Second Bull Run Ends in a Draw?

[OldReliable1862]

In my reading on the Northern Virginia campaign, my opinion of John Pope has actually improved somewhat. I no longer think he was hopelessly incompetent—instead, he seems to have been a fairly competent commander, but he made some serious mistakes. Unfortunately for Pope, Robert E. Lee was a commander who was sure to exploit those mistakes.

However, what if Second Bull Run/Second Manassas ended in a draw, rather than a Confederate victory? For now, we can say that Longstreet's flank attack fails to drive Pope from the field. What would Lee and Pope's next moves have been, and how would McClellan and the Army of the Potomac factor in?

 

[Jamieva]

You would need to flesh out more how exactly Pope fights Lee to a draw

 

[SWS]

Lee can't stay in Northeast Va. for long, but nor is he inclined to give up the initiative. Nonetheless, if McClellan-Pope are still stoutly positioned in Va., perhaps he won't get D.H. Hill, McLaws, and Walker back, but I think he needs a good portion of these troops in order to make any conceived raid a success. Probably you can leave only a portion of these troops to guard lines of communication. I don't believe Richmond is in any serious imminent danger, especially if Lee keeps moving north. As for said raid, probably the best Lee can do is march west beyond the Blue Ridge, clear the Valley of remaining Federals, change the AoNV's base to Staunton, effect the evacuation of Harpers Ferry, and prepare to use Hagerstown as a staging point for an invasion of Penn. should South Mountain be held against the enemy. The ability of Pope and McClellan to effectively co-operate together is also a doubtful thing.

 

[bankerpapaw]

In my reading on the Northern Virginia campaign, my opinion of John Pope has actually improved somewhat. I no longer think he was hopelessly incompetent—instead, he seems to have been a fairly competent commander, but he made some serious mistakes. Unfortunately for Pope, Robert E. Lee was a commander who was sure to exploit those mistakes.

However, what if Second Bull Run/Second Manassas ended in a draw, rather than a Confederate victory? For now, we can say that Longstreet's flank attack fails to drive Pope from the field. What would Lee and Pope's next moves have been, and how would McClellan and the Army of the Potomac factor in?

If General Lee was anywhere nearby, you don't dare make a mistake.

 

[JeffBrooks]

If Pope is not heavily defeated, McClellan would not have been restored to command, nor would there have been an invasion of Maryland.

 

[Saphroneth]

I have a proposal for how Second Bull Run ends in a draw, which is that Pope doesn't recall Porter on the night of the 29th/30th. I think it is plausible under those conditions that Lee doesn't commit Longstreet to an attack (because it would expose his flank to Porter, which is a force that Lee doesn't know is a particularly small corps), and that the two sides basically stare at one another on the 30th (Pope's divisions mostly too exhausted to fight, Lee not willing to either expend most of Longstreet's effort dealing with Porter or to ignore Porter) before supply woes cause Pope to withdraw over the Bull Run on the night of the 30th - there to link up with the approaching 6th Corps and 2nd Corps AoP, while Banks' corps (the future 12th) also crosses the Bull Run earlier on the 30th effectively covered by Porter.

The cause for this would be Pope realizing that the presence of Ricketts in his battle line late on the 29th indicates that Thoroughfare Gap is not blocked.

Subsequently both sides have their full armies concentrated, with DH Hill joining Lee; I don't think what you get then is a Chantilly and a Maryland Campaign, but the combined Army of Virginia is going to need a bit of reorg and to refit - if nothing else it's got a shortage of wagons and the AoP ones are still arriving from the Peninsula.

At this point Lee pretty much has a choice about whether he wants to compel a mobile campaign (which he could do by moving into Maryland, probably specifically by going for Baltimore along the National Road) or if he expects Pope will be compelled to attack him for political reasons. Given the strategic situation I think Lee will be disinclined to delay - the Union's massive 1862 volunteer call is just mustering into service - and so he'll probably try to bring on a mobile campaign.

The result would certainly be interesting. Assuming Pope keeps his position, he might or might not blame Porter and Kearny both for their not marching in a timely fashion a day or two before Second Bull Run (something he historically blamed Porter for, Kearny being dead). Pope would also probably have to take the field army into Maryland to fight with, and so you get something a lot like the historical Maryland in terms of raw participants - except that it's Pope not McClellan, and it might well be that a lot of the reorg work McClellan historically did doesn't get done.

 

[Saphroneth]

Notes on the armies going into this alternative campaign and the commanders. For these purposes I will use the September numbering for the Union corps.

For the most part, the Union has suffered fewer casualties because they weren't routed, but they also don't have a lot of achievements to point to. The Confederates have suffered a lot fewer casualties and Longstreet's corps in particular is almost untouched.


The AoP's wagons take until at least the 11th to finish unloading, so I don't think Pope can simply take out the entire army - there isn't the means to logistically support it manoeuvring in the field. In addition I don't think Halleck would let Washington be uncovered, and historically the 11th, 3rd and most of the 5th were left behind.


