Hooker quite capable at Brandy Station

[Belfoured]

I must admit that I've not come across the claim that Lee "lost" Chancellorsville. Perhaps you really mean that Chancellorsville was a "pyhrric" victory for the Confederacy but even that may be not be the appropriate term. From a purely military standpoint, there is little dispute about the battle's outcome; thwarting Hooker's offensive plan and bringing about the withdrawal of the AotP to its starting point across the Rappahanock River resulted in the ANV retaining command of the field the day after, and the total foiling of Hooker's objective. But Lee understood that without being able to deliver a body blow to the AotP, it retained enough strength to recover and fight again another day. That, and the grievous casualties suffered by the ANV that continued to diminish its manpower may be a more descriptive measure of Chancellorsville than to simply say Lee lost. As teaching by the Lost Cause "Mythmakers" is apropos of nothing, I have no comment.

I must admit that I've not come across the claim that Lee "lost" Chancellorsville.

I actually had never seen that claim until this thread. Draw whatever inferences you might ...

 

[bankerpapaw]

Battle of Brandy Station in the American Civil War

Explore the battlefield of the 1863 Battle of Brandy Station, Virginia, the largest cavalry battle of the American Civil War.

stonesentinels.com

Not too long after Chancellorsville note that Hooker is quite alive and well here at Brandy Station. It is HIS cavalry. Remember when we get to Gettysburg that it is not Meade's ARMY, it is one he borrows from Joe Hooker. Joseph Hooker's Cavalry gives a surprise attack on JEB Stuart at Brandy, also called the Battle of Fleetwood Hill. It was kind of a reversal of the roles at Chancellorsville. Confederate newspapers were highly critical of the Stuart's Confederate Cavalry at Brandy Station. Lee should have listened to his own press in their criticism of Stuart for his own good coming in to Gettysburg.

The Battle of Brandy Station was fought on June 9, 1863. It was was the largest cavalry battle of the Civil War and the first fight of the Gettysburg Campaign. The battle spread over a wide area north and east of Brandy Station, Virginia, a stop on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad just west of the Rappahannock River.

View attachment 482394

On this website:
Tour the Brandy Station Battlefield
View wayside markers and historical markers in the Brandy Station area
The Armies at Brandy Station shows the organization and commanders of the two armies—​

The Battle of Brandy Station

During the month of stalemate after the Battle of Chancellorsville Robert E. Lee conceived what was to become the Gettysburg Campaign. First he reorganized his Army of Northern Virginia from two to three Army Corps due to the loss of "Stonewall" Jackson at Chancellorsville. Then he concentrated his First and Second Corps at Culpeper while leaving his Third Corps holding the defenses along the south bank of the Rappahannock around Fredericksburg. From their position on the left of Lee's line the First and Second Corps could move around the flank of Hooker's army and into the Shenandoah Valley. This would provide a route deep into Pennsylvania shielded by the mountains of the Blue Ridge.

For this plan to work Lee had to keep his intentions from Hooker as long as possible. If Hooker knew that Lee had pulled most of his men from the Rappahannock defenses he could potentially overwhelm Lee's Third Corps in its thinly-held lines. Hooker could also throw his army onto Lee's flank as it was stretched out and vulnerable on the march into the Shenandoah. It was critical for Lee to shield the concentration of his infantry at Culpeper.

The cavalry take position

Lee concentrated his cavalry division under J.E.B. Stuart at Brandy Station. It was a small whistle stop on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad in between Culpeper and the Union position north of the Rappahannock River. From there Stuart would be in the perfect position to keep his cavalry in between the infantry and any snooping Federal forces after the Confederates began their march north.

But Hooker knew something was developing. His intelligence operation under Colonel George H. Sharpe had picked up on Lee's movements and provided strong hints of a strong cavalry raid or even a flanking movement. But Hooker needed hard evidence. He ordered his cavalry commander, Brigadier General Alfred Pleasanton, to cross the Rappahannock and "disperse and destroy" Stuart's cavalry.

Pleasanton's surprise

At dawn on June 9 Pleasanton's troopers crossed the Rappahannock at Beverly Ford and six miles downriver at Kelly's Ford. He hoped it would be a crushing double envelopment. There was confusion and delay in the Kelly's Ford column while the other column was hampered by the death of a brigade commander. Pleasanton did not have nearly the superiority in numbers that he thought he had. But the Confederates had spent the last two days in exhausting reviews for Stuart and Lee. They were surprised, and a number of Confederate cavalrymen rode into battle without saddles or boots in their haste of mounting up.

