Random Thoughts on Iuka

[DanSBHawk]

If you choose to reject the relevant contemporary record for your own personal reasons, that is certainly okay. It is what it is. You are free to do as you please, of course.

I will only note that it reminds me a bit of Stephen Sears, a fine historian, despite his flaws, when he dug in tenaciously on the timing regarding the discovery of S.O. 191, even as the evidence became simply overwhelming and crushing against his position on it. Or, how Wiley Sword dug in fiercely on his obviously erroneous interpretations regarding Hood at Spring Hill and Franklin. Sometimes it is not about convincing someone who has already made up their mind and is impervious to evidence and rather about showing the people who approach the subject openly and seriously the relevant record.

And you are entitled to your opinion as well. And it's certainly no more than an opinion.

I disagree with your opinion based on my own studying of the subject.

 

[Nathan Towne]

And you are entitled to your opinion as well. And it's certainly no more than an opinion.

I disagree with your opinion based on my own studying of the subject.

There is definitely some room for debate regarding the decision as to move only via the Jacinto road, for sure.

That is certainly a debatable point, for sure.

As for the plan and the prospect of the Confederate Army pulling back to the east, it is imperative that we put forward the relevant record. You can argue as to why it should all be ignored, but you can't state things flatly opposed to what is known without doing so is all being that you are now familiar with it. That is true for all of us.

 

[DanSBHawk]

There is definitely some room for debate regarding the decision as to move only via the Jacinto road, for sure.

That is certainly a debatable point, for sure.

As for the plan and the prospect of the Confederate Army pulling back to the east, it is imperative that we put forward the relevant record. You can argue as to why it should all be ignored, but you can't state things flatly opposed to what is known without doing so is all being that you are now familiar with it. That is true for all of us.

I never said anything should be ignored. You're reverting to your usual insults and putting down of others opinions.

If the battle had not taken place just before dark on the 19th, but early in the morning of the 20th, then it could have taken place as according to the plan with the confederates caught in a pincer. But if the confederates had escaped during the night, then who cares? It just turns out the same as it did in real life.

The only way that the plan could have possibly worked the way that Rosecrans had suggested, and Grant had counted on, was that Rosecrans stick with the original plan of covering both roads. Otherwise, the entire effort was stupid.

Really this is just common sense.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I never said anything should be ignored. You're reverting to your usual insults and putting down of others opinions.

If the battle had not taken place just before dark on the 19th, but early in the morning of the 20th, then it could have taken place as according to the plan with the confederates caught in a pincer. But if the confederates had escaped during the night, then who cares? It just turns out the same as it did in real life.

The only way that the plan could have possibly worked the way that Rosecrans had suggested, and Grant had counted on, was that Rosecrans stick with the original plan of covering both roads. Otherwise, the entire effort was stupid.

Really this is just common sense.

Unless you can get to the connecting road (the Bay Springs Road), enabling effective cross support, from where the attack can roll in effectively.

If the Army of the West could pull back to the east that night unless seriously impeded from doing so and it is clear that they full-well know that you are coming then it would seem that pressing was the only viable option unless you essentially give up, put off the attack until morning and just hope that they haven't pulled back with free reign to do so. That would have been effectively to give up. Grant merely stated in his second report that he had discussed the situation with E.O.C. Ord and that they both agreed that it was unlikely that Rosecrans was going to make it that day. That isn't necessarily the same same as saying that he should hold back if he was able to get up that day and either way, the Army of the Mississippi would be able to cover both the Jacinto and Fulton roads, provided that they could reach the connecting road. It was just that blocking those two roads was not enough in itself for the success of the plan to be ensured, as you know.

To hold back would effectively have been to give up. Maybe you don't make it, but you mine as well try. Maybe, even just by getting there and hitting them, you would be able to destabilize their situation enough that they wouldn't be able to fall back to the east, even if you weren't able to crush in their left. Who knows? It is all preferable to throwing in the towel, though.

It is an interesting and important discussion though, certainly.

 

[tony_gunter]

Hey @tony_gunter

It is always nice to hear from you.

Yes, that is the road which I understand as being the Fulton road as well. However, I have thought of the spur which runs up towards Iuka as being part of the road, or a branch of it.

Cozzens interpreted the following to have been the Mill Road. Cozzens stated in Darkest Days of the War (page 83 of my copy) that Rosecrans ordered a battalion of the Third Michigan Cavalry "to ascertain whether the Mill road joined the Fulton road or simply trailed off harmlessly into the woods." In his report, dated September 29th, Rosecrans merely stated that he ordered a battalion of the Third Michigan to "reconnoiter our right" and Col. Mizner, of the Third Michigan Cavalry, in his report, dated September 23rd, simply stated that four companies, under the command of Captain Willcox, "were sent to the right wing."

-17 OR 1:73, 113

So, I am not entirely sure where he gets that from, but it would have to come either from Sanborn's Descriptions, from the September 19th entry in the Campbell Diary which is at the Western Reserve Historical Society in Cleveland, Ohio, or would appear to be unsourced that way. I don't recall Rosecrans having stated that in his testimony to the JCCW, but it is possible. I would have to look at it again.

