Alternatives: McClellan

[Saphroneth]

Here are the benchmarks we have for the number of troops it might take to take Richmond:

- How many troops McClellan was originally planning to use.
- How many troops it would take to cover the bridges to the north of Richmond, and advance lines by regular approaches, and cover the Tolopatamoy. (In other words, what McClellan was already doing in June 1862, plus cover the Tolopatamoy.)
- How many troops were involved in the historical taking of Richmond.

Given these, what do you think is the number of troops it would take in order to take Richmond? If the number of troops required is no larger than the number McClellan actually got, how should he have employed them differently to thus take Richmond?

 

[1SGDan]

Here are the benchmarks we have for the number of troops it might take to take Richmond:

- How many troops McClellan was originally planning to use.
- How many troops it would take to cover the bridges to the north of Richmond, and advance lines by regular approaches, and cover the Tolopatamoy. (In other words, what McClellan was already doing in June 1862, plus cover the Tolopatamoy.)
- How many troops were involved in the historical taking of Richmond.

Given these, what do you think is the number of troops it would take in order to take Richmond? If the number of troops required is no larger than the number McClellan actually got, how should he have employed them differently to thus take Richmond?

Considering what he did led to failure then certainly something different, anything different might have been a better alternative.

 

[Saphroneth]

Considering what he did led to failure then certainly something different, anything different might have been a better alternative.

Okay, so based on your "anything different" statement, I'll assume you'd consider McClellan marching his men into the sea to be a superior alternative...

Come on, man. This is a thread for discussing what McClellan could have done instead of what he did do, in the forum specifically intended to cover serious discussion of hypothetical scenarios.


If you think McClellan should have been more aggressive, say so and when. If you think McClellan should have placed his troops differently, say so and when.

If you just don't want to bother suggesting any alternatives and just say McClellan failed, without exploring how he could have not failed, then you're being unproductive and contrary and I will take it as an admission that you cannot come up with any way McClellan could have performed better with the troops he had.

He didn't so the question is irrelevant. You continue to make a false equivalence between the two campaigns.

This is the what-if forum, @1SGDan . If you're not willing to consider hypotheticals you may be in the wrong place.

Unless you answer the question then I will conclude that you think McClellan could have taken Richmond if he had over 170,000 Aggregate Present.

 

[CW3O]

"Of course it's worth further discussion, it's directly relevant to whether the campaign should have had greater resources. The more resources one has the better the options available."
The question posed was why did the campaign fail. You agreed it failed. End of this part of the discussion

Woodbury's report to Barnard on the 29th notes that at that time there were:
Two bridges across the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge.
Timber framed for a bridge across the Chickahominy at New Bridge.
Two trestle bridges to be thrown at the same spot (actually a mile above and a mile below New Bridge, those being the Upper Trestle and Lower Trestle).

That's additional to Sumner's bridges, which weren't the responsibility of the engineers. If McClellan indeed did not know about those then he'd have planned to bridge the Chickahominy essentially every mile except in Sumner's command area.

On the 29th all of this was true, we were discussing the 23rd. So on the 29th according to Woodbury there were three bridges, not four as McClellan suggested on the 23rd. The New Bridge was useless at this point because the heights had not been cleared on the south side.
I never said McClellan didn't know about them I said I found no evidence that he ordered them built. I am aware that the engineers were not involved in the construction, they were built by infantry regiments on orders from Sumner.

The two planned trestle bridges were exactly that, planned, not yet in construction.

As for clearing the heights, Barnard reported the heights vulnerable from the flank . Yes, they were difficult targets, but with two Corps available and reinforcements available from Second Corps they should have been taken down as quickly as possible. The Confederate heights positions while formidable were not fully supportive of each and might have been taken on piecemeal. It would have been nasty business but allowed the wings of the AoP better access to each other. Barnard believed, based upon his reconnaissance that it was possible. Common military sense tells you not to leave the wedge of enemy between your two forces.

 

[1SGDan]

Okay, so based on your "anything different" statement, I'll assume you'd consider McClellan marching his men into the sea to be a superior alternative...

