J. Johnston Trying to understand J.E.Johnston

Piedone

First Sergeant
Joined
Oct 8, 2020
More and more I feel intrigued by the western theater but found it hard to get a understanding of this vast and complex matter.
Especially the role of J.E.Johnston is constantly puzzling me.
Hence I'd like to ask two questions:

1. Is there a good book one can read to get an overview over the western theater ?
(I have "Two Great Rebel Armies" - but this is outdated and talks only a little about the strategic concepts and failures of both sides, I read "Defending the Arterias of Rebellion" - but this is mainly treating the riverine war).

2. The book I am searching for should especially help me to evaluate my current understanding especially of J.E.Johnston - for the little I know about him - just like:
- sending away Pemberton's cavalry,
- sending opaque messages to Pemberton and failure of communication with that officer - that sealed the fate of Vicksburg,
- a show of mere token defense of Jackson with his "Army of Relief",
- a constant inability to get to terms with Jefferson Davis,
- several mistakes during the Atlanta Campaign, leaving fords without supervision, calling off promising attacks, retreating without the need to….
…all of this leads me to suspect he even might have been some kind of federal counteragent -
as I deem his influence quite decisive for confederate defeat in the West - especially in 1863/64….

But my understanding of this theatre is much too limited -
I dearly need one (or several) book(s) - to give me an overview and enough information to reassess the matter…

And as Christmas is near I would be prepared to lay myself such books under the christmas tree…..

Could anyone please give me a hint what book/books to buy?
This would be grreat….
 
You might like to obtain two separate titles, because there are two aspects to your inquiry.

Firstly, for a general overview of the western theater, would recommend 'The Civil War in the West' by Earl Hess (392 pages).

Secondly, you might want a wholly dedicated biography on Joe Johnston (given your stated interest). Have not personally read any Johnston biographies, but I note from the reading list there is a title, 'Joseph E. Johnston' by Craig Symonds (466 pages) . Would venture to recommend this author's work, sight unseen, based on my reading of another one of his works, 'Stonewall of the West: Patrick Cleburne', which I have read and found the content engaging and informative.

Otherwise, you could read Thomas Connelly's 'Autumn of Glory' for a comprehensive coverage of the high command structure of the Army of Tennessee in the period 1862-1865, and the principal commanders (including Joe Johnston) involved.

Hope these recommendations provide some guidance for you.

(Personally, found Joe Johnston to be somewhat of an enigmatic figure).
 
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Sound recommendations by @Nathan Stuart I would add Connelly's Army of the Heartland for a full treatment of the Western Theater (it is a 2 volume history).
Agree. Connelly's 'Army of the Heartland' covering the AoT in the period 1861-1862 certainly completes the coverage of this army's high command structure over the course of the war.

But if one is solely interested in tracking 'Joe' Johnston, there is scant reference to him in this particular title in only three places. This might be a relevant consideration if trying to economize on titles and read only content on a 'need to know basis.;
 
2. The book I am searching for should especially help me to evaluate my current understanding especially of J.E.Johnston - for the little I know about him - just like:
- sending away Pemberton's cavalry,
- sending opaque messages to Pemberton and failure of communication with that officer - that sealed the fate of Vicksburg,
- a show of mere token defense of Jackson with his "Army of Relief",
- a constant inability to get to terms with Jefferson Davis,
Since 1. is already well covered by the recommendation of Earl J. Hess' book Civil War in the West, I'd suggest The Civil Wars of General Joseph E. Johnston by Richard McMurry. Now I have to admit that I didn't like McMurry's Atlanta Campaign book because it comes across as being too dismissive of both Sherman and Johnston - as though their job was easy. I'm not a Johnston fan but McMurry went too far at times.

This book has things I do not agree with. For one, the book dismisses the early Virginia operations of 1861-62, claiming it's unimportant for the Johnston-Davis relationship when I think there were clear signs that Jeff Davis was getting fed up with Johnston's secrecy.

What it does really well is dive into the relationship between Johnston and Davis, highlighting missteps on both sides and how Lee was more adept than Johnston at respectfully disagreeing with the Confederate president and trying to push the man to see things his way. McMurry also does a good job of focusing on the attempts to execute the Confederate cordon defense in 1863 and the real logistical difficulties of trying to execute it.