View attachment 519855

What I wish we knew was where exactly the historic Bay Springs was. Rosecrans stated in his report, when summarizing the action of the 19th that the Confederate forces fell back that night toward Bay Springs, with his forces pursuing for fifteen miles before giving up the pursuit and pulling back to Jacinto.

Bay Springs is on one of the historical maps of Tishomingo County.

Down near the bottom center.

69734-01-map.tif - Historical Maps

Tishomingo County / Joe Bell, former Secy of State.

da.mdah.ms.gov

 

[Nathan Towne]

Bay Springs is on one of the historical maps of Tishomingo County.

Down near the bottom center.

69734-01-map.tif - Historical Maps

Tishomingo County / Joe Bell, former Secy of State.

da.mdah.ms.gov

Yes, I am very familiar with this Bay Springs.

The issue is that I don't fully understand the full course of the Bay Springs Road for it to line up with Bay Springs.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Unless you can get to the connecting road (the Bay Springs Road), enabling effective cross support, from where the attack can roll in effectively.

If the Army of the West could pull back to the east that night unless seriously impeded from doing so and it is clear that they full-well know that you are coming then it would seem that pressing was the only viable option unless you essentially give up, put off the attack until morning and just hope that they haven't pulled back with free reign to do so. That would have been effectively to give up. Grant merely stated in his second report that he had discussed the situation with Ord and they both agreed that it was unlikely that Rosecrans was going to make it that day. That isn't necessarily the same same as saying that he should hold back if he was able to get up that day and either way, he would be able to cover both the Jacinto and Fulton roads provided that they could reach the connecting road. It was just that blocking those two roads was not enough in itself for the success of the plan to be ensured, as you know.

To hold back would effectively have been to give up. Maybe you don't make it, but you mine as well try. Maybe, even just by getting there and hitting them, you would be able to destabilize their situation enough that they wouldn't be able to fall back to the east, even if you weren't able to crush in their left. Who knows? It is all preferable to throwing in the towel, though.

It is an interesting and important discussion though, certainly.

No. Trying to get to the connecting road was a needless gamble. The way to come up the Fulton Road was to go to Cartersville and then north on the Fulton Road.

By gambling on making it to the connecting road, instead of just taking the time to come in on the Fulton Road, Rosecrans screwed up the entire plan.

 

[Nathan Towne]

No. Trying to get to the connecting road was a needless gamble. The way to come up the Fulton Road was to go to Cartersville and then north on the Fulton Road.

By gambling on making it to the connecting road, instead of just taking the time to come in on the Fulton Road, Rosecrans screwed up the entire plan.

But, they are only moving with two Divisions of two brigades each and couldn't mutually support each column on the two roads and the clock was rapidly ticking on the day while the Confederates knew that they were coming. You have to get to the connecting road, regardless, in order for the attack which would attempt to deprive them of the ability to pull back via Bear Creek. If you don't do that, the plan will probably fail no matter what else you do. So, the question which Rosecrans had to answer was, why risk moving on the two roads with a force on each which could be destroyed if they were to fall upon one of them while isolated? Remember, cavalry had moved to Cartersville, so they know that the Army of the West had not yet begun to retreat at that point, it was still possible. If you don't get to the connecting road, from where you can launch the attack against them in order to try to deprive them of the ability to pull back across Bear Creek, then that is what they will do. They had to get to the connecting road anyways. The operation all but certainly fails if they don't do so. Covering the Fulton road was only one of the things which they were trying to do in order to accomplish this.

 

[DanSBHawk]

But, they are only moving with two Divisions of two brigades each and couldn't mutually support each column on the two roads and the clock was rapidly ticking on the day while the Confederates knew that they were coming. You have to get to the connecting road, regardless, in order for the attack which would attempt to deprive them of the ability to pull back via Bear Creek. If you don't do that, the plan will probably fail no matter what else you do. So, the question which Rosecrans had to answer was, why risk moving on the two roads with a force on each which could be destroyed if they were to fall upon one of them while isolated? Remember, cavalry had moved to Cartersville, so they know that the Army of the West had not yet begun to retreat at that point, it was still possible. If you don't get to the connecting road, from where you can launch the attack against them in order to try to deprive them of the ability to pull back across Bear Creek, then that is what they will do. They had to get to the connecting road anyways. The operation all but certainly fails if they don't do so. Covering the Fulton road was only one of the things which they were trying to do in order to accomplish this.

No, they don't need to get to the connecting road. They needed to come up the Fulton Road from Cartersville.

No, the clock wasn't ticking. If the confederates left Iuka after sundown, then it was no different than what it turned out to be anyways.

No, the separate columns would not be destroyed, because the confederates would suffer from the same problem that Rosecrans suffered from by sending his force up one road - you can only deploy so many troops in battle on a road. And even if a column felt itself hard-pressed, it would just need to fight a delaying action. Make the enemy deploy into a battle formation, then retreat before the fighting starts. Fall back and repeat.

