Random Thoughts on Iuka

[DanSBHawk]

The account stated that a bog ran on both sides of the road. A few hours ago your friend was saying that the roads not being mutually supportive was an excuse.

You two don't know what you believe, are ignoring the contemporary record which was never really addressed, have nothing and are now throwing mud at the wall.

I will tell you what. If you go back through all of my comments and carefully read them and want to respond with something well thought out, feel free to do so.

I never said that the roads were mutually supportive. I said that was just an excuse for abandoning the plan. If Rosecrans was as familiar with the area as he claimed, then he would have known they were not mutually supportive when he proposed the plan.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I never said that the roads were mutually supportive. I said that was just an excuse for abandoning the plan. If Rosecrans was as familiar with the area as he claimed, then he would have known they were not mutually supportive when he proposed the plan.

I didn't intend to mischaracterize what you said and acknowledge that I may have misunderstood you on that. I appreciate the clarification there.

I would agree that the evidence would indicate that there was certainly some lack of understanding of the area south of Iuka heading into the operation. I take it that your implication on that is that why could not he same be the case regarding what he was saying as far as the crossings of Bear Creek were concerned? If so, I would acknowledge the point, but would respond on the basis that it must be recalled that elements of the U.S. force had recrossed the creek from the east.

Regarding your newfound conclusion, posted in comment #233, concocted out of thin air on the basis of just reading a single account, I would merely state respectfully that I would disagree with that on the basis of the record. Sometimes it is challenging, as you have a tendency of throwing mud at the wall until something may stick, but I would like for all discussions to remain respectful. It is difficult and very draining with you though because it is akin to the game whack-a-mole. It wouldn't bother me aside from the danger that people are bamboozled by your authoritative sounding statements.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I'm not trying to "believe" anything. I'm just pointing out that the record shows that heavy rain flooded the area.

I am not sure that I would agree with that. I would need to investigate it in more depth regarding the contemporary accounts of the men in the ranks that way, although I have read quite a number. There certainly are some accounts of rainfall, but I would be hesitant in how far one takes that. I did lay out what the correspondence shows regarding the nature of the operation though and that has to be seriously recognized and understood.

Just to provide one example, Archibald Campbell stated in his report that "On the 19th the roads were in splendid order, hard and entirely free from dust. The men marched with ease and in fine order," for instance. You can follow the reports regarding the fighting on the 19th, which don't line up with what you were saying. It is always important to look at as many accounts as one can though.

Please begin by reading posts #45, #98, #121, #158, #163, #165, #184, #185 and #195. Then we can discuss further from there.

Try to put all of the evidence together and come to conclusions, or make inquiries, based on it. That is how history works. You don't go through all of the effort and then find one source, as Mr. Hawk just did and wash away everything which has been accumulated and start all over again. Everything is part of the mosaic, the source which you provided informed us of the difficulty of the ground between the Jacinto and Fulton roads and the bog running on both sides of the road for a stretch.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Regarding your newfound conclusion, posted in comment #233, concocted out of thin air on the basis of just reading a single account, I would merely state respectfully that I would disagree with that on the basis of the record. Sometimes it is challenging, as you have a tendency of throwing mud at the wall until something may stick, but I would like for all discussions to remain respectful. It is difficult and very draining with you though because it is akin to the game whack-a-mole. It wouldn't bother me aside from the danger that people are bamboozled by your authoritative sounding statements.

This thread is not all about your opinions and interpretations (which I've already mentioned that I disagree with). Just post your opinion and don't worry about other people posting theirs.

I think it is interesting that the colonel of the regiment leading Rosecrans' column up the Jacinto Road thought the battle started only because they had blundered too close to the confederates. He thought the plan was to get into position for a morning battle.

It makes a person wonder how he got that impression. Probably not from Hamilton, who wrote in his B&L article that he thought he would be marching up the Fulton Road until Rosecrans ordered him to march up the other road, with no further directions. So Hamilton wrote as if he had no idea what Rosecrans intended.

There was a guide accompanying the lead regiment and I wonder if this is where the 5th Iowa colonel got his impression of the plan. It's curious that Cozzens never mentions it.

 

[DanSBHawk]

In Iowa Colonels and Regiments: Being a History of Iowa Regiments in the War of the Rebellion, Etc, published in 1865, there appears this same allegation in the Matties section, that the plan was for a morning battle, which fell apart because they blundered too close to the confederates.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Nothing of that sort was mentioned or stated in C.L. Matthies report, which can be found at 17 OR 1: 99-100 and was written on September 21st.

It is telling how you suddenly discard volumes and volumes of evidence because you found one source somewhere which stated something, which is inconsistent with what else we know.