Historically SO 223 relieved FJ Porter and Franklin of duty, Hooker was assigned to command 5th Corps and 6th Corps was attached to the 3rd; SO 224 replaced McDowell with Reno as 1st Corps commander. McClellan asked Lincoln to reconsider these, but since Porter, Franklin and McDowell were all to my understanding under a cloud from Pope then Pope will not. Indeed the drivers for these seem to basically be driven by Pope's historical report, though of course if Pope hasn't suffered a clear defeat he won't be looking for scapegoats.

I think on balance it's likely that Porter is in for it but Franklin and McDowell may not be. Of the two it's more likely that Franklin gets it than McDowell, Franklin is closely tied to McClellan.



My suspicion (and this is pretty plastic) is:

1st Corps - Would probably remain under McDowell.
2nd Corps - Remains under Sumner; no problems here.
3rd Corps - if Franklin goes down then it might be connected to 6th Corps as planned, which would make it a very big and quite unwieldy organization. On the other hand, if Hooker gets a CC spot (as with 5th Corps) then it leaves the upper command structure somewhat impacted. Kearny would also be livid if Hooker got a CC slot and he did not; something that might be interesting would actually be if Heintzelman ends up commanding the Washington defences and Kearny gets the combined 3rd-6th Corps, though of course as far as Pope is concerned Kearny has let Pope down (the same way Porter did) in the last few days.
There's a lot of variance here.
4th Corps - only one division in the DC area. Historically was attached to 6th Corps; would presumably be attached to another here. Note that Couch as an AoP divisional commander is actually surprisingly senior, he's just below Hooker and above Richardson.
5th Corps - Porter's almost certainly going down as Pope blames him for not catching Jackson on the 28th.
6th Corps - see above with 3rd Corps. If it retains an independent organization then I think Franklin remains in command, though see below.
9th Corps - interestingly has a command structure full of - at the time - very senior generals. Stevens isn't dead because no Chantilly, and since Reno was historically considered for a corps then 9th Corps might be mined for senior generals to replace anyone who's considered unworkable (like Porter or Franklin?)
11th Corps - historically pretty badly shattered by 2BR, though the command structure was largely intact. Sigel actually did pretty well historically.
12th Corps - historically Banks was sick, which would leave Williams in command unless someone else takes over.


Pope's historical reports, among other things, scapegoated McClellan for not sending him the veteran troops from the AoP (though Pope's count was very off, he thought that 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th Corps combined was only about half the AoP) but based on this Pope might well aim to take out veteran units and not bulk out his army with new ones. Combine this with the desire by Halleck to have veteran troops to defend Washington, and the supply limits, and there's at least the potential for the "Army of Maryland" to actually be surprisingly small - it might well not be as big as Lee's.




As for Lee, his main concern is that he doesn't want to give DH Hill a "corps" command and so will probably operate his army in more than three components - his historical set up was Jackson's wing, Longstreet's wing, a wing under McLaws of his division and Anderson's (a wing which is basically a quite big Federal corps) and then a small division under Walker and what amounts to a binary corps under DH Hill because DH Hill's division is huge.

 

[SWS]

It seems that had the enemy remained in strength behind Bull Run, Lee would be inclined to maneuver into Maryland via Loudoun.

 

[Saphroneth]

I concur, Lee was talking about heading into Maryland in mid-August before Second Bull Run to my understanding. What's interesting here is whether Pope will try and "follow" Lee (i.e. move NW on the Leesburg and Little River turnpikes and the Ox Road to follow up behind Lee, possibly leading to an action at Goose Creek) or cross the Potomac via the Washington bridges, or possibly even both.

Pope's manoeuvres in the Northern Virginia campaign indicate an understanding of the merits of dividing his forces to seek decisive manoeuvre, but perhaps not an understanding of the independent will of the enemy.

One of the possible risk points here is if Pope pushes forwards some corps south of the Potomac and Lee crosses north, because the divide between the two halves of Pope's army is at that point quite substantial in time terms. Pope could end up "chasing" Lee on an arc through Loudoun and Maryland.


A more manageable alternative to plot out is probably Pope pulling back into Washington and then heading out after Lee. Where the two sides collide under those conditions is pretty contingent, though I have to flag up that I suspect Pope's scouting wouldn't be very good - it was a bit of a weakness of his and he historically overworked his cavalry so heavily that despite having roughly 50% more cavalry than Lee he was unable to keep track of enemy movements.

With Lee's operational intent being specifically to cause a battle, I think he'd be alert for Pope moving out of Washington.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Always dangerous but interesting to play the what if game. In general I believe that if a draw, Lee probably still moves into Maryland or at least makes a feint in that direction. The difference is that the Union army is not nearly as demoralized. And the big question, who commands the combined Union army in this scenario?

