Infamous Order 191

[Dom71]

I am sure this has been discussed before, and I did search around a bit before I posted this thread, and didn't see much to it so I decided to go ahead with it. So I apologize ahead of time if I'm repeating this.
I am reading Stephen W. Sears Lincoln's Lieutenants, and I just finished the Antietam chapter. Mr. Sears writes in conclusion of Antietam,
"George McClellan represents a singular Civil War conundrum. After the second Bull Run debacle only he could have reorganized and reshaped and revitalized the Army of the Potomac in time to campaign effectively in Maryland. Yet only he could have failed to exploit the remarkable promise of the Lost order. Only he, by his obsessive over counting, could have failed to capitalize on the opportunity (unique in all the war) on September 16-17 to wreck the Army of Northern Virginia."

I happened to spot a Gettysburg NPS lecture from this past winter done by Ranger Dan Vermilya titled
"On the McClellan-Go- round: George McClellan and the Antietam Campaign"
Where he gives little credence to the order, the reality being the orders do not speak of troop strength and are old at this point. He speaks of it at the 29:51 mark of the presentation.

So my question to our experts is, how important were these orders?
Did McClellan lose a valuable opportunity, or is it much ado about nothing?

 

[67th Tigers]

McClellan had ordered the strike on South Mountain several hours before SO191 was handed to him. The Army was moving as fast as humanly possible given the constraints of a single road.

 

[Saphroneth]

Yet only he could have failed to exploit the remarkable promise of the Lost order. Only he, by his obsessive over counting, could have failed to capitalize on the opportunity (unique in all the war) on September 16-17 to wreck the Army of Northern Virginia.

Sears is very uncomplimentary to McClellan, and this contains two or even three examples in two sentences. Since McClellan was already acting on the information in SO191 before he'd seen it (as he'd gotten the same information from his scouts) he'd have needed a time machine to do any better on that front...

...while Sears accuses McClellan of "obsessive over counting" while he himself has gotten the counts quite wrong. The numbers actually available to both sides at Antietam were pretty similar and McClellan didn't miss some great opportunity, and he had only a tiny reserve of troops left uncommitted at the end of the main battle day (the 17th).


Meanwhile, when Sears talks about missed opportunities he manages to forget one of the true great opportunities of the war, one created by McClellan and destroyed by Lincoln - the Loudoun Valley campaign, which isn't very well known in general but shouldn't have been missed by someone who's often described as a McClellan expert. While Antietam saw two armies straggling heavily and racing to reinforce their elements at Sharpsburg/Antietam (and where things were roughly equal), Loudoun Valley saw McClellan concentrating nearly 80,000 effectives around Warrenton within striking distance of Longstreet's wing (who was marching with only 23,400 effectives, with Jackson's half of the army blocked on the other side of the Blue Ridge and perhaps a week away from helping.)


If Antietam (which had a slight Federal advantage) is a unique opportunity to wreck the AoNV, Loudoun is an engraved invitation to turn Longstreet to paste and race Jackson back to Richmond on an inside line...

 

[Dom71]

I noticed the author isn't exactly a fan of McClellan which is why I wanted to see if maybe their was another side to it. My thanks to you and @67th Tigers for the response.

 

[Saphroneth]

I noticed the author isn't exactly a fan of McClellan which is why I wanted to see if maybe their was another side to it. My thanks to you and @67th Tigers for the response.

Sears alone isn't the problem, so much as that a lot of misconceptions have become totally baked in. It's amazing how often these false memes come in, such as McClellan being on a ship during Malvern Hill or the idea McClellan made the decision to withdraw from the Peninsula - or, for that matter, the idea McClellan significantly outnumbered his enemy during the Seven Days.

For Antietam specifically, one of the common assertions is that McClellan kept two entire corps out of the fight. But what actually happened was that there was one corps and elements of a second corps which were not sent on the attack - they were committed to the battle and were generally shielding some terribly shattered units - and what McClellan actually had as his reserve was two brigades with him (Morell's two, a third was posted elsewhere), and another two brigades (Newton and Torbert) over with Franklin that weren't in the line of battle.
As Lee had three brigades which hadn't yet fired a shot (Armistead, Pender and Field) then both sides are pretty much in the same state for uncommitted troops, but those Rebel troops who've been in battle are in a better state than the broken Federal troops being shielded by Franklin.


