Was McClellan (and the Union war effort) sabotaged for pure political reasons in Spring of 1862?

There's actually quite a bit of information about Dam No. 1.

1. On 4th-5th April the works were manned by the 14th AL and 3 coys of the 19th MS (1,040 effective men by the 30th April memo).
2. Colston's brigade returned to this area on the evening of the 4th April (1,750 ditto).
3. Nelson's battery had been tasked to provide artillery to the fortifications, although they moved around a bit.
4. Prisoners captured on the 6th reported a 24 pdr in the one-gun battery, and a 32 pdr and a 24 pdr on the redoubt behind.
5. The residue of Wilcox's brigade, complete with their battery of 6 guns, is nearby ready to reinforce the dam.
6. The creek is too deep to wade and keep ammunition dry, and the dam only permits a narrow column of 4 men.

Attacking Dam no. 1, even if one located it, is a very difficult task. Numbers don't count, and per Magruder, the only place numbers can be employed is a direct assault on the redoubts outside Yorktown. That's why he worried about McClellan's "200,000 men" [sic] rolling over him there.

Of course, we know that McClellan likely couldn't have attacked with 20,000 there, and we know that this was very insufficient for a human wave assault to be successful.

67th Tigers said:

Really? Do explain how a (by then) week old movement order that wasn't adhered to was "Lee's entire battleplan?"

The reason why McClellan was relieved, whilst in the middle of one of the most impressive movements of the war, is largely a case of paranoia. To quote myself:

Why Lincoln Actually Fired McClellan, According to Lincoln

When discussing why Lincoln fired McClellan, it is sometimes stated it was for military reasons, and a couple of lines of a diary entry from John Hay (25th September 1864) is quoted. If one reads the whole entry a different story emerges. What Lincoln actually believed, according to Lincoln via Hay, is that McClellan really was a traitor:



The Governor Smith in question is John Gregory Smith, who at the time in question (1862) was not governor (which he ascended to in 1863) but rather the Speaker of the House of the Vermont legislature. As even Stephen Sears noted, Smith's information was garbled and incorrect. Lincoln did send to Smith for a written account, and Smith checked with Baldy Smith. He then sent a letter to Lincoln (30th December 1864) which confirmed the entire episode was false. I have no access to this letter, which is in the University of Vermont library archives and has not been digitised, but if Sears, who has an interest in Smith's story being true, says the letter contradicts the story I must accept it. Hence, Lincoln was acting at the time on false information. The conspiracy was a confabulation.

That McClellan's relief was not on military grounds can be demonstrated with Lincoln telling Orville Browning after the relief that McClellan was the "superior to any other general ... at handling an army in the field." (ref) Lincoln essentially said McClellan was the best battlefield general they had, but his movements were too slow. He told Browning what he told Hay nearly two years later; that he'd issued a peremptory order and it took McClellan two weeks to start moving, and that it took McClellan six days to cross the Potomac. Of course we know that there was no "peremptory order" issued to McClellan. Possibly Lincoln gave it to Halleck as such, but Halleck's order was simply to ask McClellan to submit a plan, as discussed above.

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No one takes any of your ******** serious anymore.

The lost orders confirmed the intelligence McClelland had been receiving - namely rebel infantry in Hagerstown, near Leesburg, South, East and West of Harper's Ferry. Alas, after the "lost orders" he knew that DH Hill was on South Mountain, Longstreet was near Hagerstown, McClaws was in the Pleasant Valley, Jackson was south and west of Harper's Ferry, Walker had crossed near Leesburg, etc.

You're literally taking a moronic position (even more than usual for you) which is refuted by EVERY participant NORTH AND SOUTH and every single historian worth his salt.

Also, McClellan was relieved for being a very average general with a very dangerous, outright hostile, political stance. There's a reason the Army of the Potomac never measured well against other Union Armies and that is the stink of McClellanism

repman66 said:

No one takes any of your ******** serious anymore.

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What an excellent and well-structured argument. So, Lincoln told Hay why he relieved McClellan. Why do you discount Lincoln's own explanation for his decision?

