McClellan What Would McClellan Have Done?

[Saphroneth]

There's no reason to believe McClellan would not have attacked, had he had the forces to make it a good chance of success. Even if he were to be gun-shy in situations where the actual force ratio would have allowed him a close victory, the result of the Loudoun Valley campaign is such that that actually doesn't matter much - McClellan has, through dint of his own manoeuvre and Lee's actions, ended up in a situation where he has 3:1 or 4:1 odds of available strength around Culpeper. There is no heavily fortified position for Longstreet to use to defend himself, and his flanks are not anchored.

Unless you declare the man would never attack, then that's a situation in which it seems reasonable to say he would. And if Lee withdraws to Madison - as he said he would - then no battle happens there because Lee isn't willing to try conclusions with McClellan at such catastrophic odds.

But the result of that is that McClellan has nothing stopping him crossing the Rapidan. The only thing preventing him from moving straight to the North Anna is the need for supplies - and marching to gain an operational victory by going where the enemy isn't would seem to play into even what Caricature McClellan would like to do!

 

[jackt62]

The administration would insist on the overland approach. Contrast little Mac after a bloody battle and the ultimate victor Grant. One fritters away time while the other attempts to advance and out flank Lee. Who would you want in command?

By 1864, Lincoln and the administration had settled on Grant as the man to command the Union armies, a choice that ultimately led to victory. And Grant was certainly a bolder and more persistent commander than many of his predecessors. But he enjoyed the benefit of a "learning curve," unlike McClellan who was thrust into a major command position too early on. McClellan's strengths were in organization and training and his cautiousness may have often worked against him. In that regard, he was not the person to lead the Union to victory in 1864. However, in 1862 I'm not sure that he would have necessarily done any worse than Burnside or Hooker in confronting the ANV.

 

[Belfoured]

The first step in understanding is to understand why someone did something; your response to my point about McClellan attacking with 3/4 of his brigades on the 17th was to bring up that he didn't on the 16th and the 18th.

Quite frankly anything that addresses that is going to be an explanation, or an "explanation" if you prefer to put it in quotes - it is going to be looking into why McClellan didn't do something. If you don't want it discussed then don't mention it; either it is relevant (in which case the question is under what conditions McClellan would attack or not) or it is not (in which case, why post it? We know McClellan would attack under some conditions because he did on the 17th.)


For the example of why McClellan didn't attack on the 16th, the answer is related to the arrival of forces on the field on that date and the relative buildup of Union and Confederate strength - both in McClellan's perception and in reality. That is why he didn't attack on the 16th - the balance of forces and the movement of his troops, as far as he was concerned, indicated that he would have a better opportunity to attack on the 17th. He could also have delayed until the 18th, by which time he would have his whole force available, but he didn't do that either. He opted for the 17th as his judgement of the best balance between speed and mass.
Whether this is a good idea is separate; you probably have a guess about what I think, and you're certainly at liberty to disagree.

It doesn't change what McClellan did on the 17th. It might affect what he'd do during the phase of his arrival at Culpeper in November, though.



Here is how we might use that information.

In an alternate historical situation, on the 11th McClellan's columns approach Culpeper from two directions. 9th leads 1st on the pike road down from Warrenton, having crossed the Hazel at Rixeyville; 2nd leads 5th on the road from Rappahannock Station, having crossed the Rappahannock by the bridge there. By noon the leading corps of each column has arrived, is deploying and is available to fight that day, but the second corps of each column is far enough behind that it is not available to fight that day (at least, in McClellan's judgement).

Would McClellan attack on the 11th or delay until the 12th?

That depends on whether he thinks he has the strength available to prosecute a successful attack. He has about the same strength ratio (in reality) as he had at Antietam on the 17th, or maybe a bit more, so he might go for it; however, he might instead wait until the 12th if he thinks that an attack on the 11th would be liable to be repulsed.


That is the kind of situation where, based on Antietam, we might see McClellan opting for a delay.


On the other hand, if 1st and/or 5th are likely to be available to fight that day, in McClellan's judgement, I see no reason why he wouldn't just go for it.

Keep proving my point. The peg holding your structure together is McClellan's "perception" of his opponent's strength. That's why you'd never get an occupancy permit from the Building Inspector.

 

[Belfoured]

Countless long posts trying to explain away Mac's failures. None of which really mean anything since his record is clear. He was relieved twice. A great resume Mac!

Ellen spent less effort "explaining" everything her husband did/didn't do. In a very bizarre way, it's impressive.

 

[Belfoured]

If the attacks had been better coordinated, Keyes' Fourth Corps would have been all but destroyed on May 31st. Now, with significant reinforcements on the way, I don't know that Johnston would have been able to hold his position but knocking out 1 of the 5 corps in front of Richmond would have been a major blow.

Ryan

The shocking thing is that even Joe Johnston - a guy with a reputation similar to McClellan's based on his post-Seven Pines record in 1863 outside Vicksburg and then the interminable retreat to Atlanta in 1864 that caused his firing - even that Joe Johnston went forward with an attack the morning after a deluge that had McClellan whining to Washington at 9:30 the night before about the "frightful" roads.

