General Lee's "Lost Order" # 191

[67th Tigers]

Thank you for your response and information.
Again, I have cut significantly the quote you furnished from Mr. Griffith's site.
My original statement was, "Isn't that the the issue at the heart of every discussion of McClellan's performance? MaClellan seemed always to believe he was vastly outnumbered...."
Mr. Griffith confirms that.

To achieve the destruction of the enemy army took Grant a year with odds above 2:1 (2.3:1 in the final phase). McClellan had around parity (1:1) and was still as rapid as Grant. Whilst McClellan may be lampooned for asking for the resources he considered necessary, it's notable that what he was asking for was much less than Grant found necessary

 

[WJC]

To achieve the destruction of the enemy army took Grant a year with odds above 2:1 (2.3:1 in the final phase). McClellan had around parity (1:1) and was still as rapid as Grant. Whilst McClellan may be lampooned for asking for the resources he considered necessary, it's notable that what he was asking for was much less than Grant found necessary

Thanks for your response.
This is part of the argument Mr. Griffith makes as quoted by @Saphroneth. Rightly or wrongly, it remains a significant factor in every discussion of McClellan's performance. Perception is often more important than fact, particularly facts not available until afterwards.
The reality is his superiors were dissatisfied with his leadership. Things would certainly have been different if his Peninsula Campaign succeeded....

 

[67th Tigers]

Thanks for your response.
This is part of the argument Mr. Griffith makes as quoted by @Saphroneth. Rightly or wrongly, it remains a significant factor in every discussion of McClellan's performance. Perception is often more important than fact, particularly facts not available until afterwards.
The reality is his superiors were dissatisfied with his leadership. Things would certainly have been different if his Peninsula Campaign succeeded....

It was succeeding, at least as much as Grant's Petersburg siege was in the same time scale.

As Upton noted "the worst that could be said of the Peninsula Campaign was that thus far it had not been successful. To make it a failure was reserved for the agency of General Halleck."

 

[Saphroneth]

The reality is his superiors were dissatisfied with his leadership. Things would certainly have been different if his Peninsula Campaign succeeded....

As 67th has noted, the Peninsula Campaign fell apart because of a lack of support from the administration and a belief it should have been possible to succeed in a few months.

The thing about McClellan is not just that he didn't get support, but that he had support witheld from him and then people used failings of his directly linked to the withdrawal of promised support to criticise him for not meeting his promises. In effect, McClellan was saying "I can do this successfully with $100,000" and the Administration was saying "sure, you'll get it", giving him $60,000, then asking why it wasn't done yet.

 

[WJC]

It was succeeding, at least as much as Grant's Petersburg siege was in the same time scale.

As Upton noted "the worst that could be said of the Peninsula Campaign was that thus far it had not been successful. To make it a failure was reserved for the agency of General Halleck."

Thanks for your response.
Interesting that you quote Upton, assigning the blame to Halleck....

 

[Bruce Vail]

D.H. Hill was also scathing that Ripley failed to engage his own brigade during the counterattack phase of South Mountain, going on to say with some exaggeration that Ripley's men failed to pull a trigger during the battle.

I wondered whether you had handy the precise citations from Hill's writings on this?

The Hill quote used in Krick's article is new to me also, and am curious about the source.

 

[WJC]

The thing about McClellan is not just that he didn't get support, but that he had support witheld from him and then people used failings of his directly linked to the withdrawal of promised support to criticise him for not meeting his promises.

Thanks for your response.
That is the crux of Mr. Griffith's argument. Unfortunately, he sets up arguments with questionable strawmen ("some of the common complaints against General McClellan that one will often find in most books on the Civil War.") without providing source and context.
I don't know of any historian who believes that Lincoln was a military or logistics expert. To claim that "Lincoln was virtually illiterate when it came to military matters" may be harshly worded, but it is well known. Lincoln was no exception. Few of our wartime presidents even served in the military; only one had any high level command experience: Eisenhower, who was a logistics expert who never commanded troops in battle before becoming Allied Supreme Commander.
Similarly, to claim "Stanton delayed the arrival of supplies so he could then blame McClellan for 'excessive delay'"based on the beliefs of "quite of a few of McClellan's subordinate officers" is to charge him based on rumor and hearsay, not fact. To further condemn him because he "never did provide a credible innocent explanation" is not unlike claiming that someone's lack of response to a charge he/she was not aware of proves guilt.
There may be the substance for a very informative study on McClellan. But in the end, Mr. Griffith's article is interesting, but without proper sourcing, research and analysis of facts, not convincing.
McClellan- like others- was handicapped by opposition within the administration. Still, he had ample opportunity to prove the naysayers wrong. In the end, he failed.