67th Tigers said:

What an excellent and well-structured argument. So, Lincoln told Hay why he relieved McClellan. Why do you discount Lincoln's own explanation for his decision?

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After the battle of Antietam I went up to the field to try to get him to move, and came back thinking he would move at once. But when I got home he began to argue why he ought not to move. I peremptorily ordered him to advance. It was nineteen days before he put a man over the river. It was nine days longer before he got his army across, and then he stopped again, delaying on little pretexts of wanting this and that. I began to fear he was playing false — that he did not want to hurt the enemy. I saw how he could intercept the enemy on the way to Richmond. I determined to make that the test. If he let them get away I would remove him. He did so, and I relieved him. I dismissed Major [Key]. for his silly, treasonable talk because I feared it was staff talk, and I wanted an example. The letter of Buell furnishes another evidence in support of that theory. And the story you have heard Neill tell about [Governor Horatio] Seymour's first visit to McClellan all tallies with this story.

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Furthermore, yes McClellan was too interested in playing politics to win the **** war. You think if Eisenhower was spending his time meeting with Republican Senators and officials about a run in 1944 FDR would have kept him as general? NO! Win the **** war then earn your political laurels.

McClellan didn't. And was never President. You're not even making sense in your arguments. We all know Baldy Smith back stabbed senior officers which is why he bounced around the war. Nothing you posted has detracted from my main point. Lincoln would have kept McClellan if he was winning the war - taken his chances against him in '64 - again these are Lincolns words.

McClellan failed. He was failing. HE wasn't going to win the war.

SgtTB said:

Two reasons:

A) If Mac was truly that bad, he wouldn't have sniffed around command again. We can see from his prior campaigns that he wasn't a rank incompetent.

B) McClellan followed up his appointment with winning, and ending the Maryland campaign. How many eastern theater generals bested Bobby Lee? Right.

Taken together I think these are pretty strong points that maaaaaaaybe some of the present consensus on his record isn't true.

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Lincoln came to agree with your premise that there was nobody from within the ranks of the AoP, including Little Mac, who could match Bobby Lee. That is why he had to look to the West for Grant.

Incidentally, when Grant came East to assume his command, with ssome presiance of mind, IMO,he brought only one other officer with him, Phil Sheridan.

repman66 said:

Lincoln would have kept McClellan if he was winning the war - taken his chances against him in '64 - again these are Lincolns words.

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Really? Then why did Lincoln explain that his reasoning was actually because he'd come to believe McClellan was a traitor, and that's why he relieved him? Lincoln had sent to get an account from Baldy Smith to use in a mud-slinging exercise against the opposition candidate in the 1864 election, and then it came back that the whole conspiracy never existed.

I do wonder if Lincoln got it into his head that the reason the war hadn't yet been won wasn't his and Stanton's mismanagement, but rather that his generals were secretly traitors. Burnside and Hooker then went and did exactly what Lincoln wanted them to, without telling Lincoln his misunderstandings, and look where that got things...

It's never a good idea to surround oneself with yes-men...

SgtTB said:

I never said he was a perfect general. I never said he was months out from winning the war. I'm not even saying he was going to take Richmond with re-enforcements or extra troops. I've been clear he needed to show more initiative at Harrison's Landing and the day after Antietam. I never said he politicked right or spoke appropriately to superiors.

None of these were part of the central thesis of my thread, that there was a faction that worked to hamstring his power, and they did it for pure politics. And I think I've only discovered more proof of that the more I read about the situation.

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You are correct, there were those in Congress and Lincoln's Administration who wanted McClellan relieved of command for incompetence, if not Treason.

There is more evidence of McClellan's actions as Commander of the AoP, hamstringing the Union's war effort in Va., than Lincoln's

67th Tigers said:

There's actually quite a bit of information about Dam No. 1.