The difference is that I merely try to follow the evidence honestly. If you are not interested in a serious examination of the evidence, then that is troubling and people should know that. If you object to what was explicitly stated in the contemporary record, you are free to state why they were wrong in terms of the formulation of the plan. You can't wish it away though.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Nothing of that sort was mentioned or stated in C.L. Matthies report, which can be found at 17 OR 1: 99-100 and was written on September 21st.

It is telling how you suddenly discard volumes and volumes of evidence because you found one source somewhere which stated something, which is inconsistent with what else we know.

The difference is that I follow the evidence honestly. You are not interested in a serious examination of the evidence, which is troubling and people should know that. If you object to what was explicitly stated in the contemporary record, you are free to state why they were wrong in terms of the formulation of the plan. You can't wish it away though.

I haven't discarded any evidence. None at all. Your wordy opinion is not "evidence."

The fact is that there is a lot about Iuka that no one knows for sure. The thread is titled "Random thoughts on Iuka." The OP implies an exploration of some of these puzzling aspects of the battle. You seem to think this thread is all about your own dubious conclusions about the battle. You clearly have an issue with other people having opinions that are different than your own.

 

[Nathan Towne]

No, I'm just pointing out something you haven't resolved and you're hand-waving so you don't have to resolve it.

It is not that I would ever not want to resolve something. That is the opportunity of how I do history. What I did in this thread was demonstrate what was actually stated in the contemporary record, which directly refutes what had been stated previously by people here who were not familiar with it. It was good that I did so.

Regarding the bridges along Bear Creek, I simply do not know whether all of them were out, or not. I am not sure whether it makes much material difference regarding the conception of the plan though in terms of how it was actually described and understood at the time. It is nonetheless something which is important to look at and investigate nonetheless.

 

[tony_gunter]

Nothing of that sort was mentioned or stated in C.L. Matthies report, which can be found at 17 OR 1: 99-100 and was written on September 21st.

It is telling how you suddenly discard volumes and volumes of evidence because you found one source somewhere which stated something, which is inconsistent with what else we know.

The difference is that I merely try to follow the evidence honestly. If you are not interested in a serious examination of the evidence, then that is troubling and people should know that. If you object to what was explicitly stated in the contemporary record, you are free to state why they were wrong in terms of the formulation of the plan. You can't wish it away though.

I'm not sure anyone at this point knows what Rosecrans' plan was. He's obviously being completely disingenuous about his knowledge of Grant's change in plans. We have two letters claiming Grant's change in plan had been communicated to Rosecrans, but he claimed he hadn't a clue.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I'm not sure anyone at this point knows what Rosecrans' plan was. He's obviously being completely disingenuous about his knowledge of Grant's change in plans. We have two letters claiming Grant's change in plan had been communicated to Rosecrans, but he claimed he hadn't a clue.

I am also not sure if you are aware, but there had been serious drought over the Summer of '62 in northern Mississippi. This has been documented at great length. See, for instance, pages 1-3 of Kitchens' Rosecrans Meets Price. I could point you to a litany of contemporary accounts on that front and U.S. forces of the Army had just crossed Bear Creek from the east with their wagons. What I simply do not know is whether they did so via bridge or via the defiles in the creek.

I wouldn't say that. What letters would those be? Please always cite your sources.

I have asked before whether there are any other accounts of the Lagow and Dickey interactions with Rosecrans which have not been previously discussed and no one has ever presented anything else.

Did you begin by going back and reading through the relevant posts, such as at #158, #163, #165, 184 and #195?

 

[DanSBHawk]

From Castel's book, regarding drought and rain:

 

[Nathan Towne]

From Castel's book, regarding drought and rain:

View attachment 520526

Woodworth made the same statement in his book regarding heavy rain on the 18th, which is true. There had been rain in the several days prior to the main fight at Iuka according to several accounts which I have seen. One post-war account which I have states that it was very severe. That tells us nothing beyond that though. What we know as that the area had suffered serious drought that Summer, which may be why the prospect of the Army of the West pulling back to the east via Bear Creek was such a critical threat, as we know that it was in the conception of the plan. One need only read the relevant record.

It would be appreciated if you could provide the source for your cherry-picked reference above, by the way, please.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I haven't discarded any evidence. None at all. Your wordy opinion is not "evidence."

The fact is that there is a lot about Iuka that no one knows for sure. The thread is titled "Random thoughts on Iuka." The OP implies an exploration of some of these puzzling aspects of the battle. You seem to think this thread is all about your own dubious conclusions about the battle. You clearly have an issue with other people having opinions that are different than your own.

I would have happily had a serious discussion on this with Tony, Ned and Eric.

