Alternatives: McClellan

[Saphroneth]

With, by your numbers, over 50,00 troops available, I believe that there were sufficient troops to secure the Third and Fourth Corps front and attack the heights positions.

The problem is that you need to know what would be facing them - that is, what would be defending the heights. If Johnston has 20,000 PFD dug in on the heights then it's obviously not going to work.
What it looks like happened was that AP Hill was used to force back the pickets on the heights and regain control of the Chickahominy right bank. It's quite possible (again, not got a map for that period!) that before then the Confederates were relying on Fort Johnston and Fort Jackson to be their anchors in the northern sector.

I propose attacking the eastern most positions with Second Corps elements (there was little for Second Corps to do otherwise) supported by Fourth Corps elements already in the area.

The other point I wanted to make is about Second Corps. Second Corps was actually McClellan's reserve at this point, and was held in a position it could support either of his wings if need be (i.e. north of the Chickahominy but at the westernmost working bridges) - hence why it was ordered over the Chickahominy only when the attack took place. McClellan wasn't sure if he was going to be hit along Beaver Dam Creek or south of the Chickahominy - which was actually correct as Johnston considered both options.

 

[Saphroneth]

It might be worth looking a bit more closely at the events of the historical Seven Pines, and the frontage Casey's division was deployed on, to get a sense of how much of McClellan's left wing is needed to hold a defensive. Since it looks like some of the action at Seven Pines took place in White Oak Swamp, it's at best a porous curtain of manoeuvre. (Theoretically the frontage Casey was on is adequate if there's also reserves near to hand, as the situation was recoverable, but if 2nd Corps are off elsewhere on the attack - say - then the reserves can't be 2nd Corps and need to be someone else.)

 

[67th Tigers]

This is Johnston's plan (from Steven Newton's PhD thesis):

The dispositions a few days earlier were:

Huger (3 bdes), plus Wise's bde (from DH Hill) - in the entrenchments of Richmond.
Holmes (3 bdes) - marching to Richmond
McLaws (2 bdes) - at the crossroads of the Nine Mile and New Bridge Roads, Semmes had been driven off the New Bridge Heights on the 24th.
DH Hill (3+1 bdes)- on the Williamsburg Road, with a detached brigade on the Charles City Road
GW Smith (Whitting) (5 bdes), DR Jones (2 bdes), Longstreet (6 bdes) and AP Hill (4 bdes) - across the Meadow and Mechanicsville Bridges moving to attack at Beaver Dam Creek.

When Smith aborted the BDC attack Johnston replanned. Essentially GW Smith's attack force was supposed to drop off AP Hill and DR Jones to watch the bridges and sweep down the Nine Mile Road, overwhelming the force at Fair Oaks Station whilst DH Hill and Huger demonstrated elsewhere.

Longstreet altered the plan of attack, swinging his 6 bdes onto the Williamsburg Road (towards Seven Pines rather than Fair Oaks), creating a roadblock.

 

[CW3O]

"On 3rd June McClellan relieved the disappointing Barnard from his engineering responsibilities and placed BS Alexander in active command of the engineers"

Indeed McClellan relieved Barnard, but not all considered Barnard "disappointing". Alexander himself was happy to accept a position as aide to Barnard later in the war. Grant would appoint Barnard Chief Engineer of Armies in the Field in 1864.

 

[CW3O]

"The heights were cleared on the 24th. Whilst they were not permanently occupied the area was picketed and clear for the engineers to work, and they started the New Bridge work on 25th May."

Work on the bridge may have started on the 25th but that work was taking place on the Fifth Corps side of the river. It remains that on 1 June the bridge built by the engineers went unused, primarily because of the confederate presence on the other side. The bridge work started on the night of 31 May and completed on 1 June was conducted under the cover of darkness.

The original question I set out to answer was "The question is whether McClellan's campaign failed for reasons inside McClellan's control or not." I have stated my answer and proposed my alternative. In return I received nothing which swayed my opinion. Unless something more interesting than a recitation of the same excuses used by McClellan's I have nothing more add.

 

[1SGDan]

"On 3rd June McClellan relieved the disappointing Barnard from his engineering responsibilities and placed BS Alexander in active command of the engineers"

Indeed McClellan relieved Barnard, but not all considered Barnard "disappointing". Alexander himself was happy to accept a position as aide to Barnard later in the war. Grant would appoint Barnard Chief Engineer of Armies in the Field in 1864.

