General Lee's "Lost Order" # 191

[Andy Cardinal]

IMO someone in Jackson's staff decided that Hill should have a copy of Jackson's as Hill was leaving Jackson's command. Lee's staff had already sent Hill a copy but didn't bother to tell either Jackson men or Hill's. Bad staff work and poor communication.

I think was a direct result of the Army of Northern Virginia's confused command situation. D. H. Hill's division was independent, but also temporarily assigned to Jackson while the army was near Frederick. Walker's division was not assigned officially to either Jackson's or Longstreet's command either, I believe.

 

[Bruce Vail]

I think was a direct result of the Army of Northern Virginia's confused command situation. D. H. Hill's division was independent, but also temporarily assigned to Jackson while the army was near Frederick. Walker's division was not assigned officially to either Jackson's or Longstreet's command either, I believe.

hmmm...are you sure about that? The Antietam Battlefield marker for Ripley's Brigade, D.H. Hill's Division, states it was part of Jackson's Command.

http://antietam.aotw.org/tablet.php?tablet_id=3370

 

[Andy Cardinal]

hmmm...are you sure about that? The Antietam Battlefield marker for Ripley's Brigade, D.H. Hill's Division, states it was part of Jackson's Command.

http://antietam.aotw.org/tablet.php?tablet_id=3370

No, not sure. I was talking from memory from something I read. I know that's a little vague. I want to say I read something to that effect in Harsh's book. Either way though, Hill was serving as an independent commander Sept 14 & 15.

 

[Nathanb1]

I didn't mean that Hill personally wrapped up the cigars and laid it on the ground for the Yankees. I mean that that Lost Order was delivered to his HQ and then carelessly discarded by staff.

I've heard this Douglas theory before. I apologize, but remind me please what is the basis of this theory? He never admitted it, did he?

No, he didn't take the blame, warranted or not. I'd love for someone to expound on this...I used to be well versed in this stuff, but there's been too much water under the bridge.

I've always thought Lee's pet hen left it.

 

[BillO]

Do you mean to snarkily imply that McClellan was slow, and if so how do you think a better general would have reacted? When?

As we've seen from 67th's cronology, McClellan "reacted" before he actually got the order - to be any quicker to react to the information would have required a time machine.


For some, I think, McClellan is the only reason for some that the war didn't end in 1862, which is a very strange thing to think about someone who was repeatedly denied the resources he had been promised and who nevertheless managed to get his army into a situation in mid-1862 it later took the entire bloody Overland Campaign to achieve again. (I speak of the situation of the Army of the Potomac, on the James, supplied by sea and able to move on Petersburg.)

"snarkily" is a thing? If you had paid a little attention I have in the past defended Mac from a lot of the Grant lotus eaters here but no one can claim that Mac wasn't a very cautious general.

 

[cash]

The claim McClellan delayed after receiving the lost order by Stephen Sears was based on Sears' misreading of the time the order was received. He didn't understand the time McClellan put on his message to Washington telling them of the lost order. The message was time-stamped "12M." Sears interprets that as "12 Meridian," or "12 Noon." In actuality, it was "12 Midnight," 12 hours AFTER Sears thinks.

http://cwbn.blogspot.com/2014/03/guest-post-maurice-daoust-responds-to.html

 

[novushomus]

hmmm...are you sure about that? The Antietam Battlefield marker for Ripley's Brigade, D.H. Hill's Division, states it was part of Jackson's Command.

http://antietam.aotw.org/tablet.php?tablet_id=3370

According to Jackson's report, no. Only Jackson's division (J.R. Jones), Ewell's division (Lawton), and A.P. Hill's Light Division were part of his command.

The common but incorrect assumption about the order of battle for the Army of Northern Virginia comes from confusion resulting from the organization of the First and Second Corps, which happened in the campaign after Antietam. After the war, many people just assumed that the divisions fought under Longstreet and Jackson because Longstreet and Jackson were the two corps commanders appointed after the battle. While Longstreet and Jackson were the primary wing commanders, Joseph Harsh argues that D.H. Hill and McLaws temporarily operated as "wing" commanders (though with less permanence than the forces attached to Longstreet and Jackson) because Lee was testing potential commanders for a third maneuver element, with Hill in particular in place of G.W. Smith, while D. Scott Hartwig argues that the divisions outside of Longstreet and Jackson were just independent of the wings and assigned as needed.