 

[tony_gunter]

I am also not sure if you are aware, but there had been serious drought over the Summer of '62 in northern Mississippi. This has been documented at great length. See, for instance, pages 1-3 of Kitchens' Rosecrans Meets Price. I could point you to a litany of contemporary accounts on that front and U.S. forces of the Army had just crossed Bear Creek from the east with their wagons. What I simply do not know is whether they did so via bridge or via the defiles in the creek.

I wouldn't say that. What letters would those be? Please always cite your sources.

I have asked before whether there are any other accounts of the Lagow and Dickey interactions with Rosecrans which have not been previously discussed and no one has ever presented anything else.

Did you begin by going back and reading through the relevant posts, such as at #158, #163, #165, 184 and #195?

Again, the dispatch has been discussed here before. Dickey and Lagow both wrote of delivering a dispatch communicating the change in plans, one to his wife one to Grant.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Again, the dispatch has been discussed here before. Dickey and Lagow both wrote of delivering a dispatch communicating the change in plans, one to his wife one to Grant.

Yes, I am aware of Dickey's correspondence with his wife and with all of the references in the OR. I am also fully apprised of Rosecrans testimony in front of the JCCW and the post war accounts in which they are mentioned.

You are aware of another account?

In his letter to his wife, Dickey stated the following which I will send a picture of below. He didn't necessarily say anything about having Rosecrans delay the attack until the next morning. We have alot of evidence to demonstrate that Rosecrans was doing no such thing that day, which lines up with what we know about his conception and understanding of the plan. We have discussed the situation pertaining to whether instructions ever issued to Rosecrans to attack first, which I still believe is unclear.

 

[Nathan Towne]

@tony_gunter

My main point in this thread, before getting into anything else, was to point out that from the relevant contemporary record we know that the threat of the Confederate Army pulling back to the east across Bear Creek was a fundamental assumption in the planning and formation of the plan. For me, that is essentially incontrovertible on the basis of the evidence. Now, we have to factor that in when then looking at the subsequent decision making process.

As noted previously, Grant sent the following message to Halleck at 8:00 A.M. on September 16th:

"For ten days or more the enemy have been hovering in our front in reported large force. I have watched their moves closely until I could concentrate my forces. All are now in good shape. Hurlbut's division has come from Memphis to Bolivar and about 6,000 troops from Bolivar brought here. General Orice is southeast from us, near Bay Springs, moving northeast. It is reported that Van Dorn and Breckinridge are to join and attack. Form the best information they cannot reach here under four days. My view is they are covering a move to get General Price into East Tennessee. If I can I will attack Price before he crosses Bear Creek. If he can be beaten there, it will prevent either the design to go north or to unite forces and attack here."

-17 OR 2:220

Of course, the results of Mower's reconnaissance were not known to Grant yet at the time in which this message was sent.

Rosecrans to Grant on the 17th (not timestamped):

"Hamilton has sent out Mizner with a regiment of infantry and all our cavalry, under Mizner, toward Barnett's, on the Jacinto and Iuka road. The only thing we can do to prevent Price passing through the defiles of Bear Creek east is to push that division on him and follow it with all of Stanley's force while Ross makes a strong demonstration on his front. This is safe for a day or two if we can keep spies from running to Breckinridge and Van Dorn and Price and you can hold your hand against them. I can pursue with my entire force, which, including Du Bois and Danville, will be about 13,000 men of all arms."

-17 OR 2: 222

Also on September 17th Rosecrans, concerned that they may have already missed their opportunity, wrote the following to Grant:

"Mizner's dispatch just in reports that the cannonading of our reconnoitering party ceased at 4.40 last evening, and that about 8 o'clock last evening a very large fire was seen in the direction of Iuka; the distance is 20 miles. Mizner has gone to feel of them since 4 a.m. My suspicions are that some houses and stores have been burned in Iuka, the place abandoned, and that Price has crossed the defiles of Bear Creek, and will pass the Tennessee before it rises- at the Shoals, if possible; if not, will proceed at once to above Decatur, near Whitesburg."

-17 OR 2: 222-223

After this message had been sent, Rosecrans messaged from Jacinto later on the 17th (not timestamped) stating that Hamilton was sure that Price was still at Iuka.

17 OR 2: 223

He then forwarded the message from Hamilton to Grant at 9:30 P.M.

-17 OR 2: 224

In yet another message, sent on the 17th, Rosecrans expressed his concern regarding a move from Price, stating that had he not been pursued via their reconnoitering force, he would have probably left Iuka destined for the Tennessee Valley.

-17 OR 2: 223-224

In another message to Grant on the 17th (also not timestamped), probably sent after the above message, but certainly after hearing from Hamilton, returned to the concern expressed above, albeit expressing his hope that Grant was covering against a move directly towards Eastport on his front, stating:

"As Price is an old woodpecker it would be well to have a watch set to see if he might not take a course down the Tennessee, toward Eastport, in hopes to find the means of crossing. Have you any lookout toward Hamburg Landing?