Opting for the connecting road was a flop. Forcing a battle just before sundown was a flop. Leaving the Fulton Road open was a flop. Rosecrans came up with the plan, and then completely messed it up.

 

[Nathan Towne]

No, they don't need to get to the connecting road. They needed to come up the Fulton Road from Cartersville.

No, the clock wasn't ticking. If the confederates left Iuka after sundown, then it was no different than what it turned out to be anyways.

No, the separate columns would not be destroyed, because the confederates would suffer from the same problem that Rosecrans suffered from by sending his force up one road - you can only deploy so many troops in battle on a road. And even if a column felt itself hard-pressed, it would just need to fight a delaying action. Make the enemy deploy into a battle formation, then retreat before the fighting starts. Fall back and repeat.

Opting for the connecting road was a flop. Forcing a battle just before sundown was a flop. Leaving the Fulton Road open was a flop. Rosecrans came up with the plan, and then completely messed it up.

First (and I say this respectfully and genuinely), I appreciate that your arguments have become stronger in your third paragraph above and that you are taking a bit more recognition of the relevant record here now in that paragraph. Hopefully you don't reverse on that simply because I stated such. It is a positive thing.

So, the way I see it, there were two central reasons in which the decision was made to not come up the Fulton road. The first was that they had ascertained that forces moving via the Jacinto and Fulton roads could not mutually support one another for most of its length. Second, time was ticking on the day and because they had hit Confederate pickets and been driving them in that morning and into the early afternoon when the determination was made to move up the Jacinto road only, the Army of the West would know at that point that they were coming,

What I then said was that this decision has to be understood from the perspective that the contemporary record reveals clearly that the belief at the time, clearly and repeatedly expressed by Rosecrans, was that the Army of the West could simply pull back via Bear Creek if not seriously pressed and additionally could very likely do so, regardless, if their left wasn't crushed in via the attacks upon them. This is imperative to understand as it severely changes the dynamic of the decision making process as compared to if one doesn't realize this, as was originally the case here on this thread.

Now, in paragraph three you state that divided columns would not have been in severe danger moving up the two roads separately because only so many men can be deployed into battle along a road at one time. There is certainly some truth to this, however, I would partly disagree that that is really what happened on the Jacinto road insofar as the fighting erupted very quickly and hence Sullivan's brigade simply wasn't fully up into positions by the time that the Confederate attack opened. Same too with the Confederates. They could have delayed the attack had they so chosen to do so and brought more units into the fight from the start, but doing so would have delayed the opening of the attack. It must be recalled though, that they ground along the roads was by no means uniforn. Where the main fighting actually erupted there were a number of fields on both sides of the road. That was the case in some areas along the roads, but not in others. The larger point though is that we know what happened historically. Hamilton's Division barely held on that evening and was supplemented by units from Stanley's Division during the fight. That came about against a Confederate movement down the Jacinto road which initially entailed one infantry brigade (Louis Herbert's), soon joined by a second (John Martin's) and then ultimately joined by the remainder of Little's Division (Elijah Gates and Martin Green's brigades). They could have moved with the entire Division from the start had they elected to do so and if Federal forces have to make it up the road, rather than the other way around, they have more latitude in determining where to fight, especially, if they are able to reach the connecting road first. Based on what actually happened, I don't know how can state confidently that there would have been grave risk associated with moving the Hamilton's and Stanley's Divisions up the two roads separately.

However, let's say for the sake of discussion that you are right and such a fighting withdrawal could have been conducted. How then is that to be communicated with the forces moving via the other road? Via courier, I would presume and by the sound of the firing. It certainly would need to be done quickly enough, lest they not be able to pull back down their road again and move to support their brother forces operating on the other road, or else, that "fighting withdrawal" would be driven back to Cartersville or to the Tuscumbia road down the Jacinto road (to Barnett's Crossroads) and such a route is opened. Furthermore, once you begin to move back down the road to support your brother column, you vacate that road anyways and at that point there is no hope left of reaching the connecting road, which needed to be done. The only other option would be to press forward with your other column as rapidly as possible and hope that maybe you can take the enemy in flank, but that is problematic for obvious reasons, as the forces on the other road will still be hard pressed and that road likely to be opened, regardless. So, reaching the crossroads was essential anyway in which you look at it. The risk in moving via both roads was potentially calamitous for the units moving on each road separately. Lastly, if it wasn't sufficiently understood that the attack from Ord's forces was not going to go forward at the previously stated time, then that provides even further impetus to get there sooner rather than later.

Again, though, in the end, the central point is that it is ultimately irrelevant if you don't make it to the connecting road and beyond from where the attack can be launched. If you don't, it was highly likely that the Army of the West would escape to the east. Being that they knew that U.S. forces were coming, it was imperative that the Army of the Mississippi get to the connecting road and beyond and launch the attack. Failure to do that most likely results in failure of the operation, whether you move up both roads initially, or not and no matter what happens on each of those roads. The rest is a discussion not about whether the plan succeeds or fails, except insofar as that moving via the Jacinto road alone cut desperately needed time out, in a situation in which they didn't have much to spare if this had any hope of actually trapping the Army of the West. Beyond that, it is a discussion only, or at least principally, about how best to protect against tail risk (really bad outcomes).