Per Hartwig, the Army of Northern Virginia was organized at Antietam like:
Longstreet's Command
D.R. Jones's Division
Hood's Division
Evans's Independent Brigade
Anderson's Division
Washington Artillery
S.D. Lee's Artillery

Jackson's Command
Jackson's Division
Ewell's Division
Light Division

Independent Commands:
D.H. Hill's Division
McLaws's Division
Walker's Division
Reserve Artillery
Stuart's Cavalry Division


For most of the campaign, D.H. Hill's division, McLaws's division, Walker's division, the Reserve Artillery, and the Cavalry Division all reported directly to Lee. This is why D.H. Hill is receiving an order directly from Lee's headquarters. In the normal military protocol, if he were part of Jackson's command then the order would have gone through Jackson. Jackson, who thought D.H. Hill's division was still under his command, followed that procedure, unaware that Lee was sending a direct order.

 

[67th Tigers]

The situation with the wings etc. is interesting.

Longstreet and Jackson both were in command of multi-divisional formations, thus:

Longstreet. DR Jones commanded Longstreet's old division, which had always been tactically organised as 2x 3 brigade divisions and operated as such, with Toombs and Kemper commanding these tactical divisions. Evans until recently had command of a similar 3 brigade division, but Longstreet had detached him. On crossing the Potomac Longstreet also had Wilcox's division of 3 brigades, but they were placed under Anderson. The reason for this seems to be that Wilcox was ill, and Longstreet didn't trust the other brigadier in the division (Pryor).

Anderson's division was not reporting to Longstreet, but was directly under Lee as his army level reserve division at 2nd BR. Lee had put Anderson in with Longstreet and they marched in the rear of Longstreet across the Potomac. At Frederick there was a major reorganisation of the force, with Wilcox's division being added, and the 6 brigades placed under McLaws

Jackson's force was essentially unaltered from late July. DH Hill would be briefly attached on crossing the Potomac. DH Hill lead the crossing and Jackson was next, so naturally Jackson would take command of both. However Jackson was thrown from his horse shortly after crossing the Potomac and placed DH Hill in command of the whole force. Jackson was disabled for several days and DH Hill was commanding both his own division and Jackson's three divisions in the vicinity of Frederick.

As for DH Hill, he'd led three divisions (his own, McLaws and Walker) and a cavalry brigade up from Richmond. GW Smith was their nominal wing commander, but he was too ill to take to the field. Lee broke up the structure before crossing the Potomac. McLaws has given Anderson and Wilcox for his operations.

Now, the Jackson-DH Hill relation is the reason for their likely being two sets of SO191 sent to DH Hill.

 

[novushomus]

The situation with the wings etc. is interesting.

Longstreet and Jackson both were in command of multi-divisional formations, thus:

Longstreet. DR Jones commanded Longstreet's old division, which had always been tactically organised as 2x 3 brigade divisions and operated as such, with Toombs and Kemper commanding these tactical divisions. Evans until recently had command of a similar 3 brigade division, but Longstreet had detached him. On crossing the Potomac Longstreet also had Wilcox's division of 3 brigades, but they were placed under Anderson. The reason for this seems to be that Wilcox was ill, and Longstreet didn't trust the other brigadier in the division (Pryor).

Anderson's division was not reporting to Longstreet, but was directly under Lee as his army level reserve division at 2nd BR. Lee had put Anderson in with Longstreet and they marched in the rear of Longstreet across the Potomac. At Frederick there was a major reorganisation of the force, with Wilcox's division being added, and the 6 brigades placed under McLaws

From the evidence of official reports at Antietam, I'd consider Anderson as a part of Longstreet's command, as Longstreet specifically named Anderson in his report and makes reference to giving him orders, as well as Anderson's subordinates Mahone, Pryor, and Carnot Posey (commanding Featherston's brigade). This is an action typically done by an officer commanding a unit to name his subordinates who performed honorably. Additionally, Longstreet reported that he dispatched Anderson with six brigades (Anderson's original three and Wilcox's consolidated division) to join McLaws, having recommended to Lee that McLaws be reinforced.

McLaws's report on Antietam itself is pretty clear that Longstreet sought him out and removed the division from his command once the two divisions had arrived at Sharpsburg. I take this as Longstreet reassuming command of a division that he attached to McLaws for a temporary assignment.

There is also the issue of Pryor, taking command of Anderson's division after the latter wounding at Antietam, requesting artillery support and reinforcements from Longstreet as it was becoming clear that the Second Corps was unraveling the Confederate center. While this by itself does not indicate an order of battle, there is also the consideration that Anderson command half of Longstreet's old division as well as D.R. Jones.

