The Critical Error of R.E. Lee at Gettysburg

[M E Wolf]

Slightly off track but--thought it had a place:

"I was in Richmond when my Soldier fought the awful battle of Five Forks, Richmond surrendered, and the surging sea of fire swept the city. News of the fate of Five Forks had reached us, and the city was full of rumors that General Pickett was killed. I did not believe them. I knew he would come back, he had told me so. But they were very anxious hours. The day after the fire, there was a sharp rap at the door. The servants had all run away. The city was full of northern troops, and my environment had not taught me to love them. The fate of other cities had awakened my fears for Richmond. With my baby on my arm, I answered the knock, opened the door and looked up at a tall, gaunt, sad-faced man in ill-fitting clothes who, with the accent of the North, asked:
"Is this George Pickett's place?"
"Yes, sir," I answered, "but he is not here."
"I know that, ma'am," he replied, "but I just wanted to see the place. I am Abraham Lincoln."
"The President!" I gasped.
The stranger shook his head and said, "No, ma'am; no, ma'am; just Abraham Lincoln; George's old friend."
"I am George Pickett's wife and this is his baby," was all I could say. I had never seen Mr. Lincoln but remembered the intense love and reverence with which my Soldier always spoke of him.
My baby pushed away from me and reached out his hands to Mr. Lincoln, who took him in his arms. As he did so an expression of rapt, almost divine, tenderness and love lighted up the sad face. It was a look that I have never seen on any other face. My baby opened his mouth wide and insisted upon giving his father's friend a dewy infantile kiss. As Mr. Lincoln gave the little one back to me, shaking his finger at him playfully, he said:
"Tell your father, the rascal, that I forgive him for the sake of that kiss and those bright eyes."
He turned and went down the steps, talking to himself, and passed out of my sight forever, but in my memory those intensely human eyes, that strong, sad face, have a perpetual abiding place—that face which puzzled all artists but revealed itself to the intuitions of a little child, causing it to hold out its hands to be taken and its lips to be kissed."

Sally Corbell Pickett, Wife of Major General George E. Pickett, April 1865
"The Heart of a Soldier, As Revealed in the Intimate Letters of Genl. George E. Pickett C.S.A."
Pickett, George Edward, 1825 -1875
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"You must remember me very kindly to Mrs. Longstreet and all your children. I have not had an opportunity yet to return the compliment she paid me. I had, while in Richmond, a great many inquiries after you, and learned that you intended commencing business in New Orleans. If you become as good a merchant as you were a soldier, I shall be content. No one will then excel you, and no one can wish you more success and more happiness than I. My interest and affection for you will never cease, and my prayers are always offered for your prosperity."
Robert E. Lee in a letter to James Longstreet,
January 19, 1866.
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Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf

 

[M E Wolf]

Taking the responsibility...
From Manassas to Appotamox (Longstreet)
Chapter XXVIII.—Gettysburg—Third Day.
When engaged collecting the broken files after the repulse, General Lee said to an officer who was assisting, "It is all my fault."

A letter from Colonel W. M. Owen assures me that General Lee repeated this remark at a roadside fire of the Washington Artillery on the 5th of July. A letter from General Lee during the winter of 1863-64 repeated it in substance.

And here is what Colonel T. J. Goree, of Texas, has to say upon the subject:
"I was present, however, just after Pickett's repulse, when General Lee so magnanimously took all the blame of the disaster upon himself. Another important circumstance, which I distinctly remember, was in the winter of 1863—64, when you sent me from East Tennessee to Orange Court-House with some despatches to General Lee. Upon my arrival there, General Lee asked me into his tent, where he was alone, with two or three Northern papers on the table. He remarked that he had just been reading the Northern reports of the battle of Gettysburg; that he had become satisfied from reading those reports that if he had permitted you to carry out your plan, instead of making the attack on Cemetery Hill, he would have been successful."

Further testimony to this effect comes from another source:

"In East Tennessee, during the winter of 1863-64, you called me into your quarters, and asked me to read a letter just received from General Lee in which he used the following words: 'Oh, general, had I but followed your advice, instead of pursuing the course that I did, how different all would have been !' You wished me to bear this language in mind as your correspondence might be lost.
" ERASMUS TAYLOR.
" ORANGE COUNTY, VA."
A contributor to Blackwood's Magazine reported,—
"But Lee's inaction after Fredericksburg was, as we have called it, an unhappy or negative blunder. Undoubtedly the greatest positive blunder of which he was ever guilty was the unnecessary onslaught which he gratuitously made against the strong position into which, by accident, General Meade fell back at Gettysburg. We have good reason for saying that during the five years of calm reflection which General Lee passed at Lexington, after the conclusion of the American war, his maladroit manipulation of the Confederate army during the Gettysburg campaign was to him a matter of ceaseless self. reproach.
"' If,' said he, on many occasions, ' I had taken General Longstreet's advice on the eve of the second day of the battle of Gettysburg, and filed off the left corps of my army behind the right corps, in the direction of Washington and Baltimore, along the Emmitsburg road, the Confederates would to-day be a free people.' "(*)
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General Lee was on the field from about three o'clock of the afternoon of the first day. Every order given the troops of the First Corps on that field up to its march on the forenoon of the 2d was issued in his presence. If the movements were not satisfactory in time and speed of moving, it was his power, duty, and privilege to apply the remedy, but it was not a part of a commander's duty or privilege to witness things that did not suit him, fail to apply the remedy, and go off and grumble with his staff-officers about it. In their efforts to show culpable delay in the movements of the First Corps on the 2d, some of the Virginia writers endeavor to show that General Lee did not even give me a guide to lead the way to the field from which his battle was to be opened. He certainly failed to go and look at it, and assist in selecting the ground and preparing for action.