McClellan, himself, had given Barnard a rousing nod of approval early in the campaign. He claimed that Barnard was an officer on whom he placed great respect. He used this endorsement to qualify his decision to enter into siege at Yorktown.
Following the campaign an open rift developed between the two men. Barnard in a revised report faulted Mac's decision making on several occasions.

 

[Saphroneth]

Work on the bridge may have started on the 25th but that work was taking place on the Fifth Corps side of the river. It remains that on 1 June the bridge built by the engineers went unused, primarily because of the confederate presence on the other side. The bridge work started on the night of 31 May and completed on 1 June was conducted under the cover of darkness.

My understanding is that all the prepared timber etc. was on the Fifth Corps side of the river because that's the side of the river on the far side of the curtain of manoeuvre. Crossing some of the engineers to work on the bridge from both sides would have left them exposed and left them needing to procure wood from there.

I realize you're proposing that McClellan should have occupied a main line of resistance going from New Bridge heights to the Seven Pines area. I'll need to check just how long that line is in comparison to the line historically adopted, but as I understand it when McClellan was actually taking up that line (in June 27 after the Garnetts Hill bite and hold move) he had eight divisions - 23 brigades - south of the river to hold it at the time and had also completed the process of digging in.

The original question I set out to answer was "The question is whether McClellan's campaign failed for reasons inside McClellan's control or not." I have stated my answer and proposed my alternative. In return I received nothing which swayed my opinion. Unless something more interesting than a recitation of the same excuses used by McClellan's I have nothing more add.

The reason that you gave for the failure of McClellan's campaign was his decision to spread his forces across the Chickahominy. However, of the alternatives you suggested to that decision (i.e. remain entirely on the north or entirely on the south) one involved breaking legal Presidential and SecWar orders (entirely on the south) and the other involved not being able to attack Richmond (entirely on the north).

McClellan simply has to spread his forces across the Chickahominy if he's going to attack Richmond. It's quite possible that that could have been handled better, but it's worth noting that historically in the Seven Days he had five more brigades south of the Chickahominy than you propose he should have done (in your modified crossing plan using 2nd-4th inclusive) and had nine brigades north of the Chickahominy but was still vulnerable to the north.

With the need to supply north of the Chickahominy and attack south, the only solutions to the conundrum are to take Richmond entirely before the Confederates can consolidate their defences - something which isn't going to happen given the presence of permanent Confederate forts like Fort Jackson and the imminent rains - or to have enough troops to hold a defensive north of the Chickahominy while attacking south of the Chickahominy. In this light it is entirely proper to point out that as of the 25th May McClellan was given reason to believe that he would be recieving additional strength sufficient to hold a defensive north of the Chickahominy. (To whit, at least seven brigades of 1st Corps, of which only three arrived.)

I agree with you that, given hindsight on Confederate positions as they appear to have been and the true strength of the Beaver Dam Creek line, McClellan should have pushed forwards his main line of resistance with at least fifteen brigades to include the New Bridge heights; however, this by itself doesn't take Richmond and it leaves the strategic situation in late June fundamentally unchanged even if it produces no actual downside.

 

[rbasin]

I would suggest as a viable alternative for the early 1862 time frame would be for the Army of the Potomac (AoP) to look at moving towards Richmond from the North and Northwest, with the obvious first goal being Fredericksburg/Aquia (Belle Plain). This would have done a few things for McClellan. First, This would have covered Washington D.C., thus removing that as an issue between Mac and Lincoln. Secondly, Cooperation between the AoP and those forces in Western Virginia would have a better purpose, namely to watch Mac Western flank as he moved south-southwest.

If this started in March 1862, about the same time as the Peninsula Campaign, I think that Joe Johnston would have moved to the southeast from his position at Culpepper, as he was more cautious than Lee. During this time, Fredericksburg was held by between 8 and 11k, which I think could be defeated quickly by a amphibious force, some taking Aquia, while the rest taking Fredericksburg.

