Hooker quite capable at Brandy Station

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Meade should have been hesitant to take over the AOTP when he did as it was mid-calmpaign. Meade also worried about political interference would be like for him commanding that army (it would prove worse than I think he imagined.

 

[Belfoured]

This thread has me at a loss. I don't believe that Hooker was anywhere near Brandy Station during the battle. I also don't think Pleasanton really had much to do with it after planning. Much of what happened there was the result of the Federal division commanders. Buford and Gregg had laid the foundation for the cavalry to become what it became. Notice I've left out Duffie.

It appears that the poster is using Brandy Station as part of Hooker's resume that entitled him to remain in command and that shows he was the one who "really" won at Gettysburg. Hooker was the CO and issued the orders to Pleasanton. My point is only that if Hooker gets "credit" as army CO it doesn't advance the poster's theory because Hooker's plan failed.

 

[Belfoured]

Meade should have been hesitant to take over the AOTP when he did as it was mid-calmpaign. Meade also worried about political interference would be like for him commanding that army (it would prove worse than I think he imagined.

More important, it proves nothing. Meade did take command, fought a major battle starting only three days later, and won. The Federals would have likely fared better at Perryville in October 1862 if George Thomas had the same response instead of rejecting the request because it was mid-campaign.

 

[New Haven]

What on earth do you think this proves? We know what Meade accomplished at Gettysburg. "Brimming with confidence" may sell for pr agents but it means nothing.

Need proof? Here's an example of an army CO who was "brimming with confidence" before a battle: "our enemy must either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his defenses and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him."

Care to guess who the CO was? Care to guess which battle followed?

Thank you for your post and joining the discussion. I believe your quote was made on the evening before the demise of Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson who began his attack about an hour before sundown and conducted a foolish, hubris driven attack in the "mother of all jungles" in the dark. You forgot to add Hooker, before Chancellorsville, "May God have mercy on General Lee, for I will have none."
I don't believe the ANV conducted any more night activities after Jackson's fiasco at Chancellorsville. Got himself shot by his own men after Hooker's artillery spooked them. The great Stonewall caused the grievous suffering of his own troops by his self inflicted fratricide.
Just what does it do to the troops when there has been a death by fratricide. The 18th North Carolina went into a tailspin after Chancellorsville. I am working on the full consequence of the so-called "brilliant" flank attack of Jackson's. His hubris and lack of caution resulted in the death of some of his good staff. There are monuments to Jackson, in the battlefield and even his arm, but few for his staff that were killed with him on May 2, 1863. Jackson never asked about the battle or his men after his wounding. I particularly enjoy the comments made by Confederate based films about Jackson. In their zeal to praise and deify him they fall over each other with contradictions. I would probably not have investigated this if they just left well enough alone and only lionized Lee and Jackson. But the Lost Cause school of thought had to go on and demonize Grant and Sherman. From my experience in business, those kinds of lies perpetuate even more lies.
Fratricide results in unacceptable losses and increases the risk of mission failure; it almost always affects the unit's ability to survive and function. Units experiencing fratricide suffer these consequences:
Loss of confidence in the unit's leadership.
Increasing self-doubt among leaders.
Hesitancy in the employment of supporting combat systems.
Over supervision of units.
Hesitancy in the conduct of night operations.
Loss of aggressiveness in maneuver.
Loss of initiative.
Disrupted operations.
General degradation of unit cohesiveness, morale, and combat power.

And Belfoured if we are talking about quotes , here is Lee's at the end of Chancellorsville - At the conclusion of Chancellorsville, a quote from Lee, "We had really accomplished nothing; we had not gained a foot of ground, and I knew the enemy could easily replace the men he had lost. At Chancellorsville we gained another victory; our people were wild with delight—I, on the contrary, was more depressed." There should be no doubt in anyone's mind that the army that Lee faced at Gettysburg was none other than Fightin' Joe Hooker's AOP., the same one that Hooker had been perfecting since his appointment as commander on January 26 of that year.

