Alternatives: McClellan

[Saphroneth]

Rather than explore a specific scenario, I thought it might be valuable to have a look at the alternatives open to George McClellan during his campaigns, and hopefully get some sense of why he did what he did - and whether he missed any easy opportunities to end the war.


As a preliminary note, I should raise what I consider to be the best estimates of Confederate strength during McClellan's campaigns:

The best evidence for the strength at Yorktown is by using the Confederare report listing the effective strength of each individual (infantry) regiment, and cross-referencing with when those individual regiments arrived at Yorktown. Doing this suggests that there were 20,000 infantry in the Yorktown line by the evening of the 6th April, irrespective of artillery or cavalry.

The best estimate for the Confederate strength during the Seven Days is in Harsh's Confederate Tide Rising (appendix 2c) where he gives a Confederate PFD of 112,000 during the Seven Days, most of it in the field army but including the defences of both Richmond and Petersburg.

Most estimates of Confederate strength during the Maryland campaign which don't draw on Lost Cause sources (i.e. Harsh's Sounding the Shallows, or adding-back casualties to the post Seven Days state, or looking at the observations made by people who saw the Confederate army) suggest a PFD strength somewhere in the 70,000-80,000 range. Strength at Antietam is a different matter as both sides straggled quite heavily.

I am of course willing to drill down into these further, but what I wanted to do by raising these is point out that it is unhelpful to suggest McClellan should have simply rolled over his opponent at will; the evidence suggests strongly that he did not have this kind of advantage, and that at least some finesse was justified.


So, with that in mind... at what specific points could or should McClellan have done something different? Where he could or should have done so, is this something we know with hindsight or is it something he could reasonably have known at the time, and what would the potential negative consequences have been?

 

[Saphroneth]

So to look at a specific example, and why McClellan chose the option he did, let's consider a fairly easy one. The events after Gaines Mill.

As of the end of the Gaines Mill battle, which took place in the evening of June 27th 1862, McClellan's force north of the river has been broken. At this point, he has a major problem, which is that his supplies were sourced from White House Landing on the Pamunkey river (from where they travelled by rail to his base around Savage's Station).
And the operative word there is "were". Within a couple of hours of midnight on the night of 27-28 June Stuart's cavalry, supported by a brigade of Confederate infantry, cut the rail line and compelled the evacuation of the supply depot at White House Landing.

At this point McClellan has no supply line, and there is no prospect of reopening his old one - over half the Confederate army, 57,000 troops after casualties, is north of the Chickahominy and he would have to basically force an opposed river crossing... with no supply, and a large enemy force in (what would now be) his rear. The number of wagons he took with him was about 3,600, and he doesn't seem to have lost many due to wastage (so he has some supplies with him, his troops don't immediately have no supplies or anything) but he needs to get a new supply base soon.


McClellan thus has the following options:

Try to cross the Chickahominy.
Remain in place and do not try to open a new supply line.
Attack Richmond.
Remain in place and try to open a new supply line (which would have to be from the James River, it's the only other way of getting supplies within wagon range)
Retreat down the southern (right) bank of the Chickahominy.
Move south to the James River and establish supply there.

There are thus six options.
1) is dangerously risky, and if it fails McClellan has exhausted his troops and not improved his situation. As per the reports of his corps commanders he's already stripped the line facing Richmond thin, and most of the troops not holding that line have just been routed.
2) is obvious suicide, not least as Lee could cross troops below the mouth of the White Oak and form a circle around McClellan. In just a day or two of marching Lee would have McClellan trapped behind river lines or facing the fortifications of Richmond, and the Amy of the Potomac would be compelled to surrender.