I thinks its very viable, but am still flushing out southern troop locations

 

[Saphroneth]

I would suggest as a viable alternative for the early 1862 time frame would be for the Army of the Potomac (AoP) to look at moving towards Richmond from the North and Northwest, with the obvious first goal being Fredericksburg/Aquia (Belle Plain). This would have done a few things for McClellan. First, This would have covered Washington D.C., thus removing that as an issue between Mac and Lincoln. Secondly, Cooperation between the AoP and those forces in Western Virginia would have a better purpose, namely to watch Mac Western flank as he moved south-southwest.

While an interesting idea, the main problem it has is really with supply as historically the Confederates wrecked the rail line before withdrawing, and as the alternative supply source for an Overland plan (to whit, the York River and the James River) were inaccessible.

McClellan did actually consider a variant of this, the Urbanna plan (so called because it entailed flanking the Rappahanock line with two of his five corps landing at Urbanna, so as to either trap the majority of Johnston's army between the two halves of the Federal army or force them off the Rappahanock too quick to wreck the railway) but Lincoln nixed it indirectly.

If this started in March 1862, about the same time as the Peninsula Campaign, I think that Joe Johnston would have moved to the southeast from his position at Culpepper, as he was more cautious than Lee. During this time, Fredericksburg was held by between 8 and 11k, which I think could be defeated quickly by a amphibious force, some taking Aquia, while the rest taking Fredericksburg.

If you're going to make an amphibious move in March then going to Aquia is a bit of a waste. Fredericksburg would be a bit more worth it though.

Per 67th, this is the situation before Johnston pulled back from the Bull Run:

And this is after:

So as you can see, a landing at Aquia before Johnston withdraws is too risky, while a landing afterwards is kind of a waste - you could just march them.

This shows the Urbanna landing operation for the Federals, but obviously in this case it's the Confederates we're interested in.

If the Fredericksburg Landing is considered before the withdrawal you may as well go Urbanna instead - Urbanna forces Johnston to run for it back down towards Richmond too rapidly for them to bother with much wrecking. If it's considered afterwards then (by this map at least) there's two divisions there; it looks like that means the brigades of (in May-June) Field, Walker, Archer and Pender, at a minimum.


Drop an entire Union corps on it in one go and you've got a fair chance of taking Fredericksburg, but those three divisions behind the Rapidan might come over...

 

[luinrina]

Drop an entire Union corps on it in one go and you've got a fair chance of taking Fredericksburg, but those three divisions behind the Rapidan might come over...

In that case pull in Sumner too. I would say he's close enough to support McClellan. Not sure though what his strength was.

And didn't McClellan have more than just one corps? He could drop two on Fredericksburg and have Sumner as a reserve in case those three brigades behind the Rapidan come over.

Fredericksburg does sound like a good option - with the railroad leading directly south to Richmond, he'd have his supply lines secure.


Regarding the Peninsular Campaign: Maybe it's daring and/or totally unreasonable, but couldn't McClellan have ignored the orders/wishes to sustain his supply depot at the White House and instead move via the James River from the beginning? After all, neither politician knew exactly what it looked like from field command and know what the best option was. Even if he's relieved because he didn't follow orders, he could ignore it until someone personally appears at his HQ to evict him and take over command. Until then, he could continue his campaign – and if he's successful, maybe Washington sees that he'd been right from the beginning. The worst that could happen? A court-martial. But with his knowledge in engineering, McClellan would surely have found work in the private sector as an engineer, no?


Edit: Woot! 100 posts!

 

[67th Tigers]

Work on the bridge may have started on the 25th but that work was taking place on the Fifth Corps side of the river. It remains that on 1 June the bridge built by the engineers went unused, primarily because of the confederate presence on the other side. The bridge work started on the night of 31 May and completed on 1 June was conducted under the cover of darkness.

The engineers hadn't even started to build the main bridge on the 1st June. As part of their preparations a pontoon bridge had been set aside, and the equipment for two trestle bridges built. The plan was that when the materiale of the permanent bridge was ready whose three would be but across to (a) allow the engineers to work and (b) send a protective infantry force over. This was exactly how Bottom's Bridge was rebuilt 19th-24th May. Bottom's Bridge was only 120 feet with six spans (2x 30 ft and 4x 15 ft) and had a 24 ft wide roadway. New Bridge was much much bigger, and the permanent bridge there never built. Instead a 1,080 foot bridge with 11 foot wide roadway was constructed near the site of the Grapevine Bridge and this bridge was the main connection between the two armies. It was finished 19th June.