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Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer (Sorrel)
Chapter XX—Preparing For Gettysburg
On the cavalry, special care was bestowed. It had been heavily strengthened and much improved by selections of men and horses. For some time, during inaction, they had been getting good forage and pasturage. Now, when the time was near for the use of this formidable arm under Stuart, its able and famous leader, it was ready for the Commander-in-Chief.
What irony of fate that the great approaching campaign should be fought and lost without that bold leader and his riders being at Lee's touch, when indeed he wanted them, bitterly missing having Stuart and his great body of unsurpassed horse near by him.
The activity of preparation went through all departments—Quartermaster's, Subsistence, Ordnance, and Medical. It could be guessed that the military operations would be of great severity and
exaction and it behooved all officers of supply to be ready; to fail would be fatal.
The cavalry were assembled under Stuart in Northern Virginia, on lands growing richer and richer in grass with the advancing weeks. It was a magnificent day, befitting the superb body of cavalry that, under Stuart, marched rapidly in review before the Commander-in-Chief. A sight it was not soon to be forgotten. The utmost order prevailed. There could be no doubt that the cavalry was as ready for the work before us as was our matchless infantry.
[excerpt]
Stuart's part with his cavalry was now most important. It is contended by some that Lee left it finally optional for him to decide upon his movements. Whether to follow the army by crossing the river in the west of the ridge or by one of the lower fords. In the latter event it was, as it proved, to lose Lee and leave him without his strong arm in an enemy's country. It has been attempted to show also that the order by which Stuart moved came from Longstreet. But this must be dismissed; positive information to the contrary being at hand. Surprising to say, it now appears that Stuart left the army with his fine command and started on his too fascinating raid, not only by his own preference, but actually in violation of Lee's orders, which failed to reach him. All doubt had passed from Lee's mind and he had ordered Stuart to keep with him. The latter was raiding, and Lee's campaign was lost.
Major McClellan, Stuart's A. A. G. and chief of staff, in his history of that cavalry (an excellent work) declares that in his opinion the absence of Stuart was the cause of Lee's trouble; and for myself I have never doubted it. It is not to be supposed that no cavalry whatever was left with the army. Stuart's defenders have taken pains to point that out. There was a squadron or two, here and there, a regiment at one place, and a brigade under an efficient commander left in the rear. But these separate little commands amounted to nothing. It was the great body of that splendid horse under their leader Stuart that Lee wanted. He was the eyes and ears and strong right arm of the commander, and well may he have missed him. All through the marches he showed it.
Stuart was on a useless, showy parade almost under the guns of the Washington forts, and his horse, laurel-wreathed, bore the gay rider on amid songs and stories. He met some opposition, of course, and had a share of fighting in Ashby's Gap and the plain on the east.
When he rejoined Lee it was with exhausted horses and half worn-out men in the closing hours of Gettysburg.
Had he been with Lee where would our commander have made his battle? Possibly, not on that unfavorable ground of Gettysburg. Lee with his personally weak opponent, and Stuart by him, could almost have chosen the spot where he would be sure to defeat the Union Army.
This, however, somewhat anticipates; going back we find our three corps with their military pushed across the river with energy. The Second (Ewell's), the Third (A. P. Hill's), and Longstreet last. All infantry and artillery across, leaving only about a brigade of cavalry on the south side. The enemy for some days had quite disappeared from our observations. The march proceeded through Maryland and Pennsylvania in good form, General Lee's orders against depredations being most peremptory.
[excerpt]
I should here say that in every respect it was afterwards fully confirmed by events and facts. Harrison gave us the first complete account of the operations of the enemy since Hooker left our front. He brought his report down to a day or two, and described how they were even then marching in great numbers in the direction of Gettysburg, with intention apparently of concentrating there. He also informed us of the removal of Hooker and the appointment of George Meade to command of the Army of the Potomac. How many commanders had Lee made for that army! Harris son's report was so exceedingly important that I took him at once with me, and woke Longstreet. He was immediately on fire at such news and sent the scout by a staff officer to General Lee's camp near by. The General heard him with great composure and minuteness. It was on this, the report of a single scout, in the absence of cavalry, that the army moved. Important as was the change, the commanding General was not long in deciding. He sent orders to bring Ewell immediately back from the North about Harrisburg, and join his left. Then he started A.P. Hill
off at sunrise for Gettysburg, followed by Longstreet. The enemy was there, and there our General would strike him.
The march was much impeded by too many troops and trains on one road and Ewell's men breaking in on the route next day to get to their position.
The army thus moved forward, and A. P. Hill leading, struck the enemy near, and in, the town of Gettysburg sharply on the afternoon of July I. We were following some little distance in rear, and heard the lively fire of cannon and rifles, and soon after got the news of Hill's and Ewell's decided success in an important preliminary engagement. Many prisoners and much material remained with the Confederates. This stimulated every one forward, and Ewell taking position on our left, we were all snugly in bivouac at a good hour, with Longstreet's two divisions, McLaws and Hood, about four miles in rear, but ready for movement next day. Pickett had been doing guard duty at Chambersburg and was not yet up, but would be in the morning. The serious mishap of the day was Ewell's failure to seize the heights on the left. General Lee expected it of him, and we know of no impediment.
CONTINUED

