Alternatives: McClellan

[67th Tigers]

Apart from that, McClellan's "delusions" would certainly stop every army commander from attacking. For one, McClellan's force on the Peninsula (five infantry corps) amounts to about 114,700, present for duty, equipped (June 20; OR 1 XI, pt. 3, p. 238). Pinkerton generally estimated 180,000 – roughly 3:2 for the Confederates. How was McClellan to know that there were fewer Confederates than the Union army numbered? In addition, McClellan believed Beauregard was in Richmond and brought a part of his western army with him to reinforce Lee's army.

A closer look will reveal the following strengths (PFDE):

2nd Corps: 17,181
3rd Corps: 17,705
4th Corps: 14,568
5th Corps: 17,756
6th Corps: 18,564
Arty Res: 2,108
Cavalry: 4,412
McCall's Division: 9,501

= 101,587 in combat formations

Now, PFDE here s different to 1863+ PFDE, and still includes those posted to the logistics. A fair statement of the combat strength is 70,000 bayonets, 3,500 sabres and 316 guns. Converting companies, batteries etc. into regimental equivalents, McClellan had, when McCall joined on the 19th, 170 regiments of all arms.

Pinkerton's estimates were explicitly in the higher "aggregate present" category, and there was an established internal adjustment to convert to PFD of (PFD = 5/6 * Agg Pres).

Lee had, including the Richmond garrison and Jackson, 112,220. Using Pinkerton's conversion, which was accurate, the whole force should be 135,000 (rounded to nearest thousand) vs an estimate of 180,000. So what happened?

Pinkerton worked from a list of regiments he kept that had been reported to be in front of them. Pinkerton actually published his list as of 26th June after the war and so we can analyse it. In sum, it contained 36 infantry regiments that weren't there, a cavalry regiment that wasn't (2nd NC) and there is some double counting of unnumbered units as prisoners gave alternate names (notably the 1st Louisiana Special Battalion appears three times as that name, Wheat's Battalion, and the Louisiana Zouaves). Those 36 regiments explains almost the entire variance from the true number when combined with the double counting.

Now, the rumour that Beauregard had come east was doing the rounds. The problem is no-one could disprove it. Beauregard himself was known to have come to Richmond, but it was not known that he'd been replaced by Bragg.

However, in real terms McClellan really was outnumbered. Lee's army, excluding his garrison battalions (107,191 PFD), had 219.2 regiments of all arms vs McClellan's 170, or 129% of McClellan's count. We should thus be 4:3 in strength, and indeed that is that we get when we compare Lee's PFD, which excluded his logistics, with an estimate of McClellan's PFD excluding logistics.

Granted, he could have trusted Halleck when the latter said that Beauregard hadn't left Mississippi. But with all the differences going on on the political stage, I'd be vary of trusting intelligence coming from Washington too.

McClellan's writings on Beauregard are:

30th May, to Stanton: A contraband reports that Beauregard arrived in Richmond day before yesterday, with troops & amid great excitement. I cannot vouch for the truth of this but give it for what it may be in connection with the evacuation of Corinth.
10th June, to Stanton: I have information again that Beauregard has arrived & some of his troops are to follow him. No great reliance, perhaps none whatever, can be attached to this, but it is possible & ought to be their policy.
25th June, to Stanton: Several contrabands just give in information confirming supposition that Jackson's advance is near Hanover CH & that Beauregard arrived with strong reinforcements yesterday.... I shall have to contend with vastly superior odds if these reports be true.
18th July, to Lincoln: Those [reinforcements] at Petersburg say they are part of Beauregard's Army
26th July, to Halleck: It is said that troops of Beauregards old army are also en route hither - this last is not positive, & I hope to learn the truth in regard to it tomorrow.

As you see, McClellan never really trusted the rumours, but no-one could discount them. Bragg's forces had started entrained from Tupelo on 21st June, and arrived at Chattanooga three days later. The timings are right that if they'd be arriving at Petersburg on the 26th June onwards had they gone east instead of NW at Atlanta.

IMO it's easy to say that McClellan wasted an opportunity between the June 11 and June 23 – we have the advantage of hindsight; we know the numbers of both armies. But when putting myself in McClellan's position and going by what information he had and what was going on at that time, I believe he chose the prudent way not to attack between June 11 and June 23.

McClellan himself in the period wrote "I am completely checked by the weather". The storms that are recorded in Heintzelman's diary are:

evening 1st June - 7th: constant storms
evening 9th-10th: storm
15th-19th: storms
night, 23rd: storm

The period 1st-7th June had made everything a massive bog. Both sides were waiting until the ground could bear field artillery movements. When the ground dried both sides moved essentially simultaneously.

