Lee Did Lee Really Say This?

[Saphroneth]

If Mc had just been the commander and not so Montgomeryish { British general WWll} and been more of a aggressive general then would he have kept his command,?

I think being Montgomeryish is sort of an advantage, as he won all his battles... a general is likely to have ego, the question is more whether their ego actually gets in the way of their duty.
It's easy enough to find private insults by McClellan about Lincoln, but public ones are a lot harder to find.

 

[CaptSpook]

These are all very rational, plausible comments to consider.

We will never really know what motivated Lee to remark that McClellan, not Grant or any other, was his greatest adversary. Historians will use it as fuel for speculation for many generations to come.

Indeed, perhaps this is what Lee intended.

 

[John S. Carter]

I think being Montgomeryish is sort of an advantage, as he won all his battles... a general is likely to have ego, the question is more whether their ego actually gets in the way of their duty.
It's easy enough to find private insults by McClellan about Lincoln, but public ones are a lot harder to find.

Was the operation of ''Market Garden" Mont's ?The only credit I give him his he his reply for D Day=DO IT! Can there be agreement on this,that while he may have been a successful leader,according to what Lee or Morgan said ,that he was his own worse enemy when it relates between Washington and his lack of diplomacy? That is what made Eisenhower a great leader.and why he achieved the successes he did.Grant kept Meade in charge of the AP when he assumed command ,leadership recognizes character in other people.

 

[Saphroneth]

Was the operation of ''Market Garden" Mont's ?

Fair enough. Almost all his battles, then.
(I could go into more detail on Market Garden, but probably not the forum for it.)

The only credit I give him his he his reply for D Day

Really? Nothing for his plan for D-Day, or the fighting in North Africa, or for that matter the steady offensives which drained German strength around Caen?

Can there be agreement on this,that while he may have been a successful leader,according to what Lee or Morgan said ,that he was his own worse enemy when it relates between Washington and his lack of diplomacy?

I'm not actually so sure. It's hard for me to point to a place where McClellan was not at least professional, except for one known case during the Seven Days.
I think that there are better choices to point to as McClellan's worst enemy, like Stanton!

 

[Saphroneth]

These are all very rational, plausible comments to consider.

We will never really know what motivated Lee to remark that McClellan, not Grant or any other, was his greatest adversary. Historians will use it as fuel for speculation for many generations to come.

Indeed, perhaps this is what Lee intended.

I mean, Occam's Razor would suggest that it was because he had the most trouble that he could attribute to enemy skill while fighting McClellan. It's of a piece with comments like:


"McClellan will make this a battle of Posts. He will take position from position, under cover of his heavy guns, & we cannot get at him without storming his works, which with our new troops is extremely hazardous... It will require 100,000 men to resist the regular siege of Richmond, which perhaps would only prolong not save it - I am preparing a line that I can hold with part of our forces in front, while with the rest I will endeavour to make a diversion to bring McClellan out. He sticks under his batteries & is working day & nights - He is obliged to adhere to the R.R. unless he can reach James river to provision his Army. I am endeavouring to block his progress on the R.R. ... Our people are opposed to work. Our troops officers community & press. All ridicule & resist it. It is the very means by which McClellan has & is advancing."

 

[Belfoured]

Because historians are presented with the choice of blaming Lincoln or McClellan for the way the war did not end in 1862, and they choose McClellan to blame.


Because Lincoln did not understand warfare and thought he did. He thought it was just an easy thing of going straight towards the enemy and fighting them - he actually spoke approvingly of the slaughter at Fredericksburg!


Yep. McClellan was a War Democrat, and just after the November midterms there was a big purge of them.


His soldiers appear to have loved him because he wouldn't do that to them without good reason. McClellan was certainly willing to put his soldiers into nasty situations - he after all was the attacker at Antietam which saw the bloodiest day of American military history - but he wouldn't throw them against prepared defences without good reason.


It's hard to say about the first one, but I suspect not. As for the second one, yes, Lincoln knew that McClellan's preferred solution was not to officially end slavery but instead to just forcibly purchase every slave in an entire state and free the lot.


What kept happening - and this happens in April, May, June and July - is that McClellan is promised a certain number of troops by Lincoln, and Lincoln agrees that McClellan needs those troops, and then Lincoln or Halleck doesn't send the troops.
In September and October it's instead vital supplies.


