Alternatives: McClellan

[Saphroneth]

McClellan's report states that the 11th Corps was at New Baltimore, Gainesville and Thoroughfare Gap as of his relief, so that means I'll need to note their strength.
They seem to be fairly spread out, but they're also placed effectively to act as a flank guard so Franklin can be considered to be fully available for offensive operations.
The 11th Corps strength on December 10 is 14874 Men and 677 Offcers PFD; using my previously declared formula this gives an effective strength of 11832 effectives, or 11,800 using round numbers.

If Franklin and Siegel are available for the flank guard then the force is 34,800, which is roughly equal in strength to Jackson plus Walker.

Speaking of Walker, Upperville is mentioned as being in Union possession on the 4th. Since Lee placed Walker there on the 28th and said that if Walker moved then he should be replaced by a division of Jackson's, it may be that Walker was driven back through Ashby's gap and is with Jackson. Worst case scenario is that they've rejoined Longstreet, giving him 27,600.

Essentially there is no way Longstreet can endure what's about to hit him if he tries to stand. Longstreet's best case is that he has 27,600 and McClellan only puts 60,000 against him, but that's still better than 2:1 odds.


In Aggregate Present terms the total is

2500 HQ etc.
20500 1st Corps
18200 2nd Corps
21500 5th Corps
28800 6th Corps
16200 9th Corps

4700 Whipple
10600 Stoneman

18300 Sigel

While for Longstreet it's

37500 for the corps
of which 3500 is in (the sick) half of Hood's division
1500 is in Evans (ordered away)
and 4900 is in Walker (position unknown)

So in AP terms Longstreet has 27600-32500*
Jackson has 34400-39300*
And McClellan has 94200 concentrated at Warrenton
plus 47100 as an oversized flank guard at New Baltimore

so using AP terms Longstreet is outnumbered 3:1 or worse.

*depending where Walker/Ransom is, further clarity appreciated




The point about cavalry raids is fair for once Stuart's horses recover - AP wise McClellan has 7200 cavalry and Lee has 6400, so it's about even. However McClellan's supply line at this point is actually the O&A rail line, which is on the other side of two mountain ranges from the main body of the cavalry (and from Jackson) and by the time it can be interfered with there are four options.

1) McClellan has hit Longstreet and smashed into him in a straight up fight.
In this case Longstreet's been badly hit and McClellan can shift supply to Fredericksburg in peace.
2) McClellan has induced Longstreet to withdraw to Gordonsville, then followed him down the O&A and smashed him there.
In this case McClellan has gained Gordonsville, and is actually closer to Richmond in time terms than either Confederate corps.
3) McClellan has induced Longstreet to withdraw to Gordonsville, then followed him down the O&A and caused a further retreat.
In this case the same as (2) obtains.
4) McClellan has induced Longstreet to withdraw to Gordonsville, then shifted supply to the Fredericksburg route.
In this case it's a race to the North Anna, and McClellan's supply line is one Jackson can't interfere with as it's all south of the Rappahanock.



Of course, if Jackson does go for a raid eastwards then he's liable to find 11th Corps (and 6th, possibly) marching up his rear while the Cacotin mountain passes are held against him. This would put Jackson in immediate risk of destruction with how far he'd have to march to reach the Union supply line.


If Lee tries to recombine his forces, meanwhile, we know that historically Jackson took about a week to reunite with Longstreet (and that's after his horses recover). Even assuming Jackson can manage a punishing 20 miles per day and can use the same route he took historically he'd arrive at Gordonsville only on his 6th march after being ordered to reunite.

 

[67th Tigers]

Positions were roughly as marked below. Walker's Division was ordered to Madison Ct Hse when relieved by DH Hill.

Hood's division had a smallpox outbreak, and was quarantined.

McClellan had Franklin with 6th Corps, and the newly joined 11th Corps (which had marched out of the Alexandria defences to join) ready to defend the line of the Bull Run Mountains and support Averill's Cavalry in the valley beyond. He had 9th Corps forward to support Pleasonton's and Bayard's cavalry which had seized the crossings of the Rappahannock.

 

[Saphroneth]

Ah, thanks. So Jackson's actually spread out, not concentrated, and if he was to try and reunite with Longstreet he'd need to concentrate on DH Hill and march to Swift Run Gap before reuniting. Walker can be called in by Longstreet directly but that would take a while, longer than it would take McClellan to arrive, and if it's all of Hood in quarantine rather than just half then Longstreet has barely 24,000 AP and is outnumbered even more than I thought.