1. On 4th-5th April the works were manned by the 14th AL and 3 coys of the 19th MS (1,040 effective men by the 30th April memo).
2. Colston's brigade returned to this area on the evening of the 4th April (1,750 ditto).
3. Nelson's battery had been tasked to provide artillery to the fortifications, although they moved around a bit.
4. Prisoners captured on the 6th reported a 24 pdr in the one-gun battery, and a 32 pdr and a 24 pdr on the redoubt behind.
5. The residue of Wilcox's brigade, complete with their battery of 6 guns, is nearby ready to reinforce the dam.
6. The creek is too deep to wade and keep ammunition dry, and the dam only permits a narrow column of 4 men.

Attacking Dam no. 1, even if one located it, is a very difficult task. Numbers don't count, and per Magruder, the only place numbers can be employed is a direct assault on the redoubts outside Yorktown. That's why he worried about McClellan's "200,000 men" [sic] rolling over him there.

Of course, we know that McClellan likely couldn't have attacked with 20,000 there, and we know that this was very insufficient for a human wave assault to be successful.

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You just keep making things up. So we'll try yet again.

Since you've failed to reply to prior requests, we'll repeat it. Tell us which Confederate battery had that elusive 32 lb howitzer - one of the only 25 ever manufactured, and of the 19 that hadn't been allocated to Battery D, 1st NY Light. For that matter give us a list of any Confederate batteries that were outfitted with this gun and had it in service.

That's entirely aside from your "interpretation" of what was reported by whom and when, etc.

Belfoured said:

You just keep making things up. So we'll try yet again.

Since you've failed to reply to prior requests, we'll repeat it. Tell us which Confederate battery had that elusive 32 lb howitzer - one of the only 25 ever manufactured, and of the 19 that hadn't been allocated to Battery D, 1st NY Light. For that matter give us a list of any Confederate batteries that were outfitted with this gun and had it in service.

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What 32 pdr howitzer? If I may quote you; "You just keep making things up."

67th Tigers said:

Really? Then why did Lincoln explain that his reasoning was actually because he'd come to believe McClellan was a traitor, and that's why he relieved him? Lincoln had sent to get an account from Baldy Smith to use in a mud-slinging exercise against the opposition candidate in the 1864 election, and then it came back that the whole conspiracy never existed.

I do wonder if Lincoln got it into his head that the reason the war hadn't yet been won wasn't his and Stanton's mismanagement, but rather that his generals were secretly traitors. Burnside and Hooker then went and did exactly what Lincoln wanted them to, without telling Lincoln his misunderstandings, and look where that got things...

It's never a good idea to surround oneself with yes-men...

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"It's never a good idea to surround oneself with yes-men..."

You mean like those who - according to McClellan - told him "that I fought the battle splendidly & that it was a masterpiece of art"? Talk about a roster of sycophants and boot lickers.

67th Tigers said:

What 32 pdr howitzer? If I may quote you; "You just keep making things up."

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What "32-pdr" do you think a field battery was outfitted with?

67th Tigers said:

I do wonder if Lincoln got it into his head that the reason the war hadn't yet been won wasn't his and Stanton's mismanagement, but rather that his generals were secretly traitors.

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It's far more likely that Lincoln got it into his head that McClellan was simply never going to wage the war in an aggressive and forceful way, no matter how hard Lincoln pushed him.

67th Tigers said:

Really? Then why did Lincoln explain that his reasoning was actually because he'd come to believe McClellan was a traitor, and that's why he relieved him? Lincoln had sent to get an account from Baldy Smith to use in a mud-slinging exercise against the opposition candidate in the 1864 election, and then it came back that the whole conspiracy never existed.

I do wonder if Lincoln got it into his head that the reason the war hadn't yet been won wasn't his and Stanton's mismanagement, but rather that his generals were secretly traitors. Burnside and Hooker then went and did exactly what Lincoln wanted them to, without telling Lincoln his misunderstandings, and look where that got things...

It's never a good idea to surround oneself with yes-men...

