP Alexander points out , "Advancing Kershaw without advancing Barksdale would expose Kershaw to enfilade fire by the troops whom Barksdale would easily have driven off . Few battlefields can furnish examples of worse tactics ".


Failure to drive the federal left resulted in a serires of uncoordinated frontal assaults .

 

[cash]

I'm not as studied as you on the matter. However I continue to study and I find more than myself find Longstreets and Hoods proposals feasible.

Below is taken by Terrence L. Salada and John D. Wedo. It is a very interesting read. Point is we all have our opinions.

Published opinions on General Longstreet's suggestion run the gamut. Tucker
writes that "Longstreet should not have been discredited for holding a contrary--and, as it
developed, a superior--view." (4) Harry W. Pfanz in Gettysburg: The Second Day writes
that it "made a lot of sense in the abstract." (5) Douglas Southall Freeman in Lee's
Lieutenants: A Study in Command Volume 3: Gettysburg to Appomattox refers to lack of
cavalry and "days of delay" in a move to the right; he proposes no route. (6) Jeffrey D.
Wert in General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Soldier, A
Biography, writes, "Longstreet's proposal of a vague flank movement was impractical,
and Lee rightly dismissed it at the time." (7) Finally, Bowden and Ward call it Lee's
"worst choice." (8) One can guess that personal opinions are similar.

If anyone would like to read the intire essay it can be found at this link. I am enjoying the spirited posts of everyone involved.

http://generalmeadesociety.org/pdf/longstreet paper to meade soc aug 2012.pdf

I'm not an anti-Longstreet person at all, but in this case he was wrong. He made the assumption he could find some place between Meade and Washington where the ANV could set itself in a Fredericksburg-like Gibraltar. The thing is, he had no idea at all where such a place was or what roads could be taken to get there. If Lee followed his advice they'd be fumbling around looking for this mythical place hoping Meade didn't hit them while they were on the move. It's all fine to say "Just go around the right and find a place" if you don't have the actual responsibility for finding that place. Lee, as the commanding general, had that responsibility and he knew he didn't know where such a place was. Keep in mind that Lee was very familiar with the area around Washington, and if he didn't know of a good place to put the army between Washington and Meade, then such a place more than likely didn't exist. In order to compel Meade to attack them, they had to actually be threatening Washington or Baltimore. They couldn't do that from the South Mountain range or from Catoctin Mountain.

 

[War Horse]

I'm not an anti-Longstreet person at all, but in this case he was wrong. He made the assumption he could find some place between Meade and Washington where the ANV could set itself in a Fredericksburg-like Gibraltar. The thing is, he had no idea at all where such a place was or what roads could be taken to get there. If Lee followed his advice they'd be fumbling around looking for this mythical place hoping Meade didn't hit them while they were on the move. It's all fine to say "Just go around the right and find a place" if you don't have the actual responsibility for finding that place. Lee, as the commanding general, had that responsibility and he knew he didn't know where such a place was. Keep in mind that Lee was very familiar with the area around Washington, and if he didn't know of a good place to put the army between Washington and Meade, then such a place more than likely didn't exist. In order to compel Meade to attack them, they had to actually be threatening Washington or Baltimore. They couldn't do that from the South Mountain range or from Catoctin Mountain.

Agreed, Lee made the best choice with the information available to him at the time. The essay link I provided agreed after a very indepth study of the existing roads in the area complexed with the logistical challenges of moving an army of that size. The study concludes Lee made the best decision based on the information available to him known to be true. It also concludes to call Longstreet wrong would also not be correct. Longstreet's plan was to take on the unkown and Lee's plans were to deal with what is known. It's easy to say someone is dead wrong or right. There are times a decision has to be made and you live with the results. Disaster was the result of the decision made. Disaster would mostly been the result of the action recommented. Neither man was necessarily wrong. The debate is which disaster would have been less costly to the ANV. Although I have much more reading ahead of me on this subject and many others.

 

[cash]

Here's Dr. Richard Sommers speaking on R. E. Lee and Gettysburg. It's audio only, and not the highest quality since it was recorded from the audience, but I think Dick's perspective is 100% correct.

Dick Sommers, by the way, has probably forgotten more about the Civil War and military history than most of us will ever learn in our lifetimes. His command of the facts and his breadth and depth of knowledge are simply amazing. He can hold forth on just about any topic related to the war. He's a member of my round table and I've never seen him stumped.

 

[Lost Cause]

Catoctin Mountain does nothing for Lee.

This was an unprecedented bombardment of artillery. Nothing like it had been seen before. Assuming it breaks up the Union artillery and does significant damage to the Union infantry, combined with the intermittent cover the assaulting force had from the terrain, they have a decent chance of being able to arrive with sufficient force to seize Cemetery Hill.

There was a decent chance, but the gamble was expensive regardless if it ended in victory or defeat in both manpower and supplies for the ANV. That is why I see an alternative for day 3.

The mountain keeps Lee up North threatening Baltimore and Washington DC. This obviously does not cut off the road to Washington, however, Meade was going to have to do something whether he was ordered to engage Lee or not. By continuing the campaign, the AOP stays out of Va and increases dissension for the war in the North.