Meanwhile if Jackson instead tries coming out into Loudoun Valley he's opposed by a force nearly half again his size and concentrated, and just to concentrate on AP Hill would take a couple of days.

Presumably Jackson's best chance of saving Longstreet is to push both Hills through their respective mountain gaps (if they can manage it) and try to mount an outsize threat to McClellan's flank, but I don't think it's possible to mount enough of a threat - McClellan's force at New Baltimore is too large by itself.

Essentially there's no course of events I can see where McClellan doesn't at least gain the line of the Rappahanock, and things need to go only moderately well for the Union to reach down as far as the North Anna before Lee's army is concentrated again. If they don't concentrate then McClellan can just keep fighting his way to Richmond, and simply in order to concentrate Jackson is going to need to stop putting pressure on McClellan's NW flank for at least 5-6 days - long enough to gain the Rappahanock at a minimum.

 

[Saphroneth]

Maybe it'd be worth exploring each of the alternatives for how Jackson and Longstreet can react and how that would work out. Defining the options for Longstreet as:

Stand at Culpeper
Stand at Gordonsville
Retreat west from Gordonsville
Retreat south from Gordonsville
Retreat east from Gordonsville (to Fredericksburg)

and the options for Jackson as

Aim to recombine with Longstreet
Remain in the Valley
Move into Loudoun and head south
Move west of the Cacotins

(Plus any others I've not really considered.)

There's a lot of options on that decision matrix, but in some cases the movements of Jackson and Longstreet don't directly influence one another.

My understanding is that historically Longstreet was preparing to break contact and move south to Gordonsville (that's as of the 8th), and that Jackson was preparing to resist McClellan's anticipated attack (that's as of the 9th - Lee didn't know where McClellan's main force was, though Longstreet may have suspected). The question then is what they do after that...

 

[CanadianCanuck]

The entire point of this thread was not as a what if discussion, but a thinly veiled way for him to defend Little Mac's actions/legacy from the Peninsula through his removal in November 1862, The lengthy setup of the what if made it nearly impossible to even discuss other options because all of the scenarios were setup to show that Little Mac was awesome and ran circles around Lee.

Even the projections laid out in this thread are silly. Burnside's letter from the 9th of November, shows just how this scenario probably would have played out:

If we move upon Culpeper and Gordonsville, a fight there and a general engagement, even with results in our favor, the enemy will have many lines of retreat for his defeated army, and will, inn all likelihood, be able to reach Richmond with enough of his force to render it necessary to fight another battle at that place; and should he leave even one corps, with cavalry, on our right flank, it would render the pursuit very precarious, owing to the great lack of supplies in this country, and the liability to an interruption of our communication with Washington. Should the enemy retreat in the direction of Richmond upon our approach to Culpeper and Gordonsville, we would simply follow a retreating army, well supplied with provisions at least, at depots in his rear, whilst this army would have to rely upon a long line of communication for its supplies, and, as in the other case, a small portion of the enemy's force on our flank might tend to interrupt our communications. It may be well to add here, while on the subject of interrupted communication, that the enemy's sources for gaining information are far superior to our own. The General-in-Chief will readily understand the reason. The difference is more than usual in their favor at present, from the fact that nearly all the negroes are being run south and kept under strict guard.

Should the enemy retreat before us in the direction of Staunton and Lynchburg, the same difficulty would follow, with the certainty that he would also have a small portion of his force on our left flank. In moving by way of Fredericksburg there is no point up to the time when we should reach that place at which we will not be nearer to Washington than the enemy, and we will all the time be on the shortest route to Richmond, the taking of which, I think, should be the great object of the campaign, as the fall of that place would tend more to cripple the rebel cause than almost any other military event, except the absolute breaking up of their army. The presence of a large army on the Fredericksburg line would render it almost impossible for the enemy to make a successful move upon Washington by any road on this side of the Potomac, and I take it that there are forces enough at Washington and on the line of the Potomac, connected with the fortifications about Washington, to repulse any movement of the enemy on the capital, by way of the Upper Potomac; and it is hardly probable that he would attempt any serious invasion of Pennsylvania at this season of the year, and even if he should make a lodgment in that State of any force that he can spare, the destruction of that force would be the result very soon after winter set in, and the destruction of property by him would be small in comparison with the other expenses of the war.