The fighting lasted all day, with the central terrain feature of Fleetwood Hill changing hands several times. In the end the Federals withdrew. They suffered higher casualties and had not broken through Stuart's screen to confirm the location of Lee's infantry. But the fact that the Union cavalry had stood a 14 hour knockdown fight with Stuart's finest was a tremendous morale boost. From this point on Union cavalry would become bolder and deadlier. By the 1864 Shenandoah Valley Campaign and the 1865 Appomattox Campaign they had become an elite, decisive arm.

Stuart, in turn, felt the heat for being surprised in his camps after two days of showy reviews. The Richmond papers used terms such as "puffed up cavalry," and "negligence and bad management." Did this criticism push Stuart into his disastrous ride around the Union army that left Lee blind at the critical point of the Gettysburg campaign? Whatever the answer, the effects of the Battle of Brandy Station were felt far beyond the banks of the Rappahannock.

I cannot imagine that many horses in one place.

 

[neyankee61]

At least Hooker didn't hold a grudge like Logan. Once Logan became Senator and Sherman head of the Armies, Logan stuck it to him.

 

[Luke Freet]

I hold the steadfast position that Frederiksberg was the Confederate "high water" mark in December of 1862. Lee lost Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. I would be glad to have a point by point discussion of any of my positions. For starters this is NOT what has been taught by the Lost Cause Mythmakers for 160 years. The American Battlefield Trust has begun to shine a little light on Chancellorsville.
OK instead of addressing my post we need to do some "whataboutism" first. Instead let's take apart my comments one by one. Could we begin with the effect fratricide has on unit cohesion? The Lost Cause Mythmakers have had a 150 years head start on me, but if I persist I can get them to tell me why Jackson's arm gets a grave of its own, but there is no grave for members of his attacking party. I am also very curious why anyone thinks it is "brilliant" to march men all day and then launch an attack one hour before sundown in the Wilderness, of all places. There is no grave for these people just Jackson' arm. This is Jackson's "Butcher Bill " for May 2, 1863. It gets worse the next day because Jackson has left his army in the worst possible place with his "brilliant flank march".
Studying Chancellorsville May 2, 1863, I am thinking I found the reason Jackson was held up until dark. It was near Dowdall's Tavern that Union Col. Adolphus Buschbeck set up his defensive line, today remembered as the Buschbeck Line, causing Jackson a significant delay, thus slowing the momentum of Jackson's attack. The order of battle shows some significant Confederate casualties for the initial attacking units isolated to the May 2 attack. These were not part of Jackson's, or A.P. Hill "night recon" parties. The good news is that the American Battlefield Trust (ABT) and the Central Virginia Battlefields Trust (CVBT) have partnered to preserve the area. I know a lot of you had relatives there and let me know if you are related to any of them. Here's the list:

Rodes' (D.H. Hill's) Division May 2 1863

Major David Rowe (mw 5/2) 12th North Carolina Infantry
Colonel Philip Cook (w 5/2) 4th Georgia Infantry Regiment
Colonel Thomas W. Garrett (w 5/2) 5th North Carolina Infantry
Major William J. Hill (w 5/2) 5th North Carolina Infantry
Captain Speight B. West (w) 5th North Carolina Infantry
Colonel Thomas F. Toon (w 5/2) 20th North Carolina Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel Nelson Slough (w 5/2) 20th North Carolina Infantry
Major John S. Brooks (w 5/2) 20th North Carolina Infantry
Brigadier General Stephen D. Ramseur (w 5/2) 2nd North Carolina Infantry
Colonel William Cox (w 5/2) 2nd North Carolina Infantry
Colonel Edward A. O'Neal (w 5/2) 5th Alabama Infantry Regiment
Lieutenant Colonel E. Lafayette Hobson (w 5/2) 5th Alabama Infantry Regiment
Captain W. T. Renfro (mw 5/2) 5th Alabama Infantry Regiment
Lieutenant Colonel John S. Garvin (w 5/2) 26th Alabama Infantry Regiment