3) is to ask for McClellan to easily storm multi-layered field defences (and a few heavy forts) about two miles deep, held by 40,000 troops with plentiful artillery support. Put simply it's not going to happen, nothing like it ever did in the entire war.
4) is risky. Remaining in place facing Richmond would mean McClellan stretching his forces quite wide, as it would require the troops not holding the line against Richmond to cover the ~six miles of front from the White Oak to Malvern Hill plus the crossings of the Chickahominy below the White Oak. It's possible, which is why McClellan considered it and put it to his commanders, along with (6).
5) is basically what Lee hoped for, being able to push McClellan south down the Chickahominy and shadow him with a couple of divisions on the left bank to prevent him crossing. More importantly, McClellan would end up a long way from Richmond and thus it would no longer be in danger.
6) is the most viable option. By retreating from the Savage Station position, McClellan frees up about half his brigades and he can thus cover the distance from the White Oak to Malvern Hill more easily. This is the option that McClellan and his corps commanders selected, and McClellan's actual intent during the Seven Days was to retreat as far as the line he occupied during the Battle of Glendale, set up a supply position on the James (he wanted Haxhall's Landing, but the Navy ultimately didn't accept anywhere further upriver than Harrison's Landing) and hold until he could advance again.

 

[Saphroneth]

While I'm interested in people suggesting alternatives for what McClellan could have done (after all, if nobody can come up with an alternative at all this suggests McClellan did everything right...) I think it is worth looking at a place where McClellan probably had no choice but to gamble, and where it happens that he lost.

The situation is late June, when the ground is drying after weeks of unusual rain and it is possible for McClellan's army to attack Richmond.

McClellan's problem is essentially the one which would later flower after Gaines Mill, which is that he has a supply line north of the Chickahominy but Richmond is south of it. Lee's main force in Richmond (about 90,000 all told) could only come into positions McClellan had entrenched - McClellan penned up the river crossings of the Chickahominy north of Richmond with his entrenchments at Beaver Dam Creek - but McClellan also had the problem that Jackson could come down on his flank.

Essentially the options available here for McClellan are to either make a forwards defence (troops along the Chickahominy north of Richmond leading up to Beaver Dam Creek, troops along the line of Tolopatamoy Creek to block Jackson) or to pull back and try and defend a shorter line in the open, or to gamble that Pope's newly formed Army of Virginia (numbering at about 70,000 PFD) can keep Jackson busy.

Option (1) involves essentially trying to prevent an enemy force from crossing the river lines, forming up in strength, and smashing into a weak point along McClellan's line. We know the Beaver Dam Creek side of things would have worked, as it did historically, but the number of troops McClellan deployed north of the Chickahominy historically was not sufficient to also place troops along Tolopatamoy Creek. (It's about eight miles long, so it would have taken roughly another two divisions to cover it.)
Option (2) involves trying to just provide a strong enough line that Lee can't batter through it at all. Unfortunately it's not really a better option because the terrain isn't good, and because when McClellan held a line at Gaines Mill (which was not even half the length that would be needed here, plus in defensible terrain) Lee did break through it, though it was a close run thing. Thus to do this would take at least as many troops as option (1).
Option (3) is McClellan's historical option. It left his flank open and Jackson turned his force at Beaver Dam Creek, thus allowing Lee's left wing across the Chickahominy and also taking out the supply line.

So what's so bad about option (1)? Well, it's the deployment of those extra two divisions (i.e. six brigades). Historically McClellan placed nine brigades north of the Chickahominy and 23 south; by placing fifteen brigades north of the Chickahominy he has reduced his force south of it to 17 brigades. This is too few to attack Richmond effectively; indeed, on June 27 McClellan's corps commanders considered it dangerous to leave fewer than about 16 brigades south of the Chickahominy just to hold a strict defensive. (Heintzelmann wanted to keep four of his six, Sumner three of his six, Keyes wanted an extra one on top of his five, and Franklin gave up three of his six.)

So McClellan can make himself secure from being pushed away from the position he occupied during most of June, but at the cost of his ability to mount an offensive. Personally I think McClellan was too aggressive in late June, but he wasn't exactly operating with a large margin and he'd just been static for a month (awaiting a promised ~10-11 brigades of reinforcement, of which he got three) and it would be easy for someone to criticize him for lacking aggression in that case - indeed people still do!

If anyone has a solution which I've missed, I'd be glad to hear it...

 

[BlueandGrayl]

Honestly I think in regards to certain things in the Civil War like foreign recognition, the Union initial policies, and the Confederacy you at least have a good understanding of what is going on unlike some on this website (no offense to them).