 

[M E Wolf]

Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer (Sorrel)
Chapter XXI—Battle Of Gettysburg, July I, 2, 3, 1863.
On the tremendous and decisive battle of Gettysburg, now about to engage the two armies, more has probably been written than on any battle since Waterloo. There seems to be a feeling abroad that great secrets explaining why we were beaten are yet to be told and that they are locked up in the breasts of a few men, one of them the present writer, Longstreet's chief of staff. There is absolutely nothing in that expectation; no living man knows more about the battle than has already been written.
Lee has made his report. Longstreet has written a book and said his say. The staff has little or nothing to add. Communications were in the main between Lee and Longstreet, verbally, or occasionally by note direct.
The story has been in part told by Longstreet. We can discover that he did not want to fight on the ground or on the plan adopted by the General-in-Chief. As Longstreet was not to be made willing and Lee refused to change or could not change, the former failed to conceal some anger. There was apparent apathy in his movements. They lacked the fire and point of his usual bearing on the battlefield. His plans may have been better than Lee's, but it was too late to alter them with the troops ready to open fire on each other. Ewell on the left, A. P. Hill and Longstreet on the right, seemed never able to work together, and I can well imagine the great soul of our Commander deeply furrowed with the difficulties about him and what was going on to the disadvantage of the army. This is all I shall permit myself to express on this well-worn but ever interesting subject. One can build many theories, but theories only will they be; besides, my opinion is already given that the loss of the campaign was due to the absence of Stuart's cavalry.
proceed to jot down idly some "choses vues" of the military events and incidents of the three great days of this remarkable historic battle and the days immediately about it.
The situation on the morning of the 2nd was far from favorable to us. First of all, our position, compared with the enemy's, was not good. It may be said to have been decidedly inferior. We were the outer line, he held the inner. We were the cord to the arc on which his heavy columns were massed. True, there were some positions on the left that were in Ewell's possession and could be well used. Round Top and his high shoulders were on our right, and held by us would be everything. This Lee quickly saw and tried for. They made the key for the position, and with it dangling at our girdle the lock would have yielded and the door opened. But we were too late on our right. An attack, powerful indeed, at 4 p.m. was quite different from the commanding General's expectation of one in the forenoon.
Late on the first, and early on the second, Hill and Ewell were heavily engaged with apparently no satisfactory results.
On the second, quite late, 4 p. m., Longstreet made his long-deferred attack on the enemy's left. It was done in smashing style by McLaws's and Hood's divisions and a few of Hill's troops, Longstreet personally leading the attack with splendid effect.
His fine horsemanship as he rode, hat in hand, and martial figure, were most inspiring.
We gained ground rapidly and almost carried Round Top, but the morning delay was fatal. It had been heavily reinforced while we were pottering around in sullen inactivity. Undoubtedly Lee's intention was to make the attack in the forenoon and suport it with strong movements by Hill and Ewell. I think it would have won, notwithstanding the difficulties of position. The attempt was made to move the troops to the right into position without discovery by the enemy, but it was abortive.
We were seen from the start and signaled constantly. Much valuable time was lost by this trial, which with better knowledge of the ground by General Lee's engineers would not have been attempted.
At nightfall the combat was over and we were dragging off our captured cannon and standards, and caring for our dead and wounded.
The loss in storming the position on the right was heavy. When Hood's division was across the turnpike, under orders to attack, he begged me to look at it, report its extreme difficulty, and implore Longstreet to make the attack another way. This was done, but the answer I took to Hood was that the attack must instantly be made, that General Lee had so directed; and forward and upward the gallant Hood charged, almost gaining the plateau of Round Top, the key of the enemy's left.
The staff had been hard at work day and night, and my exhausted frame found rest that night in the snuggest fence corner in sight. The ground to weary bones felt as good as a feather bed. In addition, I had been suffering from a painful but not serious wound. Riding with Dearing's artillery late in the afternoon, while exchanging some shots, a shrapnel burst directly over us, one of the large projectiles striking me on the right arm near the shoulder. It was not broken or pierced, but paralyzed for use for at least ten days, and quite black down to the wrist. Painful, of course, it was, but a small matter where there was so much death and mangling.
[excerpt]
On the morning of July 3, it was apparent that a great blow must be delivered to Meade's army. He could not be persuaded to leave his formidable positions and instruments and attack us, and Lee could not retreat without another effort, indecisive as had been those of the 2d. Our General, as has been said, did not mind blood when it had to be shed. It is the soldier's calling. Here was a case in point: His army and trains could only be saved by a tremendous strike straight at the enemy. The time for maneuvering had passed and he prepared for what was before him. He believed his troops could do what he asked of them; never yet had they failed him.