Here is the best quote that bears witness to Hooker's ferocity.
An excerpt showing how ferocious Hooker's army was to Lee's. Of all the brigade's engagements, Chancellorsville had been the harshest. Lieutenant Octavius A. Wiggins, of the 37th North Carolina, recalled, "I do not hesitate to say that it was the bloodiest battle that I have ever witnessed." The men of Wiggins regiment all agreed that this was the hardest contested combat they experienced during the entire war. People cannot pass through such a combat - even a victorious combat - without it sapping the fighting spirit of some. A number in the 37th apparently thought it a brutal enough experience that they did not intend to take their chances in another such engagement. On May 19 1863, 32 men from Company A deserted, taking all of their equipment and weapons with them. North Carolina had a chronically high desertion rate throughout the war - which might offer an explanation for Pender's harsh discipline - but the 37th had suffered the highest casualties of any regiment in the army at Chancellorsville, losing 34 killed and 193 wounded. Chancellorsville also gutted the senior leadership of the brigade, with twelve of thirteen field officers becoming casualties, most of them on May 3, in the repeated assaults on entrenched Union positions. The carnage among company officers was also high. This was the direct result of Stonewall leading these sheep to slaughter.

So Belfoured, there were a few of the 37th MIA at Gettysburg.

 

[New Haven]

Or "may God have mercy on Gn Lee, for I will have none".

As, dearest, you know how reluctant we both have been to see me placed in this position, and as it appears to be God's will for some good purpose-at any rate, as a soldier,

"brimming with confidence"??. Sounds reluctant to me. How many bad takes do you have?

Funny, I made this take to defend Hooker and it got misread.

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

This thread has me at a loss. I don't believe that Hooker was anywhere near Brandy Station during the battle.

You are correct. He was at army headquarters, which were still outside Fredericksburg.

I also don't think Pleasanton really had much to do with it after planning.

Pleasonton's plan was based on inaccurate intelligence. He expected the Confederate cavalry to be 12 miles away in Culpeper, not right on the south bank of the Rappahannock River. That was a real surprise.

Much of what happened there was the result of the Federal division commanders. Buford and Gregg had laid the foundation for the cavalry to become what it became. Notice I've left out Duffie.

Agreed.

 

[Belfoured]

Thank you for your post and joining the discussion. I believe your quote was made on the evening before the demise of Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson who began his attack about an hour before sundown and conducted a foolish, hubris driven attack in the "mother of all jungles" in the dark. You forgot to add Hooker, before Chancellorsville, "May God have mercy on General Lee, for I will have none."
I don't believe the ANV conducted any more night activities after Jackson's fiasco at Chancellorsville. Got himself shot by his own men after Hooker's artillery spooked them. The great Stonewall caused the grievous suffering of his own troops by his self inflicted fratricide.
Just what does it do to the troops when there has been a death by fratricide. The 18th North Carolina went into a tailspin after Chancellorsville. I am working on the full consequence of the so-called "brilliant" flank attack of Jackson's. His hubris and lack of caution resulted in the death of some of his good staff. There are monuments to Jackson, in the battlefield and even his arm, but few for his staff that were killed with him on May 2, 1863. Jackson never asked about the battle or his men after his wounding. I particularly enjoy the comments made by Confederate based films about Jackson. In their zeal to praise and deify him they fall over each other with contradictions. I would probably not have investigated this if they just left well enough alone and only lionized Lee and Jackson. But the Lost Cause school of thought had to go on and demonize Grant and Sherman. From my experience in business, those kinds of lies perpetuate even more lies.
Fratricide results in unacceptable losses and increases the risk of mission failure; it almost always affects the unit's ability to survive and function. Units experiencing fratricide suffer these consequences:
Loss of confidence in the unit's leadership.
Increasing self-doubt among leaders.
Hesitancy in the employment of supporting combat systems.
Over supervision of units.
Hesitancy in the conduct of night operations.
Loss of aggressiveness in maneuver.
Loss of initiative.
Disrupted operations.
General degradation of unit cohesiveness, morale, and combat power.

And Belfoured if we are talking about quotes , here is Lee's at the end of Chancellorsville - At the conclusion of Chancellorsville, a quote from Lee, "We had really accomplished nothing; we had not gained a foot of ground, and I knew the enemy could easily replace the men he had lost. At Chancellorsville we gained another victory; our people were wild with delight—I, on the contrary, was more depressed." There should be no doubt in anyone's mind that the army that Lee faced at Gettysburg was none other than Fightin' Joe Hooker's AOP., the same one that Hooker had been perfecting since his appointment as commander on January 26 of that year.

