Why Did Lee Attack at Gettysburg?

[WJC]

Third, while he knows he is missing Stuart and his intelligence gathering ability what he can't expect is Longstreet's intransigence

While I agree with virtually all of your post, I believe this particular excerpt is yet another example of the 'Lost Cause' slander against Longstreet. We have covered this in multiple threads, so no reason to go into detail here.

 

[WJC]

I've not seen reports of Confederate infantry mowed down with cannister at Gettysburg.

The role of the U. S. artillery at Gettysburg (and elsewhere) has been largely overlooked.
You may want to read David Shultz, Double Canister at Ten Yards": The Federal Artillery and the Repulse of Pickett's Charge, July 3, 1863. (El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2016).

 

[PrivateBrooke]

He attacked because his enemy was in front of him, and he had a chance to beat them, at least on day 2. Though I long believed the main attack on day 3 was a bit foolhardy, I can't say I entirely blame him there either.

 

[Jamieva]

Lee is a naturally aggressive commander. He was coming off July 1 where they had driven 2 corps all the way through the town and heavily thrashed both of them in the process.

He is limited on his information due to lack of Stuart. He's in PA, not in VA. He cannot sit there forever that far from his base of supplies and wait for Meade to attack him.

If you look at the troop dispositions of the ANV, they're not in a defensive position at all. The 3 corps are not in a optimal position to assist each other, use interior lines etc. So if you want Lee to go on the defense after July 1, then he has to pull back and totally re-draw where Ewell is etc. Doing all of that totally gives up the gains of July 1 and makes the casualties of that day truly lost for no reason.

 

[Gasmask134]

If this wasn't an American Civil War forum we could ask why does anyone in any war bother attacking anybody in a fortified position at all? But if we focus on Gettysburg, in addition to what others have said here (particularly Lee being an aggressive commander), consider the following:

1. Lee has beaten the Army of the Potomac several times by this point. While I have no way to confirm it, I wouldn't be surprised if Lee (and the AoNV as a whole) was feeling a sense of invincibility, even if it is just a little bit.

2. If Lee doesn't attack then he either leaves PA due to a lack of supplies without accomplishing much or becomes "Hannibal" to the North, bumbling around "Italia" while Union armies make advances elsewhere (admittedly not the best analogy, but I hope it makes sense).

 

[drezac]

Regarding artillery, in the OR there is a report on artillery armament for the Army of the Cumberland as of June 30th 1863. With very few exceptions, batteries were armed with one section of 12-pdr napoleons, and 2 sections of rifles ( each section could be james, parrot, or 3" ordnance rifle). I think it would be reasonable to expect that at least some ( if not most) of the batteries at Gettysburg would have a similar armament. Tactically, this makes sense, as a rifle is not necessarily better than a smooth bore, they each have their appropriate place depending on the situation. Gettysburg is a prime example of where you would wanted to have both.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Lee's attack on July 2 was a good decision. He sought to roll up what he thought was an exposed left flank. If he had an accurate understanding of Union unit placement, Hood hadn't gone down, and the AOTP hadn't fought so hard with reinforcements hastily rushed where needed then Lee probably wins yet another battle.

July 3 is the real mistake because it involved a headlong assault at the Union center. While Lee had reasons to think it could/would work, it was probably his single worst military decision of the war.

 

[rpkennedy]

Regarding artillery, in the OR there is a report on artillery armament for the Army of the Cumberland as of June 30th 1863. With very few exceptions, batteries were armed with one section of 12-pdr napoleons, and 2 sections of rifles ( each section could be james, parrot, or 3" ordnance rifle). I think it would be reasonable to expect that at least some ( if not most) of the batteries at Gettysburg would have a similar armament. Tactically, this makes sense, as a rifle is not necessarily better than a smooth bore, they each have their appropriate place depending on the situation. Gettysburg is a prime example of where you would wanted to have both.

With only 2 exceptions (IIRC), Union batteries in the AotP consisted of one type of gun by the time of Gettysburg.

Correction: only 1 battery had more than 1 gun type.

Ryan

 

[Carronade]

We have to look beyond the immediate situation of the two armies around Gettysburg. Overall the Confederacy was slowly but steadily losing the war. Even Lee's victories like Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville only managed to maintain a stalemate in the east while their position was eroding everywhere else. They needed a decisive victory to turn the tide, and in the aftermath of Chancellorsville they had two basic options, shift troops from the ANV to the west to try to retrieve the situation there, or seek a decisive victory in the east.

 

[drezac]

With only 2 exceptions (IIRC), Union batteries in the AotP consisted of one type of gun by the time of Gettysburg.

