Infamous Order 191

[Saphroneth]

Interesting. But why deprive him of supplies? If he is meeting his objectives wouldn't the administration be satisfied with his actions?

Lord knows. There's a certain attitude that Lincoln is good and therefore in the right when he and McClellan clash on things, but McClellan got jerked around so much it's incredible.

My "favorite" is probably the nonsense around getting reinforcements to McClellan after he broke through Yorktown.

After the 18th of May everyone (McClellan, McDowell, and even the people sent on factfinding missions to discover if McClellan was right) was telling the administration that McDowell's corps (with Shields' division) needed to be sent to McClellan immediately and by water, but the admin dawdled and insisted McDowell would be sent by land - on condition that McClellan operate against the rail lines north of Richmond. He was additionally ordered to fix his supply line at White House Landing, thus meaning he couldn't shift to the James (and meaning that to attack Richmond he'd have to straddle the Chickahmoniny).

McClellan fulfilled the condition in late May. McDowell was ordered south twice, but on both occasions was then "suspended" (i.e. not cancelled but not going to happen), and McClellan was still waiting for the promised reinforcements a month later, when he instead got hit in the flank by perhaps the largest Confederate attack of the entire war. The flank which was vulnerable because of his orders I've mentioned above.

McClellan executes a genius fighting retreat to Harrisons Landing over the next week, managing to avoid Lee's trap and rescue his army. During the retreat he's promised tens of thousands of reinforcements - at times the number he's told to expect goes as high as 41,000 - but very few of these men arrive, and McClellan is understandably reluctant to advance against superior numbers while he's got reinforcements imminently on the way.

This may sound familiar, and to McClellan it probably felt it too. A month and more later (in August) McClellan was ordered off the Peninsula, having recieved a total reinforcement of about nine regiments since mid-June.


Everyone's very quick to condemn McClellan for moving slow in this period, but given that for over two months of it he's (1) got parity at best and (2) has been explicitly told he's to expect four divisions' worth of reinforcements soon - can you really blame him?
It must have been utterly infuriating.

 

[Andrew]

I am sure this has been discussed before, and I did search around a bit before I posted this thread, and didn't see much to it so I decided to go ahead with it. So I apologize ahead of time if I'm repeating this.
So my question to our experts is, how important were these orders?
Did McClellan lose a valuable opportunity, or is it much ado about nothing?

Here's a related thread you might find interesting:

https://civilwartalk.com/threads/without-the-lost-order-what-happens-to-the-maryland-campaign.74186/

 

[Andrew]

I'm curious is it partly a situation where McClellan is his own worst enemy at times as well? I know the narrative on him is very negative, but was he as grossly insubordinate, and arrogant as he is portrayed?

I think some of the arrogance people read into his letters to his wife is actually his frustration with his superiors. I also wonder if his letters to his wife are taken more literally than they are intended. Perhaps he is facetious on occasion. That's something that his wife would pick up on, but those who believe him to be be arrogant would take his statements of "saving the country again" very seriously and literally. I mean, I tell my wife when I'm going to work that I'm off to save the country. I don't mean it literally, but if you already believe that I am supremely arrogant, you'd tend to think that I was being literal.

Wasn't he personable and well-liked? That's tough to do when you're an arrogant jerk. Just ask John Pope or any number of other commanders.

Anyway, I have no basis for defending McClellan. I'm just wondering aloud. He definitely gets the "Sears" treatment by most and it's so easy to treat him as a one-dimensional cartoon character when in fact he wasn't.

 

[Dom71]

I must admit I have seen him as this despicable character for some time. Starting that book at first I was just having those feelings reinforced. But then it gets to be so negative that you start wondering how the Union survived with this all going on. So that's why I started this thread, to see if there was a different perspective on it. For a long time Meade was labeled an unsure commander, I even heard a historian claim him scared. Grant was labeled a drunk and a butcher. So perhaps McClellan has been unfairly caricatured as well. Not sure I'm entirely convinced yet but it's working that direction.

 

[Saphroneth]

I must admit I have seen him as this despicable character for some time. Starting that book at first I was just having those feelings reinforced. But then it gets to be so negative that you start wondering how the Union survived with this all going on. So that's why I started this thread, to see if there was a different perspective on it. For a long time Meade was labeled an unsure commander, I even heard a historian claim him scared. Grant was labeled a drunk and a butcher. So perhaps McClellan has been unfairly caricatured as well. Not sure I'm entirely convinced yet but it's working that direction.