The attack was to be made as soon as possible, under direction of Lee's "War Horse," that stout warrior James Longstreet, with three brigades of Pickett's division (right), Heth's division of Hill's corps (left), with supports of several brigades of other divisions thrown into position.
An artillery "feu d'enfer" was to precede the attack, directed by E. P. Alexander, who was to give the signal when in his judgment the artillery had made the greatest impression, and then the troops were to move instantly across the wide, lead-swept plain, against the heavy masses of blue on the crest of the heights. All this was done at about 2 o'clock, Longstreet accepting Alexander's signal message with dejection, it seemed. Indeed, the delay in attacking which undoubtedly hurt us was apparently caused by his objections made known to the Commander-in-Chief, but of course all this is set out from that standpoint in Longstreet's own book.
It was soon over. Pickett's men got far up the acclivity and many were soon among the enemy. There was, however, some wavering on our left, which weakened us, and we broke, tearing back pell-mell, torn by shot and shell across the width of that bloody plain, a sight never before witnessed—part of the Army of Northern Virginia in full, breathless flight.
But there was no pursuit and the run soon stopped. The soldiers got together, picked up arms, and in a short time were ready for another combat.
If there was repulse and its usual result, a quick flight for cover, there was also something else. A charge that, considering the difficulties of position, comparison of numbers, was so steady to the objective point, and so near success as to make it one of the greatest feats of arms in all the annals of war. Every brigade commander and colonel and lieuten-ant-colonel of Pickett's division was shot down. The brave Armistead and Garnett at the head of their brigades fell inside the enemy's parapet, and the gallant Kemper, hard hit and left for dead, lay with the men of his leading line. To-day, the detail of the great charge, not as barely hinted at here, but as described in full with ample particulars, mounts one's blood, stirs all hearts with deep tragedy and pride. Well do we know that amid all things to happen, the memory of Pickett's charge will forever live in song and story of that fair land for which the Southern soldier poured out his blood like water.
While Longstreet by no means approved the movement, his soldierly eye watched every feature of it. He neglected nothing that could help it and his anxiety for Pickett and the men was very apparent.
Fearing some flank attacks if we succeeded, he had sent Latrobe to the left to warn the officer against its possibility. I went sharply off in search of Pickett to watch his right and if necessary move some troops in for meeting such an attempt. I did not meet with General Pickett and was soon up with Garnett and Armistead. The former was ill that morning, but was at the head of his men where he was to fall. Just here a shell burst under my horse (my best), a splendid chestnut mare, and down she came, both hind legs off. I luckily got another from a mounted man near by, who rather ruefully gave up his horse and saved my saddle for me. Latrobe also had his horse killed over on the left; other staff officers were also sent forward with the troops and shared in the charge.
General Lee's extreme agitation when he witnessed the repulse and race of our men for cover from that murderous fire has not been exaggerated in the prints. The noble soul was stirred to its inmost depths at the sight of the awful and fruitless sacrifices his men had made at his command. His generous heart could only say, "It is my fault, I take it all—get together, men, we shall yet beat them." I saw no man fail him.
It was on July 3 that a mail from the Department at Richmond brought my commission as lieutenant-colonel, A. A. G. Latrobe's and Fairfax's, as inspectors, came along a few days later.
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Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf

 

[OpnDownfall]

Ignoring, for the moment, that the Gettysburg Campaign, was, essentially, Lee's pet project and as a direct result of his insistence, he was wandering around southern Pa. as Tn and the Mississippi were being lost.
In the Campaign itself, at the very beginning of the invasion, after meticulous planning, Lee's particular command style, resulted in the ANV losing its all around cavalry cover, on the very side it was most needed.
At Greenwood, it was Lee's orders that resulted in the confederate traffic Jam, resulting in only Johnson's Div. reacing the scene of action on Day 1, instead of Longstreet's Corps (minus Pickett's Div).
Lee starts out the day anxious about not being drawn into a general battle and cautions his Corps Commanders. Later as opportunity presents itself, he shifts tactical gears and essentially orders a general engagement by all his available forces. Still later, he again shifts gears and reverts to worrying about avoiding a general engagement, urging Ewell to make a general attack, but to avoid bringing on a general engagement If Practical, and refuses to use his last reserve, Johnson's Div. to Support Ewell's attack (requested by Lee) at the end of the day.
Most importantly, Lee's inability to establish effective ommand & control of his Corps commanders during the battle, was one of the most important (if not THE most important) failures of Lee during all three days of the battle.