As to Wilcox, in addition to being absent from illness, also had not performed particularly well at Second Manassas. He was ordered to reinforce the attack on Chinn Ridge with his division, but, misconstruing this order, only came forward with his own brigade instead of the whole division and made very little progress under Federal artillery fire. Scott Patchan discusses this in his book on the assault on Chinn Ridge. Kemper too had not distinguished himself commanding a small division on the plains of Manassas, as likewise he was folded into D.R. Jones's division, though this also may have been consolidations due to the rapidly depleting manpower to maintain strong divisions.

 

[Saphroneth]

"snarkily" is a thing? If you had paid a little attention I have in the past defended Mac from a lot of the Grant lotus eaters here but no one can claim that Mac wasn't a very cautious general.

As far as I can tell, McClellan often moved as fast as was prudent - and I do mean sensibly prudent. During the time he was in charge of the Army of the Potomac the Union and Confederate armies were quite close in total size (compared to how they were later on) and so there was more scope for a mistake where a more rash man could have cost the Union their largest field army. (e.g. attacking after Malvern Hill would have destroyed the Army of the Potomac - if Kearny was in charge then the entire AotP would have done so, been cut off without supplies and surrendered.)

 

[Bruce Vail]

The situation with the wings etc. is interesting.

Longstreet and Jackson both were in command of multi-divisional formations, thus:

Longstreet. DR Jones commanded Longstreet's old division, which had always been tactically organised as 2x 3 brigade divisions and operated as such, with Toombs and Kemper commanding these tactical divisions. Evans until recently had command of a similar 3 brigade division, but Longstreet had detached him. On crossing the Potomac Longstreet also had Wilcox's division of 3 brigades, but they were placed under Anderson. The reason for this seems to be that Wilcox was ill, and Longstreet didn't trust the other brigadier in the division (Pryor).

Anderson's division was not reporting to Longstreet, but was directly under Lee as his army level reserve division at 2nd BR. Lee had put Anderson in with Longstreet and they marched in the rear of Longstreet across the Potomac. At Frederick there was a major reorganisation of the force, with Wilcox's division being added, and the 6 brigades placed under McLaws

Jackson's force was essentially unaltered from late July. DH Hill would be briefly attached on crossing the Potomac. DH Hill lead the crossing and Jackson was next, so naturally Jackson would take command of both. However Jackson was thrown from his horse shortly after crossing the Potomac and placed DH Hill in command of the whole force. Jackson was disabled for several days and DH Hill was commanding both his own division and Jackson's three divisions in the vicinity of Frederick.

As for DH Hill, he'd led three divisions (his own, McLaws and Walker) and a cavalry brigade up from Richmond. GW Smith was their nominal wing commander, but he was too ill to take to the field. Lee broke up the structure before crossing the Potomac. McLaws has given Anderson and Wilcox for his operations.

Now, the Jackson-DH Hill relation is the reason for their likely being two sets of SO191 sent to DH Hill.

So, Hill's Division was made officially part of Jackson's command, sometime after Antietam?

That didn't last very long though, because Hill was transferred out of the ANV sometime after Fredericksburg but before Chancellorsville.

 

[Bruce Vail]

According to Jackson's report, no. Only Jackson's division (J.R. Jones), Ewell's division (Lawton), and A.P. Hill's Light Division were part of his command.

View attachment 140994


The common but incorrect assumption about the order of battle for the Army of Northern Virginia comes from confusion resulting from the organization of the First and Second Corps, which happened in the campaign after Antietam. After the war, many people just assumed that the divisions fought under Longstreet and Jackson because Longstreet and Jackson were the two corps commanders appointed after the battle. While Longstreet and Jackson were the primary wing commanders, Joseph Harsh argues that D.H. Hill and McLaws temporarily operated as "wing" commanders (though with less permanence than the forces attached to Longstreet and Jackson) because Lee was testing potential commanders for a third maneuver element, with Hill in particular in place of G.W. Smith, while D. Scott Hartwig argues that the divisions outside of Longstreet and Jackson were just independent of the wings and assigned as needed.

Per Hartwig, the Army of Northern Virginia was organized at Antietam like:
Longstreet's Command
D.R. Jones's Division
Hood's Division
Evans's Independent Brigade
Anderson's Division
Washington Artillery
S.D. Lee's Artillery

Jackson's Command
Jackson's Division
Ewell's Division
Light Division

Independent Commands:
D.H. Hill's Division
McLaws's Division
Walker's Division
Reserve Artillery
Stuart's Cavalry Division


For most of the campaign, D.H. Hill's division, McLaws's division, Walker's division, the Reserve Artillery, and the Cavalry Division all reported directly to Lee. This is why D.H. Hill is receiving an order directly from Lee's headquarters. In the normal military protocol, if he were part of Jackson's command then the order would have gone through Jackson. Jackson, who thought D.H. Hill's division was still under his command, followed that procedure, unaware that Lee was sending a direct order.