Here is the best quote that bears witness to Hooker's ferocity.
An excerpt showing how ferocious Hooker's army was to Lee's. Of all the brigade's engagements, Chancellorsville had been the harshest. Lieutenant Octavius A. Wiggins, of the 37th North Carolina, recalled, "I do not hesitate to say that it was the bloodiest battle that I have ever witnessed." The men of Wiggins regiment all agreed that this was the hardest contested combat they experienced during the entire war. People cannot pass through such a combat - even a victorious combat - without it sapping the fighting spirit of some. A number in the 37th apparently thought it a brutal enough experience that they did not intend to take their chances in another such engagement. On May 19 1863, 32 men from Company A deserted, taking all of their equipment and weapons with them. North Carolina had a chronically high desertion rate throughout the war - which might offer an explanation for Pender's harsh discipline - but the 37th had suffered the highest casualties of any regiment in the army at Chancellorsville, losing 34 killed and 193 wounded. Chancellorsville also gutted the senior leadership of the brigade, with twelve of thirteen field officers becoming casualties, most of them on May 3, in the repeated assaults on entrenched Union positions. The carnage among company officers was also high. This was the direct result of Stonewall leading these sheep to slaughter.

So Belfoured, there were a few of the 37th MIA at Gettysburg.

I think you confuse "ferocity" with "competent/successful command of an army". The IJA exhibited unmatched "ferocity" on Guadalcanal, Saipan, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa and inflicted significant casualties. How did all that end? And I'll be honest - I don't understand this obsession with whose "army" it was. In hockey I can have a set of the best custom composites ever designed. If I'm a men's league player it's a complete waste of good money. They don't bury the puck by themselves. Hooker took this well-organized and trained army and then managed to lose to an opponent he vastly outnumbered - one that also was missing not only a significant number of troops but their excellent corps commander as well. He lost/was defeated/had to retreat - I have no idea why you seem to think that the opposite happened. Anybody who envisions the Joe Hooker who clutched on April 30 and choked on May 4 doing what Meade did on July 2 is probably fooling themselves. Some guys just aren't cut out to deal with the heat in the kitchen at that level.

 

[121st PA Vols]

Here's Meade brimming with confidence --Just before leaving Frederick City he seized the first opportunity that had offered to write personally to Mrs. Meade as to the wondrous change in his affairs. To Mra. George G. Meade: HIlADQUARTEBS .AJwy 01' TBlIl POTOMAC, June 29,1863. It has pleased Almighty God to place me in the trying position that for some time past we have been talking about. Yesterday morning, at 3 A. M., I was aroused from my sleep by an officer from Washington entering my tent, and after waking me up, saying he had come to give me trouble. At first I thought that it was either to relieve or arrest me, and promptly replied to him, that my conscience was clear, void of offense towards any man; I was prepared for his bad news. He then handed me a communication to read; which I found was an order relieving Hooker from the command and assigning me to it. As, dearest, you know how reluctant we both have been to see me placed in this position, and as it appears to be God's will for some good purpose-at any rate, as a soldier,

New Haven. Any student of the battle has come across that letter in their studies, by effort or accident as it is oft quoted in myriad accounts. I stumbled upon it at the NPS library in Gettysburg (ORs I imagine) or was guided to it in the formulative years by the superb staff stationed there in the 70s-80s. Having said that, I don't see how the letter connects Hooker to the army in any manner after 28-Jun-63.
With no offense intended, can you clarify your point in your words rather than reprinting quotes and information most of us are familiar with. This will save you considerable time. I see you are new to the board. Welcome.
One thing you will find on this site is an inordinate number of well-informed members; published authors, writers, people associated with the NPS, various universities, licensed guides and former guides and self-taught individuals who are impressively well versed.

 

[dlofting]

Lieutenant Octavius A. Wiggins, of the 37th North Carolina, recalled, "I do not hesitate to say that it was the bloodiest battle that I have ever witnessed."

This is a true statement. Up until that time Chancellorsville, with combined casualties of about 30,000 men, was the bloodiest battle. That would change after Gettysburg and Chickamauga.