The essential problem is that errors have polluted the historiography. There are four main sources of them:

The first set of sources is 1864 election propaganda. A lot of the usual falsehoods about McClellan come from this period, like the idea he was on a gunboat during the fighting at Malvern Hill (which is a conflation of two different days - he was on a gunboat when the fighting started at Glendale, the day before).

The second set of sources is the Lost Cause, which argued that every Union general had had massive advantages, Lee had been a wizard to beat everyone until Grant, and Grant had simply crushed him under massive numerical superiority. This involved distorting the numbers at all the battles, and while most of the distortions got caught it wasn't done for McClellan - so the Lost Cause numbers were allowed to stand, creating the false impression that McClellan's army was much bigger than it was.
(Walter H. Taylor, for example, calculated Lee's strength at Antietam by explicitly assuming that Lee got no reinforcements whatsoever after Second Bull Run - which ignores several entire divisions for a start.)

The third set of sources is the group of authors who followed the concept of "Lincoln finds a general", which was the idea that the main problem the North had with winning the war was the psychology of the generals. This pretty much discarded the actual numbers in favour of arguing that only Grant had the willpower to actually fight, an absurdity on the face of it when you consider that McClellan must therefore have somehow reached the outskirts of Richmond through the power of pacifism.

And the final set of sources is, basically, Stephen Sears. Sears is a popular historian, but he's not a good historian - he's been caught out on several occasions actually inventing evidence, or lying about it, or distorting it, and usually in the service of making McClellan look bad.


The reason for the third and fourth set of errors appears to simply be that McClellan has become a caricature. People (for historians are people) have become invested in the idea that he sucks.

Hold on there. He did also board the Galena on July 1, when Porter was in charge at Malvern Hill. The more egregious episode was June 30 and that's more likely the source of the campaign spin but he managed to board the vessel on both days.

 

[67th Tigers]

Hold on there. He did also board the Galena on July 1, when Porter was in charge at Malvern Hill. The more egregious episode was June 30 and that's more likely the source of the campaign spin but he managed to board the vessel on both days.

Unless 1630 is before 1400, McClellan was present and in command at Malvern Hill.

McClellan boarded the Galena on the 30th before there was any significant fighting, had telegraphic communications and was able to move troops. He managed to get back to his command post just after 1800, when only two brigades had attacked. He missed very little of the fighting.

 

[Saphroneth]

Hold on there. He did also board the Galena on July 1, when Porter was in charge at Malvern Hill. The more egregious episode was June 30 and that's more likely the source of the campaign spin but he managed to board the vessel on both days.

Well, that's what I mean by a conflation of two different days.

At Glendale (on the 30th) you have the fighting starting when McClellan is on a ship, so there is combat going on while McClellan is on a vessel (which is what the campaign ad is portraying).
At Malvern Hill (July 1st), McClellan is on the Galena during the day, but he's back ashore before the fighting starts.

So the campaign ad is presenting McClellan on ship while fighting is happening at Malvern Hill, which is false. The sense of the ad is outright malicious, mind, because it's showing McClellan leaving his men to fight while he's safe elsewhere, but it can't even be excused as portraying a moment in time. (If it were portraying Glendale there would be that vague excuse.)

 

[Saphroneth]

In the interests of clarity, I feel that I should explain the reason why McClellan had to go aboard the Galena.

The basic problem is where the new supply base is. It's going to be on the James River, that much is certain, but the question is where.

The Navy (specifically the captain of the Galena, Rodgers) sent McClellan a note on the 30th of June to the effect that the Navy could not provide supplies above the mouth of the Chickahominy, and that the army should retreat to Williamsburg.

There is thus a problem. McClellan wants the new supply base as high upriver as possible, because he doesn't want to be forced back far (as of Glendale he is occupying the line he wants to hold, he doesn't want to retreat any further, which would place him about ~12-15 miles from the centre of Richmond) and was actually hoping for Haxhall's Landing to be the new supply base (which is just south of Malvern Hill), but the Navy wants the new supply base to be much further back (in effect they want McClellan to retreat another 25 miles).
McClellan goes aboard the Galena to have a conference, but almost immediately the battle starts; McClellan exercises command from the Galena at first, then goes back ashore.