 

[Saphroneth]

Always dangerous but interesting to play the what if game. In general I believe that if a draw, Lee probably still moves into Maryland or at least makes a feint in that direction. The difference is that the Union army is not nearly as demoralized. And the big question, who commands the combined Union army in this scenario?

I think it's almost certainly Pope. Pope has the confidence of Lincoln and Lincoln seems to have only reached for McClellan when there was no other choice (Halleck refused to take the army out, as to my understanding did Burnside, and Pope had lost the confidence of the army in spectacular fashion).

Here I think Pope takes the army out, though he's probably only allowed about as big a force as McClellan was or maybe a bit more - Halleck's historical anxiety over Washington was severe.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I think it's almost certainly Pope. Pope has the confidence of Lincoln and Lincoln seems to have only reached for McClellan when there was no other choice (Halleck refused to take the army out, as to my understanding did Burnside, and Pope had lost the confidence of the army in spectacular fashion).

Here I think Pope takes the army out, though he's probably only allowed about as big a force as McClellan was or maybe a bit more - Halleck's historical anxiety over Washington was severe.

I agree, which would have been REALLY interesting. But Pope did have some merits and it would be interesting to see how he'd do with more experience in that kind of setting.

Logistics is high on the list of things that is not to Pope's credit and would doom him for sure if he had continued in command unless fixed.

 

[Saphroneth]

Looking at the structure of the historical Second Bull Run, and comparing it with the historical Antietam, I think one of the issues that Pope has in a battle is coordination. That is, his attacks at Second Bull Run are quite piecemeal and quite small scale - compare with Antietam where the individual corps attacks are corps attacks, attacks by a corps that is to at least some significant extent able to manage its own front and coordinate (so it can deliver sustained pressure).

This appears to have an operational cause - Pope prioritizes haste to the extent of trying to get his corps to march by night and arrive at dawn a lot, and it looks like he doesn't consider those marches exceptional IIRC (so he orders them on multiple occasions) rather than considering them something to only ask of his men under exceptional circumstances. It also means that as the corps come in they're plugged in a bit at a time, breaking up corps integrity, and Pope doesn't really put a lot of effort into reconsolidating them.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

In my reading on the Northern Virginia campaign, my opinion of John Pope has actually improved somewhat. I no longer think he was hopelessly incompetent—instead, he seems to have been a fairly competent commander, but he made some serious mistakes.

Pope started his campaign overconfident, but he developed a serious case of tunnel vision that led to his rout.

However, what if Second Bull Run/Second Manassas ended in a draw, rather than a Confederate victory? For now, we can say that Longstreet's flank attack fails to drive Pope from the field. What would Lee and Pope's next moves have been, and how would McClellan and the Army of the Potomac factor in?

Let's suppose Pope recognizes the threat of Longstreet sooner. He shifts enough forces that Longstreet drives back the Union left flank but doesn't drive it off the field. There is no rout.

1. Pope remains on the field on Aug 31. Longstreet attempts to turn his left flank, or Jackson attempts to get across Sudley Ford and get behind Pope.

2. Pope makes an orderly withdrawal across Bull Run after dark. Aug 31 finds him redeployed on the north side of the river, though in a difficult situation because the south bank is higher than the north bank in some areas. Lee scouts Pope's new line and crosses either upstream or downstream of him predawn Sep 1. Lee seeks to flank Pope with one wing while the other wing continues to confront him across Bull Run: the same strategy has used repeatedly during the campaign. There is either another battle or Pope withdraws into Washington - possibly ordered there by Lincoln and Halleck.

3. Pope withdraws across Bull Run after dark Aug 30 and makes an orderly withdrawal to the Washington defenses.

Whatever scenario above, Lee probably still invades Maryland, but without an elaborate attempt to encircle Harper's Ferry. He probably tries to entice Pope/McClellan to attack him on chosen high ground - maybe near Gaithersburg?

Combining the AotP and AoV seems a given, but who commands it is hard to say. Pope has been defeated and driven halfway across Virginia, though without a rout or collapse. It's questionable whether he's retained but there's no reason to give McClellan (or McDowell) a second chance. Perhaps the result is organizing two armies to operate against Lee in Maryland, which Halleck will attempt to coordinate from Washington?

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

If we go with a larger point of departure: Pope takes Porter's report seriously, ceasing his attacks on Jackson and shifting to be able to face potential attacks by both Jackson and Longstreet, thus preventing Longstreet's attack...

In this case Lee probably just shifts some of Longstreet's troops to turn Porter's left flank. Alternatively, Longstreet moves behind Jackson after dark, attempting to place half the Confederate army between Pope and Washington.

 

[Saphroneth]

Given that Pope was contemplating pulling behind the Bull Run I think he does it if he's convinced Longstreet is present.

As for Pope being in command, I think Pope keeps the command unless he's very visibly and publicly fallen on his face. Even historically it seems like Lincoln was willing to sustain his friend to some extent and blaming McClellan for not delivering reinforcements fast enough (as silly as that is) would be a reasonable avenue for Pope to deflect blame.