I'm not sure the point that you're trying to make. War causes casualties and successful commanders incur their share, often more than commanders who fail. The Civil War was certainly no exception and leaders like Grant and Lee (and yes Jackson) did what they did at the cost of lives. That's why war should be a last resort, but that isn't usually the case.

 

[rpkennedy]

Here's Meade brimming with confidence --Just before leaving Frederick City he seized the first opportunity that had offered to write personally to Mrs. Meade as to the wondrous change in his affairs. To Mra. George G. Meade: HIlADQUARTEBS .AJwy 01' TBlIl POTOMAC, June 29,1863. It has pleased Almighty God to place me in the trying position that for some time past we have been talking about. Yesterday morning, at 3 A. M., I was aroused from my sleep by an officer from Washington entering my tent, and after waking me up, saying he had come to give me trouble. At first I thought that it was either to relieve or arrest me, and promptly replied to him, that my conscience was clear, void of offense towards any man; I was prepared for his bad news. He then handed me a communication to read; which I found was an order relieving Hooker from the command and assigning me to it. As, dearest, you know how reluctant we both have been to see me placed in this position, and as it appears to be God's will for some good purpose-at any rate, as a soldier,

It had less to do with confidence than with Meade being aware that he was the fourth commander of the AotP in less than 12 months. That's not exactly an enviable position in which to be placed.

Ryan

 

[rpkennedy]

Here is the best quote that bears witness to Hooker's ferocity.
An excerpt showing how ferocious Hooker's army was to Lee's. Of all the brigade's engagements, Chancellorsville had been the harshest. Lieutenant Octavius A. Wiggins, of the 37th North Carolina, recalled, "I do not hesitate to say that it was the bloodiest battle that I have ever witnessed." The men of Wiggins regiment all agreed that this was the hardest contested combat they experienced during the entire war. People cannot pass through such a combat - even a victorious combat - without it sapping the fighting spirit of some. A number in the 37th apparently thought it a brutal enough experience that they did not intend to take their chances in another such engagement. On May 19 1863, 32 men from Company A deserted, taking all of their equipment and weapons with them. North Carolina had a chronically high desertion rate throughout the war - which might offer an explanation for Pender's harsh discipline - but the 37th had suffered the highest casualties of any regiment in the army at Chancellorsville, losing 34 killed and 193 wounded. Chancellorsville also gutted the senior leadership of the brigade, with twelve of thirteen field officers becoming casualties, most of them on May 3, in the repeated assaults on entrenched Union positions. The carnage among company officers was also high. This was the direct result of Stonewall leading these sheep to slaughter.

So Belfoured, there were a few of the 37th MIA at Gettysburg.

Chancellorsville was far and away the 37th North Carolina's bloodiest battle, losing about 50% of the regiment. It shouldn't come as much of a surprise that some of the veterans felt a little jaded by what they had just experienced. How this reflects on Hooker and his abilities, I'm at a loss.

Ryan

 

[New Haven]

I think you confuse "ferocity" with "competent/successful command of an army". The IJA exhibited unmatched "ferocity" on Guadalcanal, Saipan, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa and inflicted significant casualties. How did all that end? And I'll be honest - I don't understand this obsession with whose "army" it was. In hockey I can have a set of the best custom composites ever designed. If I'm a men's league player it's a complete waste of good money. They don't bury the puck by themselves. Hooker took this well-organized and trained army and then managed to lose to an opponent he vastly outnumbered - one that also was missing not only a significant number of troops but their excellent corps commander as well. He lost/was defeated/had to retreat - I have no idea why you seem to think that the opposite happened. Anybody who envisions the Joe Hooker who clutched on April 30 and choked on May 4 doing what Meade did on July 2 is probably fooling themselves. Some guys just aren't cut out to deal with the heat in the kitchen at that level.

