J. Johnston Trying to understand J.E.Johnston

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

That makes sense. But with the Confederates out of the US the power of the abolitionists was magnified. And the patience of the British with US slavery was running short.

You are right indeed @wausaubob. The Confederates would never have made the hypothetical decision that I posted. The British, wanting cotton, might have ignored that the Confederates' gradual implementation of slavery was not as desirable as immediate cessation. The "1900 Freedom Plan" is ONLY suitable for a What If thread.

 

[SSVilla]

It's bizarre to see anything positive written about Johnston after reading of him totally washing his hands of Vicksburg before the door was even sealed shut.

Explain this please. My perception is, from Johnston's memoirs that he was sent to Mississippi on May 10, after Grant had already started his campaign and he arrived at Jackson just prior to Grant moving on it. Grant was then moving his forces so rapidly that Johnston's communications with Pemberton were too late to effectuate cooperation. This is from his memoirs, therefore it's going to be self-exculpatory in context, but it's an explanation. I think credit is due to General Grant for outfoxing both Johnston and Pemberton.

An example here:

"From the events of the 14th, I supposed that General Grant intended to occupy Jackson and hold it, to prevent the troops then there, and those coming from the East, from joining Lieutenant-General Pemberton's army. That army, including the garrison of Vicksburg, was probably about thirty-two thousand men. In the evening of that day a letter was addressed to General Pemberton, to inform him of the events of the day, and of the instructions given to Brigadier-Generals Gist and Maxey. The hope was also expressed in it that those troops would be able to prevent General Grant's forces, in Jackson, from obtaining supplies from the East; and that the troops on the Canton road might keep those of the country to the north from them. He was asked if he could close their communication with the Mississippi, and, above all, if he could beat them, should they be compelled, by want of supplies, to fall back. He was told, also, that prisoners reported that the force in Jackson constituted half of Grant's army, and that it would decide the campaign to beat it; which could be done only by concentrating, especially when the troops expected from the East should arrive. This letter was not answered. I found the explanation of this in Lieutenant- General Pemberton's report. It was not delivered to him until after the battle of Baker's Creek-too late to influence his action."​

Johnston's communications with Pemberton were further complicated by interference from the political authorities.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Explain this please. My perception is, from Johnston's memoirs that he was sent to Mississippi on May 10, after Grant had already started his campaign and he arrived at Jackson just prior to Grant moving on it. Grant was then moving his forces so rapidly that Johnston's communications with Pemberton were too late to effectuate cooperation. This is from his memoirs, therefore it's going to be self-exculpatory in context, but it's an explanation. I think credit is due to General Grant for outfoxing both Johnston and Pemberton.

An example here:

"From the events of the 14th, I supposed that General Grant intended to occupy Jackson and hold it, to prevent the troops then there, and those coming from the East, from joining Lieutenant-General Pemberton's army. That army, including the garrison of Vicksburg, was probably about thirty-two thousand men. In the evening of that day a letter was addressed to General Pemberton, to inform him of the events of the day, and of the instructions given to Brigadier-Generals Gist and Maxey. The hope was also expressed in it that those troops would be able to prevent General Grant's forces, in Jackson, from obtaining supplies from the East; and that the troops on the Canton road might keep those of the country to the north from them. He was asked if he could close their communication with the Mississippi, and, above all, if he could beat them, should they be compelled, by want of supplies, to fall back. He was told, also, that prisoners reported that the force in Jackson constituted half of Grant's army, and that it would decide the campaign to beat it; which could be done only by concentrating, especially when the troops expected from the East should arrive. This letter was not answered. I found the explanation of this in Lieutenant- General Pemberton's report. It was not delivered to him until after the battle of Baker's Creek-too late to influence his action."​

Johnston's communications with Pemberton were further complicated by interference from the political authorities.

Johnston did one thing RIGHT by suggesting to Pemberton that Pendleton should evacuate Vicksburg in order to save his army (I'm going from memory rather than looking this up). Johnston did one thing WRONG by not ORDERING Pemberton to evacuate Vicksburg to save his army.