-17 OR 2: 224

Of course, as noted above, it was imperative to prevent a move across Bear Creek to the east for the same reason.

Finally, from the Reports section of the Official Records, as it was reprinted in Grant's first report of the operation dated September 20th. The original copy is not contained in the correspondence, as is the case with many messages and orders, of course.

It was also not timestamped and is dated September 18th from Rosecrans to Grant. It read:

"One of my spies, in from Reardon's, on the Bay Springs Road, tells of a continuous movement since last Friday of forces eastward. They say Van Dorn is to defend Vicksburg, Breckinridge to make his way to Kentucky, and Price to attack Iuka or to go to Tennessee. If Price's forces are at Iuka the plan I propose is to move up as close as we can to-night and conceal our movements; Ord to advance from Burnsville, commence the attack, and draw their attention that way, while I move in on the Jacinto and Fulton roads, massing heavily on the Fulton road, and crushing in their left and cutting off their retreat eastward. I propose to leave in ten minutes for Jacinto, from whence I will dispatch you, by line of vedettes, to Burnsville. Will await a few minutes to hear from you before I start. What news from Burnsville?"

-17 OR 1: 66

As can be seen, the Fulton road was just one way out. It was just one way out. Rosecrans and Grant has been in communication regarding the situation quite steadily and continuously, to that point.

Additionally, all of this makes perfect logical sense from the perspective that one has to account for the purpose of the movement to Iuka in the first place.

So, as far as the notion that the High Command were cognizant of the Army of the West being able to fall back to the east across Bear Creek and that such recognition was fundamental to the conception of the plan, it is really all but incontrovertible as far as that is concerned. One only need to read the relevant correspondence.

That was really my principal point that way and one only need look at the record that way. Whether that assessment was accurate, or not, is really something of a separate discussion, although I do believe that there is evidence to indicate that it probably was.

Now, regarding the prospect of Rosecrans ever having instructed his men that they were not to push the operation on the 19th and were to hold back until the morning of the 20th, I don't believe that that is consistent with what is known from the contemporary record or from the reports issued from the command. Such would be quite difficult to reconcile with what we know from the above correspondence regarding the plan, as well and I was then making the point that once one appreciates the reality as to what was actually stated in the contemporary correspondence regarding the formulation of the plan and its implementation, you then have to apply that in terms of how to assess and understand Rosecrans' actions.

I wasn't frustrated with you yesterday. I know that your contributions are productive and that you are trying to get to the bottom of things just as the rest of us always are.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Nothing regarding Rosecrans having disobeyed an order to hold on the 19th, or of any understanding in his command to hold until the 20th is contained anywhere in the Official Records and is not contained in the personal correspondence of the relevant participants anywhere around the action. It also flies directly in the face of everything we know about the situation as it existed to explicitly order such and directly defies how Rosecrans was expressing himself at the time.

The statements which were made above with "certainty" regarding getting position at the crossroads are also not accurately reflective of what is known and not really consistent with the vast majority of the relevant record, although it may be consistent with some accounts, albeit not the ones which I have seen. The flooding thing does not appear to me to have all that much basis, but regardless, we know what the situation was in terms of how it was expressed in the contemporary record and in the formulation of the plan. That simply is not something which is disputable that way.

 

[DanSBHawk]

The statements which were made above with "certainty"...

I'm not the one who's been pretending to be an authority.

Your extreme interest with Bear Creek is your own thing, but it doesn't change anything on how we understand the battle. The more puzzling aspects of this battle are still unanswered, your personal theories notwithstanding.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I'm not the one who's been pretending to be an authority.

Your extreme interest with Bear Creek is your own thing, but it doesn't change anything on how we understand the battle. The more puzzling aspects of this battle are still unanswered, your personal theories notwithstanding.

I don't see it as my thing. I think that it is just true. It was merely the first thing which must be recognized.

I think that we have a general idea as to why Rosecrans pushed on on the 19th and why he took the Jacinto road rather than both the Jacinto and Fulton roads and that doing such is not really what destroyed the plan on the basis of the ability of the Confederate Army to pull back to the east, which had to be prevented, at least in terms of how the operation had been presented and was understood at the time. Getting to the crossroads and launching the attack was going to be essential, regardless, for that reason.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I don't see it as my thing. I think that it is just true. It was merely the first thing which must be recognized.

I think that we largely know why Rosecrans pushed on on the 19th and why he took the Jacinto road rather than both the Jacinto and Fulton roads and that doing such is not really what destroyed the plan on the basis of the ability of the Confederate Army to pull back to the east, which had to be prevented, at least in terms of how the operation had been presented and was understood at the time.

Well, as said earlier, I completely disagree. But you're entitled to your opinion.