That night McClellan briefly boards the Galena again to send off the French Princes with dispatches and messages for Washington.

Overnight on the 30th-1st, Rodgers comes ashore for some discussion. Then on the 1st things are quiet, and during the quiet period McClellan goes aboard the Galena for the third time and they go and recce Harrisons Landing. This becomes the new supply base.

Harrisons Landing is a little further down the James than Haxhall's (it's downriver of the City Point batteries near Petersburg) but it's significantly upriver of where Rodgers wanted the new supply base.

No fighting takes place while McClellan is aboard the Galena on the 1st. Porter is listed as in command of the fighting at Malvern because it's his corps front where the (accidental) attack takes place, and McClellan is at the army HQ when it begins.

 

[67th Tigers]

No fighting takes place while McClellan is aboard the Galena on the 1st. Porter is listed as in command of the fighting at Malvern because it's his corps front where the (accidental) attack takes place, and McClellan is at the army HQ when it begins.

Indeed, and Porter doesn't "go to the front" until ca. 1830, during DH Hill's attack. He is standing with McClellan, who has ordered the other corps to send forces into reserve in case they are needed. The first brigade to arrive was the Irish Brigade, and McClellan starts to lead it to the front, but Porter stops him and says he'll do it. Porter does this, and McClellan remains near Malvern House, watching the action with field glasses, sending brigades to the front as they arrive and holding his army reserve (The Pa Reserves) ready to put in.

 

[John S. Carter]

Fair enough. Almost all his battles, then.
(I could go into more detail on Market Garden, but probably not the forum for it.)


Really? Nothing for his plan for D-Day, or the fighting in North Africa, or for that matter the steady offensives which drained German strength around Caen?


I'm not actually so sure. It's hard for me to point to a place where McClellan was not at least professional, except for one known case during the Seven Days.
I think that there are better choices to point to as McClellan's worst enemy, like Stanton!

Thank you for all this assistance in this.information.

 

[CaptSpook]

Back to the question of Lee's alleged comments about McClellan, it will always be a mystery, at least to me.

In the end, McClellan failed to destroy Lee's army and ultimately, he was fired from his job because of it. What Lee saw beyond McLellan's ability to recruit, organize, train, inspire, and move an army in great numbers and materiel in the field, which is almost everything you have to do to be recognized as a great commander, is missing from the equation. In my opinion, if McLellan would have filled that last variable (committing his army to battle in ways that Grant did) the war might have been greatly shortened.

 

[Saphroneth]

In my opinion, if McLellan would have filled that last variable (committing his army to battle in ways that Grant did) the war might have been greatly shortened.

Can you clarify what you mean by "committing his army to battle in ways that Grant did", with special reference to the time when Grant committed his army to battle in a way greater than that which McClellan did at Antietam?

 

[67th Tigers]

Back to the question of Lee's alleged comments about McClellan, it will always be a mystery, at least to me.

Lee fought McClellan and suffered heavily. He was greatly relieved by McClellan's relief and afterwards the "heavy blows" of McClellan ended, and he got to shoot down the AoP at Fredericksburg.

After McClellan was removed, Lee was not placed in serious danger of destruction for 18 months.

 

[Belfoured]

Unless 1630 is before 1400, McClellan was present and in command at Malvern Hill.

McClellan boarded the Galena on the 30th before there was any significant fighting, had telegraphic communications and was able to move troops. He managed to get back to his command post just after 1800, when only two brigades had attacked. He missed very little of the fighting.

He never came back to the field (although he definitely was there before the fighting started) and after about 1200 forays you still haven't come up with a single order issued by McClellan to Summer, Heintzelman, or Franklin during the fighting (or, to cover the turf, Kearney, Hooker, Slocum, Sedgwick, etc etc). Tell us exactly what he did between 1800 and 2100; specify the orders he issued; and point to sources, not to your imagination.

 

[CaptSpook]

Can you clarify what you mean by "committing his army to battle in ways that Grant did", with special reference to the time when Grant committed his army to battle in a way greater than that which McClellan did at Antietam?