 

[67th Tigers]

The shocking thing is that even Joe Johnston - a guy with a reputation similar to McClellan's based on his post-Seven Pines record in 1863 outside Vicksburg and then the interminable retreat to Atlanta in 1864 that caused his firing - even that Joe Johnston went forward with an attack the morning after a deluge that had McClellan whining to Washington at 9:30 the night before about the "frightful" roads.

...and how did those roads affect his attack?

 

[121st PA Vols]

The shocking thing is that even Joe Johnston - a guy with a reputation similar to McClellan's based on his post-Seven Pines record in 1863 outside Vicksburg and then the interminable retreat to Atlanta in 1864 that caused his firing - even that Joe Johnston went forward with an attack the morning after a deluge that had McClellan whining to Washington at 9:30 the night before about the "frightful" roads.

Yes Belfoured! This is what I was attempting to convey yesterday as per below.
** Johnston attacking him (Seven Pines), not McClellan attacking Johnston, while catching his army straddling the Chickahominy. Sidebar: this is a great eg of a man (Johnston) seizing the opportunity to act completely out of character. Johnston attacking!??!

While the rain was profound, it was profound for everyone. Excuses made for not attacking when on the offensive to take Richmond should have a profound reason for not occurring. Strong defensive works don't stop aggressive generals! And I think that's what we're talking about here when asked the question "What Would McClellan Have Done?" Well, here's what he did do!
Edited to say; this isn't meant to disrespect the general but to simply show what he in fact did.

 

[Belfoured]

...and how did those roads affect his attack?

The roads weren't the problem, if you actually know anything about how the battle unfolded.

 

[DanSBHawk]

"is possibly"

We're discussing the whole force, which for both sides won't arrive until some time in the future. Remember, neither side was fully at Yorktown yet. McClellan only had 5 divisions there, with 3 more stuck en route and unable to reach the Warwick. Similarly, part of Johnston's command (Early's division) had reached Yorktown, but DH Hill's division is still en route, Toombs won't start moving there until the next day, and the remaining three divisions were not sent until after the council in Richmond. The last two rebel divisions are left up north, but might not have been.

So, in McClellan's opinion, 8 of his divisions might be a smaller force than Johnston's and Magruder's 10 divisions (spoiler alert, it actually was). Once they are all on the field, McClellan would be outnumbered. However, for both sides the whole force is not on the field. In fact, Johnston and Magruder had the equivalent of 3 divisions vs 5 Federal divisions on the 7th. This matches McClellan's estimate they had 30,000 (i.e. 3 divisions). In reality, the rebel force at Yorktown etc. peaked at 8 divisions (organised as 4 grand divisions of 2 divisions), opposed at that time by 8 Federal divisions with a 9th (Franklin) en route.

In short: it is reported Johnston's army is coming. In McClellan's opinion, that force in total plus Magruder might be larger than the detachment of the Federal army on the Peninsula. In that case he'd be outnumbered when they arrive unless additional forces were sent.

"In consequence of the loss of Blenker's division and the First Corps my force is possibly less than that of the enemy, while they have all the advantage of position."

"My force is" and "they have" clearly shows that the sentence is present tense. In short, McClellan is saying that Johnston has arrived with reinforcements, and McClellan is possibly outnumbered. That is how Lincoln would have read it, as well as how anyone else would have read it.

At no time while in front of Yorktown, was McClellan ever even close to being outnumbered.

 

[DanSBHawk]

A McClellan-led Overland Campaign would have resembled Halleck's 1862 crawl to Corinth, except longer and in slow-motion. Miles and miles and miles of siegeworks.

 

[Belfoured]

There's no reason to believe McClellan would not have attacked, had he had the forces to make it a good chance of success. Even if he were to be gun-shy in situations where the actual force ratio would have allowed him a close victory, the result of the Loudoun Valley campaign is such that that actually doesn't matter much - McClellan has, through dint of his own manoeuvre and Lee's actions, ended up in a situation where he has 3:1 or 4:1 odds of available strength around Culpeper. There is no heavily fortified position for Longstreet to use to defend himself, and his flanks are not anchored.

Unless you declare the man would never attack, then that's a situation in which it seems reasonable to say he would. And if Lee withdraws to Madison - as he said he would - then no battle happens there because Lee isn't willing to try conclusions with McClellan at such catastrophic odds.

But the result of that is that McClellan has nothing stopping him crossing the Rapidan. The only thing preventing him from moving straight to the North Anna is the need for supplies - and marching to gain an operational victory by going where the enemy isn't would seem to play into even what Caricature McClellan would like to do!

Unless it rains ...

 

[67th Tigers]

A McClellan-led Overland Campaign would have resembled Halleck's 1862 crawl to Corinth, except longer and in slow-motion. Miles and miles and miles of siegeworks.