 

[tony_gunter]

Explain this please. My perception is, from Johnston's memoirs that he was sent to Mississippi on May 10, after Grant had already started his campaign and he arrived at Jackson just prior to Grant moving on it. Grant was then moving his forces so rapidly that Johnston's communications with Pemberton were too late to effectuate cooperation. This is from his memoirs, therefore it's going to be self-exculpatory in context, but it's an explanation. I think credit is due to General Grant for outfoxing both Johnston and Pemberton.

An example here:

"From the events of the 14th, I supposed that General Grant intended to occupy Jackson and hold it, to prevent the troops then there, and those coming from the East, from joining Lieutenant-General Pemberton's army. That army, including the garrison of Vicksburg, was probably about thirty-two thousand men. In the evening of that day a letter was addressed to General Pemberton, to inform him of the events of the day, and of the instructions given to Brigadier-Generals Gist and Maxey. The hope was also expressed in it that those troops would be able to prevent General Grant's forces, in Jackson, from obtaining supplies from the East; and that the troops on the Canton road might keep those of the country to the north from them. He was asked if he could close their communication with the Mississippi, and, above all, if he could beat them, should they be compelled, by want of supplies, to fall back. He was told, also, that prisoners reported that the force in Jackson constituted half of Grant's army, and that it would decide the campaign to beat it; which could be done only by concentrating, especially when the troops expected from the East should arrive. This letter was not answered. I found the explanation of this in Lieutenant- General Pemberton's report. It was not delivered to him until after the battle of Baker's Creek-too late to influence his action."​

Johnston's communications with Pemberton were further complicated by interference from the political authorities.

Johnston's unhelpful directive to Pemberton was that he should concentrate against Grant should he cross the river. Despite repeated warnings, Johnston had starved Pemberton of the cavalry necessary to concentrate effectively against Grant should he cross the river. Two or three regiments were all Pemberton really needed to see through Grant's cavalry screen. So really, Grants arrival on the doorsteps of Jackson without any response from Pemberton can be partly attributed to McPherson's approach to the fighting at Raymond, but partly due to Johnston himself.

Johnston arrived at Jackson on May 13th to find McPherson at Clinton and Sherman at Mississippi Springs, both 10 miles distant. Johnston had 6,000 troops on hand, with an additional 6,000 arriving soon.

Johnston's options:

1) Order Pemberton to attack Clinton. Man the defenses of Jackson and attempt to hold out long enough for Pemberton and the reinforcements to arrive.

2) Order Pemberton to abandon Vicksburg and meet Johnston north of the Big Black River. Retreat in the direction of Canton.

3) Ride to Pemberton and assume command, ordering the 6,000 troops in Jackson:

a) across the Pearl River to form the core of a relief army under a subordinate commander.

b) to march to Canton, which will double the time required to consolidate the relief army.

c) with him to join Pemberton's defense of the Big Black River, bringing the total defenders of Vicksburg up to nearly 40,000 with an unfordable river as the line of defense.

Johnston instead chose the worst from all these options.

He immediately wired Richmond "I am too late." He ordered Gregg with Colquitt and WHT Walker to meet McPherson in battle OUTSIDE THE CITY DEFENSES. He ordered Pemberton to attack McPherson at Clinton, and then retreated in the opposite direction to Canton. Throughout all of this, his primary focus was supervising the evacuation of stores from Jackson.

That's right: he was more concerned with saving the food than saving Vicksburg or Pemberton.

 

[wausaubob]

Explain this please. My perception is, from Johnston's memoirs that he was sent to Mississippi on May 10, after Grant had already started his campaign and he arrived at Jackson just prior to Grant moving on it. Grant was then moving his forces so rapidly that Johnston's communications with Pemberton were too late to effectuate cooperation. This is from his memoirs, therefore it's going to be self-exculpatory in context, but it's an explanation. I think credit is due to General Grant for outfoxing both Johnston and Pemberton.