In effect, they march south, most likely engage in a costly battle around Culpeper, and delay the AotP, which gives Jackson time to move south to rejoin Lee.

 

[Jimklag]

The entire point of this thread was not as a what if discussion, but a thinly veiled way for him to defend Little Mac's actions/legacy from the Peninsula through his removal in November 1862, The lengthy setup of the what if made it nearly impossible to even discuss other options because all of the scenarios were setup to show that Little Mac was awesome and ran circles around Lee.

Very thinly veiled. The originator of this thread lives and breathes fandom for McClellan. His criticisms of other generals, like Kearney and Grant, have the sole purpose of making McClellan look better by comparison. His feline cohort has the same motives and the same M.O. And both are American-haters.

 

[CanadianCanuck]

Jackson's pretty much paralyzed by his lack of transport, because all the horses are sick. He also had no idea where McClellan even was at this point, as the Federal cavalry was doing such a good screening job. (He had tried to break through the Gap into Loudoun Valley a few days previously, but balked - and as far as Jackson knows McClellan is actually positioning to go after him, that's what Lee believed at this time.)

If Walker is where I've marked him as, then Franklin may be required as a flank guard (but a flank guard which makes any operation by Jackson essentially impossible) but McClellan still has 2.5:1 odds on Longstreet without him; if Walker is with the rest of Longstreet's force, most of Franklin isn't required as a flank guard (Ashby's Gap is easily held by the Federal cavalry in force) and McClellan can concentrate nearly 3:1 odds on Jackson.

Problem is that all of the cavalry reports up to November 5th show that McClellan has absolutely no clue where Jackson's force is, they only suspect his intentions. They also don't cover any of the southern passes through the Blue Ridge, Chester's Gap is wide open and the Manassas Gap is not held in force. With Jackson out of contact with the enemy, he can march at his leisure towards Lee, and McClellan is unlikely to know about it till he gets hit from the flank. This is especially true if the Federal cavalry is being used to hold Ashby's Gap.

Longstreet then, is essentially safe since by the 5th McClellan is, at best, 2-3 days away from organizing a general engagement. Either Longstreet stands and mounts a delaying action, or he withdraws to a more defensible position. And he's closer to Richmond, with better interior lines, than McClellan is. McClellan then, has no choice but to follow and extend his supply lines.

That's the thing, though, we know from when Lee actually tried to rejoin his army that Jackson's marching speed is very low at this time (because, again, his transport's screwed) while so is Stuart's cavalry - which is all pinned in the Shenandoah and mostly dismounted at this time, historically it took thousands of remounts to fix that. Meanwhile McClellan has finally got flying column supply going, so he can shift supply lines much more fluidly than he did previously.

Would you be willing to outline what you think Lee's best option is? Longstreet here can either stand at Culpeper or retreat to Gordonsville, and doing the latter leaves Fredericksburg completely open...

Lee, can retreat to more defensive positions at his leisure, and Jackson can move to join him either at the North Anna, or along the Rappahannock if Lee moves parallel to McClellan, who is then stretching his lines with the enemy free to maneuver on his flank.

Standing at Culpeper offers little risk since McClellan can, at best, bring 60,000 men to bear by the 7th or 8th, and it stalls for time allowing the army to withdraw. Withdrawing to Gordonsville or parallel along the Rappahannock is a risk to McClellan because he stretches his supply lines further than he can properly support them, and already there was issue supplying the men covering the gaps (ammunition running short from the skirmishes, a problem that had not been resolved by the 5th) and so none of those forces are in shape for a major action, nor are they allowed to advance into the Valley.

Essentially, Lee is falling back to a better position no matter what, and McClellan is chasing him till Lee turns around and bites him. Considering the lackluster performance at Antietam was a draw by McClellan against an unprepared Lee, I'm unwilling to bet on a big victory in November before McClellan withdraws to winter quarters.

 

[Saphroneth]

In effect, they march south, most likely engage in a costly battle around Culpeper, and delay the AotP, which gives Jackson time to move south to rejoin Lee.

Costly - can you clarify? Longstreet's outnumbered about 3:1 and not in a particularly strong defensive position. How can he have a costly battle which doesn't also seriously harm his corps and which lasts long enough for Jackson to rejoin Lee (a process which involves a march for Jackson of about a hundred miles)?

