Infamous Order 191

[John Olexa]

Has the Corporal who found the orders ever been Identified?

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Corporal Barton Mitchell, 27th Indiana, wounded at Antietam

 

[Jimklag]

That's the thing, though, McClellan was viewed as a bit of a troublemaker because he kept hurrying people along - compared to Burnside, who didn't. It's not unreasonable that McClellan would have followed up, and there's quite a lot of improvement to be gotten simply from making sure the orders were telegraphed instead of going by barge.

Historically Burnside followed up on the 14th (the order having originally been sent on the 6th), which was basically right after he'd gotten properly settled into command, but McClellan wouldn't have needed to get settled in...

Maybe.

 

[John Olexa]

Thank you!

 

[rpkennedy]

Corporal Barton Mitchell, 27th Indiana, wounded at Antietam

Corporal Mitchell was wounded in the leg at Antietam which would result in his discharge in 1864.

Ryan

 

[Jimklag]

That's the thing, though, McClellan was viewed as a bit of a troublemaker because he kept hurrying people along - compared to Burnside, who didn't. It's not unreasonable that McClellan would have followed up, and there's quite a lot of improvement to be gotten simply from making sure the orders were telegraphed instead of going by barge.

Historically Burnside followed up on the 14th (the order having originally been sent on the 6th), which was basically right after he'd gotten properly settled into command, but McClellan wouldn't have needed to get settled in...

If McClellan had still been General-in-Chief I would probably agree with you. But no-one who was dependent on Halleck moving materiel for him was free from the fubar "Old Brains,"

 

[Saphroneth]

If McClellan had still been General-in-Chief I would probably agree with you. But no-one who was dependent on Halleck moving materiel for him was free from the fubar "Old Brains,"

Well, true, but even then it's frankly easy to get things sped up by several days just by messaging them directly - one of the screw ups was not letting one of the bridging teams know that this was an urgent matter!

 

[Saphroneth]

McClellan (he was not the only one) recognized that the only real way to pin Lee in place to bring the North's strengths in engineering & artillery to bear for the destruction of Lee's army was to threaten Richmond directly.

This was something Lee certainly recognized. I can't remember the exact wording, but at one point Lee said to Davis that it was imperative to get McClellan as far from Richmond as possible - as otherwise he would "turn it into a battle of posts" and just methodically grind his way into Richmond under cover of his guns.

He'd actually started this process in June 1862, but didn't have the men to cover his flank.

 

[Andrew]

The stream is definitely an obstacle, which is why McClellan ordered Burnside to cross on the 16th. Burnside was really incredibly slow in that battle.

I don't recall McClellan's order for Burnside to cross on the 16th. Can you provide some info on where I can read more about that? Thanks.

 

[Saphroneth]

I don't recall McClellan's order for Burnside to cross on the 16th. Can you provide some info on where I can read more about that? Thanks.

It wasn't an outright order to cross, but it was a warning order - 1100 hours on the 16th. I may have given the wrong impression, sorry (likely because I couldn't remember myself).

Essentially McClellan communicated his battle plan to Burnside among others, which was (as of the 16th) to basically make attacks on the north flank and the south flank before attacking in the centre with the reserves.
https://archive.org/stream/militaryreminiscen01coxdrich#page/306/mode/2up

 

[Carronade]

McClellan (he was not the only one) recognized that the only real way to pin Lee in place to bring the North's strengths in engineering & artillery to bear for the destruction of Lee's army was to threaten Richmond directly.

This was something Lee certainly recognized. I can't remember the exact wording, but at one point Lee said to Davis that it was imperative to get McClellan as far from Richmond as possible - as otherwise he would "turn it into a battle of posts" and just methodically grind his way into Richmond under cover of his guns.

IIRC Lee said that in 1864, when Grant was threatening to do the same thing, another parallel with 1862.

 

[Saphroneth]

IIRC Lee said that in 1864, when Grant was threatening to do the same thing, another parallel with 1862.

The example I'm thinking of was definitely 1862. Of course, for McClellan it was actually true - whatever Grant's other talents, he was not very good at regular approaches and his Petersburg Siege doesn't show a great deal of initiative (heck, he sent the siege train away IIRC).

 

[Carronade]

(heck, he sent the siege train away IIRC).

Did Grant have a siege train at the outset of the Overland campaign? There were a few heavy artillery units with the army, but in an infantry or train guard role. Otherwise there was an artillery brigade in each corps and two in the army reserve along with two horse artillery brigades, one of which was usually attached to the cavalry corps.

In the first few battles, the federals found that they were unable to use all their artillery in the confined terrain. The light artillery brigades of the reserve were broken up, with several additional batteries going to each of the corps artillery brigades. According to Rhea, the batteries were reduced from six to four guns, so the number of guns in the corps remained about the same. The excess guns, limbers, etc., particularly those which needed repairs, were sent back to Washington.

It might have made more sense, if the whole mass of artillery was not immediately needed, to send the complete brigades of the reserve to the rear, rather than creating a mob of of "orphan" sections or gun crews. This would also make it easier to return the reserve artillery to the army when circumstances warranted.

AFAIK the heavy siege artillery was only brought forward when things settled down to, well, a siege.

 

[67th Tigers]

Did Grant have a siege train at the outset of the Overland campaign? There were a few heavy artillery units with the army, but in an infantry or train guard role. Otherwise there was an artillery brigade in each corps and two in the army reserve along with two horse artillery brigades, one of which was usually attached to the cavalry corps.