What the engineers did at New Bridge on 1st June was run out the pontoons and trestles. A pontoon bridge was completed by the engineers at 0815 on the 1st and declared "passable for infantry, artillery and cavalry". Smith's division were in column ready to cross as McClellan had ordered, with the Vermont Brigade in the lead. Franklin rode up to the bridge, but on the swampy banks it dumped him and his horse into the river as he tried to test it. Barnard's own report seems to confirm he was exaggerating the usability, as he notes he returned at 1000 or 1200 and found it was actually unusable.

After hours of waiting either Franklin or Smith gave the order they weren't going to cross. It wasn't McClellan, who was on the other side directing the counterattack. It is likely based upon Barnard's opinion on returning.

I know from La Comte de Paris' diary that McClellan did order Franklin to cross. Snell records:

Writing to Franklin in August, 1876, McClellan said "I have no doubt that I should have been very glad to have thrown you and Porter over the river, but I have not the slightest recollection that it was practicable.. . . No one who knows the Chick[ahominy] & the trouble it gave us will suppose for a moment that we could have commenced a bridge for you and Porter . . . & made it practicable for you to cross before the flood was at its height."63
- Mark Snell's PhD thesis, pg 181, also present in his "First to the Last" (being the published version - I have the thesis not the book)​

In sum, the engineers had failed to bridge across New Bridge to allow Franklin to get involved.

 

[Saphroneth]

In that case pull in Sumner too. I would say he's close enough to support McClellan. Not sure though what his strength was.

A corps is a big lift - historically there was concern over how many divisions McClellan could lift at once, and the absolute upper limit is four (if all of 1st corps could be simultaneously waterborne in addition to the divisions McClellan moved one at a time to Fort Monroe). It's quite possible his divisional lift was only about two, but three is a reasonable planning figure.
This of course highlights how serious the loss of 1st Corps was to McClellan's manoeuvre capability, because their transports were discharged as well - if McClellan had had the transport capacity for two divisions his build-up at Elthams Landing post-Yorktown would have been twice as fast, for example.

And didn't McClellan have more than just one corps? He could drop two on Fredericksburg and have Sumner as a reserve in case those three brigades behind the Rapidan come over.

He actually has eleven divisions, plus Banks' three (1st-5th corps are each originally 3-division corps, but Casey was a very green division so it's worth less - but the Regulars are a kind of "half" division which make up for it - and one of the corps was only two divisions strong after the transfer of IIRC Blenker elsewhere), but he can only lift about three at once at most. The first division to make the move would have to be Franklin, so he'd have to use 1st Corps for the original landing - Franklin's division was the one with the amphib training and transports.
As for the units behind the Rapidan, that's actually three divisions not three brigades.

Regarding the Peninsular Campaign: Maybe it's daring and/or totally unreasonable, but couldn't McClellan have ignored the orders/wishes to sustain his supply depot at the White House and instead move via the James River from the beginning?

To ignore the order to do so is basically a nonstarter - it's directly acting against a Presidential order. The clear and present threat to the supply base during the Seven Days makes shifting tenable, but before then it's not unless you want McClellan to disobey orders.

To advance up the James to never get the order in the first place is possible, though it'd require heavy naval cooperation and the Navy weren't cooperating until after the historical Drewry's Bluff (which incidentally was also about the time McClellan's base got fixed) - he has to cross the Chickahominy somewhere to reach Richmond either way, and the Chickahominy gets wider nearer the mouth. With hindsight it might have been worth trying, but McClellan's logic in crossing the Chickahominy where he did historically was sound given what he knew.

Even if he's relieved because he didn't follow orders, he could ignore it until someone personally appears at his HQ to evict him and take over command. Until then, he could continue his campaign – and if he's successful, maybe Washington sees that he'd been right from the beginning. The worst that could happen? A court-martial. But with his knowledge in engineering, McClellan would surely have found work in the private sector as an engineer, no?