If they don't get to the connecting road and are able to launch the attacks, the plan most likely fails anyways, even if a force on each road would have been sufficient. Being that they likely wouldn't be due to their size and the reality that forces on each couldn't support one another, we are talking not about decisions which would induce the plan to fail. We are talking about how best to protect against severe downside risk in the event that the plan would fail to accomplish its objectives.

They knew that the U.S. forces were coming. It was known that they would know that they were coming. If the Army of the Mississippi didn't get there that night, the plan had most likely failed. As far as that point is concerned, that they had to push forward in order to get there that night, or else the plan had all but failed, I don't think that there is really much way to controvert that. It is just the clear logical reality on the basis of what is known. So, you have to push on to get there if you can that day, or you essentially give up. Nothing in Rosecrans, nor Grant's, thought process, or communications, would have ever said that if you can potentially get there, don't do so, nor would it have ever said such. If you don't get there, the operation will have all but failed regardless of what is done with the Jacinto and Fulton roads, anyways, as the Army of the West knew that they were coming, at this point. The only way in which the other three paragraph which you wrote above would make any sense is if one were to reject either that that the Confederate Army knew that they were coming, which they did, that they were understood to be able to pull back to the east via Bear Creek, which they were, or that they would pull back if threatened by a major, multi-Army pincer movement which they did know was coming with a river to their back, which they probably would (and were already planning on pulling out of Iuka anyways). There is simply no other way in which they make any logical sense, objectively speaking.

 

[DanSBHawk]

First (and I say this respectfully and genuinely), I appreciate that your arguments have become stronger in your third paragraph above and that you are taking a bit more recognition of the relevant record here now in that paragraph. Hopefully you don't reverse on that simply because I stated such. It is a positive thing.

So, the way I see it, there were two central reasons in which the decision was made to not come up the Fulton road. The first was that they had ascertained that forces moving via the Jacinto and Fulton roads could not mutually support one another for most of its length. Second, time was ticking on the day and because they had hit Confederate pickets and been driving them in that morning and into the early afternoon when the determination was made to move up the Jacinto road only, the Army of the West would know at that point that they were coming,

What I then said was that this decision has to be understood from the perspective that the contemporary record reveals clearly that the belief at the time, clearly and repeatedly expressed by Rosecrans, was that the Army of the West could simply pull back via Bear Creek if not seriously pressed and additionally could very likely do so, regardless, if their left wasn't crushed in via the attacks upon them. This is imperative to understand as it severely changes the dynamic of the decision making process as compared to if one doesn't realize this, as was originally the case here on this thread.

Now, in paragraph three you state that divided columns would not have been in severe danger moving up the two roads separately because only so many men can be deployed into battle along a road at one time. There is certainly some truth to this, however, I would partly disagree that that is really what happened on the Jacinto road insofar as the fighting erupted very quickly and hence Sullivan's brigade simply wasn't fully up into positions by the time that the Confederate attack opened. Same too with the Confederates. They could have delayed the attack had they so chosen to do so and brought more units into the fight from the start, but doing so would have delayed the opening of the attack. It must be recalled though, that they ground along the roads was by no means uniforn. Where the main fighting actually erupted there were a number of fields on both sides of the road. That was the case in some areas along the roads, but not in others. The larger point though is that we know what happened historically. Hamilton's Division barely held on that evening and was supplemented by units from Stanley's Division during the fight. That came about against a Confederate movement down the Jacinto road which initially entailed one infantry brigade (Louis Herbert's), soon joined by a second (John Martin's) and then ultimately joined by the remainder of Little's Division (Elijah Gates and Martin Green's brigades). They could have moved with the entire Division from the start had they elected to do so and if Federal forces have to make it up the road, rather than the other way around, they have more latitude in determining where to fight, especially, if they are able to reach the connecting road first. Based on what actually happened, I don't know how can state confidently that there would have been grave risk associated with moving the Hamilton's and Stanley's Divisions up the two roads separately.

However, let's say for the sake of discussion that you are right and such a fighting withdrawal could have been conducted. How then is that to be communicated with the forces moving via the other road? Via courier, I would presume and by the sound of the firing. It certainly would need to be done quickly enough, lest they not be able to pull back down their road again and move to support their brother forces operating on the other road, or else, that "fighting withdrawal" would be driven back to Cartersville or to the Tuscumbia road down the Jacinto road (to Barnett's Crossroads) and such a route is opened. Furthermore, once you begin to move back down the road to support your brother column, you vacate that road anyways and at that point there is no hope left of reaching the connecting road, which needed to be done. The only other option would be to press forward with your other column as rapidly as possible and hope that maybe you can take the enemy in flank, but that is problematic for obvious reasons, as the forces on the other road will still be hard pressed and that road likely to be opened, regardless. So, reaching the crossroads was essential anyway in which you look at it. The risk in moving via both roads was potentially calamitous for the units moving on each road separately. Lastly, if it wasn't sufficiently understood that the attack from Ord's forces was not going to go forward at the previously stated time, then that provides even further impetus to get there sooner rather than later.