In the first few battles, the federals found that they were unable to use all their artillery in the confined terrain. The light artillery brigades of the reserve were broken up, with several additional batteries going to each of the corps artillery brigades. According to Rhea, the batteries were reduced from six to four guns, so the number of guns in the corps remained about the same. The excess guns, limbers, etc., particularly those which needed repairs, were sent back to Washington.

It might have made more sense, if the whole mass of artillery was not immediately needed, to send the complete brigades of the reserve to the rear, rather than creating a mob of of "orphan" sections or gun crews. This would also make it easier to return the reserve artillery to the army when circumstances warranted.

AFAIK the heavy siege artillery was only brought forward when things settled down to, well, a siege.

Yes, and it was still the 1st CT Heavy Arty (history), the regiment that manned it in 1862. They were left manning the Washington defences during the Wilderness. On 9th May, 1862 Halleck enacted an order from Grant relieving them from the fortifications and sending them to Butler without their guns to serve as infantry. Butler received them, but immediately assigned them his "heavy" guns (meaning 20 pounders, the big 100 pdrs etc. never really returned) and formed his own siege train out of them. They got parcelled out to the whole of Grant's force during the siege, mainly manning mortars.

Meanwhile, Major Hatfield of the Ordnance (report) received an order to prepare a siege train on 20th April '64, which was just materiale, not gunners. They received the order to move to City Point 20th June '64.

There of course was never a serious attempt to bombard any part of the rebel lines, and Grant brought in many fewer guns than McClellan did in '62. Most fire was to harass the enemy.

 

[Saphroneth]

AFAIK the heavy siege artillery was only brought forward when things settled down to, well, a siege.

As 67th has highlighted, it wasn't used to do the battle-of-posts function as such. That's the thing Grant missed out on.

 

[67th Tigers]

As 67th has highlighted, it wasn't used to do the battle-of-posts function as such. That's the thing Grant missed out on.

Steven Newton in his "Lost for the Cause" references an order Grant issued in mid-July to send the siege guns back to Washington preparatory to giving up the effort at Petersburg. It was countermanded before it could be put into effect. Combined with Grant's letter to Sherman that Castel referenced in "Decision in the West" and the late John Y. Simon's article on Grant in June-July '64, I think the best interpretation is that Grant really was preparing to write off the effort it took to reach Petersburg. His letter to Sherman indicated he was preparing to fall back from Petersburg to a defensive position and send the forces released to Sherman.

 

[Saphroneth]

So the siege guns were only sent to City Point on 20 June and already Grant was preparing to send them back to Washington by mid-July. That's not a very long time spent before essentially giving up trying to force a decision.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

The stream is definitely an obstacle, which is why McClellan ordered Burnside to cross on the 16th. Burnside was really incredibly slow in that battle.

My understanding of the decision on the 18th was that McClellan didn't want to court a full battle two days in a row. Functionally McClellan's army on the 18th was still recovering.


Here's the map:

View attachment 162437
(map via 67th's blog, strengths are from Carman)

That's nightfall on the 17th. The change Lee made overnight was to pull back DH Hill and solidify his centre, though Lee also got ~6,000 stragglers filtering in overnight.


McClellan sent Morell over to Burnside as a temporary reinforcement if attacked, though Burnside promptly grabbed them and put them to be part of his battleline (it was west of the river) so that was out. There's also Couch's division arriving in the morning of the 18th (which was sent over to Franklin) and Humphreys' exhausted recruits later on (which were sent over to Burnside to replace Morell, though Burnside just added Humphreys to his reserve and didn't send Morell back).

Assuming that McClellan decides he has to attack, he essentially has to gamble that the troops shattered yesterday are reformed enough to not need shepherding, and he probably has to relieve Burnside of command as well to get Morell back. Allowing for the time taken to march Morell over to the north, this means an afternoon attack by Franklin with about 14,000 effective infantry against the Dunker Church area and Nicomedius hill.
Basically this is the assault from the morning of the 17th again and is certainly not guaranteed to succeed.


Worse, if it fails it means the exhaustion of McClellan's last troops who've not been tired out. Historically McClellan had 5th and 6th corps able to manoeuvre and fight well in the days after Antietam, which is how he was able to block Lee from his planned turning movement at Williamsport. Without that, it's essentially a question of whether Lee's troops are healthy enough to allow his plan to come off and let him regain the initiative (and advantage).
Either way, for McClellan to do this would mean a major gamble - the entire Confederate force is now "up", their defensive positions are still solid, and much of McClellan's army is still badly shattered from the assaults.

I have been reading Harsh's Sounding the Shallows. I didn't previously realize that it rained on the 18th. One of Jackson's men recorded, "The day was quite warm until the P.M. when there was a heavy thunder storm." A soldier in McLaws's division noted that it was "Cloudy and raining."

It seems that it started to rain early in the afternoon, and another soldier recorded that it rained "all day." Obviously, in addition to any other consideration, rain would have put a damper on any planned movements. Fighting in the rain was not common, although Chantilly a couple of weeks earlier was a notable exception.

 

[67th Tigers]

I have been reading Harsh's Sounding the Shallows. I didn't previously realize that it rained on the 18th. One of Jackson's men recorded, "The day was quite warm until the P.M. when there was a heavy thunder storm." A soldier in McLaws's division noted that it was "Cloudy and raining."

It seems that it started to rain early in the afternoon, and another soldier recorded that it rained "all day." Obviously, in addition to any other consideration, rain would have put a damper on any planned movements. Fighting in the rain was not common, although Chantilly a couple of weeks earlier was a notable exception.

That I did not notice before. Thanks!

 

[General Butterfield]

Excellent thread, learned alot from reading all of your informative comments.