An example here:

"From the events of the 14th, I supposed that General Grant intended to occupy Jackson and hold it, to prevent the troops then there, and those coming from the East, from joining Lieutenant-General Pemberton's army. That army, including the garrison of Vicksburg, was probably about thirty-two thousand men. In the evening of that day a letter was addressed to General Pemberton, to inform him of the events of the day, and of the instructions given to Brigadier-Generals Gist and Maxey. The hope was also expressed in it that those troops would be able to prevent General Grant's forces, in Jackson, from obtaining supplies from the East; and that the troops on the Canton road might keep those of the country to the north from them. He was asked if he could close their communication with the Mississippi, and, above all, if he could beat them, should they be compelled, by want of supplies, to fall back. He was told, also, that prisoners reported that the force in Jackson constituted half of Grant's army, and that it would decide the campaign to beat it; which could be done only by concentrating, especially when the troops expected from the East should arrive. This letter was not answered. I found the explanation of this in Lieutenant- General Pemberton's report. It was not delivered to him until after the battle of Baker's Creek-too late to influence his action."​

Johnston's communications with Pemberton were further complicated by interference from the political authorities.

I think Johnston's memory summarizes the situation. When Loring began to probe the federal positions he suddenly saw three more divisions, and he concluded that Vicksburg was a trap. Johnston notes the error in Confederate plans. Grant had no intention to keep the road open back to the Mississippi. He was aiming for the Yazoo and a road from the docks there to re-establish his logistics.

 

[wausaubob]

You are right indeed @wausaubob. The Confederates would never have made the hypothetical decision that I posted. The British, wanting cotton, might have ignored that the Confederates' gradual implementation of slavery was not as desirable as immediate cessation. The "1900 Freedom Plan" is ONLY suitable for a What If thread.

I think the war could have ended and the blockade could have been lifted. But I think Congress was correct in asserting that it had the power to allow readmission, and the President did not have that authority. Each state would have to have NJ or WV type plan to abolish slavery and a date soon to arrive when a child born to an enslaved woman would be free. Congress was not in a good mood by 1863.

 

[wausaubob]

Johnston's unhelpful directive to Pemberton was that he should concentrate against Grant should he cross the river. Despite repeated warnings, Johnston had starved Pemberton of the cavalry necessary to concentrate effectively against Grant should he cross the river. Two or three regiments were all Pemberton really needed to see through Grant's cavalry screen. So really, Grants arrival on the doorsteps of Jackson without any response from Pemberton can be partly attributed to McPherson's approach to the fighting at Raymond, but partly due to Johnston himself.

Johnston arrived at Jackson on May 13th to find McPherson at Clinton and Sherman at Mississippi Springs, both 10 miles distant. Johnston had 6,000 troops on hand, with an additional 6,000 arriving soon.

Johnston's options:

1) Order Pemberton to attack Clinton. Man the defenses of Jackson and attempt to hold out long enough for Pemberton and the reinforcements to arrive.

2) Order Pemberton to abandon Vicksburg and meet Johnston north of the Big Black River. Retreat in the direction of Canton.

3) Ride to Pemberton and assume command, ordering the 6,000 troops in Jackson:

a) across the Pearl River to form the core of a relief army under a subordinate commander.

b) to march to Canton, which will double the time required to consolidate the relief army.

c) with him to join Pemberton's defense of the Big Black River, bringing the total defenders of Vicksburg up to nearly 40,000 with an unfordable river as the line of defense.

Johnston instead chose the worst from all these options.

He immediately wired Richmond "I am too late." He ordered Gregg with Colquitt and WHT Walker to meet McPherson in battle OUTSIDE THE CITY DEFENSES. He ordered Pemberton to attack McPherson at Clinton, and then retreated in the opposite direction to Canton. Throughout all of this, his primary focus was supervising the evacuation of stores from Jackson.

That's right: he was more concerned with saving the food than saving Vicksburg or Pemberton.

That's interesting. But if Johnston arranges for a concentration of all forces, Grant feigns a battle as Sherman slips past the armies and gains the heights above the Yazoo River and nearly enters the town of Vicksburg. Grant and Sherman did have pontoons is my recollection. And Grant had crossed the Big Black earlier with an improvised bridge.

