Which Way Did They Go?

[1950lemans]

This is a "how come?" question.
In reading about the Vicksburg Campaign, the rebels were constantly beset by faulty information - poor intelligence but the Yanks had pretty good info. Why's that? Wasn't Vicksburg and the campaign area home base for the defenders as opposed to the "invaders"?
Grant's army knew what roads to take, what creeks to use, etc. Pemberton and his cohorts didn't even know where the Union army(s) were.

 

[James N.]

I know that for example Grant had the assistance of slave information, such as that the Mississippi could be crossed at Bruinsburg without opposition; no doubt they aided in providing other timely information as well.

 

[diane]

I think the lack of good intelligence for Pemberton lay in the basic inefficiency and unintegrated nature of the Confederate command in the west. For example, Holmes had 25,000 or so troops across the river who could have helped considerably but Johnston didn't have command there, and Davis sent no direct orders...so Holmes sat. The cavalry was not co-ordinated under one command until far late in the war when Nathan Bedford Forrest became commander of all the cavalry - until then, it was various commands and mostly raids, or in support of infantry. Johnston thought one of the major problems was too many chiefs and not enough Indians - he needed to be able to take command of everybody. That all meant that anyone who acquired intelligence used it for their own benefit, didn't particularly share it with Pemberton or even Johnston.

 

[Eagle eye]

I think the lack of good intelligence for Pemberton lay in the basic inefficiency and unintegrated nature of the Confederate command in the west. For example, Holmes had 25,000 or so troops across the river who could have helped considerably but Johnston didn't have command there, and Davis sent no direct orders...so Holmes sat. The cavalry was not co-ordinated under one command until far late in the war when Nathan Bedford Forrest became commander of all the cavalry - until then, it was various commands and mostly raids, or in support of infantry. Johnston thought one of the major problems was too many chiefs and not enough Indians - he needed to be able to take command of everybody. That all meant that anyone who acquired intelligence used it for their own benefit, didn't particularly share it with Pemberton or even Johnston.

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Didn't Davis send conflicting orders to Pemberton & Johnson or was Pemberton recieving conflicting orders from Davis & Johnson?

 

[diane]

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Didn't Davis send conflicting orders to Pemberton & Johnson or was Pemberton recieving conflicting orders from Davis & Johnson?

I am not entirely sure but I believe that is correct - both! Davis wanted Johnston to proceed to aid Pemberton, and also Pemberton to engage Grant... Davis did send advice to Holmes but no direct orders, and Johnston didn't have the authority to order Holmes to do anything. Pemberton actually had the feeling before the siege began that Vicksburg was no longer that important, given what had already occurred on the Mississippi, but Davis insisted Vicksburg be saved.

 

[Vicksburger]

Warren Grabau in his "Ninety Eight Days" asks this same question, but doesn't really answer why it was so, but at least he believed that Grant was getting a lot of information from someone. I would be interested in hearing from some of our Vicksburg experts what they think.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Grant worked to create disinformation. Cavalry raids like Grierson's were meant to distract and disrupt. At the same time McClernand and McPherson were crossing the river to the south, Grant ordered Sherman to make a demonstration north of Vicksburg that successfully confused the Confederates as to which move was the real one.

 

[1950lemans]

That Grant was getting a lot of information from someone is an interesting point. From whom? Do you think he had spy(s) in Vicksburg or in Pemberton's command structure?
Going back to Michael Ballard's Vicksburg, he references a William Feis, Grant's Secret Service, 2002. I think I need to check that out.
IMO, the civilians in the area, who could have been the eyes and ears of Pemberton, just hunkered down and hoped they wouldn't get involved in the juggernaut while their slaves were evidently coming and going, looking for and assisting the Yankees.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

Some interesting attention is paid to this in William B. Feis's Grant's Secret Service: The Intelligence War from Belmont to Appomattox (Univ. of Nebraska, 2004). It's not the last word that could be written on the topic (as the author readily admits); I think there's more to learn about how the intelligence war was fought in the West. (And the East, for that matter...)

