Hooker quite capable at Brandy Station

[rpkennedy]

Thank you for commenting. I am compiling a "Stonewall Butcher Bill: Here is an excerpt.
33rd North Carolina Infantry Regiment
The regiment brought 480 men to the field. It marched to Chancellorsville on the 2nd and that evening deployed as skirmishers on both sides of the Plank Road, coming under heavy fire from both sides. In three days of fighting they lost 4 officers and 28 enlisted men killed, 14 officers and 87 enlisted men wounded, and 2 officers and 66 enlisted men missing; a total of 201 casualties, or 42%. Their target, the 11th Corps which they so "victoriously and brilliantly routed" has a 22% casualty rate. Of the 11,000 men of the 11th there were 217 killed, 1,218 wounded, and 972 captured or missing. That is 22% casualty, the exact same percentage for which the entire Army of Northern Virginia suffered in the same battle. Where is the wisdom in marching 30,000 men for 12 hours only to attack the "B" team of the AOP an hour before sundown. North Carolina paid the "butcher's bill" at Chancellorsville, but every Confederate state had significant losses there, except Bobbie Lee's Virginians. The entire bill is steep and I am not done putting all the numbers together. A lot of Confederate fan boys love to say "but we held Hazel Grove". Tell that to Governor Zebulon Vance.
My source https://civilwarintheeast.com/confederate-armies/csa-may-63/anv-may-63/2nd-corps-may-63/

40% of the Eleventh Corps' casualties were missing and captured. I would say that it's pretty clear that they were overrun and many got out as quickly as they could. There's no question that some officers managed to put together some lines of resistance but the losses on both sides show that the resistance was fairly minimal. More than 90% of the Confederate casualties from Jackson's column would occur on May 3rd, not during their assault against Howard. And if we're looking at officer losses:

Brigadier General Charles Devens, Jr., wounded
Lt. Colonel Charles Ashby, 54th New York, captured
Colonel Charles Glanz, 153rd Pennsylvania, captured
Colonel William H. Noble, 17th Connecticut, wounded
Colonel William P. Richardson, 25th Ohio, wounded
Colonel Robert Reily, 75th Ohio, killed
Colonel Seraphim Meyer, 107th Ohio, wounded and captured
Lt. Colonel Louis Hartmann, 29th New York, wounded
Colonel Patrick H. Jones, 154th New York, wounded
Lt. Colonel William Moore, 73rd Pennsylvania, wounded
Colonel Frederick Hecker, 82nd Illinois, wounded
Major Ferdinand H. Rolshausen, 82nd Illinois, wounded
Captian Frederick Braun, 58th New York, mortally wounded
Colonel Elias Peissner, 119th New York, killed

And that is just the field and staff officers. I'd say that the brigades that bore the brunt of Jackson's attack suffered pretty heavily while inflicting relatively few casualties.

Ryan

 

[Belfoured]

40% of the Eleventh Corps' casualties were missing and captured. I would say that it's pretty clear that they were overrun and many got out as quickly as they could. There's no question that some officers managed to put together some lines of resistance but the losses on both sides show that the resistance was fairly minimal. More than 90% of the Confederate casualties from Jackson's column would occur on May 3rd, not during their assault against Howard. And if we're looking at officer losses:

Brigadier General Charles Devens, Jr., wounded
Lt. Colonel Charles Ashby, 54th New York, captured
Colonel Charles Glanz, 153rd Pennsylvania, captured
Colonel William H. Noble, 17th Connecticut, wounded
Colonel William P. Richardson, 25th Ohio, wounded
Colonel Robert Reily, 75th Ohio, killed
Colonel Seraphim Meyer, 107th Ohio, wounded and captured
Lt. Colonel Louis Hartmann, 29th New York, wounded
Colonel Patrick H. Jones, 154th New York, wounded
Lt. Colonel William Moore, 73rd Pennsylvania, wounded
Colonel Frederick Hecker, 82nd Illinois, wounded
Major Ferdinand H. Rolshausen, 82nd Illinois, wounded
Captian Frederick Braun, 58th New York, mortally wounded
Colonel Elias Peissner, 119th New York, killed

And that is just the field and staff officers. I'd say that the brigades that bore the brunt of Jackson's attack suffered pretty heavily while inflicting relatively few casualties.