 

[Saphroneth]

Honestly I think in regards to certain things in the Civil War like foreign recognition, the Union initial policies, and the Confederacy you at least have a good understanding of what is going on unlike some on this website (no offense to them).

While the compliment is hardly unwelcome, it's not really on topic for the thread.
Anywhere you think McClellan made a mistake?

 

[Saphroneth]

This is another one for which I recently got further information - the Yorktown line.

McClellan initially rejected operations starting from Fort Monroe precisely because of the risk from the fortifications at Yorktown (which his maps showed as a single fort, not a continuous river line), preferring Urbanna, but in mid-March a meeting of the corps commanders substituted the Peninsular option for his Urbanna plan.

At this point McClellan did the groundwork to prepare several options for how to deal with the Yorktown line. The "tools" he put together or planned to use were:
1st Corps, specifically Franklin's division, which had done amphibious landing training and had landing craft.
A siege train, outfitted with mortars, heavy smoothbores, and rifled guns such as Parrotts.
The cooperation of the Navy, for any one of a number of possibilities.

McClellan's initial plan was predicated on the fact that Magruder was not actually in the Yorktown line, but forwards around Big Bethel. He planned to land Franklin in the "sandpit" south of Yorktown but north of the Big Bethel line (i.e. the Wormley Creek area) and thus cut off Magruder's force (which was at the time quite small, as Lee - coordinating operations from Richmond - had not yet worked out what McClellan was doing).
Another option, given the information McClellan had (which incorrectly described the course of the Warwick) was to simply march past Yorktown - with a field battle if necessary - and encircle it. He felt it likely that reducing Yorktown would impose a delay of perhaps a month.
An option involving the Navy was to run past the Yorktown-Gloucester Point batteries and take them in reverse, thus neutralizing them (and cutting off supplies from Eltham's Landing to Yorktown).
It was also considered to use Franklin's division to take Gloucester Point.
And if all else failed it would be possible to use the siege train to blast through Yorktown's defences.
These plans were all formed with the information McClellan had at the time, which did not include the full strength of the Warwick Line but which did include a quite accurate report of the guns at Yorktown and Gloucester pointing into the channel (to whit, not much that was any good).


Ultimately these plans came unstuck one after another. The first error was on the part of the divisions landing at Yorktown, which launched a demonstration and spooked Magruder (and, more importantly, Lee). This caused a flow of reinforcements to Magruder which would quickly increase his strength, and also made him twitchy enough to withdraw to the Warwick line - abandoning a position which could be flanked by Franklin's division.
The next problem was the discovery that the Warwick was a continuously fortified line across the Peninsula, which McClellan discovered on the 5th and 6th of April. This meant that it would need to be assaulted, rather than simply forced in a field battle; something made harder by the flow of reinforcements to Magruder.
On top of this, on the 5th, McClellan got notice that 1st Corps (specifically including Franklin's division, his amphibious unit) had been removed from his command.

At this point, McClellan's options for getting past the Warwick line had been reduced to three - a deliberate assault upon an identified weak point, or the efforts of the siege train, or the work of the Navy.
It was raining hard, preventing an immediate assault, so McClellan ordered his engineers to examine the line to try and identify a weak point (a process which took several days, not least because of the need to drive in Rebel skirmishers just to get a look at the place in some areas).
The Navy, meanwhile, was no help. Misroon, the commander in the York River, flatly refused to take his ships within range of Yorktown and Gloucester Point citing the strength of the defences and their ability to destroy his ships; in fact, per Rowena Reed, passing the defences would have been easy:

"Had the Federals realized the true state of affairs in Yorktown, they could have taken the place in half the time and with a fraction of the effort expended. 64. While Missroon [sic] was certainly right that the Confederate works, especially those on the water, were scientifically placed and admirably constructed, he never pushed his reconnaissances close enough to discover they were miserably armed. The earthworks at Gloucester were unfinished and mounted only eight guns, none larger than 32-pounders. Besides two columbiads in Yorktown's upper fort which bore on the river, there were nine guns in the water batteries below the town, all old-pattern smoothbores. 65. The most effective piece of ordnance bearing on the channel was the rifle in the "masked battery", whose accuracy had so impressed Missroon. A converted 32-pounder, it pointed straight down the river and was skilfully concealed among the bushes and earthen ramparts of an old Revolutionary War redoubt. 66. But it was only one gun."

