J. Johnston Trying to understand J.E.Johnston

[SSVilla]

What was the commissary situation in Mississippi by mid May 1863? Farragut had blocked the Red River by April, I believe.

You are right, I recently saw an account that General Banks had blocked the Red River prior to his campaign against Port Hudson.

 

[wausaubob]

You are right, I recently saw an account that General Banks had blocked the Red River prior to his campaign against Port Hudson.

No more molasses or sugar could come over from Louisiana. No more cattle could come from Texas and get on the cars at Shreveport and be shipped successfully to Vicksburg. Grant's earlier expedition had devastated northern Mississippi. Once he began to march to Jackson the army was emptying out the countryside. The farmers of southern Mississippi were probably in revolt for this very reason. It was a matter of saving their families, not patriotic further. Once Grant and Sherman made it to Jackson I believe they distributed rations to keep the people from starving.

 

[tony_gunter]

Ironically this subject has stayed on the back of my mind. It's funny how that happens sometimes isn't it?

I do agree with you @tony_gunter that Johnston was passive and didn't have any kind of bold idea to give his side a chance to turn the tables. If he wanted to concentrate elsewhere he didn't send orders to do it as his first order of business, specifically pointing a location. Part of that seems to me lack of time to reconnoiter but it can also be he didn't want to assume responsibility for the debacle he could foresee coming, as you point out. Even a bold instruction and plan wouldn't have probably worked out because of the communication problems I pointed to, but the fact he didn't try to do anything but get away is significant for showing timidity in his generalship. It's a fair criticism.

It's odd that Davis would go back to J.E. Johnston when he didn't trust him and would publicly undermine him with criticism. In normal circumstances one would think he'd need to be removed if the President's lack of confidence is that deep. Eventually Lincoln had to move on from McClellan even when the options that came after him proved to be worse for a while. He wouldn't have found a General who could get the job done if he got stuck with the same generals who proved unsatisfactory. Davis didn't try out enough other people. I know that seems easy for me to say. It's ultimately why all these discussions are theoretical.

I was just re-reading the correspondence. How fast could the distance from Johnston to Pemberton have been covered given that McPherson was between them at Clinton?

Johnston sent his message to Pemberton ordering him to come out and attack Clinton at 8:40 pm May 13th. Pemberton received the message at Bovina around 9:40 am on May 14th.

No word to Pemberton of the decision to withdraw to the northeast.

No record of where the message was transmitted via telegraph, but it could have been either Bolton or Edwards. Most likely route around McPherson to Bolton is about 33 miles, assuming one hour to send and receive the message, so just under 3 miles per hour most of which would have been in the dark. Does that sound like the probable route?

Pemberton responds on the 14th that he will instead move the next day to cut Grant's supply line. Message received on the 15th by Johnston at Calhoun Station 17 miles northeast of Jackson, no record of time sent / received.

Obviously Johnston isn't going to ride as fast as a courier, but if Johnston rode to Edwards Station to assess the situation we are talking about 43 miles instead of the 33 to Bolton. So maybe 1-2 days (May 14 or 15) to reach Edwards with an escort, 3 days (May 16) if he brings the 4,000 infantry with him, leaving Gregg's exhausted troops behind to evacuate stores and join the arriving reinforcements.

Johnston's excuse that he assumed Grant would take and hold Jackson seems dubious. The road network back to Grant's supply base was 65 miles, that's beyond the distance wagons can sustain an army. And if he had already determined to evacuate and allow Grant to take and hold the fortified city, why order Pemberton out of his defenses to attack Clinton?

Just doesn't add up.