Random Thoughts on Iuka

[Nathan Towne]

Well, as said earlier, I completely disagree. But you're entitled to your opinion.

No worries.

As long as one does so in recognition of what the plan was, as detailed in the contemporary record and what the situation was in terms of how it was understood by Rosecrans (and probably by Grant, as well) at the time, then that is totally fine.

 

[DanSBHawk]

As long as you do so...

Really, you're not in a position to dictate anything or judge anything. You have an opinion like anyone else here. Big whoop.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Really, you're not in a position to dictate anything or judge anything. You have an opinion like anyone else here. Big whoop.

I was just noting what was actually said and how the plan was actually described. That is very important if we are to understand events and decisions which were made. It should be noted that the positions and interpretations put forth by others can be useful in helping one interpret events, as well. We take and apply things to the record.

It is possible that this conversation may have itself out at this point.

 

[Nathan Towne]

@tony_gunter

For instance, if you look at Grant's first report, dated September 20th, you will see that he reported to the government, with no disapprobation whatever, that Rosecrans force "attacked Price, south of this village, about two hours before dark yesterday."

-17 OR 1: 64

Or just read the correspondence from the 19th which can be readily seen at 17 OR 1: 69 and elsewhere. Or read all of the available reports. It is clear that the Army of the Mississippi was pushing on to Iuka on the 19th.

Being that we know that the conception of the plan factored in the ability of the Army of the West to pull back across Bear Creek as a fundamental consideration (one only need to read the correspondence on that), especially as Rosecrans detailed the plan to Grant, regardless of whether that assessment was accurate or not, the question then becomes how do you operate as the situation transpired on the 19th? What was the most likely way to accomplish those objectives by the time in which the Army of the Mississippi reached Barnett's Crossroads? That is really the central relevant question as far as the plan as it was conceived was concerned, unless, of course, that assessment was inaccurate. I would pass that question on to you?

I do agree with you that there had been heavy rain over several days leading up the 19th. I would quote S.A. Hurlbut, for instance, from Bolivar, to U.S. Grant on September 18th making the point that the roads in his area had been impacted by the rainfall.

-17 OR 2: 226-227

Now, it is certainly possible that maybe the plan as Rosecrans had conceived it should have been modified on the basis of the recent rains, but we can't controvert how the plan was actually described, nor the fact that it was being described as such the same day on the 17th and 18th in messages to Grant from Rosecrans.

So, again, my question would be what would seem to be the relevant question, which is how best could that be done?

 

[SSVilla]

I had been on vacation, yay me! And thus haven't followed up on this thread. I need to catch up and will do so. Excuse my delays please. I am also still reading the Cozzens book on Iuka and Corinth.

Originally I was fine with his dry and caustic writing style, but I am finding that it doesn't make for an enjoyable read. I am capable of quick reading when I am absolutely absorbed with something, but this book is not that. I am struggling to get through. I think it's part the POV changes which make the activity about what's going on difficult to follow. The other part, I can't quite place. Or rather, I prefer to finish the book before making a conclusion, but it is slow reading.

 

[tony_gunter]

I don't think anyone has said that Rosecrans was ordered to delay his attack until morning.

The only point I've seen made is that it would make more sense to delay attack unt morning.

Sundown was at 6 or shortly after. Ord is two miles away with a Confederate division to his front. Rosecrans has been told that Ord is holding until he hears the sounds of battle. Rosecrans doesn't arrive at Iuka until 4:30 pm

Ord's participation is a moot point even if he does hear the battle raging to the south.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I don't think anyone has said that Rosecrans was ordered to delay his attack until morning.

The only point I've seen made is that it would make more sense to delay attack unt morning.

Sundown was at 6 or shortly after. Ord is two miles away with a Confederate division to his front. Rosecrans has been told that Ord is holding until he hears the sounds of battle. Rosecrans doesn't arrive at Iuka until 4:30 pm

Ord's participation is a moot point even if he does hear the battle raging to the south.

Again, that wouldn't make sense, as the Army of the West knew that they were coming. The whole conception of the plan, as has been detailed extensively above, was to try to trap the Army of the West from being to pull out of Iuka, first and foremost from being able to pull back across Bear Creek to the east.

The relevant and critical question was asked of you above.

 

[tony_gunter]

Again, that wouldn't make sense, as the Army of the West knew that they were coming. The whole conception of the plan, as has been detailed extensively above, was to try to trap the Army of the West from being to pull out of Iuka, first and foremost from being able to pull back across Bear Creek to the east.

The relevant and critical question was asked of you above.

That was the original plan, sure. That plan was busted when Rosecrans encountered the fog of war. The new plan was basically for Ord to act in response to whatever move Rosecrans decided. Attacking late in the afternoon with light fading essentially took Ord off the board.