Come on, man. This is a thread for discussing what McClellan could have done instead of what he did do, in the forum specifically intended to cover serious discussion of hypothetical scenarios.


If you think McClellan should have been more aggressive, say so and when. If you think McClellan should have placed his troops differently, say so and when.

If you just don't want to bother suggesting any alternatives and just say McClellan failed, without exploring how he could have not failed, then you're being unproductive and contrary and I will take it as an admission that you cannot come up with any way McClellan could have performed better with the troops he had.




This is the what-if forum, @1SGDan . If you're not willing to consider hypotheticals you may be in the wrong place.

Unless you answer the question then I will conclude that you think McClellan could have taken Richmond if he had over 170,000 Aggregate Present.

There are alternatives to every action.
When you attack you could have held your ground or moved away.
When you retreat you could have counterattacked or held your ground.
If you place your forces in a certain way they may have been arrayed differently.
Any suggestion that Mac did not have alternatives is ridiculous on its face.
Failure here had many causes but to suggestMac is blameless is also foolishness.

 

[67th Tigers]

He didn't so the question is irrelevant. You continue to make a false equivalence between the two campaigns.

In what sense? Of course we can compare the two campaigns. You're simply trying to shut down examination of the problem.

 

[Saphroneth]

The question posed was why did the campaign fail. You agreed it failed. End of this part of the discussion

Well, in this case it could certainly be argued that what made the campaign failed as opposed to not yet successful was when McClellan was ordered off the Peninsula. But even aside from that the question of resources is certainly relevant, unless you wish to assert that no matter the situation the amount of resources a commander has is irrelevant to whether or not he succeeded in his task.

On the 29th all of this was true, we were discussing the 23rd. So on the 29th according to Woodbury there were three bridges, not four as McClellan suggested on the 23rd. The New Bridge was useless at this point because the heights had not been cleared on the south side.
I never said McClellan didn't know about them I said I found no evidence that he ordered them built. I am aware that the engineers were not involved in the construction, they were built by infantry regiments on orders from Sumner.

I take your point about the responsibility, though I'll note that it's not a failing of McClellan to not order the construction of a bridge he already knows has been started.

As for clearing the heights, Barnard reported the heights vulnerable from the flank . Yes, they were difficult targets, but with two Corps available and reinforcements available from Second Corps they should have been taken down as quickly as possible. The Confederate heights positions while formidable were not fully supportive of each and might have been taken on piecemeal. It would have been nasty business but allowed the wings of the AoP better access to each other. Barnard believed, based upon his reconnaissance that it was possible. Common military sense tells you not to leave the wedge of enemy between your two forces.

To be clear, are you referring to an attack by 5th and 6th corps (across the Chickahominy) with support from 2nd Corps? Or do you mean an attack by 3rd and 4th Corps (from the east) with support from 2nd Corps?

 

[Saphroneth]

There are alternatives to every action.
When you attack you could have held your ground or moved away.
When you retreat you could have counterattacked or held your ground.
If you place your forces in a certain way they may have been arrayed differently.

Any suggestion that Mac did not have alternatives is ridiculous on its face.

Then I'm sure you won't have trouble providing any. Of course, if they're all manifestly inferior alternatives to what he actually did then that's a problem...

Again, if you fail to provide alternatives I will choose to assume that you cannot find a single viable alternative to McClellan's actual operations. Your behaviour to date is consistent with someone who cannot.

 

[1SGDan]

In what sense? Of course we can compare the two campaigns. You're simply trying to shut down examination of the problem.

My point is that the two were not interactive. What Mac had was in no way impacted by what Grant had. The two had different objectives, different means of approach, and different results. There is no parallel between them.
Furthermore there is no way of knowing what Mac might have accomplished with different assets. Considering what he did with what he had there is certainly no assurance that he would have been any more successful.

 

[CW3O]

I am referring to an attack by Third and Fourth Corps with assistance from 2nd Corps. Fifth and Sixth Corps attacking across the Chickahominy was not possible, what bridges there were under the guns of the very positions we are discussing, the river at this stage was not fordable so any attack from that direction would have been foolish. Fifth and Sixth Corps might have been able to contribute artillery support depending on local terrain conditions.