Essentially, I think a lot of the problem is that a lot of people have had an interest in making McClellan look like a fool. This starts very early, such as the 1864 election campaign which is where some of the falsehoods that have come down to us today (such as McClellan being on the Galena during Malvern hill) originated, and basically:

Anyone who wants to big up Grant or Meade or the like has an interest in presenting them as a competent general after a string of incompetents.
Anyone who wants to support the Lost Cause (the idea that the Union outnumbered the CSA 2:1 or 3:1 but they whupped them yankees anyway) will naturally present McClellan as a dupe because they'll show him failing to win despite having a massive advantage.
And anyone who wants to present Lincoln as a great man thus paints McClellan as an incompetent so as to explain why Lincoln fired him.
While anyone who thinks the Union was going to inevitably win the war because of massive advantages shows McClellan as a fool because otherwise he'd have won.


In fact, in the past I've seen people criticise McClellan for taking the peninsular route instead of the overland route, when the overland route as performed by Grant would have been literally impossible without McClellan having first cleared the Peninsula!

 

[67th Tigers]

In fact, in the past I've seen people criticise McClellan for taking the peninsular route instead of the overland route, when the overland route as performed by Grant would have been literally impossible without McClellan having first cleared the Peninsula!

Or Hooker having gained Fredericksburg.

Let's remember that once McClellan left the scene it took 19 months for the Union to get themselves across the Rapidan and ca. 20 months after McClellan was fired Grant reached the point McClellan was at after the Seven Days two years earlier.

AFAIC Halleck ordering McClellan to retreat added two years to the war, at least.

 

[Saphroneth]

Let's remember that once McClellan left the scene it took 19 months for the Union to get themselves across the Rapidan and ca. 20 months after McClellan was fired Grant reached the point McClellan was at after the Seven Days two years earlier.

Yes, this is the thing that's always missed. Grant's called a genius for his overland campaign, but the outcome was essentially identical to that of McClellan's peninsular campaign - and it got a lot more Union soldiers killed and wounded, something like four times as many, despite having started in a much better operational situation than McClellan did. (If Grant had mounted a campaign starting from the Peninsula, AFAICT he would have reached Fredericksburg some time earlier.)

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I think it's worth noting that many professional officers had a high opinion of McClellan's abilities, including Grant, both personally and professionally. He obviously had many good qualities, and ultimately his approach was the one that ultimately defeated Lee.

On the other side, many officers did not have a high opinion of the Administration's war management, although much of the actual criticism was leveled at Stanton, Halleck, and the Radicals in Congress

As to McClellan's letters (I think I made this point before), we should keep in mind that these are his personal letters home. I wonder what we would think of some other of the major participants if their personal letters were preserved in the same quantity? Many were not, and many of those that were (I'm thinking of Meade) we're heavily edited before publication.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

As for the Lost Order, I think McClellan's plan was pretty good. Franklin didn't do him any favors at Crampton's Gap, which I think might have been a missed opportunity. McClellan relied in Franklin, and I think that might have been misplaced.

At Antietam, getting the army across the stream & the terrain is a more significant challenge than I think many of us recognize. There were probably some missed opportunities on September 17, as there are really in any battle. I think potentially the real missed opportunity came on the 18th. Franklin wanted to seize Nicodemus Heights, but McClellan refused to give him permission.

 

[Saphroneth]

At Antietam, getting the army across the stream & the terrain is a more significant challenge than I think many of us recognize. There were probably some missed opportunities on September 17, as there are really in any battle. I think potentially the real missed opportunity came on the 18th. Franklin wanted to seize Nicodemus Heights, but McClellan refused to give him permission.

The stream is definitely an obstacle, which is why McClellan ordered Burnside to cross on the 16th. Burnside was really incredibly slow in that battle.

My understanding of the decision on the 18th was that McClellan didn't want to court a full battle two days in a row. Functionally McClellan's army on the 18th was still recovering.


Here's the map:

(map via 67th's blog, strengths are from Carman)

That's nightfall on the 17th. The change Lee made overnight was to pull back DH Hill and solidify his centre, though Lee also got ~6,000 stragglers filtering in overnight.


McClellan sent Morell over to Burnside as a temporary reinforcement if attacked, though Burnside promptly grabbed them and put them to be part of his battleline (it was west of the river) so that was out. There's also Couch's division arriving in the morning of the 18th (which was sent over to Franklin) and Humphreys' exhausted recruits later on (which were sent over to Burnside to replace Morell, though Burnside just added Humphreys to his reserve and didn't send Morell back).

Assuming that McClellan decides he has to attack, he essentially has to gamble that the troops shattered yesterday are reformed enough to not need shepherding, and he probably has to relieve Burnside of command as well to get Morell back. Allowing for the time taken to march Morell over to the north, this means an afternoon attack by Franklin with about 14,000 effective infantry against the Dunker Church area and Nicomedius hill.
Basically this is the assault from the morning of the 17th again and is certainly not guaranteed to succeed.