It goes on to note that DH Hill complained on 24 April that he had only one rifle left to keep vessels out of the channel, and that DH Hill was so lacking in artillery able to stop gunboats passing the works that he was seriously considering stationing a company of Texas sharpshooters to snipe at the crews of Union vessels attempting to run by.

Footnote 64 states that Fox examined the river defences and stated disgustedly that "the water batteries on both sides were insignificant and according to all our naval conflicts thus far, could have been passed at night with impunity".
Footnote 65 notes that Pinkerton had described the York River batteries with "surprising accuracy" in reports of 1 Feb and 29 March.
Footnote 66 directs the reader to ORA Part III p 441 to see Magruder's report on the effectiveness of the gun; I can't trace this further, unfortunately.

Once the full Confederate force had arrived at Yorktown, running past it would have made Johnston's force logistically impractical and compelled his withdrawal. (Johnston's force was supplied by river down the York, from the rail line between Richmond and the York)
Meanwhile the one point on the Warwick line which was practicable to attack was identified, and McClellan had an assault prepared. The line of departure was taken the day before (under cover of a trench raid, to avoid sounding the alarm) but a regiment was sent across the river, alerted the defenders and collapsed the dam.

This rendered the assault impractical, so McClellan finally ordered the siege train ashore, spending a couple of weeks emplacing it before ordering an open fire. He did not get Franklin back until it was really too late to do anything amphibious (Kearny's brigade, the first arrived after the assault was rendered impractical).
At about the same date as the siege train was fully emplaced, a rifle-armed gunboat (USS Sebago) joined Misroon's squadron with the will to act much more aggressively, and shelled the wharves at Yorktown. These between them compelled the withdrawal from Yorktown. (Incidentally, the Sebago's commander called Misroon a coward.)



Thus McClellan kept open a wide menu of options for dealing with the Yorktown line. He did not miss an option, even ordering both his wing commanders to attack as soon as they had closed up on the 5th. The only way a successful attack could have been made by a different decision of McClellan's would have been an attack on the "weak point" with all his force on the 6th, and would have involved information (the layout of the Warwick in general and the defences in particular) which he did not have at the time he would have needed it.

After all of these disappointments, the Yorktown position resulted in a delay of a month... exactly as McClellan had concluded back in January when he deemed the Monroe approach to be inferior to the Urbanna plan.

 

[luinrina]

Great threat, @Saphroneth! I love examining what if scenarios. Apart from offering a different outcome to actual history, they also prove a great learning experience when having to examine possibilities and their pros and cons.

So, to restate my question [...] can you name any place where McClellan should have done something else? Anywhere where he could have done a specific thing that would have worked, or stood a good chance of working?

The reason I ask is because people so rarely suggest alternatives... and when they do suggest alternatives, those alternatives generally tend not to be workable.

I'm not considering myself knowledgable enough just yet to actually contribute much to a possible alternative, but after reading about the Battle of Williamsburg in Sears' To the Gates of Richmond, I was thinking that Hancock's flanking move might have been exploited to good use had McClellan actually been at the front and directed the battle himself instead of leaving the command to Sumner.

Sears argues that Sumner had no idea what was going on in front of him and was thus unable to provide Hancock the requested reinforcement. Smith wanted to send Hancock a brigade, I believe, but it was recalled when Sumner found out.

I think that with enough and timely reinforcements, Hancock would have been able to take Fort Magruder from behind and cause the Confederates a higher number of casualties. That would have affected the Confederate army - maybe not too significantly in numbers but most likely in morale. The boys were already retreating without too much fighting. It would certainly have affected my morale to retreat from Yorktown without giving more resistance, and my morale would have dropped even further after a more decisive defeat at Williamsburg.