 

[1SGDan]

Then I'm sure you won't have trouble providing any. Of course, if they're all manifestly inferior alternatives to what he actually did then that's a problem...

Again, if you fail to provide alternatives I will choose to assume that you cannot find a single viable alternative to McClellan's actual operations. Your behaviour to date is consistent with someone who cannot.

I have already supplied a list of possible alternatives.

 

[Saphroneth]

I have already supplied a list of possible alternatives.

What, this?

When you attack you could have held your ground or moved away.
When you retreat you could have counterattacked or held your ground.
If you place your forces in a certain way they may have been arrayed differently.

That's not a list of possible alternatives, that's on the level of truism. For example, do you mean to suggest that it would be a superior alternative for McClellan to hold his ground instead of retreating post-Mechanicsville?

 

[Saphroneth]

I am referring to an attack by Third and Fourth Corps with assistance from 2nd Corps. Fifth and Sixth Corps attacking across the Chickahominy was not possible, what bridges there were under the guns of the very positions we are discussing, the river at this stage was not fordable so any attack from that direction would have been foolish. Fifth and Sixth Corps might have been able to contribute artillery support depending on local terrain conditions.

Right, gotcha. And I'm assuming that you mean post-Seven Pines here, say around 2-3 June. The weather's awful, of course...

Do you happen to have a map of the positions? I have one for the second day of Seven Pines and it shows DH Hill and Huger are not engaged while Magruder is dug in south of New Bridge (and additionally GW Smith holds a line north of Fair Oaks station). What I can't determine is how much of the Union force is "spare" from holding the line.

I do have a map for June 25, but that's a bit too late...

 

[1SGDan]

What, this?



That's not a list of possible alternatives, that's on the level of truism. For example, do you mean to suggest that it would be a superior alternative for McClellan to hold his ground instead of retreating post-Mechanicsville?

You disagree that counterattack is an alternative to retreat, or that retreat is an alternative to assault, and that troops could have been arrayed differently?

 

[CW3O]

Right, gotcha. And I'm assuming that you mean post-Seven Pines here, say around 2-3 June. The weather's awful, of course...

Do you happen to have a map of the positions? I have one for the second day of Seven Pines and it shows DH Hill and Huger are not engaged while Magruder is dug in south of New Bridge (and additionally GW Smith holds a line north of Fair Oaks station). What I can't determine is how much of the Union force is "spare" from holding the line.

I do have a map for June 25, but that's a bit too late...

No, I mean an attack as soon as Third and Fourth Corps are across the Chickahominy in strength, probably around 26 or 27th, These two Corps met little resistance on their advance to Seven Pines and should have been able to handle the job. Barnard's reconnaissance, conducted around this time, found Fourth Corps troops in already in close proximity to the Confederate positions.

 

[67th Tigers]

There are alternatives to every action.

Of course, so why do you refuse to examine the alternatives?

For example, here is a staff estimate based on the post Gaines Mill situation.

 

[Saphroneth]

You disagree that counterattack is an alternative to retreat, or that retreat is an alternative to assault, and that troops could have been arrayed differently?

Not at all. I argue that you've provided absolutely no details at all.
Do you have a specific date in mind? I don't automatically have the time to present every single possible alternative movement McClellan could have made on every individual day during the Peninsular Campaign, but if you're willing to be specific enough as to provide a date - as CW3O is doing - then we can do some mature, serious analysis.

No, I mean an attack as soon as Third and Fourth Corps are across the Chickahominy in strength, probably around 26 or 27th

Ah, okay. The problem there is simply where all of Johnston's troops are, as they have to be somewhere. The only formations which were present at the Seven Days but were not present around Richmond by Seven Pines were the brigades of Lawton, Daniel and Ransom, which means there were on the order of 89,000 PFD somewhere around Richmond*.