Worse, if it fails it means the exhaustion of McClellan's last troops who've not been tired out. Historically McClellan had 5th and 6th corps able to manoeuvre and fight well in the days after Antietam, which is how he was able to block Lee from his planned turning movement at Williamsport. Without that, it's essentially a question of whether Lee's troops are healthy enough to allow his plan to come off and let him regain the initiative (and advantage).
Either way, for McClellan to do this would mean a major gamble - the entire Confederate force is now "up", their defensive positions are still solid, and much of McClellan's army is still badly shattered from the assaults.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

This won't be news to anyone who has studied the battle in depth, but over the past couple years as I've begun to dive more deeply into it these are some considerations that I have come to realize, which has caused me to modify my view of McClellen's performance overall:

1. The two armies were both at their weakest strength that they would be at any time between the beginning of 1862 and after Gettysburg. Neither army was at full strength at Antietam.

2. Whatever advantage in numerical strength McClellan had, was negated by the fact that over a quarter of his army was made up of raw recruits. I did not really get a sense of this until I began reading some of the regimental histories. The number of soldiers going into battle the first time is astounding.

3. I have made the driving tour a few times, but it wasn't until I got out and actually walked the battlefield that I realized how much of a real challenge the terrain is. This was particularly true for the rookie soldiers who advanced from Antietam Creek to the sunken Road, and really, really true on the southern end of the battlefield.

4. The Army of the Potomac at Antietam was really a hodgepodge of three separate armies thrown together very quickly to deal with a crisis. There were real problems with leadership and morale that had to be overcome. That they were overcome is really a minor miracle.

5. Lee's decision to stand and fight at Antietam is not as off-the-wall as I had always believed. Having the river at his back is the only major concern with it, but having the Antietam Creek to his front was quite an advantage. An army crossing any body of water in the face of the enemy is always a huge challenge, especially in those days. There's a reason why that was not a common occurrence during the Civil War, and when it did happen it was usually a flanking maneuver. McClellan's options to truly outflank Lee were very limited, so Lee in a sense forced McClellan to attack him frontally.

 

[Saphroneth]

2. Whatever advantage in numerical strength McClellan had, was negated by the fact that over a quarter of his army was made up of raw recruits. I did not really get a sense of this until I began reading some of the regimental histories. The number of soldiers going into battle the first time is astounding.

One of the regiments who didn't arrive in time to participate are the best example of this. They're the Corn Exchange Regiment, and when they did fight at Shepherdstown they discovered that essentially none of their muskets worked!

They had never fired a shot even to familiarize themselves with the guns.

5. Lee's decision to stand and fight at Antietam is not as off-the-wall as I had always believed. Having the river at his back is the only major concern with it, but having the Antietam Creek to his front was quite an advantage. An army crossing any body of water in the face of the enemy is always a huge challenge, especially in those days. There's a reason why that was not a common occurrence during the Civil War, and when it did happen it was usually a flanking maneuver. McClellan's options to truly outflank Lee were very limited, so Lee in a sense forced McClellan to attack him frontally.

There's also that Lee was getting his trains over the river - if he'd retreated he'd have lost them.
McClellan's vigourous advance to South Mountain was a gamble to try and catch 1/4 of Lee's army in the Pleasant Valley, and if Harpers Ferry had held out a few more hours that would have crushed them. (I want to say McLaws? I know the Federal troops were in the valley by the time HF surrendered.)
That meant both sides were scrambling, but it so happened that Lee won the race to Antietam. That happens, and the fact he had to race at all means McClellan put him under pretty severe pressure (and continued to do so in the pursuit until it was called off by Washington).

Of course, Loudoun Valley was an even better example because McClellan decisively won the race only to be removed...

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I imagine the night of September 14/15 was one of the real low points of the war for Lee, maybe equaled by July 3, 1863, and probably only exceeded by the first week of April 1865.

I would love to know more about the Loudoun scenario. It seems Lee put himself at risk twice, once after Antietam & once after Gettysburg, by withdrawing toward Winchester & giving his opponent the opportunity to seize the "inside track" (as Lincoln called it).

 

[Saphroneth]

I imagine the night of September 14/15 was one of the real low points of the war for Lee, maybe equaled by July 3, 1863, and probably only exceeded by the first week of April 1865.

I'd argue November 9/10 1862 might have been as bad, as that was when Lee hadn't yet discovered McClellan had stopped (because he'd been relieved) but he may have just discovered McClellan's entire army was within about 10-15 miles of his depleted right wing.

I would love to know more about the Loudoun scenario.