Again, though, in the end, the central point is that it is ultimately irrelevant if you don't make it to the connecting road and beyond from where the attack can be launched. If you don't, it was highly likely that the Army of the West would escape to the east. Being that they knew that U.S. forces were coming, it was imperative that the Army of the Mississippi get to the connecting road and beyond and launch the attack. Failure to do that most likely results in failure of the operation, whether you move up both roads initially, or not and no matter what happens on each of those roads. The rest is a discussion not about whether the plan succeeds or fails, except insofar as that moving via the Jacinto road alone cut desperately needed time out, in a situation in which they didn't have much to spare if this had any hope of actually trapping the Army of the West. Beyond that, it is a discussion only, or at least principally, about how best to protect against tail risk (really bad outcomes).

If they don't get to the connecting and are able to launch the attacks, the plan most likely fails anyways, even if a force on each road would have been sufficient. Being that they likely wouldn't be due to their size and the reality that forces on each couldn't support one another, we are talking not about decisions which would induce the plan to fail. We are talking about how best to protect against severe downside risk in the event that the plan would fail to accomplish its objectives.

They knew that the U.S. forces were coming. It was known that they would know that they were coming. If the Army of the Mississippi didn't get there that night, the plan had most likely failed. As far as that point is concerned, that they had to push forward in order to get there that night, or else the plan had all but failed, I don't think that there is really much way to controvert that. It is just the clear logical reality on the basis of what is known. So, you have to push on to get there if you can that day, or you essentially give up. Nothing in Rosecrans, nor Grant's, thought process, or communications, would have ever said that if you can potentially get there, don't do so, nor would it have ever said such. If you don't get there, the operation will have all but failed regardless of what is done with the Jacinto and Fulton roads, anyways, as the Army of the West knew that they were coming, at this point. The only way in which the other three paragraph which you wrote above would make any sense is if one were to reject either that that the Confederate Army knew that they were coming, which they did, that they were understood to be able to pull back to the east via Bear Creek, which they were, or that they would pull back if threatened by a major, multi-Army pincer movement which they did know was coming with a river to their back, which they probably would (and were already planning on pulling out of Iuka anyways). There is simply no other way in which they make any logical sense, objectively speaking.

First, I don't need your approval of my posts. Just state your opinion and don't bother with the judging of other posters.

If the primary purpose of this complex operation was to trap the confederates in a pincer, then it failed. It failed because Rosecrans chose to come in on one road instead of the two. This was a plan that he proposed and that Grant had accepted on the basis of Rosecrans familiarity with the area. And despite this supposed familiarity, Rosecrans changed the plan in the middle of the operation. Once he chose to leave the Fulton Road open, there was no going back to the plan. Reaching and using the connecting road to try to get back to the plan was a foolhardy option.

If it was too dangerous to split his forces to come up two roads, then Rosecrans should have known this from the beginning and not have proposed an unworkable plan.

Personally, I believe the "supporting distance" thing was just an excuse. Even if it was true, Rosecrans would have been better off massing heavily on the Fulton Road and leaving cavalry to watch the Jacinto Road. But that would have meant arriving after dark. As it was, Price knew mid-afternoon of the federal forces coming in from the south and yet he made no effort to escape to the east. The battle would have happened the next morning.

When Dickey and Lagow met Rosecrans about noon on the 19th, they sent their guide and a courier back to Grant. Rosecrans should have used that opportunity to send a message with them to explain to Grant whatever changes he was making to the plan. Rosecrans could have used this opportunity to get back to the original plan and tell Grant he could not be in place before dark, and to suggest to Grant to have Ord attack at dawn. Rosecrans would attack at the same time.

If the confederates had evacuated during the night east, then it all just turns out the same as it did. If the confederates do not evacuate during the night through the difficult bottom of Bear Creek, then the battle happens at dawn with all the pieces of the plan in place.

It's obvious to me that Rosecrans either proposed an unworkable plan, or he made bad choices during the implementation which effectively neutered the plan. It has to be one or the other.

 

[Nathan Towne]

First, I don't need your approval of my posts. Just state your opinion and don't bother with the judging of other posters.

If the primary purpose of this complex operation was to trap the confederates in a pincer, then it failed. It failed because Rosecrans chose to come in on one road instead of the two. This was a plan that he proposed and that Grant had accepted on the basis of Rosecrans familiarity with the area. And despite this supposed familiarity, Rosecrans changed the plan in the middle of the operation. Once he chose to leave the Fulton Road open, there was no going back to the plan. Reaching and using the connecting road to try to get back to the plan was a foolhardy option.

If it was too dangerous to split his forces to come up two roads, then Rosecrans should have known this from the beginning and not have proposed an unworkable plan.

Personally, I believe the "supporting distance" thing was just an excuse. Even if it was true, Rosecrans would have been better off massing heavily on the Fulton Road and leaving cavalry to watch the Jacinto Road. But that would have meant arriving after dark. As it was, Price knew mid-afternoon of the federal forces coming in from the south and yet he made no effort to escape to the east. The battle would have happened the next morning.