Now for the Atlanta Campaign, you'll have to either wait for Vol 2 of McMurry's work or read existing literature. On this, Albert Castel is the best single-volume work available but Dave Powell's latest work is a more updated take on what happened in the first phase of the Atlanta Campaign, benefiting especially from the new scholarship on the events of Cassville, which IMO casts Johnston in a more negative light.
 
More and more I feel intrigued by the western theater but found it hard to get a understanding of this vast and complex matter.
Especially the role of J.E.Johnston is constantly puzzling me.
Hence I'd like to ask two questions:

1. Is there a good book one can read to get an overview over the western theater ?
(I have "Two Great Rebel Armies" - but this is outdated and talks only a little about the strategic concepts and failures of both sides, I read "Defending the Arterias of Rebellion" - but this is mainly treating the riverine war).

2. The book I am searching for should especially help me to evaluate my current understanding especially of J.E.Johnston - for the little I know about him - just like:
- sending away Pemberton's cavalry,
- sending opaque messages to Pemberton and failure of communication with that officer - that sealed the fate of Vicksburg,
- a show of mere token defense of Jackson with his "Army of Relief",
- a constant inability to get to terms with Jefferson Davis,
- several mistakes during the Atlanta Campaign, leaving fords without supervision, calling off promising attacks, retreating without the need to….
…all of this leads me to suspect he even might have been some kind of federal counteragent -
as I deem his influence quite decisive for confederate defeat in the West - especially in 1863/64….


Uncle Joe Johnston gave his own version of events in his 1874 "Narrative of Military Operations."


General Badeau of Grant's Staff, wrote a two volume "Military History" of Grant's campaigns. The first volume regarding the western theater particularly, to Grant's movement to Virginia.


But the second Volume by Badeau covers the Atlanta campaign, in conjunction with all operations under Grant's universal command.


Grant, being the man that tied much of the western situation up, and commanded all of the Union forces, west to east, in the last year of the war, left in his memoirs a reasonably straightforward description of the situation he faced.

Relative to the Atlanta campaign, as conducted on the Confederate side by Gen. Johnston, Grant observed in Vol. II of his memoirs:
1734274636860.png


Grant's memoirs are online, or reprints available. Served the first three years of the war in the west... and general command of all of the armies, nationwide, in the last year.



Relative to Gen. Johnston's opposition to the Union armies, Grant is quoted in conversation (in "Around the World with General Grant" vol. II) as observing that it was Johnston's generalship that gave him certain difficulties not provided by others. And, at Vicksburg, Grant felt certain that if Johnston attempted to reinforce Pemberton at Vicksburg, or attack his rear, he would have beaten him too...

1734275426663.png

1734275466188.png

1734275489622.png


Post war, General Longstreet, who served under Johnston in the first year of the War, and as Lee's second in command, for much of the balance, opined of Johnston in comparison to Lee. Of Lee:

1634253322763.png

1634253365275.png


but General Longstreet considered Joe Johnston possessing skills in both "science" and "art of war"...

1634253486297.png



And from an 1879 interview explaining more fully his points above, General Longstreet was asked, "Who do you think was the best general on the Southern side of the war?"

"I am inclined to think that General Joe Johnston was the ablest and most accomplished man that the Confederate armies ever produced. He never had the opportunity accorded to many others, but he showed wonderful power as a tactician and a commander. I do not think that we had his equal for handling an army and conducting a campaign.
General Lee was a great leader—wise, deep and sagacious. His moral influence was something wonderful. But he lost his poise in certain occasions. No one who is acquainted with the facts [thinks] that he would have fought the Battle of Gettysburg had he not been under great excitement, or that he would have ordered the sacrifice of Pickett and his Virginians on the day after the battle [of July 2, 1863]. He said to me afterwards, "Why didn't you stop all that thing that day?"
At the Wilderness, when our lines had been driven in and I was just getting to the field, General Lee put himself at the head of one of my brigades, and leading it into action my men pressed him back, and I said to him that if he would leave my command in my own hands I would reform the lines.
His great soul rose masterful within him when a crisis or disaster threatened. This tended to disturb his admirable equipoise. I loved General Lee as a brother while he lived, and I revere his memory. He was a great man, a born leader, a wise general, but I think Johnston was the most accomplished and capable leader that we had."