Ryan

To follow up a few of the regimental commanders did their best to align to meet the attack after their messages to the rear were ignored but it was a "drop in the bucket" against Jackson's force. It wasn't really possible to stay for long in that position and inflict much in the way of casualties.

 

[TLHS]

But Stuart still kept the Yankees out of the Shenandoah at Upperville, didn't he?

Backing up to June 9th, a telegram was sent at 9:00 PM from Bealeton to Pleasanton and Hooker in Falmouth that that afternoon the 1st Maine Cavalry had captured Stuart's saddlebags with his order from Gen. Lee to stall the Union reconnaissance now south of the Potomac. This was to provide about four days time for Lee's Army to move north, west of the mountains, to Harrisburg. This resulted in the skirmishes of Aldie, Middleburg, Upperville, etc. A telegram response from a commanding officer back to Hooker was a chilling: "He will not succeed". It certainly did not help Gen. Lee in his clandestine plan for Stuart and his Chief of Staff Von Borcker to report to Gen. Lee and Richmond that "Stuart's baggage was safely sent back to Culpeper and/or Gordonsville for safety" before the penetration of his headquarters on Fleetwood Hill. Hooker clearly won Brandy Station and his advance knowledge possibly influenced Meade' victory at Gettysburg.
Could it be that there could be something more to Longestreet's criticism of Stuart than a few pair of shoes?

 

[Belfoured]

Backing up to June 9th, a telegram was sent at 9:00 PM from Bealeton to Pleasanton and Hooker in Falmouth that that afternoon the 1st Maine Cavalry had captured Stuart's saddlebags with his order from Gen. Lee to stall the Union reconnaissance now south of the Potomac. This was to provide about four days time for Lee's Army to move north, west of the mountains, to Harrisburg. This resulted in the skirmishes of Aldie, Middleburg, Upperville, etc. A telegram response from a commanding officer back to Hooker was a chilling: "He will not succeed". It certainly did not help Gen. Lee in his clandestine plan for Stuart and his Chief of Staff Von Borcker to report to Gen. Lee and Richmond that "Stuart's baggage was safely sent back to Culpeper and/or Gordonsville for safety" before the penetration of his headquarters on Fleetwood Hill. Hooker clearly won Brandy Station and his advance knowledge possibly influenced Meade' victory at Gettysburg.
Could it be that there could be something more to Longestreet's criticism of Stuart than a few pair of shoes?

Hooker clearly won Brandy Station and his advance knowledge possibly influenced Meade' victory at Gettysburg.

Where for the love of [ ] is this stuff coming from? We have the benefit of a poster who is the recognized authority on the Federal cavalry in the Virginia theater and who has written an excellent book on Brandy Station. His posts here are free - I don't understand why they appear to just get ignored.

 

[TLHS]

Where for the love of [ ] is this stuff coming from? We have the benefit of a poster who is the recognized authority on the Federal cavalry in the Virginia theater and who has written an excellent book on Brandy Station. His posts here are free - I don't understand why they appear to just get ignored.

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

Backing up to June 9th, a telegram was sent at 9:00 PM from Bealeton to Pleasanton and Hooker in Falmouth that that afternoon the 1st Maine Cavalry had captured Stuart's saddlebags with his order from Gen. Lee to stall the Union reconnaissance now south of the Potomac. This was to provide about four days time for Lee's Army to move north, west of the mountains, to Harrisburg. This resulted in the skirmishes of Aldie, Middleburg, Upperville, etc. A telegram response from a commanding officer back to Hooker was a chilling: "He will not succeed". It certainly did not help Gen. Lee in his clandestine plan for Stuart and his Chief of Staff Von Borcker to report to Gen. Lee and Richmond that "Stuart's baggage was safely sent back to Culpeper and/or Gordonsville for safety" before the penetration of his headquarters on Fleetwood Hill. Hooker clearly won Brandy Station and his advance knowledge possibly influenced Meade' victory at Gettysburg.
Could it be that there could be something more to Longestreet's criticism of Stuart than a few pair of shoes?

Except that this didn't happen. Pleasonton was incapable of telling the truth about anything, and he lied about this too.