67th did a good post about it, based on a question I asked on another forum:

http://67thtigers.blogspot.com/2017/06/mcclellan-continues-another-month.html

It seems Lee put himself at risk twice, once after Antietam & once after Gettysburg, by withdrawing toward Winchester & giving his opponent the opportunity to seize the "inside track" (as Lincoln called it).

Loudoun was a month or so later than Antietam (the pause was largely due to supply concerns, as has been mentioned - McClellan would rather have pursued across the Potomac after Antietam and tried to trap Lee at Williamsport) and I think it's simply that Lee misread McClellan.

This is the thing which astonishes me so about McClellan's reputation, which is that pretty much whenever McClellan's given his head and roughly equal numbers (let alone the superiority he knew the Union could amass) he puts the Confederates in a terrible situation!

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I have read somewhere (maybe O'Reilly's book about Fredericksburg?) that McClellan also conceived of the move to Fredricksburg & that Burnside's plan was adopted at least in part from this. I assume this was McClellan's contingency plan if unsuccessful in Loudoun? Obviously McClellan would have preferred to return to the James, but this was probably the 2nd best option to advance toward Richmond, and one ultimately adopted by Grant as well.

McClellan certainly recognized the inadequacy of the Orange & Alexandria as a long term supply option.

 

[Saphroneth]

I have read somewhere (maybe O'Reilly's book about Fredericksburg?) that McClellan also conceived of the move to Fredricksburg & that Burnside's plan was adopted at least in part from this. I assume this was McClellan's contingency plan if unsuccessful in Loudoun? Obviously McClellan would have preferred to return to the James, but this was probably the 2nd best option to advance toward Richmond, and one ultimately adopted by Grant as well.

The analysis I've seen (I think it was 67th again) is that McClellan would have gotten over the Rapidan at Fredericksburg quite a lot faster - for two reasons.

One of them is the general disruption that happened historically because of McClellan's replacement wouldn't have happened. McClellan would have stayed on top of things, and that includes keeping track of the bridging materials (which got delayed by the disruption, including the War Dept. not telegraphing the order and McClellan's staff being too busy to check if they'd had a confirmation).

It's quite possible the bridging materials could have arrived as early as 15th November, and 18-19 November would be assuming an accident or two. This means it's too early for Jackson to arrive.

The other reason is even simpler - if McClellan's transferring to Fredericksburg it's because Longstreet has stepped back. For Longstreet to hold where he was would be pretty much impossible, because the position Longstreet occupied was too large for his 23,400 effectives to be mutually supporting.

McClellan could hit both of Longstreet's flanks with a force the same size as Longstreet's entire wing and still have a reserve of 30,000 effectives to go up the middle, so Longstreet either steps back or he's destroyed, and that means he can't transfer east to Fredericksburg.


As far as I can tell, after Loudoun the best case scenario for Lee is that both Longstreet and Jackson make it to the North Anna before McClellan does - this is not a certainty, mind - and the campaign stalls there, and the worst case scenario for Lee is that Longstreet gets badly battered and disrupted before McClellan crosses at Fredericksburg, marches down the rail line and basically occupies Richmond unopposed. The middle of the road scenario is that McClellan ends up before a defended Richmond, whereupon he brings up the siege train and can fight his way in (something he was probably the US expert on - indeed it's really to the detriment of the US they didn't at least bring McClellan back to handle a battle of posts.)

 

[Jimklag]

It's quite possible the bridging materials could have arrived as early as 15th November, and 18-19 November would be assuming an accident or two. This means it's too early for Jackson to arrive

I think McLellan would have been screwed by the logistics people just like Burnside was.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I think there was also talk of crossing the Rappahannock at the fords before reaching Fredricksburg -- either McClellan or Burnside, or both. Halleck vetoed this for whatever reason.

McClellan (he was not the only one) recognized that the only real way to pin Lee in place to bring the North's strengths in engineering & artillery to bear for the destruction of Lee's army was to threaten Richmond directly.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I think McLellan would have been screwed by the logistics people just like Burnside was.

I think overall that the logistics of maintaining an army in the field and maneuvering it might be the least understood & most underappreciated aspect of the war. I know my knowledge is imperfect & I'm just beginning to appreciate it. It was far more complex than simply moving from point A to point B.

 

[Saphroneth]

I think McLellan would have been screwed by the logistics people just like Burnside was.

That's the thing, though, McClellan was viewed as a bit of a troublemaker because he kept hurrying people along - compared to Burnside, who didn't. It's not unreasonable that McClellan would have followed up, and there's quite a lot of improvement to be gotten simply from making sure the orders were telegraphed instead of going by barge.

Historically Burnside followed up on the 14th (the order having originally been sent on the 6th), which was basically right after he'd gotten properly settled into command, but McClellan wouldn't have needed to get settled in...