Ryan

thanks for that information. I would like to find a similar report for the AotP that I found for AofC.

 

[Will Carry]

I am still haunted by the letter a Pennsylvania farmer wrote to a relative about watching the Army of Northern Virginia march past his farm. It was published in Civil War Times Illustrated back in the 1980s. The farmer expected to see giants! Ferocious killing machines. This vaunted Army of Southern boys that had been defeating union armies for almost three years. He said the smell hit him first. You could smell them coming. He described them as ragged scare crows, bare footed
a haggardly. Could it be that this army was living on it's reputation? You can't eat a reputation. Maybe Lee knew that his army may never be stronger and the Yankees were getting stronger every day. Maybe he knew he was ill and would never be stronger. As I understand it he was unable to ride a horse and had to ride in a wagon. I think he had heart disease, but I am not doctor.

 

[rpkennedy]

thanks for that information. I would like to find a similar report for the AotP that I found for AofC.

I believe that much of this information can be found in Henry Hunt's report about Gettysburg and in the other artillery returns for the army. I can whip together a list of what guns each battery had and PM it to you.

Ryan

 

[Carronade]

With only 2 exceptions (IIRC), Union batteries in the AotP consisted of one type of gun by the time of Gettysburg.

Correction: only 1 battery had more than 1 gun type.

Ryan

It makes sense that batteries would have uniform equipment, particularly that all the guns be capable of engaging the same targets at the same ranges. Ammunition resupply was usually carried out by pulling batteries out of the line (this also gave the crews a bit of a break). With mixed gun types, one would have to either break up the battery or pull out guns which had not yet fired off their supply.

Getting back to @drezac's post, it might make more sense for the artillery brigades or battalions to have batteries of both rifles and smoothbores. I would also guess the army artillery reserve had a higher proportion of rifles.

p.s. "Brigade" seems like an odd term for a unit of several batteries, commonly commanded by a captain. I think the Confederate "battalion" was more appropriate.

 

[rpkennedy]

It makes sense that batteries would have uniform equipment, particularly that all the guns be capable of engaging the same targets at the same ranges. Ammunition resupply was usually carried out by pulling batteries out of the line (this also gave the crews a bit of a break). With mixed gun types, one would have to either break up the battery or pull out guns which had not yet fired off their supply.

Getting back to @drezac's post, it might make more sense for the artillery brigades or battalions to have batteries of both rifles and smoothbores. I would also guess the army artillery reserve had a higher proportion of rifles.

p.s. "Brigade" seems like an odd term for a unit of several batteries, commonly commanded by a captain. I think the Confederate "battalion" was more appropriate.

Henry Hunt called them "brigades" in order to loosen up command for promotions for his officers. The artillery was notoriously stingy in giving out promotions and the branch was losing talented men to cavalry and infantry units where they could command as a colonel. Unfortunately for Hunt, he was unsuccessful and until the end of the war, talented and ambitious young artillery lieutenants and captains were leaving for regimental commands. It was a good effort on his part, though.

Ryan

 

[Green Owl]

I have long wondered why Lee decided to attack the fortified Union line at Gettysburg on Days 2 and 3. He had, after all, previously witnessed the carnage imposed on infantry assaulting fortified lines, in battles such as Malvern Hill, Fredericksburg and Second Manassas. Military historians claim that his objective on both days was to penetrate the Union line, roll it up and drive the Union Army off the field. Yet even if successful, the human cost of such an attack would have made any further operations after the battle difficult, if not impossible. Longstreet claims in his memoirs that prior to the invasion of Pennsylvania, he obtained Lee's agreement to stand on the tactical defensive when they encountered the Union Army, but this is clearly not what happened. It just doesn't make sense!

I think the answer is rather complex and may well never be known for the only person who really knows is Robert E Lee.

However some things can be said.

First he had a really good day on Day One. Victory looks to be within his grasp. Maybe it is chimerical but it certainly looks like he had a chance to destroy the Union army. Indeed as Day Two dawns it looks like he still has that opportunity for what scouting reports he has suggest that the Union left flank is in the air (See the various threads on the subject such as https://civilwartalk.com/threads/i-dont-understand-lees-orders-for-day-2.148046/ - There are many more) That means he can perhaps repeat Chancellorsville, this time with his dependable old warhorse Longstreet in the role of Jackson.

Of course it doesnt turn out like that.

Second, I also think we have to remember that by inclination Lee was an aggressive General and I think Gettysburg is the price Lee ends up paying for something that has previously worked well for him.

Third, while he knows he is missing Stuart and his intelligence gathering ability what he can't expect is Longstreet's intransigence and the sub standard performance of a number of his subordinates.