And no, Brandy Station was most assuredly NOT a Union victory, not by any conventional measure of victory. Stuart held the battlefield at the end of the day, and he prevented Pleasonton from carrying out his orders, which was the destruction or dispersal of the large concentration of Confederate cavalry in Culpeper County. Please explain how that somehow constitutes a Union victory, because I am dumbfounded that someone actually thinks it was.

I'm curious to know what clandestine plan you refer to. Stuart didn't receive orders to move until after the fights in the Loudoun Valley, June 17-21. And he got routed at Upperville on June 21.

Also, Hooker's actions in being purely reactive--rather than proactive--suggest that there was no intelligence, such as you suggest. He would have moved with alacrity, just as McClellan did after General Orders 191 was found in 1862. Instead, everything was reactive. Read something with some substance, please.

I have been studying Brandy Station for about 30 years now. I've written two books about it and it plays a prominent role in three others of mine. I think I know what I'm talking about.

 

[nc native]

Stuart was in command of Jackson's corps during the fighting on May 3rd 1863 after both Jackson and A. P. Hill were wounded. The fighting that day was some of the most intense and bloody of the Civil War. The combined casualties that day were over 22,000 men, almost evenly divided between both armies, making May 3rd 1863 the second bloodiest day of the Civil War.

 

[TLHS]

Respectfully, this "stuff" is coming from primary source documents such as original telegrams covering a week or two before June 9th and daily, a few weeks following. Most all are published in the ORs, as well as a record of a First Maine Reunion in 1872 where Judson Kilpatrick stated that if it were not for their capture of Stuart's orders, Gettysburg may have turned out differently. I am new to this, and I am not familiar with the poster who is the "recognized authority

Except that this didn't happen. Pleasonton was incapable of telling the truth about anything, and he lied about this too.

And no, Brandy Station was most assuredly NOT a Union victory, not by any conventional measure of victory. Stuart held the battlefield at the end of the day, and he prevented Pleasonton from carrying out his orders, which was the destruction or dispersal of the large concentration of Confederate cavalry in Culpeper County. Please explain how that somehow constitutes a Confederate victory.

I'm curious to know what clandestine plan you refer to. Stuart didn't receive orders to move until after the fights in the Loudoun Valley, June 17-21. And he got routed at Upperville on June 21.

Also, Hooker's actions in being purely reactive--rather than proactive--suggest that there was no intelligence, such as you suggest. He would have moved with alacrity, just as McClellan did after General Orders 191 was found in 1862. Instead, everything was reactive. Read something with some substance, please.

I have been studying Brandy Station for about 30 years now. I've written two books about it and it plays a prominent role in three others of mine. I think I know what I'm talking about.

Respectfully, I am new to this and am not trying to be disrespectful of anyone. In my post, I am only trying to participate in a friendly conversation by providing information from ONLY primary sources. In no way, Sir, do I intend to challenge your authority. My primary sources are: copies of original telegrams from the field to Hooker at Headquarters in Falmouth daily, about two weeks before the 9th and daily, about two weeks following. If you check the ORs for these dates, you will find most of them documented. Judson Kilpatrick spoke at a 1st Maine Reunion in 1872 and thanked the 1st Maine for the capture of the orders, which possibly shortened the War at Gettysburg by the advance knowledge of Gen. Lee's movements north. Also, in the ORs you will find a telegram that reads, that once the Orders were captured, the Union Troopers immediately retired from the field back across Beverly's Ford, and considered "Mission Accomplished". That is why I think Hooker won. I can not speak to Pleasanton's lack of honesty. Please consider looking at the contradiction in the ORs about "the baggage" situation reported by Stuart, von Borcker, and the Union (I believe Pleasanton).
Lastly, I am only trying to participate. Who knows, we may end up out of the box about Brandy Station and Gettysburg?
Maybe in order to avoid monopolizing this site, maybe we can meet for lunch one day to discuss. I am either in Warrenton or Williamsburg routinely.

