McClellan What Would McClellan Have Done?

[Saphroneth]

And yet the confederates abandoned Yorktown without leaving a garrison. And if it was so important to leave a small garrison in the event of abandoning the Peninsula, then the confederates would have left a garrison on May 3rd in order to slow down the federal advance. They did not leave 3000 troops in Yorktown. So much for "under any circumstances."

They didn't at a point when the siege prep had been completed - the delay had, in fact, already been gained.

I'll repeat... there is no evidence that Lee wanted to leave a sacrificial garrison at Yorktown. There is simply no need to speculate about scenarios that are not supported by the evidence.

But the scenario I am talking about is the one you are saying would happen - the one where Lee does not leave a garrison at Yorktown.

In what way does this give him an advantage, or cause McClellan problems?

 

[Saphroneth]

And yet the confederates abandoned Yorktown without leaving a garrison. And if it was so important to leave a small garrison in the event of abandoning the Peninsula, then the confederates would have left a garrison on May 3rd in order to slow down the federal advance. They did not leave 3000 troops in Yorktown. So much for "under any circumstances."

Okay, so what circumstances do you think Magruder would leave a garrison? He clearly thought it was important, since he said "under any circumstances".




Remember, this all started because of the point that - if McClellan broke through the Warwick line - he would still be delayed by the need to reduce Yorktown.

Dan, you have argued that this simply would not happen, because Lee would not leave a garrison, Magruder would not leave a garrison, and McClellan would look silly besieging a small garrison in Yorktown.

But why? What benefit does it give the Confederates to not delay McClellan?

 

[DanSBHawk]

They didn't at a point when the siege prep had been completed - the delay had, in fact, already been gained.

Yorktown was not invested as of May 3rd. Are you saying that no further delay was possible?

If the confederates had left 3000 troops in Yorktown when they evacuated on May 3rd, how long would it have taken for McClellan to get around Yorktown?

 

[67th Tigers]

Yorktown was not invested as of May 3rd. Are you saying that no further delay was possible?

If the confederates had left 3000 troops in Yorktown when they evacuated on May 3rd, how long would it have taken for McClellan to get around Yorktown?

Many sieged places were not invested (i.e. surrounded), and ultimately surrendered or were taken. It depends on whether you want to:

1. Starve out the garrison
2. Breach the works and assault

Completing investment and starving out a garrison is a very long process. Witness how long Vicksburg lasted,* and how long Petersburg lasted when option (2) was discounted by investment wasn't possible. OTOH, breaching is largely a matter of bringing up the heavy artillery. At Yorktown that meant the engineers directing the building of a wharf, a road, and digging gun emplacements. Due to the weather, this was slower than normal but was pressed and D-day for the breach and assault had been set as the batteries open up to breach on 6th May, and the assault by six divisions set for dawn on Wednesday 7th May. This was subject to the weather, because the state of the ground really matters.

The answer is, in a situation where Johnston didn't retreat, or a situation where there was a retreat and Yorktown was left garrisoned, the assault goes in about the same time - around 7th May, assuming good weather.

* That said, Grant left a "golden bridge" early in the siege, apparently hoping Pemberton would evacuate.

 

[Saphroneth]

Yorktown was not invested as of May 3rd. Are you saying that no further delay was possible?

If the confederates had left 3000 troops in Yorktown when they evacuated on May 3rd, how long would it have taken for McClellan to get around Yorktown?

A few days, at most - the guns were already in place to batter the town. That's a substantial part of how you reduce a fortified position.


In fact, there are three ways to do it.


1) An assault. This means you just attack the walls, with at most the engineering prep required to make scaling ladders.
This is very costly, but - if it succeeds, which is unlikely - it's the quickest. It is, however, what fortified positions are built to resist.


2) A bombardment. This means you emplace siege guns within siege gun range of the defences, after doing engineering prep work to identify the best gun sites you can reach and digging parallels. Once this prep work is done, which usually takes a few weeks depending on the specifics, you can bombard the fort.
This means that you are reducing the ability of the fort to effectively defend itself, because you're dismounting defending guns and blasting apart the parapet. This makes an assault much more practical, both more likely to work and less costly.
In practice, once it's clear that a bombardment has or will shortly render the fort vulnerable to an assault, the defenders usually surrender* - this is considered to be acceptable by both sides, as part of the longstanding laws and customs of war.

It is not necessary to fully invest a position (i.e. surround it by land) in order to conduct a bombardment - all you really need to do is to be able to control and defend your siege gun positions, and to approach the face of the fort you will be attacking. In some cases, forts have stronger and weaker sides (whether easier/harder to attack, or more or less decisive to take) and so attacking certain positions can be more advantageous than others.

A full investment also means that the enemy has no way of escaping, and is more likely to be compelled to surrender rather than escape. It can however mean that they're more willing to fight in the first place and you can end up with a battle or long struggle where otherwise the enemy would evacuate.