Thanks for this.

For the men of Third North Carolina Infantry, Antietam touched off a series of organizational/staff changes that was a little bewildering and a little demoralizing.

First, their Colonel, William DeRosset, was badly wounded and sent home for good. Their brigade commander, Roswell Ripley, was lightly wounded -- he was sent home and sort of disappeared. Months later he would receive an appointment to garrison duty in Charleston, S.C., without much explanation to anybody.

In the meantime the brigade came under the command of Col. George Doles of the 4th Georgia Volunteer Infantry, who had distinguished himself in the Maryland campaign. Although Doles was a fine officer, the North Carolinians had been lobbying for a reorganization that would place North Carolina regiments together in a Brigade commanded by a North Carolina general. That didn't happen. Instead a new brigade was formed under Gen. Coulston (a Virginian). Coulston would not last long -- and would be dismissed after the battle of Chancellorsville.

The North Carolinians finally got their wish to be brigaded together with other North Carolinains in June 1864, when they were placed under the command of Gen. William R. Cox. That was kind of consolation prize, though, because Third NC had been decimated May 12, 1864 at Spotsylvania Court House. In the fighting at the Mule Shoe, some 70-80 percent of the regiment was killed, wounded or captured.

 

[Bruce Vail]

D.H. Hill defended himself publicly against the accusation that he was responsible for the Lost Order.

But who made the accusation? That's not clear to me from what I have read. Was the accusation made at the time, or was that part of the post-war recrimination among Confederate generals?

 

[67th Tigers]

hmmm...are you sure about that? The Antietam Battlefield marker for Ripley's Brigade, D.H. Hill's Division, states it was part of Jackson's Command.

http://antietam.aotw.org/tablet.php?tablet_id=3370

DH Hill's division was tactically divided into two divisions, one under Ripley and one under Rodes. Ripley's division of 3 brigades was sent to reinforce Jackson, with 1st Corps attacking at the joint between Jackson's right and DH Hill's left.

DH Hill remained at the H. Piper House, where he set up his command post (CP), which is also where Longstreet set up his CP.

Essentially 3 brigades of DH Hill's division were detached and fought next to Hood under the general direction of Jackson (who was at the Reel House, further to the rear) and 2 fought under Longstreet's direction.

 

[rpkennedy]

So, Hill's Division was made officially part of Jackson's command, sometime after Antietam?

That didn't last long very though, because Hill was transferred out of the ANV sometime after Fredericksburg but before Chancellorsville.

Correct.

But most of his division did remain, under the command of Robert Roses.

Ryan

 

[Bruce Vail]

Correct.

But moat of his division did remain, under the command of Robert Roses.

Ryan

Well, this helps explains a detail of the 3rds regimental history that has confused me.

The history relates an incident that took place apparently about noon on Sept. 17. One of the junior officers is sent to HQ to ask for reinforcements after the regiment had been pushed out of The Cornfield and into the area around the Dunker Church. The junior officer is told by Gen. Longstreet that there are no reserves available. Why would the officer be riding off to Longstreet's HQ?

 

[Bruce Vail]

DH Hill's division was tactically divided into two divisions, one under Ripley and one under Rodes. Ripley's division of 3 brigades was sent to reinforce Jackson, with 1st Corps attacking at the joint between Jackson's right and DH Hill's left.

DH Hill remained at the H. Piper House, where he set up his command post (CP), which is also where Longstreet set up his CP.

Essentially 3 brigades of DH Hill's division were detached and fought next to Hood under the general direction of Jackson (who was at the Reel House, further to the rear) and 2 fought under Longstreet's direction.

Longstreet and DH Hill were operating their HQs together at the Piper House at the same time?

 

[67th Tigers]

From the evidence of official reports at Antietam, I'd consider Anderson as a part of Longstreet's command, as Longstreet specifically named Anderson in his report and makes reference to giving him orders, as well as Anderson's subordinates Mahone, Pryor, and Carnot Posey (commanding Featherston's brigade). This is an action typically done by an officer commanding a unit to name his subordinates who performed honorably. Additionally, Longstreet reported that he dispatched Anderson with six brigades (Anderson's original three and Wilcox's consolidated division) to join McLaws, having recommended to Lee that McLaws be reinforced.