I think you confuse "ferocity" with "competent/successful command of an army". The IJA exhibited unmatched "ferocity" on Guadalcanal, Saipan, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa and inflicted significant casualties. How did all that end? And I'll be honest - I don't understand this obsession with whose "army" it was. In hockey I can have a set of the best custom composites ever designed. If I'm a men's league player it's a complete waste of good money. They don't bury the puck by themselves. Hooker took this well-organized and trained army and then managed to lose to an opponent he vastly outnumbered - one that also was missing not only a significant number of troops but their excellent corps commander as well. He lost/was defeated/had to retreat - I have no idea why you seem to think that the opposite happened. Anybody who envisions the Joe Hooker who clutched on April 30 and choked on May 4 doing what Meade did on July 2 is probably fooling themselves. Some guys just aren't cut out to deal with the heat in the kitchen at that level.

Would you care to respond to the this post that awaits you---
Thank you for your post and joining the discussion. I believe your quote was made on the evening before the demise of Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson who began his attack about an hour before sundown and conducted a foolish, hubris driven attack in the "mother of all jungles" in the dark. You forgot to add Hooker, before Chancellorsville, "May God have mercy on General Lee, for I will have none."
I don't believe the ANV conducted any more night activities after Jackson's fiasco at Chancellorsville. Got himself shot by his own men after Hooker's artillery spooked them. The great Stonewall caused the grievous suffering of his own troops by his self inflicted fratricide.
Just what does it do to the troops when there has been a death by fratricide. The 18th North Carolina went into a tailspin after Chancellorsville. I am working on the full consequence of the so-called "brilliant" flank attack of Jackson's. His hubris and lack of caution resulted in the death of some of his good staff. There are monuments to Jackson, in the battlefield and even his arm, but few for his staff that were killed with him on May 2, 1863. Jackson never asked about the battle or his men after his wounding. I particularly enjoy the comments made by Confederate based films about Jackson. In their zeal to praise and deify him they fall over each other with contradictions. I would probably not have investigated this if they just left well enough alone and only lionized Lee and Jackson. But the Lost Cause school of thought had to go on and demonize Grant and Sherman. From my experience in business, those kinds of lies perpetuate even more lies.
Fratricide results in unacceptable losses and increases the risk of mission failure; it almost always affects the unit's ability to survive and function. Units experiencing fratricide suffer these consequences:
Loss of confidence in the unit's leadership.
Increasing self-doubt among leaders.
Hesitancy in the employment of supporting combat systems.
Over supervision of units.
Hesitancy in the conduct of night operations.
Loss of aggressiveness in maneuver.
Loss of initiative.
Disrupted operations.
General degradation of unit cohesiveness, morale, and combat power.

And Belfoured if we are talking about quotes , here is Lee's at the end of Chancellorsville - At the conclusion of Chancellorsville, a quote from Lee, "We had really accomplished nothing; we had not gained a foot of ground, and I knew the enemy could easily replace the men he had lost. At Chancellorsville we gained another victory; our people were wild with delight—I, on the contrary, was more depressed." There should be no doubt in anyone's mind that the army that Lee faced at Gettysburg was none other than Fightin' Joe Hooker's AOP., the same one that Hooker had been perfecting since his appointment as commander on January 26 of that year.

Here is the best quote that bears witness to Hooker's ferocity.
An excerpt showing how ferocious Hooker's army was to Lee's. Of all the brigade's engagements, Chancellorsville had been the harshest. Lieutenant Octavius A. Wiggins, of the 37th North Carolina, recalled, "I do not hesitate to say that it was the bloodiest battle that I have ever witnessed." The men of Wiggins regiment all agreed that this was the hardest contested combat they experienced during the entire war. People cannot pass through such a combat - even a victorious combat - without it sapping the fighting spirit of some. A number in the 37th apparently thought it a brutal enough experience that they did not intend to take their chances in another such engagement. On May 19 1863, 32 men from Company A deserted, taking all of their equipment and weapons with them. North Carolina had a chronically high desertion rate throughout the war - which might offer an explanation for Pender's harsh discipline - but the 37th had suffered the highest casualties of any regiment in the army at Chancellorsville, losing 34 killed and 193 wounded. Chancellorsville also gutted the senior leadership of the brigade, with twelve of thirteen field officers becoming casualties, most of them on May 3, in the repeated assaults on entrenched Union positions. The carnage among company officers was also high. This was the direct result of Stonewall leading these sheep to slaughter.