 

[SSVilla]

Johnston's unhelpful directive to Pemberton was that he should concentrate against Grant should he cross the river. Despite repeated warnings, Johnston had starved Pemberton of the cavalry necessary to concentrate effectively against Grant should he cross the river. Two or three regiments were all Pemberton really needed to see through Grant's cavalry screen. So really, Grants arrival on the doorsteps of Jackson without any response from Pemberton can be partly attributed to McPherson's approach to the fighting at Raymond, but partly due to Johnston himself.

Johnston arrived at Jackson on May 13th to find McPherson at Clinton and Sherman at Mississippi Springs, both 10 miles distant. Johnston had 6,000 troops on hand, with an additional 6,000 arriving soon.

Johnston's options:

1) Order Pemberton to attack Clinton. Man the defenses of Jackson and attempt to hold out long enough for Pemberton and the reinforcements to arrive.

2) Order Pemberton to abandon Vicksburg and meet Johnston north of the Big Black River. Retreat in the direction of Canton.

3) Ride to Pemberton and assume command, ordering the 6,000 troops in Jackson:

a) across the Pearl River to form the core of a relief army under a subordinate commander.

b) to march to Canton, which will double the time required to consolidate the relief army.

c) with him to join Pemberton's defense of the Big Black River, bringing the total defenders of Vicksburg up to nearly 40,000 with an unfordable river as the line of defense.

Johnston instead chose the worst from all these options.

He immediately wired Richmond "I am too late." He ordered Gregg with Colquitt and WHT Walker to meet McPherson in battle OUTSIDE THE CITY DEFENSES. He ordered Pemberton to attack McPherson at Clinton, and then retreated in the opposite direction to Canton. Throughout all of this, his primary focus was supervising the evacuation of stores from Jackson.

That's right: he was more concerned with saving the food than saving Vicksburg or Pemberton.

This is probably a point of opinion and I am far from being a Johnston fan, or persuading anyone on his behalf. I am just trying to be fair. Thank you for your reply.

This was Johnston's opinion concerning the feasibility of transfers between the armies of the Tennessee and Mississippi:

"Being convinced, before [CSA President Jefferson Davis] left Jackson [in December of 1862] that my command was little more than nominal, I so represented it to him, and asked to be assigned to a different one, on the ground that two armies far apart, like those of Mississippi and Tennessee, having different objects, and opposed to adversaries having different objects, could not be commanded by the same general. After reflection, he replied that the seat of government was so distant from the two theatres of war, that he thought it necessary to have an officer nearer, with authority to transfer troops from one army to the other in an emergency. If such an officer was needed, I certainly was not the proper selection; for I had already expressed the opinion distinctly that such transfers were impracticable, because each of the two armies was greatly inferior to its antagonist; and they were too far from each other for such mutual dependence. The length of time consumed in the transportation of Stevenson's division without artillery or wagons, from Tennessee to Mississippi, fully sustained this opinion. That time was more than three weeks."​

Excerpt From Narrative of Military Operations, Joseph Eggleston Johnston

I think Johnston in principle didn't favor relying on these kinds of transfers to make up for an inferiority in numbers and resources or to retrieve a desperate situation because reinforcements would never arrive in time. Then, after Sherman was repulsed at Chickasaw Bayou in 1862 and Grant forced back by Van Dorn's raid at Holly Springs, General Bragg in Tennessee had a desperate battle with General Rosecrans at Murfreesboro, which created an emergency. According to Johnston:

"The condition of the country [in Mississippi] was such, too, as to make military operations on a large scale in it impracticable; and the most intelligent class of the inhabitants supposed that it would remain in that condition until the middle of the spring. In Tennessee, on the contrary, after the most effective fighting made by either party up to that time, our army had lost much ground, and was in danger of further disaster. For, while the United States Government was sending such reënforcements as reestablished the strength of its army, the Confederate War Department made no answer to General Bragg's calls for twenty thousand additional troops, which he required, he said, to enable him to hold the southern part of Middle Tennessee, which was still in his possession.​