Very thinly veiled.

I'm still open to alternatives... in fact, the reason I created this thread was because on other threads the following pattern would occur:

Someone would make a criticism of McClellan's conduct in a particular battle.
I would ask what McClellan should have done instead.
I would either get a reply of "anything" or a reply that it wasn't the right forum/job of the person to offer an alternative.


So that's why this thread exists - it's for the actual discussion of what McClellan could feasibly have done instead.

For the record, there's already two alternatives which I consider could have resulted in a superior (or not inferior) outcome during McClellan's battles:

1) Holding the line of the Tolopatamoy instead of attacking Richmond, in June 1862. This would have prevented the Seven Days.
2) Sending Franklin along the south side of the Potomac during September 17 in the Antietam Campaign, though this would have required McClellan to know AP Hill was about to leave.

 

[CanadianCanuck]

Very thinly veiled. The originator of this thread lives and breathes fandom for McClellan. His criticisms of other generals, like Kearney and Grant, have the sole purpose of making McClellan look better by comparison. His feline cohort has the same motives and the same M.O. And both are American-haters.

What bellies belief to me is that McClellan earning a draw at Antietam is somehow going to translate into McClellan gaining a significant victory somewhere in Virginia before he has to withdraw to winter quarters. He can't move on Richmond, the army isn't prepared to do so. Even if he fights an action at Culpeper, it will expend supplies and ammunition that will delay a march further south, which means he moves slowly, away from his supplies, as the roads get worse.

Just not seeing this "significant victory" we're told is coming. Nothing in the orders and correspondence from October-November suggests it.

 

[Saphroneth]

Problem is that all of the cavalry reports up to November 5th show that McClellan has absolutely no clue where Jackson's force is, they only suspect his intentions. They also don't cover any of the southern passes through the Blue Ridge, Chester's Gap is wide open and the Manassas Gap is not held in force. With Jackson out of contact with the enemy, he can march at his leisure towards Lee, and McClellan is unlikely to know about it till he gets hit from the flank. This is especially true if the Federal cavalry is being used to hold Ashby's Gap.

The map I have showing the cavalry positions has Manassas Gap held by some of Averell's cavalry, and that the gaps further south are outside Pleasanton's cavalry screen. There's no gap that's not at least covered by a cavalry screen.

Longstreet then, is essentially safe since by the 5th McClellan is, at best, 2-3 days away from organizing a general engagement. Either Longstreet stands and mounts a delaying action, or he withdraws to a more defensible position. And he's closer to Richmond, with better interior lines, than McClellan is. McClellan then, has no choice but to follow and extend his supply lines.

Of course Longstreet is safe for a few days after the 5th - the map I made is as of the 9th, because McClellan's orders for marches were followed for the 8th and the 9th.

Lee, can retreat to more defensive positions at his leisure, and Jackson can move to join him either at the North Anna, or along the Rappahannock if Lee moves parallel to McClellan, who is then stretching his lines with the enemy free to maneuver on his flank.

If Longstreet retreats from Culpeper to Warrenton then he's given up the line of the Rappahanock - that's better than the historical Fredericksburg battle. For Lee to move parallel to McClellan that would (presumably) mean moving to Fredericksburg, but that opens the Orange and Alexandria.

Standing at Culpeper offers little risk since McClellan can, at best, bring 60,000 men to bear by the 7th or 8th, and it stalls for time allowing the army to withdraw. Withdrawing to Gordonsville or parallel along the Rappahannock is a risk to McClellan because he stretches his supply lines further than he can properly support them, and already there was issue supplying the men covering the gaps (ammunition running short from the skirmishes, a problem that had not been resolved by the 5th) and so none of those forces are in shape for a major action, nor are they allowed to advance into the Valley.

60,000 men Effectives, or Present? Longstreet has less than 25,000 men Effective at Culpeper, while in Present terms Longstreet has about 28,000 but McClellan has 94,000 concentrated at Warrenton itself (1st, 2nd, 5th, 9th).

Of course, this can't be brought to bear until after the time McClellan was historically removed from command (that being the 7th when the order caught up with him) - but it's not more than a few days delay.

The forces covering the gaps (the cavalry) is one thing, but McClellan's main body was resupplying at Warrenton (on the rail line) and as such was about ready for another move - it's flying column supply.