 

[Nathan Towne]

That was the original plan, sure. That plan was busted when Rosecrans encountered the fog of war. The new plan was basically for Ord to act in response to whatever move Rosecrans decided. Attacking late in the afternoon with light fading essentially took Ord off the board.

Based on the plan as it was described, they greatly risked losing them if they held back on the 19th. There was no way for them to know that the fighting wouldn't be heard and it remains very unclear that they understood the alteration of plan, regardless, regarding Ord's forces not opening the attack. Either way, if they held back, based on the conception of the plan, it was most likely that the Army of the West would simply slip across Bear Creek that evening. Being that the direct road to Eastport wasn't covered either, as the attack never came in from the west, the Army of the West could have just moved north, as well.

 

[DanSBHawk]

The main objectives were to have federal forces coming in on the Burnsville road, the Jacinto road, and the Fulton road. That was the plan.

This is was what Grant wrote at the time:
"This was the first I knew of the Fulton road being left open to the enemy for their escape. With it occupied no route would have been left them except east, with the difficult bottom of Bear Creek to cross, or northeast with the Tennessee River in their front, or to conquer their way out."

By blocking three roads, it would have left the confederates three options. None of those options would have been ideal for the confederates.

 

[Nathan Towne]

The plan was to trap the Confederate force before it could pull out of Iuka, via any roads to the south, via Bear Creek to the east or to the north. That has been heavily covered and is not controvertible when one reads the contemporary record.

See Post #256.

It was known that they were coming and hence waiting until the morning of the twentieth wasn't really much of an option. The question then is what was the most likely way to prevent the Army of the West from slipping out of Iuka via either the roads to the south or via Bear Creek to the east, all of which needed to be prevented in order to catch the Confederate Army? That, in essence, is the relevant question.

 

[tony_gunter]

Based on the plan as it was described, they greatly risked losing them if they held back on the 19th. There was no way for them to know that the fighting wouldn't be heard and it remains very unclear that they understood the alteration of plan, regardless, regarding Ord's forces not opening the attack. Either way, if they held back, based on the conception of the plan, it was most likely that the Army of the West would simply slip across Bear Creek that evening. Being that the direct road to Eastport wasn't covered either, as the attack never came in from the west, the Army of the West could have just moved north, as well.

Whether Ord heard the fighting or not is a bit irrelevant. It would take some time to pitch in, he was still a few miles outside of town, darkness was approaching, and a Confederate division was in his way.

At best, Ord's participation is peripheral if the attack takes place that afternoon.

I don't think Eastport would have been a viable option, wouldn't they need boats to cross?

 

[SSVilla]

From the official military atlas of the civil war.

To get to the Fulton road through the road Rosecrans was attempting to, after he changed his own plan due to his delay, was really impracticable and probably precisely what General Price was attempting to prevent him from doing (and succeeded) when he attacked. I am inclined to think that using that road is indeed what Rosecrans was still hoping to do.

Ironically, even Castel, who is a notable Rosecrans admirer stated that this plan was impracticable. He described it in a really picturesque way as "the equivalent of shooting an arrow into the air, only to have it fall somewhere in Berkeley Square." For Castel the plan depended much more on surprise than it did timing. As it was, the plan probably needed both and had neither.

Rosecrans gave the plan's failure too much importance due to believing it was a repeat of Rich Mountain, even where many things pointed to its difficulty in execution, him not being completely blameless. And he might have been even more inclined to blame others to excuse his own part.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Whether Ord heard the fighting or not is a bit irrelevant. It would take some time to pitch in, he was still a few miles outside of town, darkness was approaching, and a Confederate division was in his way.

At best, Ord's participation is peripheral if the attack takes place that afternoon.

I don't think Eastport would have been a viable option, wouldn't they need boats to cross?

Sorry, I have been sick the last number of days.

Remember, Eleazer Paine's and Ormsby Mitchell's Divisions of the Army of the Mississippi had moved north in August and Gordon Granger's Division had commenced the move on September 4th. I would have to look again in order to see what routes they each took.

Rosecrans explicitly mentioned the potential of this movement in his correspondence. Furthermore, even if not at Eastport, there was no guarantee that the Army of the West did not have access to temporary bridging, such as via pontoons.

Ord's participation would still be critical to the operation if Rosecrans had been able to get to the connecting road and launch the attack, including on the left of the Army of the West. If so, without the corresponding attack from the Divisions operating under Ord's command, the Confederate force could potentially counterattack against the Army of the Mississippi and reopen the key access to the crossings of Bear Creek, which was the central necessity in preventing. The importance of Ord's attack on the 19th is debatable really because that didn't happen and hence they would have been attacking the Army of the West that afternoon/evening without the Confederate Army being deprived of its central escape routes, via the Fulton road, or via Bear Creek.

 

[Nathan Towne]

From the official military atlas of the civil war.