To compare and contrast between Grant and McClellan in this respect, I would point to some basic differences in their personalities. Of course, this could take more than a forum discussion might offer, but from my understanding of the two men, Grant was more apt to utilize (and use) his resources than was McClellan because Grant's style was more tuned to defeating his enemy, than was McClellan.

I'm sure McClellan's goal was to defeat his enemies, but his "tactical style" (my own quote) was less direct than Grant's. Another way of saying this is, Grant was more willing to put men into battle knowing the probable high casualty outcome, than was McClellan, who might have considered the potential political consequences of posting high casualty rates, and consequently was more reluctant to commit the bulk of his army to battle. Grant had foresight much like Lee and knew what it would take to win battels; Grant and Lee knew that there were times when they had to send men to their deaths in order to achieve their goals. Both did so reluctantly.

Antietam, or Sharpsburg, is a prime example where McClellan could have thrown in his reserves at key moments and routed Lee. In my opinion, Grant would have personally overseen the battle, and maneuvered and committed his entire command, and most likely would have forced Lee to surrender. (I know, I don't particularly appreciate speculation, it's only my opinion).

Again, my opinions. Thanks.

 

[67th Tigers]

He never came back to the field (although he definitely was there before the fighting started) and after about 1200 forays you still haven't come up with a single order issued by McClellan to Summer, Heintzelman, or Franklin during the fighting (or, to cover the turf, Kearney, Hooker, Slocum, Sedgwick, etc etc). Tell us exactly what he did between 1800 and 2100; specify the orders he issued; and point to sources, not to your imagination.

Depends what you call "the field" doesn't it. As you should know from our previous conversations, the orders were all verbal since they were running out of paper and hence little is recorded. Indeed, this lack of paper contributed to Hammerstein failing to deliver an order from McClellan to Wessells. I should maybe just repeat myself:

When McClellan left the Dew House after receiving Rodger's note at 1600 there was no attack, merely some exchange of artillery fire. Longstreet ordered Jenkins to advance skirmishers to snipe the gunners, but around 1630 Jenkins took his brigade and charged the Federal batteries from the front. Wilcox thought they were attacking and launched his two ready regiments as well. With an ad hoc attack underway Longstreet orders Kemper and Branch to attack at 1700. Kemper launches 1715-30, but Branch's brigade (the one nearest McClellan's CP at the Dew House) had gone into routine and were around their cooking fires; they didn't launch until around 1800. Other "attacks" were launched after 1830, but were essentially demonstrations to cover breaking contact.

McClellan is down at Haxalls when Jenkins launches, and is on the Galena or on a boat back from the Galena when Kemper launches. By the time Branch launches he is ashore and probably riding up Malvern Hill. He would be back at his CP before AP Hill launched any attacks.

Let me also note that the column under Holmes that attacked Malvern was Lee's main effort, and we know this because this is where he sent his reserve force (Magruder). The force at the crossroads was merely making a demonstration against the centre to stop McClellan pulling forces from there onto Malvern Hill. Jenkins' unordered attack indeed caused McClellan to react as Lee wanted, he sent forces from Malvern Hill to the crossroads, but Holmes' attack was smothered by artillery and the gunboats and was defeated easily.

McClellan's signals after he was informed of the attack at the crossroads certainly include orders for reserves to reinforce the centre, as Couch is explicit where the order came from. The question of who ordered the 4 brigades from White Oak is unresolved, and quite possibly everyone did. The two from Sedgwick's brigade we know were en route before the attack, and also received orders from multiple staff officers from various commanders to hurry up. The two brigades from Richardson's division were not ordered to move until after 1800. Meagher had been at Sumner's HQ for a while asking for Sumner to order them to the contact, and after 1800 Sumner did. We have no information about whether Sumner suddenly changed his mind or whether he received orders to that effect we don't know either way.

Essentially of the seven brigades that moved (or should have) to the New Market crossroads:

* Two (Dana and Sully) were ordered there well before McClellan left for the Galena, but had been sent over to counter a threat by Huger en route and then proceeded to the crossroads.
* Two (Howe and Palmer) were absolutely verifiably ordered there by McClellan, with Maj Webb carrying the order.
* Two (Caldwell and Meagher) were ordered there around 1800 hrs by Sumner under unknown circumstances.
* One (Wessells) was ordered to the crossroads by McClellan but the aide carrying the order (Hammerstein) could not find them and so headed on with his other orders

The order to Howe and Palmer was carried from the signals station by Maj Webb. The order to move Wessells was carried by Maj Hammerstein, who stated he could not spend long looking for him as he "had to move other troops". Which other troops were these? The only other significant troop movement on the field in the hour after this was that of Meagher and Caldwell, and the obvious answer is that he was tasked to move reinforcements down from White Oak Swamp to New Market Crossroads, unless you know of another troop movement?