McClellan might not have been able to catch up with Johnston's wagon train as he fought Williamsburg as a rear-guard action precisely to allow the train to move on through the muddy roads, but I think a boost in the Union morale and drop of the Confederates' morale would have had an effect on future movements and battles of the Peninsular Campaign. Johnston might also have felt compelled to give another battle to stop the Union advance if he thought they were moving too fast on him.

 

[luinrina]

What I considered first as a possible alternative would probably only have been a slim one - if one at all.

Sears said that at the beginning of the siege of Yorktown on 6th April, Hancock discovered a weak spot in the Confederate position. It wasn't a confirmed expedition by McClellan - he instead ordered that nothing should be done against enemy works until the engineers had thoroughly examined it - but one "Baldy" Smith undertook of his own. When McClellan's order arrives, he Smith has to call back Hancock, much to his chagrin. The passage in the book (page 42) reads:

Hancock said that he had already discovered the weak spot they were looking for, and that it could be taken easily. No matter now, Smith told him: it was out of their hands. Baldy Smith always believed that had McClellan's order arrived an hour or two later, he would have broken the enemy's line and ended the siege of Yorktown the day it began.2​

I'm not certain what force McClellan had in front of Yorktown on 6th April - @Saphroneth, you said in the other thread, McClellan had the numerical advantage before Confederate reinforcements arrived, and according to another post of yours in the other thread, Magruder had only about 16,900 effectives before reinforcements arrived later that day and next day - but I think McClellan needed time to actually assess the situation and inspect the grounds before acting, especially since he hadn't counted on the Warwick line to be there and to be reinforced. This would have nothing to do with being overly cautious; he just wasn't rushing in without a plan but actually considering all options in order to adjust his existing plan of how to invest Yorktown - and that, in my opinion, speaks of a good commander, unwilling to throw away his men's lives when there were other, less bloody options.

 

[Saphroneth]

Sears said that at the beginning of the siege of Yorktown on 6th April, Hancock discovered a weak spot in the Confederate position. It wasn't a confirmed expedition by McClellan - he instead ordered that nothing should be done against enemy works until the engineers had thoroughly examined it - but one "Baldy" Smith undertook of his own. When McClellan's order arrives, he Smith has to call back Hancock, much to his chagrin. The passage in the book (page 42) reads:

Hancock said that he had already discovered the weak spot they were looking for, and that it could be taken easily. No matter now, Smith told him: it was out of their hands. Baldy Smith always believed that had McClellan's order arrived an hour or two later, he would have broken the enemy's line and ended the siege of Yorktown the day it began.2

Sears is either mistaken or lying - indeed it's actually a key part of my argument that Sears is not a very good analyst. His source for this claim is Hancock's report:



This creek here is about 1,200 yards distant from the Yorktown road. The Fourteenth Alabama was stationed there, and according to the statement of four soldiers of that regiment, taken by the Sixth Maine Volunteers, it numbered 1,070 men when it left Richmond, a few days ago. During the afternoon other movements of troops were observed marching down the stream behind the works, while this regiment was holding the crest of the creek. The dam there, by the statement of the colonel, is from 15 to 20 rods in length and about 12 feet broad. It is believed that yesterday that point could have been easily taken. The colonel of the regiment sent me a message by his major, asking permission to take it, which, however, I did not receive, being at the time with the other regiment, overlooking the two lower works. I merely mention this to show his idea of the practicability of it at that time, for I imagine the difficulty would have been in crossing the creek and in maintaining possession after we had taken it, for we had no artillery or intrenching tools with us. Major Harris, who took the message, with an escort of two men, meeting a scouting party of seven of the enemy, was prevented from communicating. He, however, by a ruse (commanding a deployment of men) and the fire of the two men, killing one of the enemy, causing them to fall back, escaped.

The circumstances were entirely changed afterwards, for the movement of several regiments of troops beyond the forts was observed by our line of skirmishers, who, notwithstanding, held the crest for about three hours, and until withdrawn to return. The next work below that appeared to be a rifle pit, and showed no guns. Our skirmishers, of the Fifth Wisconsin Volunteers, Captain Bean, drove the enemy from this crest down the bank, across the bridge there, and into their works. This appears to be flanked by the work in rear of the one-gun battery. Below this three other works were seen, each mounting artillery, each containing several guns. We drove the enemy to the crest of the high ground overlooking the flat in front of these forts. From the one (of those two) highest up the stream the enemy threw a number of shells at our skirmishers. It appears to have a direct control of the next one or two lower down the stream. We had a fair view of the lower work from this crest at about not more than 1,000 paces, and probably not so far. This crest commands it, and looks down upon the mill and road directly under it.