Essentially, Lee is falling back to a better position no matter what, and McClellan is chasing him till Lee turns around and bites him. Considering the lackluster performance at Antietam was a draw by McClellan against an unprepared Lee, I'm unwilling to bet on a big victory in November before McClellan withdraws to winter quarters.

The question is, where is the better position where Longstreet can hold off 3:1 odds or worse? If there's one north of Gordonsville, that's one thing, but if there's no position of that sort until Gordonsville then McClellan can just shift east to Fredericksburg and then McClellan's over the Rappahanock.


Lee of course has the option between retreating and giving battle, but retreating means giving up ground, and I'm not sure what Lee can do here that means he's not given up the line of the Rappahanock. If he marches west to Fredericksburg and gives up Gordonsville then McClellan is actually as close to Richmond as he is...

 

[Saphroneth]

What bellies belief to me is that McClellan earning a draw at Antietam is somehow going to translate into McClellan gaining a significant victory somewhere in Virginia before he has to withdraw to winter quarters. He can't move on Richmond, the army isn't prepared to do so. Even if he fights an action at Culpeper, it will expend supplies and ammunition that will delay a march further south, which means he moves slowly, away from his supplies, as the roads get worse.

McClellan got a draw (well, a draw where Lee spent the entire time withdrawing and managed to do so successfully) at Antietam fighting with an army of a certain size against an army of a certain size. Since then McClellan has gained more than an entire corps in reinforcements (Stoneman's division, Siegel's corps, an extra division for 6th Corps) while Lee has not.

If McClellan is able to bring the same sort of strength he used at Antietam against only half the army he fought at Antietam (i.e. just Longstreet) then that's how McClellan can win a victory if Lee stands and fights. If Lee doesn't stand and fight at Culpeper and withdraws to Gordonsville, then McClellan has at the very least gained the line of the Rappahanock - a significant outcome.

 

[Saphroneth]

Even if he fights an action at Culpeper, it will expend supplies and ammunition that will delay a march further south, which means he moves slowly, away from his supplies, as the roads get worse.

Sorry, but wanted to touch on this point here. Of course fighting an action at Culpeper would expend supplies and ammunition, but both of McClellan's approach routes here explicitly involve using railways. (The Orange and Alexandria, or the Fredericksburg and Richmond.) He's not really marching away from his supplies if he's got a rail line to keep him topped up, and Longstreet can only prevent him from using one of those lines to advance south.


The impression I get from your statements is that you think that Lee would have Longstreet withdraw to Gordonsville without fighting an action, and Jackson march down to the northernmost open gap to rejoin Longstreet. Is that correct?

 

[CanadianCanuck]

The map I have showing the cavalry positions has Manassas Gap held by some of Averell's cavalry, and that the gaps further south are outside Pleasanton's cavalry screen. There's no gap that's not at least covered by a cavalry screen.

This is not supported by the reports of the cavalry. Nor is that going to mean anything when Jackson moves south.

Of course Longstreet is safe for a few days after the 5th - the map I made is as of the 9th, because McClellan's orders for marches were followed for the 8th and the 9th.

Sorry, then he is safe until at least the 13th, if not 14th or 15th. McClellan was complaining his rail line connections were in no state to supply his force, and looking for more cars to move things.

If Longstreet retreats from Culpeper to Warrenton then he's given up the line of the Rappahanock - that's better than the historical Fredericksburg battle. For Lee to move parallel to McClellan that would (presumably) mean moving to Fredericksburg, but that opens the Orange and Alexandria.

I'm not sure how that's better, since either Lee is moving a portion of his force to screen Fredericksburg while retreating to the Robertson River or North Anna or concentrating for a turning movement on McCllelan's flank.

60,000 men Effectives, or Present? Longstreet has less than 25,000 men Effective at Culpeper, while in Present terms Longstreet has about 28,000 but McClellan has 94,000 concentrated at Warrenton itself (1st, 2nd, 5th, 9th).

On your map, he has only 60,000 present, and could maybe get sixty thousand against Longstreet. Longstreet and Lee can hold those odds, and McClellan can't use the rail line to supply an advance, and his column is at the end of its tether (by your measure) even advancing to battle. Longstreet defend the roads before McClellan's columns can mutually support one another in a general advance

The forces covering the gaps (the cavalry) is one thing, but McClellan's main body was resupplying at Warrenton (on the rail line) and as such was about ready for another move - it's flying column supply.