Jefferson Davis observed of his relief of Johnston from command of the Army of Tennessee before Atlanta in late July, 1864, that he was already under a significant political pressure to relieve him, to which he submitted when it was not evident Johnston would launch offensives in an effort that "might" save the city... From "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government" vol. II:

1734279087003.png

1734279221199.png


Besides Grant's memoirs, rendered eminently readable by editorial assistance by Mark Twain, there is Sherman's memoirs. General Sherman served through most of the war in the western theater, and in its last year commanded all US forces in the "Military Division of the Mississippi" from that river east to the Carolinas. His memoir might provide some general explanation.

Vol. I.


Vol. II covers the Atlanta campaign to the close of the war.



But my understanding of this theatre is much too limited -
I dearly need one (or several) book(s) - to give me an overview and enough information to reassess the matter…

And as Christmas is near I would be prepared to lay myself such books under the christmas tree…..

Could anyone please give me a hint what book/books to buy?
This would be grreat….

There are reprints of all of the previously cited works available.




Some notice of Earl Hess's work on "The War in the West" from Appalachia to the Mississippi (2012) which has been previously mentioned, and many reviews describe as a reasonably concise overview. One reader-reviewer noting...

"A reader will find "The Civil War in the West" to be extremely useful and enlightening read. Among its' many good points is that it tells the tale in clear, cohesive style rather than drown the reader in a hurricane of regimental numbers, leader names from the Division leader clear down to the 2nd Adjutant Assistant Corporal-3rd Class Biscuit Baker and any of the other chaff that some writers try to pass off as scholarship."


From the publisher:

"The Western theater of the Civil War, rich in agricultural resources and manpower and home to a large number of slaves, stretched 600 miles north to south and 450 miles east to west from the Appalachians to the Mississippi. If the South lost the West, there would be little hope of preserving the Confederacy. Earl J. Hess's comprehensive study of how Federal forces conquered and held the West examines the geographical difficulties of conducting campaigns in a vast land, as well as the toll irregular warfare took on soldiers and civilians alike. Hess balances a thorough knowledge of the battle lines with a deep understanding of what was happening within the occupied territories.
In addition to a mastery of logistics, Union victory hinged on making use of black manpower and developing policies for controlling constant unrest while winning campaigns. Effective use of technology, superior resource management, and an aggressive confidence went hand in hand with Federal success on the battlefield. In the end, Confederates did not have the manpower, supplies, transportation potential, or leadership to counter Union initiatives in this critical arena."
 
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Since 1. is already well covered by the recommendation of Earl J. Hess' book Civil War in the West, I'd suggest The Civil Wars of General Joseph E. Johnston by Richard McMurry. Now I have to admit that I didn't like McMurry's Atlanta Campaign book because it comes across as being too dismissive of both Sherman and Johnston - as though their job was easy. I'm not a Johnston fan but McMurry went too far at times.

This book has things I do not agree with. For one, the book dismisses the early Virginia operations of 1861-62, claiming it's unimportant for the Johnston-Davis relationship when I think there were clear signs that Jeff Davis was getting fed up with Johnston's secrecy.

What it does really well is dive into the relationship between Johnston and Davis, highlighting missteps on both sides and how Lee was more adept than Johnston at respectfully disagreeing with the Confederate president and trying to push the man to see things his way. McMurry also does a good job of focusing on the attempts to execute the Confederate cordon defense in 1863 and the real logistical difficulties of trying to execute it.

Now for the Atlanta Campaign, you'll have to either wait for Vol 2 of McMurry's work or read existing literature. On this, Albert Castel is the best single-volume work available but Dave Powell's latest work is a more updated take on what happened in the first phase of the Atlanta Campaign, benefiting especially from the new scholarship on the events of Cassville, which IMO casts Johnston in a more negative light.
By coincidence I just got the new essay compilation linked below. Symonds' essay on Johnston is excellent. It shows that the Joe Johnston of the ACW had a prequel in Mexico and thereafter, including his direct friction with Davis.

 
You might like to obtain two separate titles, because there are two aspects to your inquiry.

Firstly, for a general overview of the western theater, would recommend 'The Civil War in the West' by Earl Hess (392 pages).