The report is dated the 7th, and what it claims is that "it is believed that yesterday the point could be easily taken" and it notes further that the belief is by the colonel of the 6th Maine - not by Hancock - while Hancock himself notes that later the same day it was discovered that several regiments stood-to on the crestline.

Sears provides no evidence that the conversation on the 6th actually took place.

 

[Saphroneth]

I'm not certain what force McClellan had in front of Yorktown on 6th April - @Saphroneth, you said in the other thread, McClellan had the numerical advantage before Confederate reinforcements arrived, and according to another post of yours in the other thread, Magruder had only about 16,900 effectives before reinforcements arrived later that day and next day - but I think McClellan needed time to actually assess the situation and inspect the grounds before acting, especially since he hadn't counted on the Warwick line to be there and to be reinforced.

As for the actual situation on the 6th, what Magruder has there on the 5th consists of a brigade there with another in reserve - essentially an attack at Garrow Ridge (which appears to be the weak point in question) would have been opposed by half of Winston and by Pryor (who's in works about half a mile away) with Wilcox behind and Colston about a mile and a half away in support.

Make no mistake, Garrow Ridge is a weak point, but only by comparison to the line as a whole. That's why McClellan prepared an all-up attack on it the following week.

 

[Saphroneth]

I'm not considering myself knowledgable enough just yet to actually contribute much to a possible alternative, but after reading about the Battle of Williamsburg in Sears' To the Gates of Richmond, I was thinking that Hancock's flanking move might have been exploited to good use had McClellan actually been at the front and directed the battle himself instead of leaving the command to Sumner.

Historically McClellan did ride to the battle himself to take command, but the reason he wasn't with Sumner is actually because he intended Sumner to be the smaller force. Note that none of Sumner's divisions were actually at Williamsburg, and this is because they were both were preparing to move by water up the York; Sumner was put in command of the smaller wing of four divisions moving by land as a full independent commander rather than "senior corps commander present", while the larger wing of five divisions moved by water (which was where McClellan was)

Essentially Williamsburg is where McClellan first tests Sumner in independent command, and as it happens Sumner is no good in this role. This is actually the reason why McClellan wanted to wait before appointing corps commanders (they were appointed by Lincoln in March after voting against McClellan's Urbanna plan, Lincoln promoted the minority opinion...)

Essentially moving up the York saves a day or two of marching. As far as I can tell McClellan's plan was to transport the "head" of his column to West Point and then strike out once enough of it arrived, with Sumner's column becoming the "tail" having gone by land.

Given that Johnston's force at this time was something like 75% of McClellan's force size or more (if the Norfolk troops have joined it's quite a bit more, perhaps up towards 90%) there's not really a good chance of being able to mount an effective pursuit if the enemy is unbroken and willing to mount rearguard action. If McClellan hadn't been making the turning movement by water then Johnston would likely have held Williamsburg seriously with his whole force (as it was a third defensive line).

 

[67th Tigers]

Hancock's report is actually two reports jammed together. Hence the attached engineer officer changing half way through. I guess he sat down to write his report of events on the 6th on the 7th, but was then interrupted and when he came back to it on the 9th or 10th simply continued writing. To those who lived the events the break would have been obvious.

On 6th Hancock could not approach the Garrow Ridge because the 14th Alabama were on it and his orders where to march across the whole frontage to assist the engineers in determining WTH was going on. On the 9th he was sent to push the 14th Alabama off the Garrow Ridge and allow the engineers to see what was beyond it.

So the events Sears says happened on the 6th in part happened on the 9th, but this is a natural mistake given the jammed together report. I only figured it out from elements of Siciliano's PhD thesis on Baldy Smith and the regimental histories of the units involved.