 

[hurryuphill]

Lee had no clue as to the disposition of the Union forces as he continually expressed in inquiries as to Stuart's whereabouts. He desired a battle that he thought, in error, was similarliy envisaged by his commanders. He underestimated the growing experience of the AoP. And he thought his troops were capable of taking defensive positions, something Longstreet thought highly unlikely.

But, Sgt. Major OpnDownfall, continues to believe that Lee was responsible for the farce that was the confederate west. Lee was not yet in command of all the confederate forces and even if he was, the East was the only place true victory was possible. The only way to win was to influence northen opinion through the eastern press and/or bring foreign pressure to bear. Also the reasons for the Gettysburg campaign were of a logistical and tactical necessity. Lee knew his army was in top form and it would have been a waste to let them sit idle and hungry.

The confederate defeat at Gettsyburg was caused primarily by union resolve and Stuart's absence. Lee's great error was not to make it clear to take the high ground on the first day. And his great error of the entire war was to order Pickett's charge.

 

[OpnDownfall]

This particular area of the war has been rather thoroughly plowed, in other threads concerning Gettysburg and the "What If...?" thread.
'Why' Lee made the errors he did, is not relevant as to whether the errors noted were made or not.
Lee had no clue where the AoP was located, because he had no clue where Stuart was. Because of Lee's command style Stuart was allowed to follow his own ideas, rather than Lee's.
There is general agreement that Lee had several opportunities to defeat Meade until at least, mid-day of the Day 2, if he could have gottent any ofhis original plans executed as he wanted, rather than as his corps commanders wanted.
It is indeed my opinion, that Richmond's and Longstreet's (at least) attention were being drawn to the growing threat in the West And that it was Lee's direct influence that diverted attention and resources back to Northern Va. by urging the invasion into Pa.
Does hurryuphill know why Longstreet commanded the assault on Day 3, when 2/3 of the attacking force was from Hill's corps? ( I do not mean to imply that Hill would have been any more successful, but, then again, he, at least, Might have attacked earlier)

 

[hurryuphill]

Lee chose Longstreet as he was the commander with the most experience. Also Hill recommended the transfer of troops and heartily endorsed Lee's plan to attack. It may have been an error to choose someone less than enthusiastic over the assignment but neither one of us is convinced that Hill would have done much better.

So am I to believe that Longstreet was distracted by the growing crisis in the West and was therefore derelict of duty at Gettysburg? Not sure I see the substance in your argument. Longstreet realized early on that the defensive position held the advantage and was distracted by the growing doom of attacking the union positions. His concern for the West was not in his thoughts that day and to indicate such displays a stubborn adherence to a simplistic conspiracy theory of how the south "really" lost the war.

 

[OpnDownfall]

The Critical Errors of R.E. Lee at Gettysburg

In fact, Lee's original plan for Longstreet on Day 3, was to reform his corps for the planned attack against Cemetary Ridge. But as soon as Lee reaches Longstreet on the morning of the third day, Longstreet immediately urges Lee to reconsider his, Longstreets, proposed flanking movement. Eventually going so far as to predict that Lee's plan is certain to fail. The irritated Lee finally ends the discussion, in his own favor.
Later, while the Artillery is moving into place, Longstreet informs Lee that it is too risky to withdraw, Hood or McLaws to join in Pickett's attack and (again) Lee accedes to the wishes of one his corps commander. Surely, the proper and Obvious command decision concerning a commander whose mind is so obviously set against his commanding general's plan And considers his mission is futile and bound to fail, should not have been as difficult as Lee seemed to think.
The argument is not whether Hill would have done any better, but, with the known facts at the time, was Lee's decision making concerning Day 3, based on more or less logic and/or reason?
Strategically, Longstreet at least, unlike Lee, seems to have been more aware that the War was bigger than Northern Va. and that what happened in one area of the war, tended to affect all the other areas.

 

[Elennsar]

It has been covered elsewhere, but the odds that it would have made a significant difference (to the Confederacy's gain) for Longstreet and two divisions (or more) to be sent Westward are not high enough to justify the risks to Virginia from Lee facing Hooker without them.

Even had they been able to make a positive impact (and Lee avoid a negative impact from not having them), the odds were greater that they could make a positive impact here.