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

It does seem to be clear that there were four major avenues of information collection available to Grant:

1. Recon reports from cavalry and gunboats
2. Interview of captured Confederate soldiers
3. Information obtained from the civilian population (including slaves)
4. Newspaper reports

I'm not saying they were approached in a rigorous, methodical manner; to someone with modern intel training, nearly all Civil War intelligence operations look pretty rough and sloppy...

 

[diane]

Grant worked to create disinformation. Cavalry raids like Grierson's were meant to distract and disrupt. At the same time McClernand and McPherson were crossing the river to the south, Grant ordered Sherman to make a demonstration north of Vicksburg that successfully confused the Confederates as to which move was the real one.

This is really a great point. Raids like Grierson's not only occupied particularly formidable cavalry units like Forrest's but also caused the Confederate cavalry to split into several smaller groups and scatter over a large area.

 

[Rebforever]

Johnston could of had 100000 men and he would probably do the same thing as McCellan. Back up with them.

 

[Eagle eye]

I am not entirely sure but I believe that is correct - both! Davis wanted Johnston to proceed to aid Pemberton, and also Pemberton to engage Grant... Davis did send advice to Holmes but no direct orders, and Johnston didn't have the authority to order Holmes to do anything. Pemberton actually had the feeling before the siege began that Vicksburg was no longer that important, given what had already occurred on the Mississippi, but Davis insisted Vicksburg be saved.

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Thanks Diane.…in the Marines we called that "a cluster f***".

 

[Sid J.]

That Grant was getting a lot of information from someone is an interesting point. From whom? Do you think he had spy(s) in Vicksburg or in Pemberton's command structure?
Going back to Michael Ballard's Vicksburg, he references a William Feis, Grant's Secret Service, 2002. I think I need to check that out.
IMO, the civilians in the area, who could have been the eyes and ears of Pemberton, just hunkered down and hoped they wouldn't get involved in the juggernaut while their slaves were evidently coming and going, looking for and assisting the Yankees.

The widely accepted narratives of the Vicksburg campaign have key information brought directly to Grant at key moments i.e., an " intelligent contraband" shows up as soon as Grant decides Grant Gulf is not viable as a crossing point, with Intel about Bruinsberg and the roads inland. " Hurlbuts Scout" brings critical correspondence from Johnston to Pemberton directly and immediately to Grant. "Railroad workers" report Pemberton on the move from Edwards heading east, including an exact count of regiments. While I have no evidence that ties all these folks together in a spy network, it's hard to believe all these events are mere happenstance.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

I can't remember where I read this-- may have been in Feis-- but there's at least a suspicion that some of the "intelligent contraband" reports may actually have been provided by local citizens, and that the "contraband" story was a concealment of their identity to guard against retribution.

 

[1950lemans]

I can't remember where I read this-- may have been in Feis-- but there's at least a suspicion that some of the "intelligent contraband" reports may actually have been provided by local citizens, and that the "contraband" story was a concealment of their identity to guard against retribution.

That's an interesting angle. Maybe they cooperated out of a sense of self-preservation since "hard war" was the norm during the Vicksburg Campaign.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

That's an interesting angle. Maybe they cooperated out of a sense of self-preservation since "hard war" was the norm during the Vicksburg Campaign.

That, and (speculation) there may have been somewhat less-than-total support for the Confederacy in the area. Vicksburg and the surrounding area had voted against secession originally, and while many did rally to the Confederate cause after secession, it's still possible there were some undercurrents of disaffection.

It's obviously next to impossible to prove one way or the other, but it's an interesting thought.

 

[ole]

That, and (speculation) there may have been somewhat less-than-total support for the Confederacy in the area. Vicksburg and the surrounding area had voted against secession originally, and while many did rally to the Confederate cause after secession, it's still possible there were some undercurrents of disaffection.

It's obviously next to impossible to prove one way or the other, but it's an interesting thought.

I have long thought/understood/speculated that those planters near Vicksburg were not entirely committed to the Confederacy.

And Grant, not wanting to have Forrest on his butt, had the great good sense to send out Grierson and Streight (and maybe a few more) our to keep Forrest's attention away from what he was doing.