McLaws's report on Antietam itself is pretty clear that Longstreet sought him out and removed the division from his command once the two divisions had arrived at Sharpsburg. I take this as Longstreet reassuming command of a division that he attached to McLaws for a temporary assignment.

McLaws command, consisting of his own and Anderson's divisions, arrived at Sharpsburg around dawn on the 17th and went into reserve on the road west of Sharpsburg. They remained there until ca. 0800 hrs when Lee had his first major decision of the battle - having reports that his left was crumbling he ordered McLaws forward with McLaws (pus Armistead) heading to the West Woods and Anderson (minus Armistead) towards the Piper House. The order was sent to McLaws for both his divisions and was carried by Maj Taylor. Taylor could not find McLaws (who was further back bringing up Anderson's diviion) and issued the order to McLaws' divisional adjutant who formed the brigades and started them without McLaws. Maj Ratchford of DH Hill's staff guided in the division.

Lee also ordered Walker from the right flank (where Longstreet had exceeded his authority to place him, earning him a rebuke from Lee), and even pulled GT Anderson's brigade from Longstreet. You'll note from McLaws' AAR that whilst Longstreet ordered McLaws to send Anderson to him shortly afterwards he found Lee who countermanded that order.

At this point Lee leaves his CP on Cemetery Hill for the only time in the battle. Unable to ride a horse due to his broken wrists, he walked through Sharpsburg and up to the Reel House (Jackson's CP) with an aide leading his horse Traveller by the reins. At the Reel House they boosted Lee onto Traveller and led him around, because Lee could not hold the reins. DH Hill, Gordon, and others visited Lee at the Reel House to ask for orders. After around two hours at the Reel House Lee could not ignore Burnside any more and returned to his main CP where he remained for the rest of the battle.

As to Anderson, sadly we lack any reports. Five of his brigades went to DH Hill, hich is roughly where Longstreet wanted them anyway.

There is also the issue of Pryor, taking command of Anderson's division after the latter wounding at Antietam, requesting artillery support and reinforcements from Longstreet as it was becoming clear that the Second Corps was unraveling the Confederate center. While this by itself does not indicate an order of battle, there is also the consideration that Anderson command half of Longstreet's old division as well as D.R. Jones.

As to Wilcox, in addition to being absent from illness, also had not performed particularly well at Second Manassas. He was ordered to reinforce the attack on Chinn Ridge with his division, but, misconstruing this order, only came forward with his own brigade instead of the whole division and made very little progress under Federal artillery fire. Scott Patchan discusses this in his book on the assault on Chinn Ridge. Kemper too had not distinguished himself commanding a small division on the plains of Manassas, as likewise he was folded into D.R. Jones's division, though this also may have been consolidations due to the rapidly depleting manpower to maintain strong divisions.

The divisions were pretty strong when they set out from Frederick, their strength a few days earlier being:

McLaws (4 bdes): 7,652 PFD
RH Anderson (3): 5,712
Wilcox (3): 5,582
= 18,946 PFD

A few days after the battle this force reports 9,252 PFD after 2,397 casualties, and so they had around 11,649 on the field.

 

[67th Tigers]

Longstreet and DH Hill will operating their HQs together at the Piper House at the same time?

So I read. With respect to the junior officer going to DHH's CP at H. Piper's house, if ca. 0800-1000 then likely he would have found Longstreet there alone, as DH Hill had ridden back to Jackson's CP where Lee arrived ca. 0830. ISTR DH Hill rode back when French's division approached the sunken road.

It seems Jackson, Hood and DH Hill managed the fighting on the left until 0830, leaving Longstreet watching the centre and right. Lee came over around then and personally supervised this sector until around 1000.

 

[Bruce Vail]

So I read. With respect to the junior officer going to DHH's CP at H. Piper's house, if ca. 0800-1000 then likely he would have found Longstreet there alone, as DH Hill had ridden back to Jackson's CP where Lee arrived ca. 0830. ISTR DH Hill rode back when French's division approached the sunken road.

It seems Jackson, Hood and DH Hill managed the fighting on the left until 0830, leaving Longstreet watching the centre and right. Lee came over around then and personally supervised this sector until around 1000.

I went back to re-read the section of the regimental history: It's just not detailed enough to give an estimated time that the junior officer (Lt. Cicero Craige) spoke to Longstreet. It seems likely the junior officer arrived at the CP when Hill was otherwise occupied at the Sunken Road.