Does he have Sherman and Grant, who were the ones who did the lions share of the entrenching?

 

[Saphroneth]

I'm not really sure why it would be expected that McClellan would dig in so much. He did it against fortified enemy positions where there was no easy way around them, but when there was a way around them (Williamsburg, for example) he just turned them.

Similarly he dug forts around Washington, which was to free up troops to operate in the field, and to protect his supply base (ditto) or in periods when the enemy is following up on Union retreat (that's Harrisons Landing).

On the advance with room to manoeuvre, he's unlikely to do it - it's not the kind of thing he actually did, hence why he doesn't do it between Yorktown and Richmond, or between Washington and Sharpsburg, or between the Potomac and Warrenton - though I agree that he'd dig in if he reached Richmond, or if there was a strong enemy position with anchored flanks that he couldn't just bypass by marching.

There just aren't many places to do that, en route to Richmond. Lee didn't find a spot he could block an enemy from bypassing it aside from Fredericksburg (with his whole army) or Cold Harbor/the Richmond Defences.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Does he have Sherman and Grant, who were the ones who did the lions share of the entrenching?

I'm not surprised that you would blame the subordinates rather than the commander. It's the same thing you do with McClellan.

 

[Bentonville]

He would have concluded, from intelligence reports, that Lee had a million men, backed up with a thousand M1A2 main battle tanks and several squadrons of A-10 Warthogs.

I concur.

 

[Bentonville]

What Would McClellan Have Done?

He would have asked for reinforcements then do nothing . His usual. The war may have concluded in time for the US entry into WWII.

Well you must admit he did retreat wnd hunker down before crying to Lu coln about troops.

 

[67th Tigers]

Well you must admit he did retreat wnd hunker down before crying to Lu coln about troops.

Indeed, he did retreat to the James when his supply base was lost, because he couldn't feed his army. Interestingly, in the same situation, Grant also retreated.

In January 1863, Grant attempted an overland advance against Vicksburg. Van Dorn's cavalry sacked his supply base at Holly Springs, meaning he couldn't feed his army. He retreated back to a point he could feed his army. Bizarrely, Grant ordered more retreats than McClellan, and yet it is McClellan that gets stick for it.

Both Grant and McClellan did, at times, state they were too weak to take to the offensive and they needed reinforcement. IMHO, both of them were right.

Grant and McClellan - more similar than many think...

 

[Saphroneth]

Well you must admit he did retreat wnd hunker down before crying to Lu coln about troops.

Well, he certainly did retreat when attacked by a superior army (in terms of size, Lee's Seven Days army is bigger than McClellan's - not as much bigger as McClellan said, but it is bigger), but only once his supply base was lost. He then moved to reopen supply, and waited for the reinforcements Lincoln had already promised him (that is, Lincoln promised him reinforcements during the fighting of the Seven Days).

Those reinforcements never actually arrived, so of course McClellan remains in place - at least, until he gets told the reinforcements aren't coming. He's actually resumed the advance when he's ordered off the Peninsula over his objections.

None of the conditions that would produce this are in play during the Loudoun Valley campaign:

1) Lee's army is not actually bigger. Even combined, it's not actually bigger.
2) McClellan's supply line is protected by an entire corps (11th) covering Thoroughfare Gap, and historically Jackon wasn't moving in that direction to attack it, nor was Lee telling him to. The supply line would not be in serious danger.
3) McClellan has recieved all the reinforcements he was promised (3rd Corps was arriving by rail at the time of his firing, and he'd got the others).

 

[Saphroneth]

An observation that may be useful - or informative, at least - in understanding McClellan is that a principle of military science is that a failed attack is damaging to the morale of the unit that did it and the formation to which it belongs, and this is more pronounced the more seriously the attack was pressed and the more complete the repulse (i.e. the less was gained for it). An individual failed attack is something that the morale of a unit can often survive, long term - it means they're exhausted for the day but can keep going afterwards - but a pattern of failed attacks is quickly corrosive to the morale and effectiveness of the unit.

This is useful to keep in mind as an explanation of why McClellan did or didn't launch attacks when he did or didn't do so.

 

[Belfoured]

An observation that may be useful - or informative, at least - in understanding McClellan is that a principle of military science is that a failed attack is damaging to the morale of the unit that did it and the formation to which it belongs, and this is more pronounced the more seriously the attack was pressed and the more complete the repulse (i.e. the less was gained for it). An individual failed attack is something that the morale of a unit can often survive, long term - it means they're exhausted for the day but can keep going afterwards - but a pattern of failed attacks is quickly corrosive to the morale and effectiveness of the unit.

This is useful to keep in mind as an explanation of why McClellan did or didn't launch attacks when he did or didn't do so.

That's "one principle of military science". As I'm certain you know, there are many others, and some subordinate the one you've isolated. Eisenhower was presumably aware of that one on June 5, 1944, to the extent that he drafted an alternative "press release" in the event the landings failed. As we know, he still went forward.