When Dickey and Lagow met Rosecrans about noon on the 19th, they sent their guide and a courier back to Grant. Rosecrans should have used that opportunity to send a message with them to explain to Grant whatever changes he was making to the plan. Rosecrans could have used this opportunity to get back to the original plan and tell Grant he could not be in place before dark, and to suggest to Grant to have Ord attack at dawn. Rosecrans would attack at the same time.

If the confederates had evacuated during the night east, then it all just turns out the same as it did. If the confederates do not evacuate during the night through the difficult bottom of Bear Creek, then the battle happens at dawn with all the pieces of the plan in place.

It's obvious to me that Rosecrans either proposed an unworkable plan, or he made bad choices during the implementation which effectively neutered the plan. It has to be one or the other.

If they don't get there that night, the Army of the West would simply pull back via Bear Creek east. That just is. They were already orders to pull out regardless, had no intention of fighting the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Mississippi at the same time (as clearly expressed, for very good reason, via voluminous correspondence) and knew that they were coming. So that you know, I am not convinced that all of the bridges were out, but even if they were, we know that the ability to pull back via Bear Creek was central to the entire conception of the plan and for very good reason. Lest we forget, elements of Rosecrans Army had been east of Bear Creek on September 11th and pulled back with their wagons across the creek when the Army was consolidated following Price's movements. This isn't hypothetical and was a central consideration in the entire plan, as is essentially indisputably shown via the relevant contemporary record.

As for the point regarding Price not attempting to pull out during the day on the 19th, they received information as to the Federal threat coming. They had to move to meet the threat. It takes considerable time to cross a river via narrow corridors, such as defiles or bridges. It is the same situation as at Antietam, for instance. Lee ordered the wounded of the Army to be sent back across Boteler's Ford on the night of the 17th-18th, which was essentially accomplished by dawn on the 18th. Why didn't he then begin pulling the Army back across the Potomac then? Why did he then wait until the cover of darkness? What would have happened if he had begun to pull the Army back across the Potomac during the day on the 18th with the Army of the Potomac right there? I am not trying to be caustic. It just is how it works.

Now, whether the plan could have worked or not, I tend to think that it was possible, but that there was very little room for error and would be dependent on speed and precision (and maybe even a little bit of luck). It failed because the U.S. Army wasn't able to get into position by nightfall of the 19th in which all of the major withdrawal options had been deprived of the enemy, all of which needed to be taken away.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Considering that Price had to be convinced to evacuate much later that night after the battle, I simply disagree that he would have evacuated if the battle had not occurred as it did on the 19th. And even if he did, then it's just the same result as what happened by leaving the Fulton Road open.

By leaving the Fulton Road open, Rosecrans threw away any chance of trapping Price.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Considering that Price had to be convinced to evacuate much later that night after the battle, I simply disagree that he would have evacuated if the battle had not occurred as it did on the 19th. And even if he did, then it's just the same result as what happened by leaving the Fulton Road open.

By leaving the Fulton Road open, Rosecrans threw away any chance of trapping Price.

That's funny, because Ned's whole point here was precisely that regarding Price.

Will the Real Winner of Iuka Come On Down!

If you read Price's correspondence, you will see very clearly that the last thing which was intended was to get into a fight against both the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Mississippi while isolated and for very good and obvious reasons. The correspondence is voluminous on this. I can walk you through all of it, if you would like for me to?

What Price stated in his report was merely that after the attack had had the success which he believed it had had on the 19th, that:

"I had proposed to renew the battle in the morning and had made my dispositions accordingly, but having ascertained toward morning that the enemy had by means of the two railroads massed against me a greatly superior force, and knowing that my position was such that a battle would endanger the safety of my trains even if I should be victorious, of which I had but little doubt, I determine to adhere to my original purpose and to make the movement upon which I had already agreed with General Van Dorn. Orders were issued accordingly, and the wagons trains having been put in motion, the troops were withdrawn from the battle-field a little before sunrise, the enemy manifesting no desire to renew the bloody conflict and firing only two or three shots at my cavalry rear guard. Every wagon and all of the valuable stores that we had taken together with many of the sick and wounded, were safely brought away."

-17 OR 1: 122

Thomas Snead's famous account also covered this.

Of course, some of that as it pertains to what the U.S. Army was doing wasn't accurate, but you get the drift. Furthermore, being that they knew that they were coming, it obviously is unlikely that they would have stayed and fought and the whole plan was predicated on that they could leave at any time, which they did that night and were already orders to do, regardless. They could have stayed and fought on the 20th if they so chose to, obviously, but didn't. The whole thing about just waiting until the morning doesn't make much sense because the whole point is to try catch them while isolated.