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

Respectfully, this "stuff" is coming from primary source documents such as original telegrams covering a week or two before June 9th and daily, a few weeks following. Most all are published in the ORs, as well as a record of a First Maine Reunion in 1872 where Judson Kilpatrick stated that if it were not for their capture of Stuart's orders, Gettysburg may have turned out differently. I am new to this, and I am not familiar with the poster who is the "recognized authority

Respectfully, I am new to this and am not trying to be disrespectful of anyone. In my post, I am only trying to participate in a friendly conversation by providing information from ONLY primary sources. In no way, Sir, do I intend to challenge your authority. My primary sources are: copies of original telegrams from the field to Hooker at Headquarters in Falmouth daily, about two weeks before the 9th and daily, about two weeks following. If you check the ORs for these dates, you will find most of them documented. Judson Kilpatrick spoke at a 1st Maine Reunion in 1872 and thanked the 1st Maine for the capture of the orders, which possibly shortened the War at Gettysburg by the advance knowledge of Gen. Lee's movements north. Also, in the ORs you will find a telegram that reads, that once the Orders were captured, the Union Troopers immediately retired from the field back across Beverly's Ford, and considered "Mission Accomplished". That is why I think Hooker won. I can not speak to Pleasanton's lack of honesty. Please consider looking at the contradiction in the ORs about "the baggage" situation reported by Stuart, von Borcker, and the Union (I believe Pleasanton).
Lastly, I am only trying to participate. Who knows, we may end up out of the box about Brandy Station and Gettysburg?
Maybe in order to avoid monopolizing this site, maybe we can meet for lunch one day to discuss. I am either in Warrenton or Williamsburg routinely.

Trust me--I have looked at all of this in detail over the course of everything that I have written. We welcome your participation--me included--but understand that the very knowledgeable folks here will challenge statements like the one you made, which simply is not supported by the available evidence.

By the time the 1st Maine reached Fleetwood Hill, which was after Wyndham's attacks failed, they never got close enough to Stuart's tent to have captured anything of the sort. And again, Hooker's actions are purely reactive and not proactive. They do not reflect the idea that he had knowledge of Lee's plans at all.

Scott Mingus and I have published a two-volume set titled If We Are Striking for Pennsylvania: The Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of the Potomac March to Gettysburg that covers the 30 days prior to Gettysburg in greater detail than anyone else has ever done (that's a fact; it's not me blowing my own horn, which I am loath to do). We looked at well over 1000 sources in the process of writing those two volumes, and I have seen NOTHING that suggests that Hooker had any advance knowledge of Lee's intentions, let alone that such "knowledge" in any way impacted a single decision made by George Meade (and I have a book on Meade as army commander that will be published next year; I have studied these events in a great amount of detail over a period of a lot of years) at Gettysburg. May I suggest that you read it?

 

[TLHS]

Trust me--I have looked at all of this in detail over the course of everything that I have written. We welcome your participation--me included--but understand that the very knowledgeable folks here will challenge statements like the one you made, which simply is not supported by the available evidence.

By the time the 1st Maine reached Fleetwood Hill, which was after Wyndham's attacks failed, they never got close enough to Stuart's tent to have captured anything of the sort. And again, Hooker's actions are purely reactive and not proactive. They do not reflect the idea that he had knowledge of Lee's plans at all.

Scott Mingus and I have published a two-volume set titled If We Are Striking for Pennsylvania: The Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of the Potomac March to Gettysburg that covers the 30 days prior to Gettysburg in greater detail than anyone else has ever done (that's a fact; it's not me blowing my own horn, which I am loath to do). We looked at well over 1000 sources in the process of writing those two volumes, and I have seen NOTHING that suggests that Hooker had any advance knowledge of Lee's intentions, let alone that such "knowledge" in any way impacted a single decision made by George Meade (and I have a book on Meade as army commander that will be published next year; I have studied these events in a great amount of detail over a period of a lot of years) at Gettysburg. May I suggest that you read it?

 

[TLHS]

Thank you Sir.
I need to ask of you, in your research, did you run into the primary source hard copy telegrams referred to with Pleasanton's hand written comments? Also, in the ORs, how do you judge the apparent contradiction of Stuart/von Borcker's report on that "baggage" vs. the Union report about said "baggage"? Also, I think in 1872, the statement rendered by Judson Kilpatrick about the "baggage" of that Confederate General can not be ignored. Believe me, being seventh generation Virginian growing up and still residing within a Cannon shot of Kelly's Ford and Brandy Station, I never want to see, after 77 years of life, one of my heros, Maj.Gen. J.E.B. Stuart's good name dishonored.