 

[Saphroneth]

I'm sure McClellan's goal was to defeat his enemies, but his "tactical style" (my own quote) was less direct than Grant's. Another way of saying this is, Grant was more willing to put men into battle knowing the probable high casualty outcome, than was McClellan, who might have considered the potential political consequences of posting high casualty rates, and consequently was more reluctant to commit the bulk of his army to battle. Grant had foresight much like Lee and knew what it would take to win battels; Grant and Lee knew that there were times when they had to send men to their deaths in order to achieve their goals. Both did so reluctantly.

I'm not really sure I follow. On 17th September 1862 McClellan sent in four separate corps level attacks (1st, 12th, 2nd, 9th) and had some pressure on a divisional front of a fifth corps (5th Corps with Sykes' division), resulting in his own troops on the attack taking at least 12,000 casualties. There is no single day that I am aware of when any other Union commander - Grant included - launches attacks that cost his army so many men.

This is why I think the idea that McClellan was overly casualty-averse simply does not hold up; the bloodiest day in American history is entirely the result of his attacks.

Antietam, or Sharpsburg, is a prime example where McClellan could have thrown in his reserves at key moments and routed Lee. In my opinion, Grant would have personally overseen the battle, and maneuvered and committed his entire command, and most likely would have forced Lee to surrender. (I know, I don't particularly appreciate speculation, it's only my opinion).

See, this is why I said "with reference to" etc.

At no point in the Overland that I can find does Grant commit his entire command to attack on the same day. If you can identify a day when this happens, please alert me to it.

It should be noted first that McClellan put as many troops on the 17th into actual attacks (in proportion of his army on the field through the whole day) as Lee committed on the first two days of Gettysburg, inclusive; second, it should be noted that - far from fearing for his army being vulnerable to destruction if McClellan made one more attack - Lee was actually considering a counterattack at Antietam when the fighting ended on the 17th (though he did ultimately decide against it).

This isn't as crazy on Lee's part as it sounds. If he tried to count up the brigades he had which he thought could advance (i.e. had not been exhausted by close combat or routed today) he'd say:


Three brigades of McLaws (who were not closely engaged so far) and two brigades of Walker (who were also not in close combat), then five of RH Anderson's brigades (in line of battle, but not closely engaged).
In addition to this there's the brigades of Rodes and Garland (who were not in close action) a little to the south, plus Armistead's brigade (which was in reserve and completely fresh), plus Early's brigade (which escaped the general wrecking of Lawton's division) and Evans' brigade.

So in other words Lee could have pointed to 15 brigades who were at least capable of combat, and this doesn't count any of the troops facing Burnside. The extent to which they could mount an offensive against troops well positioned for defence is another thing, of course, but it serves notice that Lee's army was not about to disintegrate under sheer weight of pressure.

 

[Belfoured]

Lee fought McClellan and suffered heavily. He was greatly relieved by McClellan's relief and afterwards the "heavy blows" of McClellan ended, and he got to shoot down the AoP at Fredericksburg.

After McClellan was removed, Lee was not placed in serious danger of destruction for 18 months.

Actually he wasn't in danger of destruction before McClellan was removed - as you've repeatedly pointed out. Can you cite us to a source where Lee expressed "great relief" at McClellan's removal in November? Again, an actual source. I'm willing to be enlightened. And I'll close by asking who it was that Grant said was his toughest opponent in the War. All of these statements - even if it's proven they were made as repeated - need to be accompanied by a large dose of salt.