View attachment 521506
To get to the Fulton road through the road Rosecrans was attempting to, after he changed his own plan due to his delay, was really impracticable and probably precisely what General Price was attempting to prevent him from doing (and succeeded) when he attacked. I am inclined to think that using that road is indeed what Rosecrans was still hoping to do.

Ironically, even Castel, who is a notable Rosecrans admirer stated that this plan was impracticable. He described it in a really picturesque way as "the equivalent of shooting an arrow into the air, only to have it fall somewhere in Berkeley Square." For Castel the plan depended much more on surprise than it did timing. As it was, the plan probably needed both and had neither.

Rosecrans gave the plan's failure too much importance due to believing it was a repeat of Rich Mountain, even where many things pointed to its difficulty in execution, him not being completely blameless. And he might have been even more inclined to blame others to excuse his own part.

They had to make it to the connecting road anyways in order to launch the attack and without launching the attack, they couldn't prevent the Army of the West from pulling back via Bear Creek to the east, which was the central consideration in the plan as it was actually enunciated at the time, as has been shown repeatedly above.

That was the primary issue, lest the Army of the West would have pulled back that night regardless, at least per the conception of the plan as it was actually articulated at the time.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I basically take the amended argument of @DanSBHawk to be that Rosecrans should have moved the Army of the Mississippi via both the Jacinto and Fulton roads, regardless, but we then return to the natural realization that by doing so, each element would have been unlikely to be able to hold if attacked and by the time such a movement reached the connecting road, if they were able to do so, there likely would have been very little daylight left and Ord's attack may have gone in unsupported at that point.

So, I then understand the argument to be that it was then preferable to wait until the morning of the 20th and relay this to Grant and to Ord, but even if this could have been relayed in a timely enough manner that Ord's forces did not attack alone that afternoon/evening, which remained a real risk, the simple reality is that the Army of the West knew that they were coming at that point and the whole conception of the plan, as outlined, extensively, in the contemporary correspondence, was that the Army of the West could pull back across Bear Creek. So, unless that situation had changed, by waiting until the morning of the 20th, wouldn't you be effectively giving up on the operation, as the Army of the West knew that they were coming at that point? To be sure, there had been recent rain. @tony_gunter is absolutely right about this and I can point to contemporary evidence to demonstrate the case, but unless the rains of the past several days had sufficiently altered the situation, then that was the reality which was being confronted. Rosecrans restated such multiple times over the course of the 18th, as shown in Post #256 above.

Obviously, we can't just hold up Grant's second report, which isn't as critical as some would have you believe, by the way, or especially his statement in his Memoirs and conclude that that is definitive on the subject when we have voluminous contemporary correspondence on the point. We should always attempt to engage in responsible historical inquiry.

 

[Nathan Towne]

The main objectives were to have federal forces coming in on the Burnsville road, the Jacinto road, and the Fulton road. That was the plan.

This is was what Grant wrote at the time:
"This was the first I knew of the Fulton road being left open to the enemy for their escape. With it occupied no route would have been left them except east, with the difficult bottom of Bear Creek to cross, or northeast with the Tennessee River in their front, or to conquer their way out."

By blocking three roads, it would have left the confederates three options. None of those options would have been ideal for the confederates.

That most definitely was not the plan, as extensively detailed in the correspondence.

 

[DanSBHawk]

That most definitely was not the plan, as extensively detailed in the correspondence.

Obviously I disagree with your interpretation of the evidence.

Grant and Rosecrans knew what the plan was. I've already cited Grant's report. Here's Rosecrans in his 1865 testimony to the Joint Committee: "(I) should get possession of the rebels' line of retreat, south of Iuka, by seizing and holding both the Fulton and Jacinto roads,..."

 

[DanSBHawk]

Ord was not going to initiate a battle on his own on the afternoon and evening of the 19th. Grant and Ord had already mutually agreed that Rosecrans was not going to be in position before dark. They expected the battle would not take place on the 19th.

The reason they thought this was because they expected Rosecrans to stick to the plan and reach Cartersville before heading north on the Fulton Road.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Obviously I disagree with your interpretation of the evidence.

Grant and Rosecrans knew what the plan was. I've already cited Grant's report. Here's Rosecrans in his 1865 testimony to the Joint Committee: "(I) should get possession of the rebels' line of retreat, south of Iuka, by seizing and holding both the Fulton and Jacinto roads,..."

View attachment 521712

Yes, which comprised two of the means of withdrawal of the Confederate Army. I have cited from Rosecrans Congressional testimony on numerous occasions. You should probably go a read the contemporary correspondence again.

Yes, I am well aware of the recorded discussions between Grant and Ord on that issue. I have covered them extensively. The above point referred to Rosecrans understanding of the situation on that point.

If you just read the relevant correspondence, you see what the issues were.

Just read through the correspondence cited on Post #256.