They were trying to cover the Fulton road, but covering the Jacinto and Fulton roads was simply not sufficient and that had been clearly expressed from the start. They had to accomplish all of the things previously listed and in order to do so they would have to get to the crossroads regardless. By the time they reached Barnett's Crossroads, it was all but too late for the Army of the West to pull out that day, of course, but they could simply do so under the cover of night, if permitted to. The day was fast ticking away. The very unfortunate reality is though that even had the Army of the Mississippi been able to get to the connecting road and launch the attack (even if Ord's attack had not gone in yet and/if Rosecrans was still anticipating that it would) and they had been able to crush in the Confederate left amidst the attack, the operation still may have failed, as it is very possible that Ord and most of his forces would not hear the fighting, permitting the Army of the West to concentrate enough force to push them back at least to a sufficient degree to enable them to pull back across Bear Creek that night. This was the consequence of the problems with maintaining the original, optimistic timetable, the difficulty in communicating effectively and rapidly and Grant's decision to then permit the attack from the south to go in first. Understandable, but it could have resulted in the operation failing even if they had been able to accomplish everything else requisite for the operation to have a real chance of actually catching and destroying Price's Army.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Yes, I know that Price had no desire to fight a concentrated federal force. But after the battle with Rosecrans, he felt that the next morning he could hold off the Burnsville force long enough to finish off Rosecrans. He became convinced differently during the night by his generals. He then chose to evacuate.

Price's original intention for the 19th was not to go east through Bear Creek, but to go south and then west to Baldwyn to join Van Dorn. By 2:00 in the afternoon, he still had not left, and obviously he made no effort to evacuate until very late in the night. By one account it was almost dawn. Rosecrans would have been blocking both roads by sundown. So the idea that Price would have simply evacuated after dark over two blocked roads is obviously silly and lacking in common sense.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Yes, I know that Price had no desire to fight a concentrated federal force. But after the battle with Rosecrans, he felt that the next morning he could hold off the Burnsville force long enough to finish off Rosecrans. He became convinced differently during the night by his generals. He then chose to evacuate.

Price's original intention for the 19th was not to go east through Bear Creek, but to go south and then west to Baldwyn to join Van Dorn. By 2:00 in the afternoon, he still had not left, and obviously he made no effort to evacuate until very late in the night. By one account it was almost dawn. Rosecrans would have been blocking both roads by sundown. So the idea that Price would have simply evacuated after dark over two blocked roads is obviously silly and lacking in common sense.

He wouldn't have. He would have reacted to the developing situation and moved via Bear Creek eastwards and out of harms way. At least that would be the most likely response and the threat in terms of not being able to catch the Army of the West while isolated.

Yes, they collected their wounded and all of that before pulling out.

Furthermore, Van Dorn's movements can be also added on top of all of this, but we don't even necessarily need to get into that.

 

[tony_gunter]

First (and I say this respectfully and genuinely), I appreciate that your arguments have become stronger in your third paragraph above and that you are taking a bit more recognition of the relevant record here now in that paragraph. Hopefully you don't reverse on that simply because I stated such. It is a positive thing.

So, the way I see it, there were two central reasons in which the decision was made to not come up the Fulton road. The first was that they had ascertained that forces moving via the Jacinto and Fulton roads could not mutually support one another for most of its length. Second, time was ticking on the day and because they had hit Confederate pickets and been driving them in that morning and into the early afternoon when the determination was made to move up the Jacinto road only, the Army of the West would know at that point that they were coming,

What I then said was that this decision has to be understood from the perspective that the contemporary record reveals clearly that the belief at the time, clearly and repeatedly expressed by Rosecrans, was that the Army of the West could simply pull back via Bear Creek if not seriously pressed and additionally could very likely do so, regardless, if their left wasn't crushed in via the attacks upon them. This is imperative to understand as it severely changes the dynamic of the decision making process as compared to if one doesn't realize this, as was originally the case here on this thread.

Now, in paragraph three you state that divided columns would not have been in severe danger moving up the two roads separately because only so many men can be deployed into battle along a road at one time. There is certainly some truth to this, however, I would partly disagree that that is really what happened on the Jacinto road insofar as the fighting erupted very quickly and hence Sullivan's brigade simply wasn't fully up into positions by the time that the Confederate attack opened. Same too with the Confederates. They could have delayed the attack had they so chosen to do so and brought more units into the fight from the start, but doing so would have delayed the opening of the attack. It must be recalled though, that they ground along the roads was by no means uniforn. Where the main fighting actually erupted there were a number of fields on both sides of the road. That was the case in some areas along the roads, but not in others. The larger point though is that we know what happened historically. Hamilton's Division barely held on that evening and was supplemented by units from Stanley's Division during the fight. That came about against a Confederate movement down the Jacinto road which initially entailed one infantry brigade (Louis Herbert's), soon joined by a second (John Martin's) and then ultimately joined by the remainder of Little's Division (Elijah Gates and Martin Green's brigades). They could have moved with the entire Division from the start had they elected to do so and if Federal forces have to make it up the road, rather than the other way around, they have more latitude in determining where to fight, especially, if they are able to reach the connecting road first. Based on what actually happened, I don't know how can state confidently that there would have been grave risk associated with moving the Hamilton's and Stanley's Divisions up the two roads separately.