A.P. Hill's Division, May 2, 1863

Major General Ambrose Powell Hill (w 5/2)
Brigadier General Henry Heth (w 5/2)
Brigadier General Dorsey Pender (w 5/2)
Captain S. D. Stewart (k) 5th Alabama Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel James Aiked (w 5/2) 13th Alabama Infantry
Major John T. Smith (k 5/2) 13th Alabama Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel John A. Fite (w 5/2) 7th Tennessee Infantry
Colonel William McComb (w 5/2) 14th Tennessee Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel Fleet W. Cox (w 5/2) 40th Virginia Infantry
Colonel Francis Mallory (k 5/2) 55th Virginia Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel William S. Christian (w 5/2) 55th Virginia Infantry
Major Andrew D. Saunders (k 5/2) 55th Virginia Infantry
Colonel Edward G. Haywood (w 5/2) 7th North Carolina Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel Junius L. Hill (k 5/2) 7th North Carolina Infantry
Major William L. Davidson (w 5/2) 7th North Carolina Infantry
Colonel Thomas J. Purdie (k 5/2) 18th North Carolina Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel Forney George (w 5/2) 18th North Carolina Infantry
Colonel Mark M. Avery (w 5/2) 33rd North Carolina Infantry
Colonel William M. Barbour (w 5/2) 37th North Carolina Infantry
Brigadier General J Samuel McGowan (w 5/2)
Colonel Oliver E. Edwards (mw 5/2)
Colonel James M. Perrin (mw 5/2) 1st South Carolina Rifle
Colonel Oliver E. Edwards (mw 5/2) 13th South Carolina Infantry
Colonel Alfred M. Scales (w 5/2) 13th North Carolina Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel William A. Stowe (w 5/2) 16th North Carolina Infantry
Colonel William A. Stowe (w 5/2) 16th North Carolina Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel Christopher C. Cole (k 5/2) 22nd North Carolina Infantry
Major Laben Odell (k 5/2) 22nd North Carolina Infantry
Captain Greenlee Davidson (mw 5/2) Richmond Letcher (VA) Artillery

What time did Jackson start his flank march on May 2, 1863? Asking for a friend.

Wow, for once a buddy of me points out some insane post to me and I don't feel angry, just...ungodly confounded.

I will say, first of all, I agree that Hooker is overlooked as a general in the Civil War, and that mostly stems from his actions at Chancellorsville. He is responsible for rejuvenating the Army of the Potomac, and prior to Chancellorsville probably their most beloved commander after McClellan. And even after the defeat at Chancellorsville, he proves quite good at corps command in the west, though he has his lowpoints (Ringgold Gap & Peachtree Creek are the most egregious examples).

What I will not give is the insane position that Hooker won Chancellorsville. I don't know how one can even concieve of that. Lee did suffer heavy casualties, but Hooker lost far more, and he was fighting on the defensive. He had excellent ground to defend and meet an attack, yet Lee's able to drive him from his position despite outnumbering Lee than any other commander of the AotP. More than Meade did at Gettysburg; more so than McClellan did at Antietam; and more so than Grant did during the Overland Campaign.

There's an argument to be had, certainly, that the defeat wasn't entirely his fault. Howard was tasked to hold the army's flank with his corps, a task he failed at in spectacular fashion. However, that only applies if Howard's rout made the battle unwinnable for the Union...which Stephen Sears in his book on Chancellorsville (Sears also being a Hooker apologist, yet more reasonably so that seen here) says that the Union still could pull out a victory. They still had the troops, they had the defensive position. Indeed, May 3rd is when almost 80% of Lee's casualties for the battle occur, with most of XI Corps not putting up enough fight to inflict heavy losses on Jackson's Corps.

However, Hooker was forced to abandon the field. Why? Because he was an idiot about artillery. He sidelined Henry Hunt, who had achieved greatness during the Peninsular Campaign organizing massive grand batteries for defense, notably at Malvern Hill, one of Lee's worst defeats. He instead left him in the rear, in a powerless role, while artillery was dispersed to the infantry divisions. Thus, when the rebels took the heights around Hazel Grove, they organized a grand battery with proper reserves, whereas the division artillery would simply leave the field once they ran out of ammo. Thus, the army was worn down, Hooker being injuried by a shell impairing his command ability and worsening the tactical situation, before Hooker ordered a withdrawal of the army from Chancellorsville.