 

[Bruce Vail]

I am fascinated that there is this vocal knot of commentators/analysts dedicated to rehabilitating the reputation of McClellan. It seems there is nothing about the Civil War that is settled -- that every element is subject to revision, debate and reconsideration. And then more revision, debate and reconsideration....

I'm not really engaged on McClellan. Is there a single book, or a single writer, that I could consult for the most powerful arguments on McClellan's behalf?

 

[novushomus]

I wondered whether you had handy the precise citations from Hill's writings on this?

The Hill quote used in Krick's article is new to me also, and am curious about the source.

Actually, the exact quotation I have is not first hand, but rather from Longstreet's memoirs. Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America. New York: Barnes & Noble, 2004. 181. Longstreet didn't give a citation, but I believe he may be referring to one of Hill's articles after the war, possibly Battles & Leaders.

 

[novushomus]

I wondered whether you had handy the precise citations from Hill's writings on this?

The Hill quote used in Krick's article is new to me also, and am curious about the source.

I think I found the original source. It is indeed Battles & Leaders in an article written by D.H. Hill - here: https://ehistory.osu.edu/books/battles/vol2/559
https://ehistory.osu.edu/books/battles/vol2/569

"About 3: 30 P. M, the advance of Longstreet's command arrived and reported to me---one brigade under Colonel G. T. Anderson and one under General Drayton. They were attached to Ripley's left, and a forward movement was ordered. In half an hour or more I received a note from Ripley saying that he was progressing finely; so he was, to the rear of the mountain on the west Side. Before he returned the fighting was over, and his brigade did not fire a shot that day. | The Federal commander intrusted to General Burnside the management of the fight, but under his own eyes; Burnside ordered a general advance on both sides of the pike. The First Corps, under Hooker, was to attack on the north side of the National road, while the Ninth Corps, under Reno, was to move forward, as before, on the south side. Hooker's corps consisted of 3 divisions, 10 brigades, or 42 regiments, With 10 batteries of artillery and a battalion of cavalry. General Meade, a division commander, had under him the brigades of Seymour, Magilton, and Gallagher, containing 13 regiments with 4 batteries attached. General Hatch, division com- mander, had under him the brigades of Doubleday, Phelps, Patrick, and Gibbon---17 regiments and 4 batteries. General Ricketts, division com- mander, had under him the brigades of Duryea, Christian, and Hartsuff---12 regiments and 2 batteries. From the nature of the ground, none of the artillery of Hooker's corps could be used, except that which went directly up the pike with Gibbon's brigade and one battery (Cooper's) on the enemy's right."

It seems that Longstreet was paraphrasing Hill.

 

[Saphroneth]

Similarly, to claim "Stanton delayed the arrival of supplies so he could then blame McClellan for 'excessive delay'"based on the beliefs of "quite of a few of McClellan's subordinate officers" is to charge him based on rumor and hearsay, not fact. To further condemn him because he "never did provide a credible innocent explanation" is not unlike claiming that someone's lack of response to a charge he/she was not aware of proves guilt.

Is there an innocent explanation for the months delay of supplies promised by Stanton? Is there an innocent explanation of why he would either not know about this, or would know about it but blame McClellan anyway?

McClellan- like others- was handicapped by opposition within the administration. Still, he had ample opportunity to prove the naysayers wrong. In the end, he failed.

If you could provide an example, offhand, out of the ample opportunities?

 

[Andrew]

I'm not really engaged on McClellan. Is there a single book, or a single writer, that I could consult for the most powerful arguments on McClellan's behalf?