Someone saying McClellan dropped the ball really needs to provide a realistic alternative. We know he sent his army off as fast as possible and we know how fast his army turned up on the field, and I'm unsure I can see when he could have done differently safely...

 

[Carronade]

McClellan had ordered the strike on South Mountain several hours before SO191 was handed to him. The Army was moving as fast as humanly possible given the constraints of a single road.

That single road is something I find puzzling. Granted the National Road had the most capacity, but there was also the route through Crampton's Gap, used by 6th Corps, and the road, railroad, and canal/towpath along the river which does not seem to have been used at all.

Putting most of the army on the best road gives the appearance of concentration of force, but in truth it prolonged the process of concentrating the army on the far side of South Mountain.

Pardon me for repeating this, but the analogy that occurs to me is Napoleon's passage of the Black Forest in 1806, a similar situation except that he had less knowledge of his opponent's dispositions than McClellan did. He sent roughly equal forces on each of the three routes, the fastest way to get his entire army through the barrier. He appreciated that if one of his columns was blocked, those that got through would threaten to cut off the blocking force and thereby clear the way.

 

[Carronade]

Sears is very uncomplimentary to McClellan, and this contains two or even three examples in two sentences. Since McClellan was already acting on the information in SO191 before he'd seen it (as he'd gotten the same information from his scouts) he'd have needed a time machine to do any better on that front...

...while Sears accuses McClellan of "obsessive over counting" while he himself has gotten the counts quite wrong. The numbers actually available to both sides at Antietam were pretty similar and McClellan didn't miss some great opportunity, and he had only a tiny reserve of troops left uncommitted at the end of the main battle day (the 17th).

Meanwhile, when Sears talks about missed opportunities he manages to forget one of the true great opportunities of the war, one created by McClellan and destroyed by Lincoln - the Loudoun Valley campaign, which isn't very well known in general but shouldn't have been missed by someone who's often described as a McClellan expert. While Antietam saw two armies straggling heavily and racing to reinforce their elements at Sharpsburg/Antietam (and where things were roughly equal), Loudoun Valley saw McClellan concentrating nearly 80,000 effectives around Warrenton within striking distance of Longstreet's wing (who was marching with only 23,400 effectives, with Jackson's half of the army blocked on the other side of the Blue Ridge and perhaps a week away from helping.)

If Antietam (which had a slight Federal advantage) is a unique opportunity to wreck the AoNV, Loudoun is an engraved invitation to turn Longstreet to paste and race Jackson back to Richmond on an inside line...

True, we don't see much about Loudoun Valley, but it seems a remarkable missed opportunity.

 

[Saphroneth]

True, we don't see much about Loudoun Valley, but it seems a remarkable missed opportunity.

Yes, and it also makes McClellan's relief frankly suspicious! If he was being removed for lack of aggression, doing it then is a funny way to show it...

Pardon me for repeating this, but the analogy that occurs to me is Napoleon's passage of the Black Forest in 1806, a similar situation except that he had less knowledge of his opponent's dispositions than McClellan did. He sent roughly equal forces on each of the three routes, the fastest way to get his entire army through the barrier. He appreciated that if one of his columns was blocked, those that got through would threaten to cut off the blocking force and thereby clear the way.

I wonder if the problem is that pushing a force along the towpath along the Potomac would end up with their being totally unsupported (six miles from Franklin's detachment) and trying to fit through a gap less than 300 yards wide (from the river to the Weverton cliffs). They'd also end up running into pretty much the entire Confederate army, and the road route to reach the river from Frederick is the same one to reach Cramptons until at least Jefferson - functionally that means the "river" force is either behind Franklin's force or ahead of it, making it an "either/or" in some sense.

 

[67th Tigers]

That single road is something I find puzzling. Granted the National Road had the most capacity, but there was also the route through Crampton's Gap, used by 6th Corps, and the road, railroad, and canal/towpath along the river which does not seem to have been used at all.