At this time Lieutenant-General Pemberton had some six thousand cavalry near Grenada, unemployed, and almost unorganized. Under the circumstances described, Major-General Van Dorn was directed to form a division of two-thirds of these troops, and to move into Tennessee, after preparing it for the field. When there he was either to assist General Bragg in holding his new position, or cover the country near Columbia, upon which the army depended for food. These troops were so poorly equipped, and the difficulty of supplying deficiencies so great, that the division was not ready for actual service until February, nor able to cross the Tennessee until the middle of the month. It was directed to Columbia, and, by occupying that neighborhood, enabled General Bragg to feed his army in Middle Tennessee. Without such aid he could not have done this, and would have been compelled to abandon the country north of the Tennessee River."​

Excerpt From Narrative of Military Operations, Joseph Eggleston Johnston

What was done with the third that was left to Pemberton is not addressed.

 

[tony_gunter]

This is probably a point of opinion and I am far from being a Johnston fan, or persuading anyone on his behalf. I am just trying to be fair. Thank you for your reply.

If I've missed any of Johnston's viable options, feel free to fill in the blanks.

I don't see how Johnston's explanation of his actions jives with Grant's operational parameters or Johnston's orders to Pemberton. As a matter of logistics, Grant could not take and hold Jackson because it was 80 miles to Grant's supply base at Grand Gulf, too far to support an army by wagons. And if Johnston somehow believed Grant could pull that off, why not order Pemberton to cut his supply line instead of coming out to attack?

My ->opinion<- is that Johnston's initial orders to Pemberton were a thinly veiled demand to abandon Vicksburg. Johnston was facing two divisions to the west and two divisions to the southwest, that leaves four of Grant's divisions lurking somewhere near Raymond, due south of where Johnston ordered Pemberton to attack. When Pemberton ventures out, he is repulsed and driven north (conveniently in the direction of Johnston) and Grant takes Vicksburg. Johnston distances himself from the debacle, reputation intact.

What was done with the third that was left to Pemberton is not addressed.

The third of Pemberton's cavalry that remained was left was facing off against XVI corps which remained on the Memphis / Corinth line, with the exception of Wirt Adams' regiment at Vicksburg.

 

[SSVilla]

Such claims were the work of newspaper journalists and party platforms.

Davis, a former Secretary of War of the United States, was aware a war would be tremendous in scale and bloodshed. In his speech of January 10, 1861 in the US Senate he warned the opponents of the Southern democracy in the US Government that interfering with the secession of the South would lead to a Civil War on a scale they couldn't imagine.

View attachment 533851
View attachment 533852

Speech of the Hon. Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi

www.google.com

Several weeks into the war, in June, 1861, Mary Chesnut discussed the situation with him as Confederate President. In her diary she says the war was already too long. Davis, she said, suggested and long and painful struggle against the manhood of the North.

View attachment 533835

Davis was evidently not a "secessionist per se." In other words he was not inclined to the theoretical metaphysics of the arch-secessionists, who were convinced the north was paralyzed by political factions and divisions, etc. and would not take up the gauntlet, etc. But at the head of the Southern Confederate government, he was charged with defending its territory in the manner outlined by its ruling party. He pressed that program to its conclusion.




Indeed. As mentioned the situation of the Southern Confederacy was distinct. The Confederacy officially declared itself as NOT revolutionary, but a functional de facto territorial government from inception, determined to defend its lengthy borders to prove it (recall Davis each year kept pressing the armies to, and beyond, the border States).

They were particularly determined to maintain their internal security entire, not only to defend the institutions, but to ensure the Europeans that they were a de facto authority; and thus a somewhat safe investment for the banks and businesses of Europe; and encourage foreign recognition. The British remained neutral but somewhat accepted the Confederate's claim of de facto status for their own purposes (for example at the close of the war they sequestered and secured Confederate property, accounts, etc. in Britain rather than turning them over to the USA). The US Government never conceded the Confederacy was a de facto government; having never abandoned its forts in the secession crisis, and keeping troops therein to "enforce the laws of the Union" etc. From the British view:

View attachment 533830

From Shortridge v. Mason, 1868, the US courts noted the USA never conceded the Confederacy was a de facto government, excluding its jurisdiction by force of arms from the South.