Secondly, you might want a wholly dedicated biography on Joe Johnston (given your stated interest). Have not personally read any Johnston biographies, but I note from the reading list there is a title, 'Joseph E. Johnston' by Craig Symonds (466 pages) . Would venture to recommend this author's work, sight unseen, based on my reading of another one of his works, 'Stonewall of the West: Patrick Cleburne', which I have read and found the content engaging and informative.

Otherwise, you could read Thomas Connelly's 'Autumn of Glory' for a comprehensive coverage of the high command structure of the Army of Tennessee in the period 1862-1865, and the principal commanders (including Joe Johnston) involved.

Hope these recommendations provide some guidance for you.

(Personally, found Joe Johnston to be somewhat of an enigmatic figure).
I recently purchased a used copy of "Joseph E. Johnston, A Civil War Biography," by Craig L. Symonds. It is over 400 pages in length, includes maps, and has the appearance and potential for being an authoritative work. Alas, I have not yet read it and cannot recommend it.
 
I haven't read anything specific to Jos. Johnston, but my readings of Civil War history in general have left me wondering whether he was in some ways a realist. The Lee-Jackson aggressive tactics could certainly beat down timid Union commanders and rouse up the popular spirit among the Confederate populace, but they accelerated casualties, depleting human resources quickly. Johnston was more conservative in the use of his forces. He preferred to give up ground and to be prepared to take advantage of military opportunities when they presented themselves. In the long run, drawing out the war gave the northern population more time to get sick of the conflict and increased the chances that England or France might offer support to the beleaguered Confederacy. Just a thought -- call it a hypothesis...
AR
 
I haven't read anything specific to Jos. Johnston, but my readings of Civil War history in general have left me wondering whether he was in some ways a realist. The Lee-Jackson aggressive tactics could certainly beat down timid Union commanders and rouse up the popular spirit among the Confederate populace, but they accelerated casualties, depleting human resources quickly. Johnston was more conservative in the use of his forces. He preferred to give up ground and to be prepared to take advantage of military opportunities when they presented themselves. In the long run, drawing out the war gave the northern population more time to get sick of the conflict and increased the chances that England or France might offer support to the beleaguered Confederacy. Just a thought -- call it a hypothesis...
AR
I think the problem with "giving up ground" is that there comes a point when you're giving up too much. That was the perception Davis, Bragg, et al had in July 1864 when they plausibly concluded Atlanta was next. And by 1864 foreign intervention was in the scrap heap. What took over was one of Johnston's negatives - his mistrust of his C in C to the point of concealing his plans from Davis. It happened in May 1862 with what became the attack at Seven Pines and again in 1863 with Vicksburg. I've never been 100% convinced that in mid-July 1864 Johnston intended what Hood in fact undertook (as Johnston later claimed in Fall 1864), but even if he did he never let Davis in on that. As I pointed out above, the Symonds essay on Mexico makes a good case that this Joe Johnston had surfaced in connection with that war.
 
I think the problem with "giving up ground" is that there comes a point when you're giving up too much. That was the perception Davis, Bragg, et al had in July 1864 when they plausibly concluded Atlanta was next. And by 1864 foreign intervention was in the scrap heap. What took over was one of Johnston's negatives - his mistrust of his C in C to the point of concealing his plans from Davis. It happened in May 1862 with what became the attack at Seven Pines and again in 1863 with Vicksburg. I've never been 100% convinced that in mid-July 1864 Johnston intended what Hood in fact undertook (as Johnston later claimed in Fall 1864), but even if he did he never let Davis in on that. As I pointed out above, the Symonds essay on Mexico makes a good case that this Joe Johnston had surfaced in connection with that war.
I do agree here. For all that Joe Johnston and his supporters talk about a Fabian strategy, he seemed bafflingly unprepared to actually execute it at the start of the campaign. Dave Powell's Vol. 1 on Atlanta has Johnston comes across as being ignorant of the terrain to his rear. Snake Creek Gap was one thing, but Calhoun was a good opportunity missed and Cassville was never a lost opportunity as Johnston liked to claim - Sherman never set foot on the trap even if Johnston wanted to spring it.

His strategic vision seemed to boil down to Sherman one day blundering and repeating Fredericksburg several times. Sherman definitely blundered at Kennesaw Mountain but that was one time. Johnston never tried to tenaciously defend against Sherman's flanking moves even though time was critical for the Lincoln administration. In my view, Johnston never seemed to think of making an opportunity through his own hands.