What am I to do, if I can not rely on primary sources from 1862 and 1872? I refuse to be a revisionist and never will be!

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

Thank you Sir.
I need to ask of you, in your research, did you run into the primary source hard copy telegrams referred to with Pleasanton's hand written comments? Also, in the ORs, how do you judge the apparent contradiction of Stuart/von Borcker's report on that "baggage" vs. the Union report about said "baggage"? Also, I think in 1872, the statement rendered by Judson Kilpatrick about the "baggage" of that Confederate General can not be ignored. Believe me, being seventh generation Virginian growing up and still residing within a Cannon shot of Kelly's Ford and Brandy Station, I never want to see, after 77 years of life, one of my heros, Maj.Gen. J.E.B. Stuart's good name dishonored.

What am I to do, if I can not rely on primary sources from 1862 and 1872? I refuse to be a revisionist and never will be!

I'll address your Kilpatrick point first. The comment was made seven years after the end of the war and also was intended to make the vets feel good at their reunion. One has to be careful with post-war reminiscences--that fish had a tendency to go from the size of a minnow to the size of a shark. There is no evidence that anything of Stuart's headquarters was captured, particularly by the 1st Maine. It never got close to his headquarters tent before it was repulsed, and I repeat what I said earlier: nothing of Hooker's actions begins to suggest that he was being anything but completely reactive to Lee's movement north. Hooker tended to be aggressive (when not concussed) and I can assure you that had he obtained the sort of intel that you suggest he got, he would have been aggressive and proactive, not entirely reactive.

As for the supposed contradiction: I believe Stuart for the reasons stated above.

You're so busy looking at the trees, you have lost sight of the forest. Look at the big picture, and in particular, Hooker's very tentative response to the movements of the ANV. He stayed in place after Brandy Station instead of moving aggressively. Why? Because Pleasonton did an absolutely abysmal job of providing timely and accurate intelligence. That's the reality of the situation.

I want to suggest a book to you. This extremely groundbreaking work dug deeply into the files of the AoP's Bureau of Military Information, which goes into great detail of just what a horrid job Pleasonton did of providing Hooker with timely and accurate intelligence. It's a great book, and I can't say enough good things about it. This is it: https://www.amazon.com/dp/0395742811/?tag=civilwartalkc-20

 

[Belfoured]

Respectfully, this "stuff" is coming from primary source documents such as original telegrams covering a week or two before June 9th and daily, a few weeks following. Most all are published in the ORs, as well as a record of a First Maine Reunion in 1872 where Judson Kilpatrick stated that if it were not for their capture of Stuart's orders, Gettysburg may have turned out differently. I am new to this, and I am not familiar with the poster who is the "recognized authority

Respectfully, I am new to this and am not trying to be disrespectful of anyone. In my post, I am only trying to participate in a friendly conversation by providing information from ONLY primary sources. In no way, Sir, do I intend to challenge your authority. My primary sources are: copies of original telegrams from the field to Hooker at Headquarters in Falmouth daily, about two weeks before the 9th and daily, about two weeks following. If you check the ORs for these dates, you will find most of them documented. Judson Kilpatrick spoke at a 1st Maine Reunion in 1872 and thanked the 1st Maine for the capture of the orders, which possibly shortened the War at Gettysburg by the advance knowledge of Gen. Lee's movements north. Also, in the ORs you will find a telegram that reads, that once the Orders were captured, the Union Troopers immediately retired from the field back across Beverly's Ford, and considered "Mission Accomplished". That is why I think Hooker won. I can not speak to Pleasanton's lack of honesty. Please consider looking at the contradiction in the ORs about "the baggage" situation reported by Stuart, von Borcker, and the Union (I believe Pleasanton).
Lastly, I am only trying to participate. Who knows, we may end up out of the box about Brandy Station and Gettysburg?
Maybe in order to avoid monopolizing this site, maybe we can meet for lunch one day to discuss. I am either in Warrenton or Williamsburg routinely.