View attachment 533831

Long story short, had the Confederacy been less determined to seek foreign alliances, and approval at home and abroad, and as a territorial authority struggling to establish itself as a de facto government, over the region to protect its institutions, people, and property entire, perhaps it might not have expended manpower and resources in such quantity to defend its vast borders, and its cities in the way it did.

View attachment 533853

Had the Confederate resources been employed instead in a strictly revolutionary policy, Johnston's fabian strategy might perhaps have been much more advantageous; perhaps somewhat in the mode of General Washington's in the 1700s, or Garibaldi recently in Italy. But again, that would have been in opposition to the ruling party, and its "statesmen, philosophers and philanthropists" as VP Stephens noted later.

If Johnston personally was unable to fight campaigns unfettered by orders to defend fortified cities to the last, he was at least able to keep ancillary forces afoot in mobile warfare. For example General Forrest. Johnston as department commander in the west from late 1862 through July, 1864 who encouraged his free reign as a "cavalry corps" commander. From Wyeth on Forrest:

View attachment 533859
View attachment 533860

You can imagine how a suggestion to "give up" the defense of Mississippi went over in Davis' mind. But again, as Confederate President, he understood his job was to defend territory at all costs.



The Confederate soldiers loved Uncle Joe Johnston like none other. I say this because, the enthusiasm and dedication ascribed to him was in spite of the lack of battlefield victories beyond Manassas, etc. But that might be part of the point, He was not trapped in the "Shiloh" cycle of pitched battles. Phil Stephenson of the Washington Artillery noted at Dalton in 1864 how Johnston transformed the beaten and demoralized Army of Tennessee in a few months into a force capable of fighting one of the great campaigns of history. The "100 days battle" as some of his veterans called it. In army reviews and inspections, Johnston rode down the line of every unit, glancing at each man, and unlike other commanders, would look the man right in the eyes. It was as if he made an unspoken contract with each soldier of his army that their lives would not be sold cheap. Where Johnston commanded, the corruption that robbed the troops of rations and clothing (and made men wealthy) was not welcome. Recall he had been the Quartermaster General of the US Army. So while the troops loved him, he was persona non grata to the party of "harpies."

Sam Watkins of the 1st Tennessee on Johnston assuming command in early 1864:

View attachment 533869

Douglas J. Cater of the 3rd Texas recalled, "We loved him , we were proud to be commanded by so great and gifted a soldier."


View attachment 533833

I recently came across this quote: "historian Hew Strachan prefers to underscore the importance of strategic dialogue in reconciling what is desired with what can be done." Antulio J. Echevarría II, Military Strategy A Very Short Introduction.

I immediately thought of J.E. Johnston and his differences on strategy with Davis as discussed in this thread. It seems like he had such fundamental differences about "how to reconcile the desired end with what can be done," that he and Davis could never agree.

Reconciling that goal with what could be done only became completely impossible at the end when the confederacy was evidently crumbling and Davis was in an increasingly Quixotic state of denial. I dislike Davis, particularly for this Quixotic state when the end of the confederacy was approaching, but I have to credit him with trying to work with Johnston, even in a dysfunctional way. It reminds me of Lincoln trying to work with McClellan.

 

[wausaubob]

If I've missed any of Johnston's viable options, feel free to fill in the blanks.

I don't see how Johnston's explanation of his actions jives with Grant's operational parameters or Johnston's orders to Pemberton. As a matter of logistics, Grant could not take and hold Jackson because it was 80 miles to Grant's supply base at Grand Gulf, too far to support an army by wagons. And if Johnston somehow believed Grant could pull that off, why not order Pemberton to cut his supply line instead of coming out to attack?