The thing is that at the same time as the order fixing McClellan's base he was assured he was about to get 1st Corps by land. Operating from White House Landing with 11-12 divisions is every bit as viable as operating from the James with 9-10, so the only way to see McClellan considering it an advantage is for him to assume as a matter of course that:
1) Washington will retain McDowell's 1st corps indefinitely to chase Jackson, in addition to using Banks' 5th Corps and Fremont's Valley Department etc.
2) They won't be able to stop Jackson coming down on his flank anyway.

I should also note that the time it would take for McClellan to be relieved from command is functionally a few hours after the decision is made back at Washington - he'd just be relieved by a telegraph dispatch with command passed to the senior general. At the time I think that's Sumner, who had already disappointed McClellan at Williamsburg; I could see McClellan being concerned about the idea of Sumner taking over, whether rightly or not.

 

[1SGDan]

There was no reason for there to be any disappointment concerning the engineers and the work they accomplished. Below is a list of bridges that were constructed during the time period under discussion. This does not include all the work accomplished constructing the seige batteries before Yorktown and the countless miles of road corduroyed and repaired. The engineers were put to the test and found every bit as capable as could be expected. Was Barnard used as a scapegoat? Possibly but he had no reason not to be proud of what the engineers had accomplished.

 

[Tennessee_Mountainman]

For some reason I have a soft spot for McClellan. Everyone hates him but I don't. Someone has to like him

 

[1SGDan]

According to Barnard's report of operations

"Orders from head-quarters were given for throwing, that night (May 31st), the bridges at the points selected at and near "New Bridge."

"The result of the operation was, that at 8.15 a.m. (June 1st), the pontoon bridge at the site of New Bridge was complete, and passable to infantry, cavalry, and artillery. About noon the "upper trestle bridge'' was practicable for infantry. It was not till night that a practicable bridge for infantry was obtained at the "lower trestle bridge."

"Anxious to ascertain how practicable the route was, I directed Lieutenant Babcock to proceed, with a few of his sappers, as far aa he safely could on the other side. He proceeded perhaps two hundred yards, when he was fired upon by sharpshooters ambuscaded in the vicinity, and one of his men shot through the lungs"

"The enemy held with artillery, and undisturbed, the opposite heights. It was evidently impossible to pass here with our infantry, artillery, and cavalry confined to this narrow causeway…"

"There was one way, however, to unite the army on the other side; it was to take advantage of a victory at Fair Oaks, to sweep at once the enemy from his position opposite New Bridge, and, simultaneously, to bring over by the New Bridge our troops of the right wing, which would then have met with little or no resistance."

"We had, June 19th, the following bridges :
"Upper Trestle Bridge" - Debouches held by the enemy, and incomplete on his side.
"The New Bridge" — Two pontoon bridges — Captain Duane having built a second one alongside the one completed June 1st. The road was held on south side of Chickahominy by the enemy.
"Lower Trestle Bridge" — Debouches held by enemy, and incomplete on his side.
The "Foot Bridge" — Available for infantry under certain circumstances. It was on the shortest line between the two wings of the army.
"Duane's Bridge" — ^A fine structure, practicable for all arms, and affording a very direct communication.
The "Infantry Bridge" {of Woodbury).— Available for infantry.
"Woodbury and Alexander's Bridge" — For all arms. "

Barnard was notified of his relief of duty with the Army of the Potomac:
"On Friday, the 15th (August), I left Harrison's Landing by steamer for Fort Monroe, under orders from the Commanding General; and on the 16th I received a telegram from the head-quarters at Washington, relieving me from duty with the Army of the Potomac. "

 

[67th Tigers]

There was no reason for there to be any disappointment concerning the engineers and the work they accomplished. Below is a list of bridges that were constructed during the time period under discussion.

Indeed, they did very well, but lets not credit them with work they didn't do.

For example, you list a 27th May wooden bridge at New Bridge. This did not exist. The detachment tasked with building this bridge reported their progress to the 29th:

25th May - measured the distance between piles of the old destroyed bridge
26th May - completed the framing so they knew what planks etc. were needed
27th-28th May - cut lumber for the bridge and hauled it to near the shore
29th May - took possession of the saw mill and started cutting the lumber into planks

No work on an actual bridge, beyond preparations on shore, had happened as of 31st May. Hence on the 7th June Woodbury reports Capt Ketchum is making new framing (because Duane took away the existing for his bridge). This was never completed, and given the coming emergency Ketchum threw a second pontoon bridge next to the first at New Bridge and planked over between them on 26th June.