McClellan's War by Ethan Rafuse is a good place to start for a more balanced judgment of McClellan. Later this year or early next year a book by Steve Stotelmyer, Too Useful to Sacrifice: Reconsidering George B. McClellan's Generalship in the Maryland Campaign from South Mountain to Antietam, will be released. Steve will be giving a presentation of the same name on July 19 in Sharpsburg. You could also read every post by 67th Tigers on this forum .

 

[WJC]

Is there an innocent explanation for the months delay of supplies promised by Stanton? Is there an innocent explanation of why he would either not know about this, or would know about it but blame McClellan anyway?

Thanks for your response.
I do not know. Nor am I going to guess. My intention is neither to defend nor condemn McClellan (or Stanton): let the facts- not opinions- speak for themselves.
My guess is we'll never know....

 

[WJC]

If you could provide an example, offhand, out of the ample opportunities?

Thanks for your response.
I refer you to Mr. Griffith's website or #112....

 

[BillO]

Somewhat. Hill did have a sarcastic and biting wit but he was also a prick.

Ryan

He wasn't a politician, for sure. It seems that it's not polite to remind your boss repeatedly that he isn't very good at his job.

 

[Saphroneth]

Thanks for your response.
I refer you to Mr. Griffith's website or #112....

Well, since the website holds that McClellan was generally capable, I assume that means "he didn't".

My intention is neither to defend nor condemn McClellan (or Stanton): let the facts- not opinions- speak for themselves.

The problem there is that McClellan's reputation was very thoroughly besmirched by the election campaign of 1864, and that is pretty much the baseline these days - to the point people essentially fabricate evidence against McClellan, chiefly Sears IIRC.

 

[Bruce Vail]

Thanks. I'm putting the Stotelmeyer event on my calendar.

 

[Bruce Vail]

McClellan's War by Ethan Rafuse is a good place to start for a more balanced judgment of McClellan. Later this year or early next year a book by Steve Stotelmyer, Too Useful to Sacrifice: Reconsidering George B. McClellan's Generalship in the Maryland Campaign from South Mountain to Antietam, will be released. Steve will be giving a presentation of the same name on July 19 in Sharpsburg. You could also read every post by 67th Tigers on this forum .

Thanks. I'm putting the Stotelmeyer event on my calendar.

 

[67th Tigers]

Thanks for your response.
I do not know. Nor am I going to guess. My intention is neither to defend nor condemn McClellan (or Stanton): let the facts- not opinions- speak for themselves.
My guess is we'll never know....

There is a chapter about this in Stotelmyer's forthcoming book.

However, indeed McClellan found post-Antietam he could barely subsist his army. Lincoln detailed the Assistant Secretary of War, Thomas Scott, to look into McClellan's claims that supplies were not reaching his army. He found McClellan's claims accurate, and that all the supplies issued to the Army of the Potomac had been issued to the depots of the Washington Defences rather than the army in the field. They never publicly apologised or recanted their accusations, but quietly unblocked the supplies which started to move mid-October (the first supplies started arriving at Hagerstown on 14th October). McClellan once resupplied launched the Loudoun Valley campaign at the end of October.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

McClellan's War by Ethan Rafuse is a good place to start for a more balanced judgment of McClellan. Later this year or early next year a book by Steve Stotelmyer, Too Useful to Sacrifice: Reconsidering George B. McClellan's Generalship in the Maryland Campaign from South Mountain to Antietam, will be released. Steve will be giving a presentation of the same name on July 19 in Sharpsburg. You could also read every post by 67th Tigers on this forum .

I found McClellan's War to be very good and it gave me a new perspective on McClellan. Rafuse presents a convincing argument. I am also looking forward to the new book.

I have always contended that McClellan was not as bad a general as his critics claim nor as great as his defenders assert. His Peninsula Campaign was as close as the Union came to victory in the east until June 1864 and was actually the best chance either side had during the war to break the stalemate that characterized the war in the east. I also think McClellan did a better job in Maryland than most will admit. The army was in chaos and 3 weeks later he won a victory. But he was less aggressive than his political bosses wanted, and his open relationship with the Democratic party made him a liability to a Republican administration.