I also noticed that recent studies give most of the credit for the idea of Johnston's counterattacks to his subordinates: Bob Jenkins credited the whole Cassville plan to Hood, Earl J Hess pointed out that Johnston only claimed credit for the idea of the Peachtree Creek counterattack after Atlanta fell and Bentonville was essentially Wade Hampton's plans.

Also thanks for bringing the Mexican-American war book to my attention. Definitely less aware of Joe Johnston, Beauregard and McClellan's time in Mexico vs. say Grant's, Bragg's and Thomas'.
 
For all that Joe Johnston and his supporters talk about a Fabian strategy, he seemed bafflingly unprepared to actually execute it at the start of the campaign.
Johnston never tried to tenaciously defend against Sherman's flanking moves even though time was critical for the Lincoln administration. In my view, Johnston never seemed to think of making an opportunity through his own hands.

I wonder if Johnston suffered from the same problem Lee did: not enough staff members? And probably no experienced engineer besides himself?

At least Lee had Stuart and Hampton. They would fight a Buford/Wilder/Minty-style delaying action when needed, such as during the Gettysburg retreat and on the first day of both Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor. I don't think Joe Wheeler ever did. He probably considered such tactics beneath him.
 
I wonder if Johnston suffered from the same problem Lee did: not enough staff members? And probably no experienced engineer besides himself?
That's a topic nobody has touched on as far as I can tell. I don't think there's been any examination of how Joseph Johnston's use of staff, while Grant, Sherman, Lee, Longstreet and Stonewall Jackson have all received coverage on their usage.

On the point of engineers, taking from Powell's book on Atlanta, Bragg had already begun the work of making maps from Missionary Ridge to Atlanta in November. Capt. Wilbur S. Foster got the assignment and did his work with a small corps of engineers. Work was oft interrupted by Federal patrols as well as suspicious Confederate cavalrymen and civilians. Foster admitted that a general map would only be ready by late April-early May, after the campaign started.

That said, Joe Johnston was more focused on Atlanta itself instead of his immediate rear. Construction of Atlanta's field works seems to have started in December and Johnston gave a favorable impression after a day-long inspection on March 13. As historian Stephen Davis noted "No one… asked General Johnston why he was looking so far to his rear, when the campaign in northwest Georgia had not even begun."
 
I think the problem with "giving up ground" is that there comes a point when you're giving up too much. That was the perception Davis, Bragg, et al had in July 1864 when they plausibly concluded Atlanta was next.
Very true. Whether a good idea or bad, giving up ground had its limit. Then you get to that point and whoops, Atlanta is gone.
AR
 
I do agree here. For all that Joe Johnston and his supporters talk about a Fabian strategy, he seemed bafflingly unprepared to actually execute it at the start of the campaign. Dave Powell's Vol. 1 on Atlanta has Johnston comes across as being ignorant of the terrain to his rear. Snake Creek Gap was one thing, but Calhoun was a good opportunity missed and Cassville was never a lost opportunity as Johnston liked to claim - Sherman never set foot on the trap even if Johnston wanted to spring it.

His strategic vision seemed to boil down to Sherman one day blundering and repeating Fredericksburg several times. Sherman definitely blundered at Kennesaw Mountain but that was one time. Johnston never tried to tenaciously defend against Sherman's flanking moves even though time was critical for the Lincoln administration. In my view, Johnston never seemed to think of making an opportunity through his own hands.

I also noticed that recent studies give most of the credit for the idea of Johnston's counterattacks to his subordinates: Bob Jenkins credited the whole Cassville plan to Hood, Earl J Hess pointed out that Johnston only claimed credit for the idea of the Peachtree Creek counterattack after Atlanta fell and Bentonville was essentially Wade Hampton's plans.

Also thanks for bringing the Mexican-American war book to my attention. Definitely less aware of Joe Johnston, Beauregard and McClellan's time in Mexico vs. say Grant's, Bragg's and Thomas'.
I'd only add that one of the most interesting essays is Ethan Rafuse's essay on Joe Hooker. I'll leave to you to read it and see what Rafuse thinks Joe learned in Mexico. :D
 

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