GW Smith reported on the 27th that he was to hit Porter at Beaver Dam Creek with a total of 11 brigades (Smith (Whiting), AP Hill, DR Jones), but this movement was cancelled. Branch is elsewhere (at Hanover Court House, as it happens), but that still leaves over half the Confederate army somewhere and it's actually a force larger than 3rd and 4th put together.

This is why I think we need to know where the Confederate units were on that date.




*McClellan's comparable figure is 102,000 PFD, of which 3rd and 4th are 37,100 and 2nd is 17,700; Porter is 15,400 and Franklin is 20,100, with the balance consisting of things like the advance guard etc.

Derivation of figure:

In the Seven Days Lee's army had 112,000 PFD, split as:

Army of Northern Virginia
Longstreet: 14,291
A.P. Hill: 16,411
D.H. Hill: 12,318
Stuart: 2,109
Total: 45,129

Army of the Valley
Jackson: 9,604
Ewell: 6,353
Whiting: 5,537
Cavalry: 605
Total: 22,099

Confederate defensive forces south of the Chickahominy:
McLaws: 4,915
D.R. Jones: 4,503
Magruder: 5,671
Huger: 6,160
Holmes: 9,018
Reserve artillery: 1,680
Cavalry: 2,000
Richmond defenses: 9,136
Petersburg defenses: 1,909
Total: 44,992

(Harsh)

As of Seven Pines, the following Seven Days regiments are with Johnston's army.

Whiting's division: 9/9
Jackson's division: 1/18 (will carry over to Longstreet)
Ewell's division: 0/18
DH Hill's division: 20/23 (missing a few scattered units)
DR Jones' division: 10/9 (1st KY extra, will carry over to McLaws)
McLaws' division: 9/10 (Kershaw not listed on Wikipedia but was present)
Magruder's division: 9/9 (some regiments missing on Wikipedia but were present, such as 17th MS and Cobbs brigade)
Longstreet's divison: 25/27 (missing 2 SC Rifles and 56th VA)
Huger's division: 20/27 (missing one of the Dept. of NC brigades, plus 44th AL. I will treat it as 15/16 and assume the Dept. of NC is embraced in Holmes.)
AP Hill's division: 31/32 (missing 5th Alabama battalion)
Holmes: not present except for 26th VA and Walker's 5-regiment brigade. Will treat AP Hill's division as complete and DH Hill's division as complete, and treat the remaining two regiments as overflow and credit nothing to Holmes.

Thus it adds up to Whiting, DH Hill, DR Jones, McLaws, Magruder, Longstreet, Huger, AP Hill.

So the estimated PFD strength just before Seven Pines is roughly:
Longstreet: 14,291
A.P. Hill: 16,411
D.H. Hill: 12,318
Whiting: 5,537
McLaws: 4,915
D.R. Jones: 4,503
Magruder: 5,671
Huger: 6,160
Reserve artillery: 1,680
Cavalry: 2,000
Richmond defenses: 9,136
Seven Pines casualties 6,134

 

[CW3O]

Perfect intelligence would always be nice but seldom occurs. The other side to that coin is that reasonable risks have to be taken in war.

With, by your numbers, over 50,00 troops available, I believe that there were sufficient troops to secure the Third and Fourth Corps front and attack the heights positions. Again they don't have to be attacked all at once, their layout makes them less mutually supportive than is ideal. I propose attacking the eastern most positions with Second Corps elements (there was little for Second Corps to do otherwise) supported by Fourth Corps elements already in the area. The remainder of Fourth Corps and Third Corps hold the front, McClellan already had ordered them to begin constructing defensive positions which were being laid out by the engineers. At this stage I view this as a wise decision by McClellan, his force had been on the move for several days and were situated over broad areas on both sides of the river. This would have been the time to secure the northern flank of the southern wing by taking on the heights positions. Early removal of all or some of the eastern most heights positions would have allowed more bridging work in late May/early June before the river got too flooded to work and without interference from the Confederate artillery on the heights. As the eastern most heights are eliminated the front required to be covered by the southern wing actually gets smaller.