Depends what you call "the field" doesn't it. As you should know from our previous conversations, the orders were all verbal since they were running out of paper and hence little is recorded. Indeed, this lack of paper contributed to Hammerstein failing to deliver an order from McClellan to Wessells. I should maybe just repeat myself:

When McClellan left the Dew House after receiving Rodger's note at 1600 there was no attack, merely some exchange of artillery fire. Longstreet ordered Jenkins to advance skirmishers to snipe the gunners, but around 1630 Jenkins took his brigade and charged the Federal batteries from the front. Wilcox thought they were attacking and launched his two ready regiments as well. With an ad hoc attack underway Longstreet orders Kemper and Branch to attack at 1700. Kemper launches 1715-30, but Branch's brigade (the one nearest McClellan's CP at the Dew House) had gone into routine and were around their cooking fires; they didn't launch until around 1800. Other "attacks" were launched after 1830, but were essentially demonstrations to cover breaking contact.

McClellan is down at Haxalls when Jenkins launches, and is on the Galena or on a boat back from the Galena when Kemper launches. By the time Branch launches he is ashore and probably riding up Malvern Hill. He would be back at his CP before AP Hill launched any attacks.

Let me also note that the column under Holmes that attacked Malvern was Lee's main effort, and we know this because this is where he sent his reserve force (Magruder). The force at the crossroads was merely making a demonstration against the centre to stop McClellan pulling forces from there onto Malvern Hill. Jenkins' unordered attack indeed caused McClellan to react as Lee wanted, he sent forces from Malvern Hill to the crossroads, but Holmes' attack was smothered by artillery and the gunboats and was defeated easily.

McClellan's signals after he was informed of the attack at the crossroads certainly include orders for reserves to reinforce the centre, as Couch is explicit where the order came from. The question of who ordered the 4 brigades from White Oak is unresolved, and quite possibly everyone did. The two from Sedgwick's brigade we know were en route before the attack, and also received orders from multiple staff officers from various commanders to hurry up. The two brigades from Richardson's division were not ordered to move until after 1800. Meagher had been at Sumner's HQ for a while asking for Sumner to order them to the contact, and after 1800 Sumner did. We have no information about whether Sumner suddenly changed his mind or whether he received orders to that effect we don't know either way.

Essentially of the seven brigades that moved (or should have) to the New Market crossroads:

* Two (Dana and Sully) were ordered there well before McClellan left for the Galena, but had been sent over to counter a threat by Huger en route and then proceeded to the crossroads.
* Two (Howe and Palmer) were absolutely verifiably ordered there by McClellan, with Maj Webb carrying the order.
* Two (Caldwell and Meagher) were ordered there around 1800 hrs by Sumner under unknown circumstances.
* One (Wessells) was ordered to the crossroads by McClellan but the aide carrying the order (Hammerstein) could not find them and so headed on with his other orders

The order to Howe and Palmer was carried from the signals station by Maj Webb. The order to move Wessells was carried by Maj Hammerstein, who stated he could not spend long looking for him as he "had to move other troops". Which other troops were these? The only other significant troop movement on the field in the hour after this was that of Meagher and Caldwell, and the obvious answer is that he was tasked to move reinforcements down from White Oak Swamp to New Market Crossroads, unless you know of another troop movement?

Try this one - an account from any of the commanders at the cross roads referring o an order from McClellan/his staff during the fighting. Crickets.

 

[Belfoured]

I mean, Occam's Razor would suggest that it was because he had the most trouble that he could attribute to enemy skill while fighting McClellan. It's of a piece with comments like:


"McClellan will make this a battle of Posts. He will take position from position, under cover of his heavy guns, & we cannot get at him without storming his works, which with our new troops is extremely hazardous... It will require 100,000 men to resist the regular siege of Richmond, which perhaps would only prolong not save it - I am preparing a line that I can hold with part of our forces in front, while with the rest I will endeavour to make a diversion to bring McClellan out. He sticks under his batteries & is working day & nights - He is obliged to adhere to the R.R. unless he can reach James river to provision his Army. I am endeavouring to block his progress on the R.R. ... Our people are opposed to work. Our troops officers community & press. All ridicule & resist it. It is the very means by which McClellan has & is advancing."

Odd it is that nobody appears to have yet posted about the quote that Longstreet attributed to Lee at the time they learned McClellan had been removed. See Longstreet's B&L article on Fredericksburg. Suffice to say that far from expressing "relief" it expressed disappointment with reasoning that makes sense given how things actually transpired. And, if one does even minimal research, he/she will find highly positive comments by Lee about Grant's tool box.