Fair enough. The poster I referred to is Eric W. I think you'll find that he has immersed himself in this area for so long and so intensively that he literally has forgotten more than 25 or 30 of us collectively have ever known about it. His 2010 book on Brandy Station is excellent and relatively inexpensive. Plus what he posts here is insightful and free (at least for now ... )

 

[TLHS]

Thank you for your proper comment on the post war honoring the Vets; they all deserve that recognition of that time and any other service.

Still am not satisfied that one should completely ignore those telegrams and the ORs as they were not all generated by Pleasanton.

Also, Stuart and/or Von Borcke's baggage report to Lee can not (in my opinion) stand as having more credibility than the Union Report about the baggage containing the Orders. They can not be mutually exclusive, only one or none can be true.

I should say that at the June Gettysburg show, I ran into a recent member of the Brandy Station Foundation whereby I discussed my research with him about that "baggage". His comment back to me was a speaker presented at their last Tour the same information.
In parting, I thank you for this exchange and look foward to reading your next book.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Did Union cavalry possibly capture someone else's baggage that they mistook for Stuart's?

Given Kilpatrick's reputation, I'm kind of surprised the 1st Maine - or any other regiment - invited him to a reunion. I'd certainly take his claims with more than the usual number of grains of salt.

 

[TLHS]

Really don't think so due to the various references to the same claim that it was Stuart's. I also suggest that one read the Regimental History of the 1st Maine about the detailed activity of the 9th, which had no connection with Pleasanton or Kilpatrick at the time it was written. My question continues: After 161 years since the primary source actual telegrams of day to day reporting such as Lee's troop and artillery strength by regiment, reported by a Confederate Sargeant turn coat, June 8th reconnaissance of the green grass across the river in Culpeper County where the rebal horses are grazing, day to day report of challenging Stuart's order to be a decoy to delay the Union Troopers, description of engagement with Stuart through Aldie, Middleburg, Upperville, etc.; I would have to content there is continuity in the reports through the telegrams as a whole. These were all in field reports back to Hooker at Headquarters via strung wire from Bealeton to Falmouth. I don't think it reasonable to take one telegram out of 20 or so and discount it, as ALL found their way into the Official Record that we all rely on.
Also, that critical one at 9:00 PM on the 9th was repeated by two or three other contemporary accounts. There is Truth; however, unless more contemporary information comes to light, we may never know for certain.

Did Union cavalry possibly capture someone else's baggage that they mistook for Stuart's?

Given Kilpatrick's reputation, I'm kind of surprised the 1st Maine - or any other regiment - invited him to a reunion. I'd certainly take his claims with more than the usual number of grains of salt.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

@TLHS your questions are very specific about certain Union telegrams and contradictory information from a Confederate telegram, but your expectation seems to that forum members will individually look for said telegraphs in the OR and find all of the same telegraphs you're referring to.

I refuse to be a revisionist and never will be!

What is "revisionist" in this context supposed to mean? Especially since you clearly mean it as a pejorative.

 

[TLHS]

Sorry to not be more clear. What I should have said is, there are about 15 or so daily Union telegrams reproduced in the ORs, with the exception of one or two. There are no Confederate telegrams. Stuart and von Borcke's reports concerning the safety of the "baggage" taken to Culpeper and/or Gordonsville published in the ORs is in direct contradiction to the telegram sent to Hooker about the "baggage" being captured and then reproduced in the ORs.
One may wish to review all reports, etc. in the ORs for the period June 1 to July 1, for the Confederate informer on troop strength, 1st Maine activity on the 9th, and claim of captured saddlebags that conflict with Stuart and Von Borcke's report on same.

Concerning "revisionist", I don't think I should question something reported by the actual participants 161 years ago. Just go with the primary sources I still think is best. However, how do we today judge which one is correct since both reports of those bags are primary sources?

 

[10th Michigan Infantry]

Need proof? Here's an example of an army CO who was "brimming with confidence" before a battle: "our enemy must either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his defenses and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him."

Care to guess who the CO was? Care to guess which battle followed?

If I remember correctly Hooker stated "may God have mercy on General Lee for I will have none." We know how well that went for him at Chancellorsville.

 

[10th Michigan Infantry]

I don't believe the ANV conducted any more night activities after Jackson's fiasco at Chancellorsville.

Second Winchester, Culps Hill, some of the fighting in the Wilderness, and several other battles were fought in darkness. This is pure fiction.