Putting most of the army on the best road gives the appearance of concentration of force, but in truth it prolonged the process of concentrating the army on the far side of South Mountain.

Pardon me for repeating this, but the analogy that occurs to me is Napoleon's passage of the Black Forest in 1806, a similar situation except that he had less knowledge of his opponent's dispositions than McClellan did. He sent roughly equal forces on each of the three routes, the fastest way to get his entire army through the barrier. He appreciated that if one of his columns was blocked, those that got through would threaten to cut off the blocking force and thereby clear the way.

You've found what I think McClellan most serious mistake in the campaign was. Lets examine the road system:

Burnside's wing (1st and 9th Corps) is in the advance. They reach Frederick first and seize the two gaps in Catoctin Mountain near there. Cox seized the northern Braddock Gap and Rodman the Jefferson Gap. The other road near the Braddock Gap is the Shookstown Road and the experience of the 14th (when McClellan diverted 2nd Corps via to to get around the traffic) showed that vehicles, including artillery, could not move by it, and troops were slowed.

Sumner's wing (2nd and 12th Corps) crosses the Monocacy via the road from Urbana and is stacked up behind Burnside. McClellan has ordered 6th Corps to Urbana, with the intent to turn west there.

What McClellan could have done differently was sent Sumner's wing via the Jefferson Gap. It would offer several advantages. Sumner could have advanced earlier against Crampton's Gap, and would have had the options of heading NW to Middletown to reinforce Burnside at Fox's and Turner's gaps, or instead head SW to Weverton Gap (which had a similar defensive force to Crampton's Gap). However, I suspect that Frederick itself was the issue. As someone once pointed out, it took Lee two full days to march his army through Frederick, and the same should apply to McClellan.

Not on the map is Sugarloaf Mountain, which forces troops along the Potomac to north to Urbana, cross the Monocacy there and turn south again for Point of Rocks if heading there. That seems to have been the original idea for sixth corps.

 

[67th Tigers]

Yes, and it also makes McClellan's relief frankly suspicious! If he was being removed for lack of aggression, doing it then is a funny way to show it...

After much reading I finally concluded that Lincoln was not the major player in McClellan removal. On 5th November he simply withdrew protection of McClellan, after the polls had shut. Halleck obtained a signed order from Lincoln allowing Halleck to remove McClellan and Porter, and was allowed to do what he wanted with it. There was an issue of protocol, as Lincoln had signed their Commissions as commander of the AoP/ 5th Corps and the General-in-Chief could not legally countermand a Presidential order, and so Lincoln's signature needed to be on the paperwork.

The major player was Pope. Pope had opened a dialogue with Halleck wherein he tried to essentially blackmail Halleck into sacrificing McClellan and Porter to cover up his own failure at 2nd Bull Run. Halleck ran into the problem that Lincoln had actually withdrawn his protection of McClellan in late July, but had reinstated it after Antietam. When the Republicans got a good drubbing in the polls on 5th November he withdrew his protection again, and Halleck moved against McClellan.

 

[Saphroneth]

The major player was Pope. Pope had opened a dialogue with Halleck wherein he tried to essentially blackmail Halleck into sacrificing McClellan and Porter to cover up his own failure at 2nd Bull Run. Halleck ran into the problem that Lincoln had actually withdrawn his protection of McClellan in late July, but had reinstated it after Antietam. When the Republicans got a good drubbing in the polls on 5th November he withdrew his protection again, and Halleck moved against McClellan.

And no attention paid to the military situation...


I wonder if there's scope for a novel framing McClellan as something of a tragic hero, it might redress things a bit. Maybe a longshot, but then again The Killer Angels did a lot for other aspects of ACW history.

 

[Dom71]

I'm curious is it partly a situation where McClellan is his own worst enemy at times as well? I know the narrative on him is very negative, but was he as grossly insubordinate, and arrogant as he is portrayed?