On 31st May there was no workable bridge at New Bridge. On 1st June they threw a pontoon bridge over, but it was broken almost immediately, and Ketchum repaired it some days later.

Ketchum on 1st June was ordered to build a trestle bridge near New Bridge, reported that the Colonel Lansing of the 17th NY arrived with orders direct from McClellan to get it done, and got to the opposite shore at 0200 the next morning, but didn't complete until the 5th.

Spaulding was also tasked to put over another trestle bridge. However, Spaulding reports he could not finish it, and handed it over to Capt Chester to complete. As of the 7th June Woodbury reports Capt Chester is still working on it.

Barnard's claims that he provided a bridge across at New Bridge on the 1st are contradicted by the reports of the men who built said bridges. In fact the engineers were not able to provide a crossing for Smith's division, in column and ready to cross.

 

[CW3O]

My opinion remains that the separation of the AoP was the root cause of the failure of the Peninsula Campaign. Neither the North Wing or the South wing had power enough to accomplish much.
Blame the engineers if that makes you happy. I don't, they could not overcome terrain, mother nature and the overwhelming requirements placed upon them. Many of these requirement were the direct result of McClellan's decision to split the force. There was opportunity between the 20th , when his forces crossed the Chickahominy, until the 31st when Johnson attacks to fully clear the heights and re-connnect the two wings of his forces, but it was not done. Ordering the required bridges after the enemy attacked it not useful and clearly indicative of poor command. All of this was a command responsibility and McClellan was in command.

I agree that McClellan did some things very well, but there are those that don't believe he could do anything wrong.

 

[Jamieva]

Here are the benchmarks we have for the number of troops it might take to take Richmond:

- How many troops McClellan was originally planning to use.
- How many troops it would take to cover the bridges to the north of Richmond, and advance lines by regular approaches, and cover the Tolopatamoy. (In other words, what McClellan was already doing in June 1862, plus cover the Tolopatamoy.)
- How many troops were involved in the historical taking of Richmond.

Given these, what do you think is the number of troops it would take in order to take Richmond? If the number of troops required is no larger than the number McClellan actually got, how should he have employed them differently to thus take Richmond?

This question is impossible to answer without considering the opposing force involved. The ANV in 1862 is not the same number or quality of 64-65 ANV. It's apples and oranges once you get past the commander.

 

[Saphroneth]

My opinion remains that the separation of the AoP was the root cause of the failure of the Peninsula Campaign. Neither the North Wing or the South wing had power enough to accomplish much.

Well, there is simply no way to avoid separating the Army of the Potomac across the Chickahominy if the supply route is White House Landing. Incidentally, in late June the south wing (23 brigades) was strong enough to push towards Richmond now the weather was clear enough to move artillery.

There was opportunity between the 20th , when his forces crossed the Chickahominy, until the 31st when Johnson attacks to fully clear the heights and re-connnect the two wings of his forces, but it was not done. Ordering the required bridges after the enemy attacked it not useful and clearly indicative of poor command. All of this was a command responsibility and McClellan was in command.

But holding the heights over New Bridge wouldn't solve that problem! There'd still be at least one corps north of the river, and having New Bridge available to move troops wouldn't mean there were suddenly enough troops to cover Tolopatamoy Creek - that mile or two of controlled river doesn't free up the four required brigades.
It would mean it was possible to transfer reinforcements more easily, true, but that doesn't cover Beaver Dam Creek and Tolopatamoy Creek with the same force.

As far as I can tell by looking at the maps, holding the line from Seven Pines to the New Bridge Heights with sufficient density to make it the main line of resistance would mean committing at least half of Sumner's Corps if not the whole thing to an advanced line. This is frankly pretty risky, as it would mean McClellan had a small (or no) reserve available - if Casey gets hit like he was in the historical Seven Pines and collapses, then suddenly McClellan's been flanked - and it also means that there are no reserves available in the case of an attack north of the Chickahominy. (McClellan's advancing against an enemy of roughly equal size with the benefit of fortification, and 20% of his army is elsewhere. Caution is almost required in this situation because if his enemy flubs it they can retreat into the fortifications, but if he flubs it then he's not got any fortifications to retreat into and he's stuffed.)