The West was not abandoned, deserted, neglected, overlooked, disregarded, or whatever term you care to use by Lee. If it had any chance of being saved, it would require something that had nothing to do with any troops sent from the East to happen, and that something does not appear more likely with an extra eight brigades than without them. Even assuming that it would be better to focus all efforts on it than on Virginia, which is disputable.

 

[67th Tigers]

In fact, Lee's original plan for Longstreet on Day 3, was to reform his corps for the planned attack against Cemetary Ridge. But as soon as Lee reaches Longstreet on the morning of the third day, Longstreet immediately urges Lee to reconsider his, Longstreets, proposed flanking movement. Eventually going so far as to predict that Lee's plan is certain to fail. The irritated Lee finally ends the discussion, in his own favor.
Later, while the Artillery is moving into place, Longstreet informs Lee that it is too risky to withdraw, Hood or McLaws to join in Pickett's attack and (again) Lee accedes to the wishes of one his corps commander. Surely, the proper and Obvious command decision concerning a commander whose mind is so obviously set against his commanding general's plan And considers his mission is futile and bound to fail, should not have been as difficult as Lee seemed to think.
The argument is not whether Hill would have done any better, but, with the known facts at the time, was Lee's decision making concerning Day 3, based on more or less logic and/or reason?
Strategically, Longstreet at least, unlike Lee, seems to have been more aware that the War was bigger than Northern Va. and that what happened in one area of the war, tended to affect all the other areas.

Lee's orders for day (an oblique attack against Cemetary Hill with all 9 divisions) got watered down a lot, and we ended up with Pickett's Charge.

However, in Lee's original concept of operations Hood's and McLaws' Divisions would also step off moving NE up the Emmitsburg Road (as they were ordered to on the 2nd, before Hood was hit and C&C broke down, leading to the attack drifting onto the Round Tops, ground with no significance). Pickett to their left was also to advance NEE. The Heth/Pender composite division was to advance roughly E (hitting where they historically did hit), Rodes' to the SE, Johnson's to the S, Early's the the SWW while Stuart's cavalry "closed the box". Anderson's division was shifted to Longstreet as a reserve, since 1st Corps had the hardest task.

If successful it would have enveloped the Union Right (11th and 12th Corps) and Centre (1st and 2nd), leaving the left (3rd, 5th and 6th) isolated and on poor ground.

Great plan, poorly executed....

 

[trice]

Lee's orders for day (an oblique attack against Cemetary Hill with all 9 divisions) got watered down a lot, and we ended up with Pickett's Charge.

However, in Lee's original concept of operations Hood's and McLaws' Divisions would also step off moving NE up the Emmitsburg Road (as they were ordered to on the 2nd, before Hood was hit and C&C broke down, leading to the attack drifting onto the Round Tops, ground with no significance). Pickett to their left was also to advance NEE. The Heth/Pender composite division was to advance roughly E (hitting where they historically did hit), Rodes' to the SE, Johnson's to the S, Early's the the SWW while Stuart's cavalry "closed the box". Anderson's division was shifted to Longstreet as a reserve, since 1st Corps had the hardest task.

If successful it would have enveloped the Union Right (11th and 12th Corps) and Centre (1st and 2nd), leaving the left (3rd, 5th and 6th) isolated and on poor ground.

Great plan, poorly executed....

Hmm.

This plan suffers from a flaw common to most Confederate day-of-battle plans.

As always, the Confederates lacked the resources necessary and are planning on a wing-and-a-prayer. If they actually execute what you are describing, they have no reserves to reinforce success. They might break the Union lines, but what happens after that is merely a matter of luck and the chaos of battle. Lee will be unable to do much to control what happens or to exploit opportunities.

In addition, the Confederates seem perpetually unable to act early in the day. What should have been an operation starting at 6 AM or so doesn't get rolling until afternoon. That is a major command-and-control issue. It seems to have affected every Confederate army.

Tim

 

[67th Tigers]

Hmm.

This plan suffers from a flaw common to most Confederate day-of-battle plans.

As always, the Confederates lacked the resources necessary and are planning on a wing-and-a-prayer. If they actually execute what you are describing, they have no reserves to reinforce success. They might break the Union lines, but what happens after that is merely a matter of luck and the chaos of battle. Lee will be unable to do much to control what happens or to exploit opportunities.

"Breaking the line" wasn't the objective; it was the means to an end. The objective was to gain Cemetary Hill, which is the Key Terrain in that area. The first stage of this was to be a rupture of the Federal line by Pickett, into which the reserve (RH Anderson) was on hand to have been thrown.

Longstreet altered the sequencing on his flank, due to concerns about his flank security, especially due to a Federal Cavalry Division which he was worried would descend on his exposed flank (in fact they did, and were stopped at South Cavalry Field). Longstreet left 4 brigades of Hood's and McLaws' Divisions to screen the right (essentially one brigade face each of the three Federal Corps, and another refused to front the possible cavalry attack), and pulled the rest back to act as part of his reserve for Pickett. The rest of the reserve was 2 brigades of RH Anderson's, while the other two (Wilcox's Demi-Division) replaced McLaws' and Hood's in the battle plan.