It was not by the 7th, as McClellan is complaining the rail line is of little use, and he is not recieving all the supplies he wants, and is obliged to establish his depot at Gainesville, 12 miles from Warrenton, and a full 35 miles distant from Culpeper, which means McClellan can only proceed as far as Culpeper (by your standard 40 mile overland limit) before the railroad is repaired (including any damage caused by the rebels) which means he has to stop and supply and move his supply routes before he can chase Longstreet, and this is even without a battle.

A general pursuit to Richmond is then unlikely, at least before McClellan is compelled to withdraw to winter quarters.

The question is, where is the better position where Longstreet can hold off 3:1 odds or worse? If there's one north of Gordonsville, that's one thing, but if there's no position of that sort until Gordonsville then McClellan can just shift east to Fredericksburg and then McClellan's over the Rappahanock.

Even a delaying action at Culpeper could hold off those odds. And then he has to cross the Roberston River and North Anna before going into winter quarters, not happening. It would take another month just to shift his lines east to Fredericksburg, and by then Lee has all his army to counterattack.

In short, the campaign season will end before McClellan can land his hypothetical killing blow.

 

[67th Tigers]

Problem is that all of the cavalry reports up to November 5th show that McClellan has absolutely no clue where Jackson's force is, they only suspect his intentions.

On what grounds do you allege this? It seems unlikely given that during that period his cavalry was actually in contact with parts of Jackson's command and reports such.

They also don't cover any of the southern passes through the Blue Ridge, Chester's Gap is wide open and the Manassas Gap is not held in force.

On 5th November they held all these gaps except Chester Gap (which was seized on the 6th). On the 7th they held none because it was completely unnecessary. The Army had changed base from Berlin to the Manassas Gap Railroad, and now the Bull Run Mountains were McClellan's curtain of maneouver. All Jackson could do is come into the Bull Run Valley. Strategically this would be meaningless, and the 6th and 11th Corps held Thoroughfare Gap.

With Jackson out of contact with the enemy, he can march at his leisure towards Lee, and McClellan is unlikely to know about it till he gets hit from the flank. This is especially true if the Federal cavalry is being used to hold Ashby's Gap.

Unless Jackson has teleporters this is impossible. McClellan's army is completely east of the Bull Run Mountains and has all the gaps of that mountain range.

Longstreet then, is essentially safe since by the 5th McClellan is, at best, 2-3 days away from organizing a general engagement. Either Longstreet stands and mounts a delaying action, or he withdraws to a more defensible position. And he's closer to Richmond, with better interior lines, than McClellan is. McClellan then, has no choice but to follow and extend his supply lines.

Lee had no intention of doing this. On 10th November he committed to attacking McClellan's bridgehead, except Burnside had withdrawn it.

McClellan of course will shift his base east to Fredericksburg, as he intended, and as Grant did in 1864. This is because both understood the military geography.

Lee, can retreat to more defensive positions at his leisure, and Jackson can move to join him either at the North Anna, or along the Rappahannock if Lee moves parallel to McClellan, who is then stretching his lines with the enemy free to maneuver on his flank.

How does Lee move parallel to McClellan? He has to do what he did historically and go round 3 sides of a square whilst the Federals have but one. That he managed to get in front of Burnside at Fredericksburg is due to terrible staff work on Burnsides part. Indeed, it was so obvious that he couldn't defend Fredericksburg that Lee historically marched his army to the North Anna, and arriving there sent two divisions (McLaws and Ransom (ex-Walker) forward to harass the oncoming Federals. They were confused when they reached Fredericksburg to find Burnside had not crossed.

Standing at Culpeper offers little risk since McClellan can, at best, bring 60,000 men to bear by the 7th or 8th, and it stalls for time allowing the army to withdraw. Withdrawing to Gordonsville or parallel along the Rappahannock is a risk to McClellan because he stretches his supply lines further than he can properly support them, and already there was issue supplying the men covering the gaps (ammunition running short from the skirmishes, a problem that had not been resolved by the 5th) and so none of those forces are in shape for a major action, nor are they allowed to advance into the Valley.

The Blue Ridge Gaps were abandoned when they ceased to be of any utility.

The cavalry ca. 8-9 November was in the following positions:

Averill and Farnsworth: Little Washington
Gregg: Waterloo Bridge, holding the river crossing
Bayard: Rappahannock Station, holding the river crossing

 

[Yankeedave]

Interesting thread.