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McClellan and his cronies came very ******* near treason in July-August of '62. Very **** near. His failure to follow preemptory orders and to passively allow Pope to "get out of his scrap" is a very damning chapter in his career and should have earned him being cashiered out of the armed forces of the United States. Reading his private correspondence its very clear men died so McClellan could hopefully have the opportunity to swoop in and be the savior AFTER Pope failed. That's treason or very near its like.

His middling performance in the Maryland campaign notwithstanding, he was rightfully relieved by the commander in chief of the United States.

Yes men, ********. McClellan was given a direct order, a preemptory order by the President, to move his ***. He did nothing. That was the final straw.

In fact, I have in my collection an original 1862 pamphlet from the Prince de Joinville / ARMY OF THE POTOMAC ITS ORGANIZATION ITS COMMANDER. Let's listen to the Prince ......

The Richmond campaign, undertaken in the spring, with the Army of the Potomac, made hardier by a winter passed in tens, and recovered from the fatal impressions of Bull Run, would be the coup de grace to Secession. The later course was chosen, either as the result of real deliberation, or of necessity from not having decided in time to act during the fine weather of the autumn of 1861.

And there I may point out, in passing, a characteristic trait of the American people - that is, as well in regard to the people as to an agglomeration of individuals - delay. This delay in resolving and acting, so opposed to the promptitude, the decision, the audacity to which the American, considered as an individual, had accustomed us, is an inexplicable phenomenon which always caused me the greatest astonishment. Is it the abuse of the individual initiate that kills the collective energy? IS it the habit of calculating only on one's self and of acting only for one's self that renders them hesitating and distrustful when they must act with the assistance of others? Is it the never having learned to obey that makes it so difficult to command? Doubtless something of all these causes, and other causes still that escape us, most combine in producing this result, as strange as it is unaccountable; but this delay in action which, besides, appears to belong to the Anglo-Saxon race, is atoned for by a tenacity and perseverance which failure does not discourage.

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I am no psychologist BUT I've always read that as ---- replace AMERICAN with George McClellan and you just about have a perfect summation from one who was there.

repman66 said:

McClellan and his cronies came very ******* near treason in July-August of '62. Very **** near. His failure to follow preemptory orders and to passively allow Pope to "get out of his scrap" is a very damning chapter in his career and should have earned him being cashiered out of the armed forces of the United States. Reading his private correspondence its very clear men died so McClellan could hopefully have the opportunity to swoop in and be the savior AFTER Pope failed. That's treason or very near its like.

His middling performance in the Maryland campaign notwithstanding, he was rightfully relieved by the commander in chief of the United States.

Yes men, ********. McClellan was given a direct order, a preemptory order by the President, to move his ***. He did nothing. That was the final straw.

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Even Ethan Rafuse, who manfully attempted to explain things from McClellan's perspective, drew lines that the acolytes blindly dash through. In one of them he agrees that McClellan's "efforts" at reinforcing Pope with Franklin - to put it nicely - left a lot be desired regarding intent and execution.

repman66 said:

In fact, I have in my collection an original 1862 pamphlet from the Prince de Joinville / ARMY OF THE POTOMAC ITS ORGANIZATION ITS COMMANDER. Let's listen to the Prince ......




I am no psychologist BUT I've always read that as ---- replace AMERICAN with George McClellan and you just about have a perfect summation from one who was there.

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We have a poster who has touted repeatedly in this thread the thinking of T. Harry Williams. In Lincoln and His Generals, Williams offered some insights regarding McClellan's mentality that are hard to dispute, then or now.

DanSBHawk said:

It's far more likely that Lincoln got it into his head that McClellan was simply never going to wage the war in an aggressive and forceful way, no matter how hard Lincoln pushed him.

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Lincoln was undoubtedly aware that once he issued his proclamation on the very topic McClellan had vehemently objected to in the Harrison's Bar letter, McClellan's determination to wage an aggressive war would likely crater further. That's even without Lincoln knowing of the seditious correspondence between McClellan's "wing man" and the New York World's Marble about the Proclamation.

repman66 said:

McClellan and his cronies came very ******* near treason in July-August of '62. Very **** near. His failure to follow preemptory orders and to passively allow Pope to "get out of his scrap" is a very damning chapter in his career and should have earned him being cashiered out of the armed forces of the United States. Reading his private correspondence its very clear men died so McClellan could hopefully have the opportunity to swoop in and be the savior AFTER Pope failed. That's treason or very near its like.