My ->opinion<- is that Johnston's initial orders to Pemberton were a thinly veiled demand to abandon Vicksburg. Johnston was facing two divisions to the west and two divisions to the southwest, that leaves four of Grant's divisions lurking somewhere near Raymond, due south of where Johnston ordered Pemberton to attack. When Pemberton ventures out, he is repulsed and driven north (conveniently in the direction of Johnston) and Grant takes Vicksburg. Johnston distances himself from the debacle, reputation intact.


The third of Pemberton's cavalry that remained was left was facing off against XVI corps which remained on the Memphis / Corinth line, with the exception of Wirt Adams' regiment at Vicksburg.

If we attempt to analyze Grant's decisions prior to May 1863 it seems he was intent on reconnecting to the Yazoo River. Careful consideration of the Grand Gulf route should have concluded that it was a physical impossibility to run enough supplies to that crossing to supply a major army. That would have confirmed by better observation of Blair's division, which left almost mothing behind. Sherman had made a costly attack on the hills above the junction of the Yazoo and the Mississippi. Study of Grant's method would have suggested he would try it again, in a different way.
But I would still give Johnston a break. Grant's plan, to disrupt Confederate communications with a cavalry raid, and to display Sherman's force in a way that disguised Grant's intentions was working. Then add in the dark side of the plan. The murder of Earl Van Dorn, and the agents that intercepted Johnston's correspondence with Pemberton, and the freedmen who were a constant source of information about the geography of Mississippi, were important factors in Grant's favor.
Its great to have a Mississippi guy writing on these subjects. If we can't get the late Mr. Foote we at least can have @tony_gunter .

 

[wausaubob]

The telegraph system created the illusion that people in Washington and Richmond could control events in Mississippi.

 

[wausaubob]

To understand Joe Johnston we might have to consider what the situation was like in Mississippi once Grant's force gained the eastern bank of the river. An analyst would have to consider the counties with very high concentrations of enslaved people, and also the behavior of white farmers in counties with few slaves, who might have thought they were being used to fight the plantation owner's war.

 

[SSVilla]

If I've missed any of Johnston's viable options, feel free to fill in the blanks.

I don't see how Johnston's explanation of his actions jives with Grant's operational parameters or Johnston's orders to Pemberton. As a matter of logistics, Grant could not take and hold Jackson because it was 80 miles to Grant's supply base at Grand Gulf, too far to support an army by wagons. And if Johnston somehow believed Grant could pull that off, why not order Pemberton to cut his supply line instead of coming out to attack?

My ->opinion<- is that Johnston's initial orders to Pemberton were a thinly veiled demand to abandon Vicksburg. Johnston was facing two divisions to the west and two divisions to the southwest, that leaves four of Grant's divisions lurking somewhere near Raymond, due south of where Johnston ordered Pemberton to attack. When Pemberton ventures out, he is repulsed and driven north (conveniently in the direction of Johnston) and Grant takes Vicksburg. Johnston distances himself from the debacle, reputation intact.


The third of Pemberton's cavalry that remained was left was facing off against XVI corps which remained on the Memphis / Corinth line, with the exception of Wirt Adams' regiment at Vicksburg.

It's not about discussing viable options but about the fog of war and the reality of what he was facing, not in hindsight and from an armchair, but in real time. He only got there a single day before Jackson would be overwhelmed. A couple of generals had already been engaged with McPherson before he even got there. Grant's army was too large for the small detachment at Jackson. These the generals could plainly tell him.

He really was too late to effectuate a concentration before Grant got to Jackson. He couldn't communicate effectively with Pemberton. He tried to send a message to Pemberton that wasn't answered. Whether it was a brilliant suggestion or not is beside the point, because my original point was about the impossibility of coordination when his communication was not received until it was too late to be taken into account. Even if it had been answered it wouldn't have come before he had to make up his own mind. Realistically, for a time he had to act on his own without knowing what else was going on, what had happened to Pemberton, where he was, or whether he received the message or could count or him, or even what Pemberton planned, etc.