 

[Saphroneth]

So I thought it'd be interesting to have a look at what McClellan could have done to avoid losing 1st Corps during the Peninsular operations - specifically during the first week or so, during the time when a landing at Mobjack Bay or similar could have allowed him to turn Gloucester and thence Yorktown. Since Franklin was ordered to embark on the 4th, only objections raised before about the 6th April would be soon enough to hold back Franklin.

Essentially the reason why 1st Corps was held back was because Washington was felt to not be adequately defended. Now, Lincoln deferred to McClellan's corps commanders as to what that defence should be, or rather he said he would; they concurred that 40,000 men would suffice, including in that a 25,000 man covering force (described as "from Manassas to Harpers Ferry", thus including the Shenandoah.)
It was also the case that the War Board (including Stanton, Thomas and Hitchcock) concluded on March 27 that troops at Manassas and in the Shenandoah counted as part of the city's defences - that is, they were the covering force.

McClellan's explanation of what he left to defend the Capital does contain some errors, but these are not the justification used to withold McDowell. McClellan's layout of what was to be defending and around Washington was:


Baltimore - 7,388 after railroad guards
Washington - 10,600 manning the fortifications
11,400 disposable troops (i.e. a force surplus to the defences) of whom 4,000 ordered to Manassas. This means a total of 22,000 in Washington.
4,000 new troops in NY ordered to Washington
3,500 new troops in Pa ordered to Manassas
Guarding the railroads in Md: 3,359, to be relieved and sent to Manassas
Abercrombie's force at Manassas including Geary and some cavalry: 7,780 (with 12 field guns)
In the Shenandoah was Banks' 5th Corps and Blenker's division of 2nd Corps: 29,715 (with 24 field guns)
And 3,652 cavalry and the railroad guards (2,100)
And "some regiment" plus 500 cavalry to be 1,350 men total on the lower Potomac.

Note that here McClellan is including troops who had not yet arrived; he is also excluding troops who have not yet left. This is his description of the situation as it was going to be once he had completely transferred to the Peninsula.

The actual strengths at these points were (31 March unless otherwise noted), all strengths Present

Washington: 20,795
5th Corps: 23,607
Blenker approx. 9,302 (1/3 of 2nd Corps)
Alexandria (included in the Washington area) 1,404
Railroad Brigade 4,993 (April)
Baltimore 6,717 (30th May)
Geary's Independent Brigade, Shenandoah railroad guards, cavalry: no strength found. Assume them all to be included in Banks as this is the worst interpretation.

Consolidating descriptions, this comes to the following minimum values:

BEFORE McClellan's changes
Washington: 22,199 Present
Covering force (Banks and Blenker): 32,909 Present

AFTER McClellan's changes but BEFORE new units arrive
Washington: 22,199 - 4,000 = 18,199
Covering force (Banks and Blenker plus transfers from Washington and MD railroad guards): 32,909 + 4,000 + 4,993
= 41,902

AFTER McClellan's changes and AFTER new units arrive

Washington: 18,199 + 4,000 (from NY) = 22,199
Covering force: 41,902 + 3,500 (from PA) + 1,350 (new troops for the lower Potomac) = 46,752

Total 69,000.

At no point have I used Baltimore in the count.

Now, what was McClellan's error? It depends on your assumptions about Geary, the Shenandoah railroad guards and the cavalry as to the magnitude of it, but what it looks like to me is that he has simply double counted some of the force of Banks and Blenker. This leads to an overestimation of the size of the covering force.

Note that at no point in any of these does the strength either at Washington or in the covering force drop below the concurrence of the corps commanders. Had McClellan been entirely correct in his numbers he would still have been within the scope of the corps commanders' position on the strength required to defend Washington.


With that out of the way, what was Wadsworth's protestation?

His protestation was that his department had less than 20,000 troops*, and that that this wasn't enough troops to defend Washington. Stanton, Thomas and Hitchcock concurred in this, holding that McClellan had not left enough troops to defend Washington because troops in the Shenandoah did not count, and it's this justification which was used to withold McDowell.
* he counted a different way to McClellan, not using Present.


Thus, had McClellan's document been without error, it would:
1) Still have fulfilled the requirements made of it (that is, to leave amply sufficient force to make Washington entirely secure in the opinion of the corps commanders).
2) Not have prevented Wadsworth, Stanton, Thomas and Hitchcock from getting 1st Corps held back.



I see no direct causal link between McClellan's error with his document and the witholding of 1st Corps.