In addition, the Confederates seem perpetually unable to act early in the day. What should have been an operation starting at 6 AM or so doesn't get rolling until afternoon. That is a major command-and-control issue. It seems to have affected every Confederate army.

This is often a matter of getting troops into position. At Gettysburg the action was supposed to all kick off in the morning, but Pickett wasn't in position. The order to hold never got as far round the line as Early, and his Division launched at the designated H-hr, while everyone else held fast.

Something that was pointed out to me the other day was just how little staff the Confederates (and indeed the Federals) had. One of Napoleon's Divisions had more staff than the entire Army of Northern Virginia. Little wonder that C&C was difficult, and we get a poor version of Frederickian linear warfare (see: http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=...hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=11&ct=result )

 

[trice]

"Breaking the line" wasn't the objective; it was the means to an end. The objective was to gain Cemetary Hill, which is the Key Terrain in that area. The first stage of this was to be a rupture of the Federal line by Pickett, into which the reserve (RH Anderson) was on hand to have been thrown.

Indeed, it ended up something like that, but it was not the original plan for July 3.

Longstreet altered the sequencing on his flank, due to concerns about his flank security, especially due to a Federal Cavalry Division which he was worried would descend on his exposed flank (in fact they did, and were stopped at South Cavalry Field). Longstreet left 4 brigades of Hood's and McLaws' Divisions to screen the right (essentially one brigade face each of the three Federal Corps, and another refused to front the possible cavalry attack), and pulled the rest back to act as part of his reserve for Pickett. The rest of the reserve was 2 brigades of RH Anderson's, while the other two (Wilcox's Demi-Division) replaced McLaws' and Hood's in the battle plan.

Indeed, this is about what happened. It is not the all out assault Lee wanted originally, and which Elennsar was describing. Instead of a 9-division assault, you are describing a 4-division assault.

This is often a matter of getting troops into position. At Gettysburg the action was supposed to all kick off in the morning, but Pickett wasn't in position. The order to hold never got as far round the line as Early, and his Division launched at the designated H-hr, while everyone else held fast.

I agree that troop movements impacted such plans. However, Confederate armies very rarely carried out assaults early in the day as planned, having great difficulty managing the task (bad staff work, unrealistic expectations, etc.) Bragg at Murfreesborough is one of the few exceptions, along with the ragged attack at Shiloh.

Something that was pointed out to me the other day was just how little staff the Confederates (and indeed the Federals) had. One of Napoleon's Divisions had more staff than the entire Army of Northern Virginia. Little wonder that C&C was difficult, and we get a poor version of Frederickian linear warfare (see: http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=...hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=11&ct=result )

At least in Lee's case, this appears to be deliberate. His staff was tiny beyond belief (really 4 officers) and he preferred to use his skilled talent in officers for combat command, not staff work. The results show the strengths and weaknesses of that approach.

Tim

 

[OpnDownfall]

As pointed out by Trice, Whatever his plans, Lee's critical error during All three days of the battle, was his failure to establish effective command and control of his army through his corps commanders.
The assaults on Days 2 and 3, were planned for early morning and both were delayed until the afternoon.
On Both days, the delays were the result of the reluctance of his corps commanders to accept his, Lee's, ending in Lee agreeing to the delays, rather than demanding immediate obedience to his orders.
I agree that was not in character for Lee personally or command style. But, after the fact, it is obvious the Failure to Command was the 'Critical Error' of Lee.

 

[67th Tigers]

That's a very interesting PoV.

I regard the absolute worst error in this regard to be Jackson's turning movement at Chancellorsville, which is also interesting for examining the Union. When Hooker goes down the Federal command structure prettymuch collapses. However, Jackson isn't in position at all that day, and with dusk approaching he simply has the cross the LD with his formations still disrupted (and repeating the errors of Shiloh by placing divisions behind one another meaning the DC can't control his line).

However, this is the Gettysburg forum....

Lee certainly wasn't able to realise his plans at Gettysburg, and excuses don't really cut it. Hood gets hit and suddenly his entire division vears off and ends up assaulting the round tops....

 

[M E Wolf]

Dear List Members;

If you can gain a copy of : Great Maps of the Civil War by William J. Miller; inside the end cover is a super map of Gettysburg.

It is squished even as it takes two pages of space but; should you get a copy of it from the US Library of Congress; it details the battlefield in every way. You will need a strong magnifying glass to appreciate the details.

General Meade was a topographical engineer, so he reviewed it before signing it.

It is known as the John B. Bacheldar's 1863 'birds-eye' panoramic map "Gettysburg Battle-field." Map is 21 x 36 inches.

