They reported being in contact with
Stuart yes, no report on Jackson.
On the 7th Sigel declares "
A deserter reports that the enemy is throwing up fortifications on the other side of Rappahannock Station. Artillery is brought down there from Culpeper. Longstreet's forces, 25,000 strong, are at Culpeper. Have not ben able to find out the whereabouts of Jackson's forces"
That is the report of one deserter, and that deserter didn't know Jackson's location. You are heavily overconcluding based on selective data. In fact McClellan knew very well the locations, as he wrote in 1863:
"The army was thus massed near Warrenton, ready to act in any required direction, perfectly in hand, and in admirable condition and spirits. I doubt whether during :he whole period that I had the honor to command the Army of the Potomac it was in such excellent condition to fight a great battle. When I gave up the command to General Burnside the best information in our possession indicated that Longstreet was immediately in our front near Culpeper; Jackson, with one, perhaps both, of the Hills, near Chester and Thornton's Gaps, with the mass of their three west of the Blue Ridge.
The reports from General Pleasonton, on the advance, indicated the possibility of separating the two wings of the enemy's forces, and either beating Longstreet separately or forcing him to fall back at least upon Gordonsville, to effect his junction with the rest of the army.
The following is from the report of General Pleasonton:
At this time and from the 7th instant my advance pickets were at Hazel River, within 6 miles of Culpeper, besides having my flank pickets toward Chester and Thornton's Gaps extended to Gaines' Cross-Roads and Newby's Cross-Roads, with numerous patrols in the direction of Woodville, Little Washington, and Sperryville.
The information gained from these parties, and also from deserters, prisoners, contrabands, as well as citizens, established the fact of Longstreet with his command being at Culpeper, while Jackson with D. H. Hill, with their respective commands, were in the Shenandoah Valley, on the western side of the Blue Ridge, covering Chester and Thornton's Gaps, and expecting us to attempt to pass through and attack them.
As late as the 17th of November a contraband just from Strasburg came in my camp and reported that D. H. Hill's corps was 2 miles beyond that place, on the railroad to Mount Jackson. Hill was tearing up the road and destroying the bridges, under the impression that we intended to follow into that valley, and was en route for Staunton. Jackson's corps was between Strasburg and Winchester. Ewell and A. P. Hill were with Jackson. Provisions were scarce, and the rebels were obliged to keep moving to obtain them.
Had I remained in command, I should have made the attempt to divide the enemy as before suggested, and could he have been brought to a battle within reach of my supplies, I cannot doubt that the result would have been a brilliant victory for our army.
On the 10th of November General Pleasonton was attacked by Longstreet with one division of infantry and Stuart's cavalry, but repulsed the attack. This indicates the relative position of our army and that of the enemy at the time I was relieved from the command."
In other words, they had no clue where Jackson was, then withdrew to cover their flank, and now Jackson is free to use the passes as he pleases, and they still don't know where he is or what he's doing. There's not a blessed thing stopping him from taking the same route he took in August and joining Lee at Gordonsville and having Lee get neatly out of the supposed bag McClellan has placed him in, again.
Nope, for both points.
As per above, Pleasonton is providing correct int about the enemy locations.
Jackson is
101 miles from Gordonsville, and his horses are knackered. When he moved from Winchester it took him 6 days to move to Gordonsville and his column was 3 days long (i.e. the back arrived at Gordonsville 8 days after the front started moving). The movement from Winchester to Fredericksburg was a 12 day march.
So he will do the same as Burnside. We can expect the same result, or if he gets lucky he gets thumped on the North Anna and then retreats across the Rappahannock.
Fredericksburg took some special doing by Burnside.
The bridge train from Berlin was ordered by McClellan to Washington on 6 Nov. Comms going via Washington and the war dept instead of telegraphing on the order placed it on a Potomac barge to leisurely make its way upriver and it wasn't received until 12 Nov. In the disruption of McClellan being removed noone on the staff wondered why they didn't hear from the engineers and reiterate the order.
Burnside wondered on 14 Nov about the trains. They replied they were only just reaching Washington and needed rehorsing. They suggested Burnside wait 6 days until 20 Nov to start his move. Halleck refused to allow this and Burnside told his engineers to float 40 more pontoons down from Washington. These arrived 18 Nov, but no-one had told the other train, which had the horses and extra equipment that this was urgent and they didn't leave until 19 Nov and spared the horses during a major storm and arrived 24 Nov.
Now if the initial screw up in Washington was caught early, such as the staff not being absorbed in the changeover that saves 6 days and the pontoons can be there on the 18 Nov. They'd also miss said storm and save another 3 days to be there on the 15 Nov.
One of Burnside's flaws is that he was too nice to hurry things up. He let things happen in their own time, which people liked because McClellan was often prodding and hurrying for celerity of movement. This is a classic case. McClellan would likely have had the pontoons in place 9 days earlier.
So in sum, argue 6 day delay won't happen with McClellan and staff undistracted, and you then miss said storm. Also Burnside could have put forces over the river to secure the heights. Sumner proposed this but Burnside said no. Hooker proposed taking his 2 corps across US ford and occupying the river drawing supplies from port royal. This was denied. Burnside held his force in place and allowed Lee to occupy the heights.
McClellan OTOH would see this like the eltham landing operation. A well entrenched force can resist a much larger force. He would likely occupy the heights across the river at least, whilst waiting for the pontoons if they had not arrived. Hookers proposal was sound and is similar to what istr McClellans thinking was.
In sum, even without the pontoons McClellan would have got across the Rappahannock unopposed. Worst case is Lee forms behind the north Anna.
Bringing the