However, let's say for the sake of discussion that you are right and such a fighting withdrawal could have been conducted. How then is that to be communicated with the forces moving via the other road? Via courier, I would presume and by the sound of the firing. It certainly would need to be done quickly enough, lest they not be able to pull back down their road again and move to support their brother forces operating on the other road, or else, that "fighting withdrawal" would be driven back to Cartersville or to the Tuscumbia road down the Jacinto road (to Barnett's Crossroads) and such a route is opened. Furthermore, once you begin to move back down the road to support your brother column, you vacate that road anyways and at that point there is no hope left of reaching the connecting road, which needed to be done. The only other option would be to press forward with your other column as rapidly as possible and hope that maybe you can take the enemy in flank, but that is problematic for obvious reasons, as the forces on the other road will still be hard pressed and that road likely to be opened, regardless. So, reaching the crossroads was essential anyway in which you look at it. The risk in moving via both roads was potentially calamitous for the units moving on each road separately. Lastly, if it wasn't sufficiently understood that the attack from Ord's forces was not going to go forward at the previously stated time, then that provides even further impetus to get there sooner rather than later.

Again, though, in the end, the central point is that it is ultimately irrelevant if you don't make it to the connecting road and beyond from where the attack can be launched. If you don't, it was highly likely that the Army of the West would escape to the east. Being that they knew that U.S. forces were coming, it was imperative that the Army of the Mississippi get to the connecting road and beyond and launch the attack. Failure to do that most likely results in failure of the operation, whether you move up both roads initially, or not and no matter what happens on each of those roads. The rest is a discussion not about whether the plan succeeds or fails, except insofar as that moving via the Jacinto road alone cut desperately needed time out, in a situation in which they didn't have much to spare if this had any hope of actually trapping the Army of the West. Beyond that, it is a discussion only, or at least principally, about how best to protect against tail risk (really bad outcomes).

If they don't get to the connecting road and are able to launch the attacks, the plan most likely fails anyways, even if a force on each road would have been sufficient. Being that they likely wouldn't be due to their size and the reality that forces on each couldn't support one another, we are talking not about decisions which would induce the plan to fail. We are talking about how best to protect against severe downside risk in the event that the plan would fail to accomplish its objectives.

They knew that the U.S. forces were coming. It was known that they would know that they were coming. If the Army of the Mississippi didn't get there that night, the plan had most likely failed. As far as that point is concerned, that they had to push forward in order to get there that night, or else the plan had all but failed, I don't think that there is really much way to controvert that. It is just the clear logical reality on the basis of what is known. So, you have to push on to get there if you can that day, or you essentially give up. Nothing in Rosecrans, nor Grant's, thought process, or communications, would have ever said that if you can potentially get there, don't do so, nor would it have ever said such. If you don't get there, the operation will have all but failed regardless of what is done with the Jacinto and Fulton roads, anyways, as the Army of the West knew that they were coming, at this point. The only way in which the other three paragraph which you wrote above would make any sense is if one were to reject either that that the Confederate Army knew that they were coming, which they did, that they were understood to be able to pull back to the east via Bear Creek, which they were, or that they would pull back if threatened by a major, multi-Army pincer movement which they did know was coming with a river to their back, which they probably would (and were already planning on pulling out of Iuka anyways). There is simply no other way in which they make any logical sense, objectively speaking.

I don't see where you've ever addressed the distinct possibility that the Bear Creek crossing might have been impacted by the heavy rains.

It certainly wouldn't have been fordable, were there bridges and if so were they intact?

 

[Nathan Towne]

I don't see where you've ever addressed the distinct possibility that the Bear Creek crossing might have been impacted by the heavy rains.

It certainly wouldn't have been fordable, were there bridges and if so were they intact?

Again, this was not only fundamental in the formulation and conception of the plan (see again Post #184), but also elements of Rosecrans Army had just crossed from the east, with their wagons, following the commencement of Price's move against Iuka.

The river was well recognized to be eminently crossable east of Iuka and such wasn't a hypothetical. I don't see much justification for your comments here.

 

[tony_gunter]

Again, this was not only fundamental in the formulation and conception of the plan (see again Post #184), but also elements of Rosecrans Army had just crossed from the east, with their wagons, following the commencement of Price's move against Iuka.

The river was well recognized to be eminently crossable east of Iuka and such wasn't a hypothetical. I don't see much justification for your comments here.

The rain was so heavy it rendered the ground unsuitable for Rosecrans men to deploy into line until they were on top of the Confederate main body,

That's heavy enough to render Bear Creek unfordable, and could have washed out bridges for all we know. Think about the chaos brought to Pemberton by the heavy rain on May 14th, 1863.

 

[Nathan Towne]

The rain was so heavy it rendered the ground unsuitable for Rosecrans men to deploy into line until they were on top of the Confederate main body,

That's heavy enough to render Bear Creek unfordable, and could have washed out bridges for all we know. Think about the chaos brought to Pemberton by the heavy rain on May 14th, 1863.

Cite sources please.

Again, go back and read the relevant correspondence.

And one could attempt to make the same claim regarding the roads, but the evidence does not support this conjecture. Obviously, that wouldn't be workable.