US Library of Congress's Call Number is:
G3824.G385.1863.B32 CW321

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf

 

[Elennsar]

Indeed, this is about what happened. It is not the all out assault Lee wanted originally, and which Elennsar was describing. Instead of a 9-division assault, you are describing a 4-division assault.

I'm unclear on what you're refering to here, Trice. Could you point me to what I said in that regard?

Not disputing what you are saying, I just find myself unable to recall refering to a nine division assault anywhere and its possible that my memory and reading skills are going AWOL.

OpnDownfall:
As for Lee failing to establish command of his corps commanders: What, exactly, should they have done that they didn't do (that would require Lee forcing them to obey his plans...taking more initiative being ordered is a comical concept)?

 

[trice]

It has been covered elsewhere, but the odds that it would have made a significant difference (to the Confederacy's gain) for Longstreet and two divisions (or more) to be sent Westward are not high enough to justify the risks to Virginia from Lee facing Hooker without them.

Even had they been able to make a positive impact (and Lee avoid a negative impact from not having them), the odds were greater that they could make a positive impact here.

The West was not abandoned, deserted, neglected, overlooked, disregarded, or whatever term you care to use by Lee. If it had any chance of being saved, it would require something that had nothing to do with any troops sent from the East to happen, and that something does not appear more likely with an extra eight brigades than without them. Even assuming that it would be better to focus all efforts on it than on Virginia, which is disputable.

Well, that would be because I had a brain-burp somewhere along the line and referred to the wrong poster. It is actually this one:

Lee's orders for day (an oblique attack against Cemetary Hill with all 9 divisions) got watered down a lot, and we ended up with Pickett's Charge.

However, in Lee's original concept of operations Hood's and McLaws' Divisions would also step off moving NE up the Emmitsburg Road (as they were ordered to on the 2nd, before Hood was hit and C&C broke down, leading to the attack drifting onto the Round Tops, ground with no significance). Pickett to their left was also to advance NEE. The Heth/Pender composite division was to advance roughly E (hitting where they historically did hit), Rodes' to the SE, Johnson's to the S, Early's the the SWW while Stuart's cavalry "closed the box". Anderson's division was shifted to Longstreet as a reserve, since 1st Corps had the hardest task.

If successful it would have enveloped the Union Right (11th and 12th Corps) and Centre (1st and 2nd), leaving the left (3rd, 5th and 6th) isolated and on poor ground.

Great plan, poorly executed....

Tim

 

[OpnDownfall]

The Critical Error R.E. Lee at Gettysburg

Elennsar, it is not a question of what else the corps commanders should have done. The Question Is, what should Lee have done?
FIrst, do we even know for sure that Lee had a well thought out, coherent, unified plan of attack for Day 3? Or is it only bits and pieces of historical information from various sources, that Historians and CW scholars have had to piece together, for the History Books?
From conventional history, Lee should have called a Council of War for his Corps commanders. Agreed that this was no a normal command procedure for Lee, but this Campaign was make or break operation, Lee could easily lose the ANV if things do not go very right. The success of the Confederacy might very well be riding on the issue of success or failure. (as in fact, it was) Or Lee , at the very least, should have relieved Longstreet from what he obviously considered an onerous duty on Day 3,(which Longstreet, himself, would obviously have welcomed) and given the command to Hill as he should have in the first place. Especially, after Lee has full knowledge of the extent of Longstreets reluctance to follow orders.
I can agree these actions are more easily seen in hind-sight, but they are obvious solutions to Lee's very apparent and growing problem of command, and should have been obvious to an experienced commander such as Lee.

 

[Elennsar]

Correct, but the point is, how much of where 2nd Corps and 3rd Corps failed to be act effectively can be blamed on Lee as opposed to their commanders?

Blaming Lee for Ewell being reluctant to use his own judgment and act as he saw fit is only legitimate when looking at Lee's recommendations for corps commanders...it is not fair to accuse Lee of failing the AoNVA and the Confederacy because of Ewell's personal mistakes.

I am not sure I would agree with a "council of war" proper (with all the formalities and subordinates voting for or against something). But something like what Meade did that night (July 2) was very necessary in order to ensure everyone was on as close to the same page as possible.

So the question stands. What failures did Lee, as army commander, commit here? The failure of his subordinates to be good subordinates is an entirely seperate problem from Lee failing to, for instance (as you are suggesting and I agere with) have an overall plan for them to work together to make work, instead of a "trust in Providence and hope they exploit any opportunities on their front".

But the failure, for instance, for Anderson's division to advance in any useful way on Day 2 cannot be blamed on Lee.

So what exactly did Lee do wrong? I'm not arguing he didn't do wrong things. But Ewell and Hill bear a certain amount of the responsibility by failing to do their job or alert Lee as to something they needed someone "with more authority than a corps commander" to handle.

Ultimate responsibility rests with Lee. Specific responsibility for the specific things that went wrong may or may not, and what specifically was "Lee's responsibility" that Lee mishandled, needs to be answered.