Hooker shouldnt have lost. 130k Union soldiers vs. 60k Confederates should have been a no-brainer, certainly to an officer as talented as Hooker. Yet when fighting on the defensive, which would have required the enemy to field far more than you do in order to overcome the line, he is forced to cede the field of battle, with 6k more casualties than Lee's army sustained. It was a defeat. There's no arguing that the Union won here. Some of it was on the shoulders of Howard & Sedgwick, but Hooker, as army commander, deserves the burden of blame.

Btw, I just noticed: you place all those officer casualties on May 2nd, when in reality 99% of them were on May 3rd. Are you unironically trying to argue that all those officers were lost during Jackson's flank attack? Because that is intellectual dishonesty if I've ever seen it.

 

[Belfoured]

At least Hooker didn't hold a grudge like Logan. Once Logan became Senator and Sherman head of the Armies, Logan stuck it to him.

Hooker held enough of a "grudge" to tell Sherman to stuff it and take his toys home. Logan went home for the elections and then returned to resume leading a corps under Sherman.

 

[Belfoured]

Wow, for once a buddy of me points out some insane post to me and I don't feel angry, just...ungodly confounded.

I will say, first of all, I agree that Hooker is overlooked as a general in the Civil War, and that mostly stems from his actions at Chancellorsville. He is responsible for rejuvenating the Army of the Potomac, and prior to Chancellorsville probably their most beloved commander after McClellan. And even after the defeat at Chancellorsville, he proves quite good at corps command in the west, though he has his lowpoints (Ringgold Gap & Peachtree Creek are the most egregious examples).

What I will not give is the insane position that Hooker won Chancellorsville. I don't know how one can even concieve of that. Lee did suffer heavy casualties, but Hooker lost far more, and he was fighting on the defensive. He had excellent ground to defend and meet an attack, yet Lee's able to drive him from his position despite outnumbering Lee than any other commander of the AotP. More than Meade did at Gettysburg; more so than McClellan did at Antietam; and more so than Grant did during the Overland Campaign.

There's an argument to be had, certainly, that the defeat wasn't entirely his fault. Howard was tasked to hold the army's flank with his corps, a task he failed at in spectacular fashion. However, that only applies if Howard's rout made the battle unwinnable for the Union...which Stephen Sears in his book on Chancellorsville (Sears also being a Hooker apologist, yet more reasonably so that seen here) says that the Union still could pull out a victory. They still had the troops, they had the defensive position. Indeed, May 3rd is when almost 80% of Lee's casualties for the battle occur, with most of XI Corps not putting up enough fight to inflict heavy losses on Jackson's Corps.

However, Hooker was forced to abandon the field. Why? Because he was an idiot about artillery. He sidelined Henry Hunt, who had achieved greatness during the Peninsular Campaign organizing massive grand batteries for defense, notably at Malvern Hill, one of Lee's worst defeats. He instead left him in the rear, in a powerless role, while artillery was dispersed to the infantry divisions. Thus, when the rebels took the heights around Hazel Grove, they organized a grand battery with proper reserves, whereas the division artillery would simply leave the field once they ran out of ammo. Thus, the army was worn down, Hooker being injuried by a shell impairing his command ability and worsening the tactical situation, before Hooker ordered a withdrawal of the army from Chancellorsville.

Hooker shouldnt have lost. 130k Union soldiers vs. 60k Confederates should have been a no-brainer, certainly to an officer as talented as Hooker. Yet when fighting on the defensive, which would have required the enemy to field far more than you do in order to overcome the line, he is forced to cede the field of battle, with 6k more casualties than Lee's army sustained. It was a defeat. There's no arguing that the Union won here. Some of it was on the shoulders of Howard & Sedgwick, but Hooker, as army commander, deserves the burden of blame.

Btw, I just noticed: you place all those officer casualties on May 2nd, when in reality 99% of them were on May 3rd. Are you unironically trying to argue that all those officers were lost during Jackson's flank attack? Because that is intellectual dishonesty if I've ever seen it.

Not much to disagree with here. I do think the "deal clincher" for me is the decision on May 5 (I've been inadvertently using May 4 because that's when Hooker pulled back into a defensive line). Although Sedgwick had pulled back on his end (after getting diddly for input from Hooker during the 4th), Hooker still outnumbered Lee, including Reynolds' virtually unused I Corps. He crawled away to Falmouth after holding a sham "council of war" where he got input he didn't want to hear.