By this point (9th) the defence of Dam No. 1, which on the 5th was the 14th Alabama and some elements of Wilcox's brigade who reinforced it, had been reinforced by Cobb's brigade. Hancock drove the 14th Alabama back across the river, but had he attempted to cross it he'd have faced a dug-in brigade.

When Dam No. 1 was attacked on the 16th, the rebels had Cobb's large brigade (reinforced to 6 regts) defending it, and Toombs' division was in the reserve position at the Lebanon Church and was immediately sent to reinforce.

 

[Saphroneth]

Hancock's report is actually two reports jammed together. Hence the attached engineer officer changing half way through. I guess he sat down to write his report of events on the 6th on the 7th, but was then interrupted and when he came back to it on the 9th or 10th simply continued writing. To those who lived the events the break would have been obvious.

That does make a lot of sense, thanks. So that means that in actuality McClellan didn't get this information until well into the second week of April, by which point there were nearly 30,000 infantry effectives in the Yorktown line.

 

[Saphroneth]

So looking at the plausibility of an attack on Garrow on the 5th and 6th.

Firstly, we'd need McClellan to have good maps. The maps he was using did not show the Warwick correctly, thus why he took the roads he did. He'd need to have known to take the Four Corners road instead, with at least one of his corps.

Secondly he'd need to know that Garrows was the best weak point he was going to find, and commit to it with a full attack. Fortunately we know that McClellan did order a full attack from both corps commanders as soon as they reached the line, so that's good.

And thirdly you'd need the force (presumably five brigades, with one thrown out to the west towards Lees Mill) to take the ridge, cross the river, and successfully take fortifications defended by - essentially - Colston and Wilcox' brigades, plus the two Alabama regiments of Winston. Based on my table of arrival dates and (effective) strengths that's about 4,250 effective infantry in the two full brigades, with another 1,500 in the two Alabama regiments. Since these strengths are late April Effectives, this total is a low estimate and in PFD terms it may be up to 8,000.

Keyes' entire 4th Corps had a PFD strength of 33,231 all up on the 13th of April. An attack by 5/9 of this force would essentially be an attack by about 18,000 - this is, roughly, 2.3:1 odds and has a chance to succeed (assuming everything works out in terms of marching).
If the setup for the attack takes long enough that Magruder can send his newly arriving reinforcements there, however, the attack instead finds itself also confronting Early and Rodes (functionally another 6,000+ PFD) who arrived on the 6th.

 

[67th Tigers]

Part of the issue was the the Warwick line was only occupied on 28th March. Before that Magruder has occupied a much more forward line. When McClellan or Wool had infiltrated spies into Magruder's command they'd either seen the most forward line or Yorktown proper, but not the Warwick line.

The int picture painted on 19th March was:

 

[luinrina]

Historically McClellan did ride to the battle himself to take command, but the reason he wasn't with Sumner is actually because he intended Sumner to be the smaller force. Note that none of Sumner's divisions were actually at Williamsburg, and this is because they were both were preparing to move by water up the York; Sumner was put in command of the smaller wing of four divisions moving by land as a full independent commander rather than "senior corps commander present", while the larger wing of five divisions moved by water (which was where McClellan was)

Essentially Williamsburg is where McClellan first tests Sumner in independent command, and as it happens Sumner is no good in this role. This is actually the reason why McClellan wanted to wait before appointing corps commanders (they were appointed by Lincoln in March after voting against McClellan's Urbanna plan, Lincoln promoted the minority opinion...)

Essentially moving up the York saves a day or two of marching. As far as I can tell McClellan's plan was to transport the "head" of his column to West Point and then strike out once enough of it arrived, with Sumner's column becoming the "tail" having gone by land.

Given that Johnston's force at this time was something like 75% of McClellan's force size or more (if the Norfolk troops have joined it's quite a bit more, perhaps up towards 90%) there's not really a good chance of being able to mount an effective pursuit if the enemy is unbroken and willing to mount rearguard action. If McClellan hadn't been making the turning movement by water then Johnston would likely have held Williamsburg seriously with his whole force (as it was a third defensive line).

Yeah, I read about Lincoln appointing McClellan's corps commanders withouth consulting him. There goes again the wannabe-political-tactician vs. the military-trained commander in the field.