Fourth, Lee may well not have been feeling very well. There is certainly some evidence to suggest that. Imagine trying to command so many people while under the weather.

goo

 

[Green Owl]

I think the answer is rather complex and may well never be known for the only person who really knows is Robert E Lee.

However some things can be said.

First he had a really good day on Day One. Victory looks to be within his grasp. Maybe it is chimerical but it certainly looks like he had a chance to destroy the Union army. Indeed as Day Two dawns it looks like he still has that opportunity for what scouting reports he has suggest that the Union left flank is in the air (See the various threads on the subject such as https://civilwartalk.com/threads/i-dont-understand-lees-orders-for-day-2.148046/ - There are many more) That means he can perhaps repeat Chancellorsville, this time with his dependable old warhorse Longstreet in the role of Jackson.

Of course it doesnt turn out like that.

Second, I also think we have to remember that by inclination Lee was an aggressive General and I think Gettysburg is the price Lee ends up paying for something that has previously worked well for him.

Third, while he knows he is missing Stuart and his intelligence gathering ability what he can't expect is Longstreet's intransigence and the sub standard performance of a number of his subordinates.

Fourth, Lee may well not have been feeling very well. There is certainly some evidence to suggest that. Imagine trying to command so many people while under the weather.

 

[Green Owl]

Good points; I think the most likely is the last one; not feeling well. Lee subsequently suffered from heart disease. Perhaps the heat and arrhythmia clouded his judgement.

 

[Green Owl]

Back to the actual topic of the thread. As pointed out, the Union position wasn't fortified.

On July 1 Lee enjoyed a great victory, defeating and nearly destroying two corps of the Army of the Potomac and forcing a retreat through the town onto Cemetery Hill. This came almost two months after his victory at Chancellorsville.

On July 2, Lee had the following choices:

1. Retreat
2. Maneuver
3. Stay in place
4. Attack

He considered each alternative carefully and came to the logical decision that attack was his best option. He was trying to win the war, after all, and a retreat would not do that. Maneuvering without cavalry was too dangerous. Staying in place was dangerous as well, since the Union Army was getting stronger with time while he was not going to get any stronger. Attack, then, was his best option for July 2.

On that day, he came very close to winning. The Union line was almost broken in several places, and only the last second arrival of new troops in various places was able to stave off Union defeat.

On July 3, he had the same options:

1. Retreat
2. Maneuver
3. Stay in place
4. Attack.

Again, he considered each alternative carefully.
Retreat would not help him win the war.
He now had Stuart's cavalry to help with maneuver, but he needed to know what road system he would use, which he didn't know and didn't have time to find out.
He still would not get any stronger by staying in place, while Union reinforcements were still coming and the Union force would continue to get stronger. Additionally, his foraging was now limited, having cleaned out the area where he was. Staying there much longer would not do.

So he decided once again, logically, that attack was his best option, remembering his men had broken the Union line two days before and had almost broken the Union line again in several places the day before.

 

[Green Owl]

Why not simply take Long streets advice and move around the Union position southwest towards Washington? Meade would have followed and been forced to attack. Given a strong defensive position, there is no reason Lee could not have been able to score victory. Remember, Meade had prepared just such a defensive position at Pipe's Creek.

 

[cash]

Why not simply take Long streets advice and move around the Union position southwest towards Washington? Meade would have followed and been forced to attack. Given a strong defensive position, there is no reason Lee could not have been able to score victory. Remember, Meade had prepared just such a defensive position at Pipe's Creek.

That's the maneuver option. He couldn't maneuver on July 2 because he had no cavalry to screen his movement and find out where the Union army was. He couldn't maneuver on July 3 because he had no idea about the road system, which would have to be scouted.

It's easy to say just maneuver around, and it was very easy for Longstreet to say it, since he had no responsibility for the safety of the army when it was on the move. Lee, however, couldn't just pick up and move. He had to ensure he had a safe route for his army to travel so it wouldn't be attacked on the move when it was weakest. And which strong defensive position would he have used? Lee had no idea where this mythical strong position would be located. Again, it's easy for Longstreet to say, "we'll just go find one" because he didn't have the responsibility for finding one. Lee, however, would have that responsibility. Lee wasn't on the distribution list for the Pipe Creek Circular, so he had no idea what the Pipe Creek Line was or where it was.

And you're assuming Meade allows Lee to maneuver between him and Washington. Meade's orders specified he was to always remain between Lee and Washington/Baltimore. Meade had his cavalry as well as signal stations set up in the surrounding area and would be able to tell when Lee was trying to maneuver to the south.

Such a move was fraught with danger and would likely have failed.