It is quite possible that this risk would have been borne out, of course... but even if it had, the essential difference is that McClellan's attacks against Richmond are in the position on the 25th June (when the rains clear and offensives can resume) they historically were on the 27th. It doesn't solve the problem of how to defend against Jackson coming down on the flank, unless (and this is impossible to tell) it means Jackson is recalled to Richmond. If Jackson is recalled to Richmond by this operation then Richmond falls in July because McClellan gets McDowell, but that's a third-order development hinging on the Confederate commander making an unforced error.

Blame the engineers if that makes you happy. I don't, they could not overcome terrain, mother nature and the overwhelming requirements placed upon them. Many of these requirement were the direct result of McClellan's decision to split the force.

But McClellan has no choice but to split the force. The Chickahominy has to be crossed, there's no way to avoid that.

Ordering the required bridges after the enemy attacked it not useful and clearly indicative of poor command.

But, um... is it not a plausible sequence of events that McClellan has previously ordered the Chickahominy bridged and is reiterating the order to get the bridges in place as fast as possible now the need is urgent? I mean, they were clearly already working on the bridges, so it's not like he asked them to bridge the Chickahominy from scratch during a battle.

This question is impossible to answer without considering the opposing force involved. The ANV in 1862 is not the same number or quality of 64-65 ANV. It's apples and oranges once you get past the commander.

Yes, the ANV of 1862 is substantially bigger than the ANV of 1864. Quality differs, it's true, but the same is true of the AotP.

But it's possible to calculate the amount of troops surplus beyond a strict defensive in the south (because all the commanders were asked how many troops they could spare - and McClellan then assumed they were pessimistic and took a bit more) and the answer is about six brigades. Those six brigades are enough to conduct a bite-and-hold if they're available in the south, but they're also about what it would take to cover Tolopatamoy Creek (the one natural line McClellan didn't have the troops to cover). Thus McClellan has enough troops to attack Richmond or cover Tolopatamoy Creek.

Essentially making the comparison with 1864 to 1862, the assertion that comes out is that in 1862 the Army of the Potomac was at least twice as good on a man to man basis relative to the Army of Northern Virginia than it was in 1864. (1862 the campaign strengths of the two sides were even, 1864 the AoNV was outnumbered about 2:1 in campaign strength. By Lanchester Square this would imply that the 1864 ANV would have to be as much as four times as good man-to-man to make those relative force balances proportionate.)

Of course, we can rely on contemporary opinion?
In 1862 everyone agreed McClellan didn't have enough troops, they just never got around to actually reinforcing him. (June 1862 everyone agrees McClellan needs 1st Corps, July 1862 Lincoln agrees McClellan needs as many reinforcements as possible.) The contemporary argument about not reinforcing McClellan was generally that there were not enough troops available, and for that an 1864 comparison is absolutely appropriate.

 

[67th Tigers]

My opinion remains that the separation of the AoP was the root cause of the failure of the Peninsula Campaign. Neither the North Wing or the South wing had power enough to accomplish much.
Blame the engineers if that makes you happy. I don't, they could not overcome terrain, mother nature and the overwhelming requirements placed upon them. Many of these requirement were the direct result of McClellan's decision to split the force. There was opportunity between the 20th , when his forces crossed the Chickahominy, until the 31st when Johnson attacks to fully clear the heights and re-connnect the two wings of his forces, but it was not done. Ordering the required bridges after the enemy attacked it not useful and clearly indicative of poor command. All of this was a command responsibility and McClellan was in command.

I agree that McClellan did some things very well, but there are those that don't believe he could do anything wrong.

McClellan had a detachment rebuilding the bridge at New Bridge 10 days before Johnston's attack. Woodbury's reports show Capt Ketchum reported to Franklin on the 21st May with orders to rebuild New Bridge. He could not start because the heights were occupied. On 24th May, after the trestle bridges at Bottom's Bridge were completed McClellan passed 4 divisions across the river and Naglee cleared the heights of Semmes' Brigade pickets. Ketchum started framing the bridge on the 25th, but by the 31st they're still cutting lumber for it.

Splitting the troops is a requirement. The objective is on one side of the river, and your own supply base is on the other.