Is there any question he could have made a stand? I don't think so, particularly without preparation. He had no time to reconnoiter, etc. It seems like a reasonable thing to focus on salvaging what could be salvaged and considering a concentration some other way. I think the generals advising him would have told him they couldn't hold the point. I think Grant was frustrated in catching him and the small army that was there. They got away and could come back, particularly because they had saved their provisions and equipment. It was basically damage control ao that point IMO. It would have been worse for future immediate prospects to have been captured and defeated there… He couldn't defeat Grant without cooperation.

My original point was that Grant was moving too fast and aggressively to allow them to cooperate and you didn't really show me any different. That is why I said it's probably a matter of opinion. You are much tougher and think he had options. I think realistically he was justified in evacuating.

I am hardly to be found in the Johnston camp of fandom. Normally I am indifferent to confederate generals, but I do try to be fair and reasonable.

I think with regards to the transfer of troops Johnston was affirmatively against it. He had a reasonable opinion that both Bragg and Pemberton faced aggressive armies with different objectives and active campaigning that was going on. He wanted to impress on Davis that relying on transfers of troops to manage the situation in each theater was impracticable and it proved true. Pemberton didn't need his cavalry when Grant was across the River and unable to land an army on dry ground. Meanwhile Bragg had his *** handed to him… even to send what cavalry was sent took almost two months. It wouldn't have been sent to go back in a few weeks. The whole thing didn't make sense.

A new cavalry would have to be raised and that was for the political people, the governors, Davis, etc. to deal with, and it was for Pemberton to maximize what he had. Pemberton was at one time saying Grant had gone to Memphis so his need for cavalry was not evident… by the time he really needed it, it couldn't come in time. That was precisely what Johnston had been warning Davis about.

 

[SSVilla]

edited for redundancy.

 

[wausaubob]

The fog of war was not the result of an act of nature. The telegraph lines were temporarily down. Hurlburt and Dodge has infiltrated Johnston's staff. Forrest was away in Alabama chasing Straight. Sherman was still visible at the junction of the Yazoo and the Mississippi.

 

[SSVilla]

The fog of war was not the result of an act of nature. The telegraph lines were temporarily down. Hurlburt and Dodge has infiltrated Johnston's staff. Forrest was away in Alabama chasing Straight. Sherman was still visible at the junction of the Yazoo and the Mississippi.

I had come across Dodge and Forrest and Grierson's raid and didn't mention them to avoid piling on to the complications the confederacy had that were man made. I am curious about your statement that Hurlbut and Dodge had infiltrated Johnston's staff? I do know certain communications were intercepted.

 

[wausaubob]

I had come across Dodge and Forrest and Grierson's raid and didn't mention them to avoid piling on to the complications the confederacy had that were man made. I am curious about your statement that Hurlbut and Dodge had infiltrated Johnston's staff? I do know certain communications were intercepted.

Its impossible to know more than that. Grant and his subordinates deliberately hid what they did from Washington and from history.

 

[wausaubob]

What was the commissary situation in Mississippi by mid May 1863? Farragut had blocked the Red River by April, I believe.

 

[SSVilla]

Ironically this subject has stayed on the back of my mind. It's funny how that happens sometimes isn't it?

I do agree with you @tony_gunter that Johnston was passive and didn't have any kind of bold idea to give his side a chance to turn the tables. If he wanted to concentrate elsewhere he didn't send orders to do it as his first order of business, specifically pointing a location. Part of that seems to me lack of time to reconnoiter but it can also be he didn't want to assume responsibility for the debacle he could foresee coming, as you point out. Even a bold instruction and plan wouldn't have probably worked out because of the communication problems I pointed to, but the fact he didn't try to do anything but get away is significant for showing timidity in his generalship. It's a fair criticism.

It's odd that Davis would go back to J.E. Johnston when he didn't trust him and would publicly undermine him with criticism. In normal circumstances one would think he'd need to be removed if the President's lack of confidence is that deep. Eventually Lincoln had to move on from McClellan even when the options that came after him proved to be worse for a while. He wouldn't have found a General who could get the job done if he got stuck with the same generals who proved unsatisfactory. Davis didn't try out enough other people. I know that seems easy for me to say. It's ultimately why all these discussions are theoretical.