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That's very confused of you. It was McClellan offering Lincoln a very blunt choice after Halleck had waffled and vacillated:

"I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: First, to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope; Second, to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all of our means to make the capital perfectly safe. No middle ground will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer."

What we see is McClellan offer Lincoln a stark choice borne out of Pope's failure - send the last troops (2nd and 6th Corps) to try and extract Pope knowing they might also get destroyed, or have them defend Washington. The rumours in Washington were that Pope had already been destroyed, and so this might be throwing good money after bad. The former option leads to the possibility of complete defeat and the rebels occupying Washington and winning the whole war. It was fully correct that McClellan give Lincoln the options, and you'll note he fully complied with Lincoln's decision and sent 6th and 2nd Corps forward, as he'd made preparations to do.

It's a strange kind of "treason" that's asking the President what to do, and then doing it...

repman66 said:

His middling performance in the Maryland campaign notwithstanding, he was rightfully relieved by the commander in chief of the United States.

Yes men, ********. McClellan was given a direct order, a preemptory order by the President, to move his ***. He did nothing. That was the final straw.

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Except he was not given any orders beyond "you need to submit a plan for the President to approve, and you cannot act until the President makes his decision."

The problem is, people don't read beyond the first line, which is basically the subject line. This is Halleck's message. Read the bolded part at the end, which confirms that it wasn't an order to move, but to submit a campaign plan for approval combined with an order not to move until the plans are approved:

"I am instructed to telegraph you as follows: The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south. Your army must move now while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your operation, you can be re-enforced with 30,000 men. If you move up the Valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. The President advises the interior line between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will immediately report what line you adopt and when you intend to cross the river; also to what point the re-enforcements are to be sent. It is necessary that the plan of your operations be positively determined on before orders are given for building bridges and repairing railroads. I am directed to add that the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief fully concur with the President in these instructions.''

McClellan replied with a campaign plan immediately, and then had to wait 10 days for a reply. The reply was the President does not like this plan, can you do something else? McClellan listened and submitted a new plan which was approved on the 23rd October. As soon as Halleck and Lincoln allowed McClellan to, he started a new offensive...

Belfoured said:

What "32-pdr" do you think a field battery was outfitted with?

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Why do you think Nelson's battery, a battery of position with heavy guns, is a "field battery?"

Indeed, 20th April, Magruder (now commanding the right wing) is complaining that he wants to swap the heavy 32 pdrs (at Dam No. 1 or elsewhere?)* for some lighter ones from Redoubt No. 4:



Note Magruder stating he'd moved those light 32 pdrs around the line. On the 13th April, DH Hill reported only one light 32 pdr was in his command (Yorktown and the Redoubts), leaving Richardson's other light 32 pdr somewhere on the Warwick line on the 13th...

* They'd apparently stripped the naval batteries on Mulberry Island.

67th Tigers said:

Why do you think Nelson's battery, a battery of position with heavy guns, is a "field battery?"

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Hmmm - and just what do you think the official designation was for the battery that Captain William Nelson commanded in April 1862???

If you have a source stating that it was a "heavy" battery and not a "light" battery, feel free to post it. Even better, if you have a source stating that it had EITHER a 32 lb howitzer OR a 32 lb gun, show it to us. (By the way, the 24 lb howitzer the battery had was a field piece).

"Battery of position" is meaningless. All the Confederate batteries at the Warwick Line were in "position". According to you, none, therefore, were field/"light" batteries. The fact that a gun is behind an embrasure or fortification of some kind doesn't change its status. A 12 lb howitzer, a M1857 Napoleon, a 3" Ordnance Rifle, and a 10 lb Parrott are still field pieces and a battery outfitted with those is still a field battery.