Chancellorsville was far and away the 37th North Carolina's bloodiest battle, losing about 50% of the regiment. It shouldn't come as much of a surprise that some of the veterans felt a little jaded by what they had just experienced. How this reflects on Hooker and his abilities, I'm at a loss.

Ryan

Well, my goodness , how did those tarheels get bloody? Unless they continued to shoot at their own, I'm gonna guess that it was Hooker's troops that made 'em bloody.

 

[rpkennedy]

Well, my goodness , how did those tarheels get bloody? Unless they continued to shoot at their own, I'm gonna guess that it was Hooker's troops that made 'em bloody.

So? A number of Confederate regiments suffered their worst casualties at Malvern Hill. Does that reflect the ferocity of McClellan?

IMO, you are attempting to give Hooker credit for things in which he had a fairly minimal hand. Yes, he rebuilt the army after the catastrophe of Fredericksburg and the Mud March when the army was threatening to disintegrate. That said, he fought the army poorly at Chancellorsville once his initial plan was scuppered and his pursuit of Lee north was lackluster. Hooker had no real plan of action while Meade had multiple contingencies within 24 hours of taking command. It definitely shows a contrast between Hooker and Meade.

Ryan

 

[Belfoured]

So? A number of Confederate regiments suffered their worst casualties at Malvern Hill. Does that reflect the ferocity of McClellan?

IMO, you are attempting to give Hooker credit for things in which he had a fairly minimal hand. Yes, he rebuilt the army after the catastrophe of Fredericksburg and the Mud March when the army was threatening to disintegrate. That said, he fought the army poorly at Chancellorsville once his initial plan was scuppered and his pursuit of Lee north was lackluster. Hooker had no real plan of action while Meade had multiple contingencies within 24 hours of taking command. It definitely shows a contrast between Hooker and Meade.

Ryan

In addition, the poster keeps ignoring the fact that Lee caused 17,000 casualties for Hooker despite facing odds of 2:1 and that those casualties, coupled with the loss of 20,000 expiring enlistments, made "Hooker's army" much less capable of offensive operations. And, by the way, Lee held the field at the end while Hooker fell back to Falmouth. Smells like defeat to me.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Hooker had no real plan of action while Meade had multiple contingencies within 24 hours of taking command. It definitely shows a contrast between Hooker and Meade.

It's remarkable how quickly Meade put the Pipe Creek plan together.

That said, multiple contingencies? In the sense that two is technically multiple. Keep pushing forward to find Lee or fall back to concentrate on a specific defensive position.

Meade would also show a lack of contingency planning the rest of his time commanding the AOTP.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

And, by the way, Lee held the field at the end while Hooker fell back to Falmouth. Smells like defeat to me.

I think Chancellorsville is widely regarded as a tactical victory for Lee, albeit often seen as Phyrric.

 

[Belfoured]

Would you care to respond to the this post that awaits you---
Thank you for your post and joining the discussion. I believe your quote was made on the evening before the demise of Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson who began his attack about an hour before sundown and conducted a foolish, hubris driven attack in the "mother of all jungles" in the dark. You forgot to add Hooker, before Chancellorsville, "May God have mercy on General Lee, for I will have none."
I don't believe the ANV conducted any more night activities after Jackson's fiasco at Chancellorsville. Got himself shot by his own men after Hooker's artillery spooked them. The great Stonewall caused the grievous suffering of his own troops by his self inflicted fratricide.
Just what does it do to the troops when there has been a death by fratricide. The 18th North Carolina went into a tailspin after Chancellorsville. I am working on the full consequence of the so-called "brilliant" flank attack of Jackson's. His hubris and lack of caution resulted in the death of some of his good staff. There are monuments to Jackson, in the battlefield and even his arm, but few for his staff that were killed with him on May 2, 1863. Jackson never asked about the battle or his men after his wounding. I particularly enjoy the comments made by Confederate based films about Jackson. In their zeal to praise and deify him they fall over each other with contradictions. I would probably not have investigated this if they just left well enough alone and only lionized Lee and Jackson. But the Lost Cause school of thought had to go on and demonize Grant and Sherman. From my experience in business, those kinds of lies perpetuate even more lies.
Fratricide results in unacceptable losses and increases the risk of mission failure; it almost always affects the unit's ability to survive and function. Units experiencing fratricide suffer these consequences:
Loss of confidence in the unit's leadership.
Increasing self-doubt among leaders.
Hesitancy in the employment of supporting combat systems.
Over supervision of units.
Hesitancy in the conduct of night operations.
Loss of aggressiveness in maneuver.
Loss of initiative.
Disrupted operations.
General degradation of unit cohesiveness, morale, and combat power.