 

[Saphroneth]

On your map, he has only 60,000 present, and could maybe get sixty thousand against Longstreet.

No, he has 60,000 effectives (well, 59900 at Warrenton and another big chunk at New Baltimore, which I need to update as I have confirmation that Siegel was there). Effectives and Present are two different measures of strength, considerably so.

If you read Longstreet as about 30,000 Present and McClellan as 60,000 Effectives and consider those two numbers to both be on the same scale, you're wrong; simple as that. (I know this because they're my numbers; if you'd prefer I can make a map showing Present and Effective numbers in two different colour codes. That might actually be quite useful anyway.)

 

[Saphroneth]

Updated numbers and positions here:

Note that the ratio of Union effectives to Present is a much greater gap than the Confederate one. This may be because Confederate logistics mostly relies on non-whites (including slaves) or it may be because my calculation of Union effectives is overly pessimistic.


I accidentally drew on the basemap for the upper Potomac stuff, but for the record in AP terms Morell is 5400 and Slocum is 14900.

 

[CanadianCanuck]

On what grounds do you allege this? It seems unlikely given that during that period his cavalry was actually in contact with parts of Jackson's command and reports such.

They reported being in contact with Stuart yes, no report on Jackson. On the 7th Sigel declares "A deserter reports that the enemy is throwing up fortifications on the other side of Rappahannock Station. Artillery is brought down there from Culpeper. Longstreet's forces, 25,000 strong, are at Culpeper. Have not ben able to find out the whereabouts of Jackson's forces"

On 5th November they held all these gaps except Chester Gap (which was seized on the 6th). On the 7th they held none because it was completely unnecessary. The Army had changed base from Berlin to the Manassas Gap Railroad, and now the Bull Run Mountains were McClellan's curtain of maneouver. All Jackson could do is come into the Bull Run Valley. Strategically this would be meaningless, and the 6th and 11th Corps held Thoroughfare Gap.

Unless Jackson has teleporters this is impossible. McClellan's army is completely east of the Bull Run Mountains and has all the gaps of that mountain range.

In other words, they had no clue where Jackson was, then withdrew to cover their flank, and now Jackson is free to use the passes as he pleases, and they still don't know where he is or what he's doing. There's not a blessed thing stopping him from taking the same route he took in August and joining Lee at Gordonsville and having Lee get neatly out of the supposed bag McClellan has placed him in, again.

Lee had no intention of doing this. On 10th November he committed to attacking McClellan's bridgehead, except Burnside had withdrawn it.

McClellan of course will shift his base east to Fredericksburg, as he intended, and as Grant did in 1864. This is because both understood the military geography.

How does Lee move parallel to McClellan? He has to do what he did historically and go round 3 sides of a square whilst the Federals have but one. That he managed to get in front of Burnside at Fredericksburg is due to terrible staff work on Burnsides part. Indeed, it was so obvious that he couldn't defend Fredericksburg that Lee historically marched his army to the North Anna, and arriving there sent two divisions (McLaws and Ransom (ex-Walker) forward to harass the oncoming Federals. They were confused when they reached Fredericksburg to find Burnside had not crossed.

So he will do the same as Burnside. We can expect the same result, or if he gets lucky he gets thumped on the North Anna and then retreats across the Rappahannock.

 

[Saphroneth]

There's not a blessed thing stopping him from taking the same route he took in August and joining Lee at Gordonsville and having Lee get neatly out of the supposed bag McClellan has placed him in, again.

August? As far as I can tell Jackson didn't enter the Shenandoah Valley in August. What route are you thinking of?

So he will do the same as Burnside. We can expect the same result, or if he gets lucky he gets thumped on the North Anna and then retreats across the Rappahannock.

Whyever would McClellan retreat clear across the Rappahanock, even after a defeat on the North Anna? Fredericksburg is a valid supply base, indeed it'd be the one he'd be using at that point, and the North Anna is about 25 miles south of the Rappahanock...

 

[CanadianCanuck]

Whyever would McClellan retreat clear across the Rappahanock, even after a defeat on the North Anna? Fredericksburg is a valid supply base, indeed it'd be the one he'd be using at that point, and the North Anna is about 25 miles south of the Rappahanock...

There's precious little good defensive ground between Fredericksburg and the North Anna. McClellan has to get closer to his supplies, and the only way to defend his supplies and the army is to withdraw beyond the Rappahannock.