 

[67th Tigers]

On the 29th all of this was true, we were discussing the 23rd. So on the 29th according to Woodbury there were three bridges, not four as McClellan suggested on the 23rd. The New Bridge was useless at this point because the heights had not been cleared on the south side.
I never said McClellan didn't know about them I said I found no evidence that he ordered them built. I am aware that the engineers were not involved in the construction, they were built by infantry regiments on orders from Sumner.

The two planned trestle bridges were exactly that, planned, not yet in construction.

There were three permanent bridges over 8 miles of river. From east to west:

Bottom's Bridge - Federal pickets reach 17th May and found it burned. The engineers built two trestle bridges on 20th May and started rebuilding Bottom's Bridge, which was completed on 24th May. By 24th May 4 divisions had crossed here.

Railroad Bridge - a mile upstream from Bottom's Bridge, it was also burned. On 22nd May Federal infantry, who'd crossed at Bottom's Bridge, occupied the far bank and the engineers started rebuilding. A test locomotive crossed on the evening of 27th May.

New Bridge - 8 miles up from Bottom's Bridge, New Bridge had also been burned. To cross the heights opposite needed occupying. On 24th McClellan started 3rd and 4th Corps in that direction. They drove off the enemy force on New Bridge Heights on the 24th, and on the 25th the engineers were able to measure the burned spans. They started work on framing and cutting the timber, but as of the 31st they hadn't enough material (on account of the saw mill breaking and then the flood carry some of the accumulated material away).

Two trestle bridges were built between the Railroad Bridge and New Bridge on McClellan's orders by infantry. One was completed 29th May, and the other on 31st May.

On the afternoon of the 31st McClellan had an argument with Franklin, Porter and Barnard. McClellan insisted on the engineers immediately bridging at New Bridge and pushing 6th Corps over. The other three argued it was impossible, but McClellan ordered them to do it. That evening he wrote to Marcy that if the engineers didn't have a bridge in place in the morning he would consider getting rid of them. The engineers had previously prepared pontoons and two sets of trestles. At 0815 on the 1st they reported the pontoon bridge ready. Franklin rode out onto it and it collapsed beneath him. At midday they reported one of the trestle bridge complete, and on the 2nd the other one. It was too late to use in the battle, as the rebels were already moving back to the Richmond entrenchments.

On 3rd June McClellan relieved the disappointing Barnard from his engineering responsibilities and placed BS Alexander in active command of the engineers. Barnard was kicked upstairs to be a staff wallah, and was no longer able to delay operations as he had at Yorktown or along the Chickahominy.

As Robert Krick once wrote to Steven Newton, lampooning those claiming McClellan could have walked into Richmond, "McClellan certainly did not possess a sky-hook" (Newton, Battle of Seven Pines, pg 101).

As for clearing the heights, Barnard reported the heights vulnerable from the flank . Yes, they were difficult targets, but with two Corps available and reinforcements available from Second Corps they should have been taken down as quickly as possible. The Confederate heights positions while formidable were not fully supportive of each and might have been taken on piecemeal. It would have been nasty business but allowed the wings of the AoP better access to each other. Barnard believed, based upon his reconnaissance that it was possible. Common military sense tells you not to leave the wedge of enemy between your two forces.

The heights were cleared on the 24th. Whilst they were not permanently occupied the area was picketed and clear for the engineers to work, and they started the New Bridge work on 25th May.

 

[Saphroneth]

As the eastern most heights are eliminated the front required to be covered by the southern wing actually gets smaller.

I wanted to quickly check this, because it seems to me to be unclear about the geography (though it's equally possible I misunderstand).

As I understand it, the area historically occupied by Casey's division when it got hit during Seven Pines - that is, the Union "stop line" in the advance south of the river - was both south and at least slightly east of the Lower Trestle bridge. Thus occupying the heights over New Bridge would mean extending the front covered by the southern wing from a north-south line into a diagonal one. Similarly, a Confederate force occupying the heights over New Bridge would not be a wedge (i.e. a salient) as such.
It'd only shorten the line if the Union flank near the White Oak was flung forward west of New Bridge compared to their flank near the Chickahominy being east of the Lower Trestle.