 

[Luke Freet]

Not much to disagree with here. I do think the "deal clincher" for me is the decision on May 5 (I've been inadvertently using May 4 because that's when Hooker pulled back into a defensive line). Although Sedgwick had pulled back on his end (after getting diddly for input from Hooker during the 4th), Hooker still outnumbered Lee, including Reynolds' virtually unused I Corps. He crawled away to Falmouth after holding a sham "council of war" where he got input he didn't want to hear.

Oh yes, this reminds me:
I have not finished the post-Chancellorsville portions of Sears' book (I need to get around to finishing it sometime), and so I was shocked to discover, when visiting Chancellorsville battlefield two weeks back, that Lee planned to attack Hooker's command with Stuart's Corps. If Hooker stayed for May 6th, we wouldn't be talking about "Lee the Military Genius". Honestly I chastise Lee for the frontal assaults of May 3rd, and the heavy casualties he sustained that day, when the most damage was being done by his artillery.

 

[Belfoured]

Oh yes, this reminds me:
I have not finished the post-Chancellorsville portions of Sears' book (I need to get around to finishing it sometime), and so I was shocked to discover, when visiting Chancellorsville battlefield two weeks back, that Lee planned to attack Hooker's command with Stuart's Corps. If Hooker stayed for May 6th, we wouldn't be talking about "Lee the Military Genius". Honestly I chastise Lee for the frontal assaults of May 3rd, and the heavy casualties he sustained that day, when the most damage was being done by his artillery.

Lee was actually talked out of assaulting the May 4 line in a frontal assault, for very good reason. His subordinates knew better. They were probably pleasantly surprised when Hooker turned tail on May 5. Maybe Joe had learned that Lee's best subordinate and 15,000 men were on the way back from their Suffolk Campaign, reducing Hooker's advantage from 2:1 to "only" 1.7:1. Meanwhile, if I were in the I Corps I might have been asking what "all the fuss was about" during the preceding four days.

 

[jackt62]

Give Hooker credit. He was a fine Division commander in the III Corps. He led his own Corps well at Antietam and was against Burnsides attack at Fredericksburg. He rebuilt the AoP after the Mud March. He made pretty good plans for the Chancellorsville Campaign. Out West he led the XX Corps quite well. He failed at Chancellorsville because when Lee called, Hooker folded. And he couldn't keep his mouth shut. In addition his reputation in the Old Army never went away. Both Grant and Sherman had to carry this "Old Army" baggage but it seems both were unable to get around "Fighting Joe's". Don't tell me O O Howard was a better choice to replace McPherson!

I might have noted that Hooker was an effective enough division and corps commander before and after Chancellorsville. If not for that poorly executed plan (and his bombastic personality), he would have been rated in the upper tier of Union commanders.

 

[rpkennedy]

I might have noted that Hooker was an effective enough division and corps commander before and after Chancellorsville. If not for that poorly executed plan (and his bombastic personality), he would have been rated in the upper tier of Union commanders.

Hooker has to be rated among the best US division and corps commanders of the war. But Chancellorsville severely darkens his battlefield record and shows that army command may very well have been beyond his competency.

Ryan

 

[neyankee61]

Not to steal this discussion but Sen. John Logan along with Sec of War William Belknap did everything they could to limit the power of Sherman when he was the Commanding Gen. of the Armies. In 1871 Logan engineered a budget fight that saw the Army budget cut nearly in half and the size of the Army reduced. Logan may have been a fine military commander but he did hold a grudge against Sherman for being passed over. Hooker as stated "took his toys and went home". Logan bided his time.

 

[121st PA Vols]

Hooker has to be rated among the best US division and corps commanders of the war. But Chancellorsville severely darkens his battlefield record and shows that army command may very well have been beyond his competency.

Ryan

This reminds me of the great observation by....?....historian that one of the great mistakes of the war was (Lee-Davis?) trying to make a good army commander out of a good division commander (words to that effect), referencing Hood. Or, the Peter Principle as some call it today.

 

[jackt62]

This reminds me of the great observation by....?....historian that one of the great mistakes of the war was (Lee-Davis?) trying to make a good army commander out of a good division commander (words to that effect), referencing Hood. Or, the Peter Principle as some call it today.