 

[Nathanb1]

I'm curious is it partly a situation where McClellan is his own worst enemy at times as well? I know the narrative on him is very negative, but was he as grossly insubordinate, and arrogant as he is portrayed?

Yeppers. He really did breeze right by Lincoln and go upstairs without a word...read his letters to his wife. And various other quotes.

 

[67th Tigers]

Yeppers. He really did breeze right by Lincoln and go upstairs without a word...read his letters to his wife. And various other quotes.

The question of whether "the snub" really happened is interesting, and certainly if it did it was not meant or taken as an insult. None of the principles present (McClellan, Lincoln or Seward) ever mentioned it. There is a some evidence that the only source, John Hay, invented the story some decades afterwards. It didn't appear until the 1890's in a "court history" written for Lincoln's son, who was allowed to edit it.

Certainly, the wedding* party he supposidly was returning from happened around ten days before Hay records the "snub", but the wedding did occur on said day.... in St. Louis, Missouri. Unless the date is wrong, something is amiss.


* Col. Frank Wheaton of the 2nd Rhode Island to Emma Twiggs Mason, General Buell's stepdaughter.

 

[Saphroneth]

I'm curious is it partly a situation where McClellan is his own worst enemy at times as well? I know the narrative on him is very negative, but was he as grossly insubordinate, and arrogant as he is portrayed?

As 67th has pointed out, the story itself is highly dubious. McClellan was not as far as I am aware insubordinate - the closest incident with any substantiation is when someone who was not Lincoln asked him to disclose his plans, and McClellan refused unless ordered by the President. This is often reported as Lincoln asking and McClellan refusing, which would be insubordinate, but the true events are not.


The Snub would not automatically be insubordination (especially not in the etiquette of the time), but there's reason to suspect it didn't happen.

 

[Saphroneth]

As for arrogance... that's harder to say, though confidence and arrogance are hard to tell apart in a general. Certainly McClellan's actions and promises are fairly consistent - he said he could handle Yorktown with the forces he was given, but then he pretty promptly got a huge chunk of them stripped away.

 

[Saphroneth]

Though here's something interesting to think about. The times when McClellan was in the field with the forces and supplies he expected to get (had been promised) were:


The first few days at Yorktown.
The Antietam campaign.
The Loudoun Valley campaign.

In total, it's probably less than a month. (McClellan was being deprived of supplies for about a month after Antietam.) Worse, it's broken up into three chunks.
And yet, in that time, McClellan was always moving fast, confidently and aggressively, and indeed was moving fast enough to scare his opponent badly.

 

[Dom71]

Though here's something interesting to think about. The times when McClellan was in the field with the forces and supplies he expected to get (had been promised) were:


The first few days at Yorktown.
The Antietam campaign.
The Loudoun Valley campaign.

In total, it's probably less than a month. (McClellan was being deprived of supplies for about a month after Antietam.) Worse, it's broken up into three chunks.
And yet, in that time, McClellan was always moving fast, confidently and aggressively, and indeed was moving fast enough to scare his opponent badly.

Interesting. But why deprive him of supplies? If he is meeting his objectives wouldn't the administration be satisfied with his actions? Or is it political? He being an outspoken Democrat?

 

[67th Tigers]

Interesting. But why deprive him of supplies? If he is meeting his objectives wouldn't the administration be satisfied with his actions? Or is it political? He being an outspoken Democrat?

After Antietam it was a major screw-up. McClellan complained that supplies weren't forthcoming, but Washington was certainly issuing them. After an argument Lincoln eventually asked Thomas Scott, the assistant sec'y of war, to investigate. He found that the quartermasters in Washington were issuing the supplies to the troops in Washington and they were just being stacked up in yards in Washington instead of making their war to the field army.

 

[Dom71]

After Antietam it was a major screw-up. McClellan complained that supplies weren't forthcoming, but Washington was certainly issuing them. After an argument Lincoln eventually asked Thomas Scott, the assistant sec'y of war, to investigate. He found that the quartermasters in Washington were issuing the supplies to the troops in Washington and they were just being stacked up in yards in Washington instead of making their war to the field army.

Jeez so the early war was a total **** show after all.