So, Johnston didn't stop at Williamsburg's defensive lines because after watching the gathering of ships at Yorktown during the siege, he supposed McClellan would flank him by going up the York. Makes sense to retreat farther than just Williamsburg. I had so far thought McClellan was following only on foot and wondered why Johnston didn't make a stand, but if the Union plan was to flank them by using the river, the Confederates would have exposed their backs by making a stand at Williamsburg.

Considering all this, Johnston's believe that to protect Richmond he needed to be much closer to the city than far out on the peninsular suddenly doesn't appear too absurd anymore.

Additionally, the flanking force was a threat to Johnston's supply line. That's why he decided on the rear-guard defense at Williamsburg until his trains had moved through the quagmire roads.

It also explains why Sumner was in command and not McClellan, and thus not reinforcing Hancock was Sumner's fault. If he wanted to test Sumner in independant command, now was the best opportunity since the Confederates were already retreating and thus probably not able of too much resistance when caught up with by the pursuing Union forces.

It would have been interesting to see Hancock reinforced. According to Sears, "in the center on the Yorktown Road, two of Baldy Smith's brigades - 6,100 men - idled away the hours virtually without event." Smith wanted to send Hancock a brigade - probably one of the two sitting idly by - but Sumner recalled it.


I might sound like I'm holding everything Sears says to be the one truth, but I'm not. I've read several times here on the forum that he doesn't seem to like McClellan and should be read with a grain of salt which is what I'm doing. That's why I'm discussing this with you to get a well-rounded understanding. He's a good starting point though since I'm still acquiring an overview and haven't yet delved into corps/brigade/regimental level.

 

[Saphroneth]

A bit of the problem at Williamsburg was Kearny, who was a "Chaaaarge!" commander and who was newly in command of a division.

 

[luinrina]

Would you mind elaborating? So far as I understand it, Kearny rallied Hooker's men after they broke after an attack by R.H. Anderson's troops. They then managed to drive the Confederates back into the woods. Yes, Anderson's men held on until the end of the day but it could have ended in a Union rout had Kearny not arrived at the time he did.

Keyes' entire 4th Corps had a PFD strength of 33,231 all up on the 13th of April. An attack by 5/9 of this force would essentially be an attack by about 18,000 - this is, roughly, 2.3:1 odds and has a chance to succeed (assuming everything works out in terms of marching).
If the setup for the attack takes long enough that Magruder can send his newly arriving reinforcements there, however, the attack instead finds itself also confronting Early and Rodes (functionally another 6,000+ PFD) who arrived on the 6th.

A chance but a mighty slim one timewise. A lot of circumstances would have had to be just right for enabling McClellan to successfully attack Garrow Ridge. Given that he had to operate with what knowledge he possessed, I think he didn't make a mistake in not attacking.

 

[Saphroneth]

Would you mind elaborating? So far as I understand it, Kearny rallied Hooker's men after they broke after an attack by R.H. Anderson's troops. They then managed to drive the Confederates back into the woods. Yes, Anderson's men held on until the end of the day but it could have ended in a Union rout had Kearny not arrived at the time he did.

My understanding is that Kearny's essential problem is that he was obsessed with charging, and would do things like grab regiments (or companies), sometimes from other commanders, and throw them at fortified positions with abatis.
I understand he also ordered a battery to put canister into a broken Union regiment, though it didn't actually happen as the battalion commander refused the order. The problem with Kearny's action here is that he was attacking with inferior forces rather than acting as a proper fixing force.

 

[luinrina]

Thanks for the explanation. It's certainly a bad idea to charge headlong into fortified positions. But it seemed to have worked for Kearny in the Mexican-American War. If I remember correctly he was part of the cavalry charging Churubusco which did lead to the Mexicans' retreat (eventually).

Though, I think a part of the problem was also Sumner husbanding his forces instead of getting them into the action. Hooker asked for reinforcements but Sumner said he'd have to rely on his own third division - which was Kearny's. With more men at hand, Hooker's men wouldn't have broken - at least that that easily - and the charge when it was made would have been stronger.