And Belfoured if we are talking about quotes , here is Lee's at the end of Chancellorsville - At the conclusion of Chancellorsville, a quote from Lee, "We had really accomplished nothing; we had not gained a foot of ground, and I knew the enemy could easily replace the men he had lost. At Chancellorsville we gained another victory; our people were wild with delight—I, on the contrary, was more depressed." There should be no doubt in anyone's mind that the army that Lee faced at Gettysburg was none other than Fightin' Joe Hooker's AOP., the same one that Hooker had been perfecting since his appointment as commander on January 26 of that year.

Here is the best quote that bears witness to Hooker's ferocity.
An excerpt showing how ferocious Hooker's army was to Lee's. Of all the brigade's engagements, Chancellorsville had been the harshest. Lieutenant Octavius A. Wiggins, of the 37th North Carolina, recalled, "I do not hesitate to say that it was the bloodiest battle that I have ever witnessed." The men of Wiggins regiment all agreed that this was the hardest contested combat they experienced during the entire war. People cannot pass through such a combat - even a victorious combat - without it sapping the fighting spirit of some. A number in the 37th apparently thought it a brutal enough experience that they did not intend to take their chances in another such engagement. On May 19 1863, 32 men from Company A deserted, taking all of their equipment and weapons with them. North Carolina had a chronically high desertion rate throughout the war - which might offer an explanation for Pender's harsh discipline - but the 37th had suffered the highest casualties of any regiment in the army at Chancellorsville, losing 34 killed and 193 wounded. Chancellorsville also gutted the senior leadership of the brigade, with twelve of thirteen field officers becoming casualties, most of them on May 3, in the repeated assaults on entrenched Union positions. The carnage among company officers was also high. This was the direct result of Stonewall leading these sheep to slaughter.

Well, my goodness , how did those tarheels get bloody? Unless they continued to shoot at their own, I'm gonna guess that it was Hooker's troops that made 'em bloody.

Well, my goodness , how did those tarheels get bloody? Unless they continued to shoot at their own, I'm gonna guess that it was Hooker's troops that made 'em bloody.

You have a refreshingly "unique" view of military success. It looks like we need to revise a whole lot of history. I'm starting with Hirohito was better than Nimitz because "his army" really won at Guadalcanal. Look at all the casualties they inflicted.

 

[New Haven]

So? A number of Confederate regiments suffered their worst casualties at Malvern Hill. Does that reflect the ferocity of McClellan?

IMO, you are attempting to give Hooker credit for things in which he had a fairly minimal hand. Yes, he rebuilt the army after the catastrophe of Fredericksburg and the Mud March when the army was threatening to disintegrate. That said, he fought the army poorly at Chancellorsville once his initial plan was scuppered and his pursuit of Lee north was lackluster. Hooker had no real plan of action while Meade had multiple contingencies within 24 hours of taking command. It definitely shows a contrast between Hooker and Meade.

Ryan

prepping for Gettysburg --Joseph Hooker January 26 to June 28 --Meade 3 days --

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

prepping for Gettysburg --Joseph Hooker January 26 to June 28 --Meade 3 days --

He spent most of that time prepping for Chancellorsville, not Gettysburg.

 

[Belfoured]

I think Chancellorsville is widely regarded as a tactical victory for Lee, albeit often seen as Phyrric.

The problem here is that we're not looking at what happened to "Hooker's army" as a result of Chancellorsville. This was not Guilford Court House, just for example. Cornwallis's victory there was truly a pyrrhic tactical win because it "helped" him lose the campaign. Chancellorsville was different. Lee retained the capability to subsequently undertake an invasion and the Army of the Potomac had its offensive capability degraded by the loss of c. 37,000 troops due to casualties and the expiring enlistments. That was 17,000 casualties Hooker could ill afford. I'd also be interested in which historian(s), if any, have said it was other than a tactical victory for Lee.