I would perhaps leave Lee out of that one. When asked by Davis, Lee only gave a backhanded recommendation for Hood. But the general idea is correct. Lee's promotion of AP Hill to Corps Command is a very good illustration of what you note.

 

[Belfoured]

Not to steal this discussion but Sen. John Logan along with Sec of War William Belknap did everything they could to limit the power of Sherman when he was the Commanding Gen. of the Armies. In 1871 Logan engineered a budget fight that saw the Army budget cut nearly in half and the size of the Army reduced. Logan may have been a fine military commander but he did hold a grudge against Sherman for being passed over. Hooker as stated "took his toys and went home". Logan bided his time.

Agree - which means that while it mattered during a war Logan "sucked it up" and did his duty. Disconcerting that an "amateur" (I know - he enlisted and served in the Mexican War) would have a firmer grip on that than a USMA grad.

 

[Belfoured]

This reminds me of the great observation by....?....historian that one of the great mistakes of the war was (Lee-Davis?) trying to make a good army commander out of a good division commander (words to that effect), referencing Hood. Or, the Peter Principle as some call it today.

As always, I cue Inspector Callahan at the end of Magnum Force. One of the few times that a great line from a movie should also be in a PowerPoint for the military.

 

[121st PA Vols]

I would perhaps leave Lee out of that one. When asked by Davis, Lee only gave a backhanded recommendation for Hood. But the general idea is correct. Lee's promotion of AP Hill to Corps Command is a very good illustration of what you note.

Agreed. At some point after years of research it's easy confusing topics as Allen R. Thompson reminds In the Shadow of the Round Tops recently published and read about memory, dedicating a large portion of Part One to the topic.
I forgot how Lee was in fact opposed to advancing Hood, favoring Beauregard but that's a whole other story. Thanks for jogging the memory.

 

[jackt62]

Not to steal this discussion but Sen. John Logan along with Sec of War William Belknap did everything they could to limit the power of Sherman when he was the Commanding Gen. of the Armies. In 1871 Logan engineered a budget fight that saw the Army budget cut nearly in half and the size of the Army reduced. Logan may have been a fine military commander but he did hold a grudge against Sherman for being passed over. Hooker as stated "took his toys and went home". Logan bided his time.

Jockeying for position, jealousy, angling for promotion were the coin of the realm for army officers before, during, and after the CW. Logan, who was not a regular army officer, bided his time until he was in a position of power in which he could retaliate against Sherman for not appointing him to command the AoT. Hooker certainly never lost an opportunity to disparage fellow officers but once he resigned his commission he lacked whatever influence he may have had.

 

[New Haven]

I actually had never seen that claim until this thread. Draw whatever inferences you might ...

Thank you for commenting. I am compiling a "Stonewall Butcher Bill: Here is an excerpt.
33rd North Carolina Infantry Regiment
The regiment brought 480 men to the field. It marched to Chancellorsville on the 2nd and that evening deployed as skirmishers on both sides of the Plank Road, coming under heavy fire from both sides. In three days of fighting they lost 4 officers and 28 enlisted men killed, 14 officers and 87 enlisted men wounded, and 2 officers and 66 enlisted men missing; a total of 201 casualties, or 42%. Their target, the 11th Corps which they so "victoriously and brilliantly routed" has a 22% casualty rate. Of the 11,000 men of the 11th there were 217 killed, 1,218 wounded, and 972 captured or missing. That is 22% casualty, the exact same percentage for which the entire Army of Northern Virginia suffered in the same battle. Where is the wisdom in marching 30,000 men for 12 hours only to attack the "B" team of the AOP an hour before sundown. North Carolina paid the "butcher's bill" at Chancellorsville, but every Confederate state had significant losses there, except Bobbie Lee's Virginians. The entire bill is steep and I am not done putting all the numbers together. A lot of Confederate fan boys love to say "but we held Hazel Grove". Tell that to Governor Zebulon Vance.
My source https://civilwarintheeast.com/confederate-armies/csa-may-63/anv-may-63/2nd-corps-may-63/

 

[CowCavalry]

That didn't stop him from winning at Brandy Station.

Ryan

Hooker won so much, people apparently got sick of winning.

 

[Belfoured]

Hooker won so much, people apparently got sick of winning.

Envy is a dangerous thing.