* assuming they have no available means of escape, of course


3) A siege, in the technical sense. This means you cut off access to the fort, meaning that the enemy cannot move in food supplies, and wait until starvation compels the enemy to surrender.
This is usually the longest but surest process - it's what was done to Vicksburg - and unlike the other two it does require cutting the position off and investing it.

Note that this doesn't just mean cutting off access by land. If the Confederates can continue to get ships down the York by night, they can resupply the garrison. Consequently, for the siege timer to "start" for Yorktown there would need to be Union guns of some sort interdicting the York north of Yorktown - or making the wharves untenable for supply ships in some other way.



As of May 3, McClellan's siege guns are largely in position and emplaced, ready to bombard both the Redoubts line and Yorktown itself. This means that essentially all of the time that the bombardment would take has already been done; at this point, if Johnston leaves a garrison in Yorktown, he'll lose it within a day or two.

That wasn't true as late as April 30.

 

[DanSBHawk]

A few days, at most - the guns were already in place to batter the town. That's a substantial part of how you reduce a fortified position.


In fact, there are three ways to do it.


1) An assault. This means you just attack the walls, with at most the engineering prep required to make scaling ladders.
This is very costly, but - if it succeeds, which is unlikely - it's the quickest. It is, however, what fortified positions are built to resist.


2) A bombardment. This means you emplace siege guns within siege gun range of the defences, after doing engineering prep work to identify the best gun sites you can reach and digging parallels. Once this prep work is done, which usually takes a few weeks depending on the specifics, you can bombard the fort.
This means that you are reducing the ability of the fort to effectively defend itself, because you're dismounting defending guns and blasting apart the parapet. This makes an assault much more practical, both more likely to work and less costly.
In practice, once it's clear that a bombardment has or will shortly render the fort vulnerable to an assault, the defenders usually surrender* - this is considered to be acceptable by both sides, as part of the longstanding laws and customs of war.

It is not necessary to fully invest a position (i.e. surround it by land) in order to conduct a bombardment - all you really need to do is to be able to control and defend your siege gun positions, and to approach the face of the fort you will be attacking. In some cases, forts have stronger and weaker sides (whether easier/harder to attack, or more or less decisive to take) and so attacking certain positions can be more advantageous than others.

A full investment also means that the enemy has no way of escaping, and is more likely to be compelled to surrender rather than escape. It can however mean that they're more willing to fight in the first place and you can end up with a battle or long struggle where otherwise the enemy would evacuate.

* assuming they have no available means of escape, of course


3) A siege, in the technical sense. This means you cut off access to the fort, meaning that the enemy cannot move in food supplies, and wait until starvation compels the enemy to surrender.
This is usually the longest but surest process - it's what was done to Vicksburg - and unlike the other two it does require cutting the position off and investing it.

Note that this doesn't just mean cutting off access by land. If the Confederates can continue to get ships down the York by night, they can resupply the garrison. Consequently, for the siege timer to "start" for Yorktown there would need to be Union guns of some sort interdicting the York north of Yorktown - or making the wharves untenable for supply ships in some other way.



As of May 3, McClellan's siege guns are largely in position and emplaced, ready to bombard both the Redoubts line and Yorktown itself. This means that essentially all of the time that the bombardment would take has already been done; at this point, if Johnston leaves a garrison in Yorktown, he'll lose it within a day or two.

That wasn't true as late as April 30.

To sum up:

We know that Magruder's "under any circumstances" did not mean under any circumstances a garrison would be left at Yorktown to slow down the federal advance, because in real life there was no garrison left at Yorktown to slow down the federal advance.

And we know that in Lee's two separate instructions to Magruder to be careful not to get cut off on the Peninsula, Lee never mentioned anything about leaving a garrison at Yorktown.

This is why I simply disagree with your claim that McClellan might as well have been timid and slow with the Warwick line, because of some inevitability that he would have had to besiege a 3000 man garrison with his 60,000 or 70,000 or 80,000 man army.

 

[Saphroneth]

We know that Magruder's "under any circumstances" did not mean under any circumstances a garrison would be left at Yorktown to slow down the federal advance, because in real life there was no garrison left at Yorktown to slow down the federal advance.

And we know that in Lee's two separate instructions to Magruder to be careful not to get cut off on the Peninsula, Lee never mentioned anything about leaving a garrison at Yorktown.

This is why I simply disagree with your claim that McClellan might as well have been timid and slow with the Warwick line, because of some inevitability that he would have had to besiege a 3000 man garrison with his 60,000 or 70,000 or 80,000 man army.

But you seem to think that "under any circumstances" means that Magruder would never leave a garrison, even if it would have given the Confederates the benefit of several weeks to muster troops to defend Richmond?

What circumstances do you think "under any circumstances" applies to? Because the only example we have of circumstances where it doesn't apply is a month later when the slow down effect would be very minor - since the town could be taken in a few days.

 

[67th Tigers]

To sum up:

We know that Magruder's "under any circumstances" did not mean under any circumstances a garrison would be left at Yorktown to slow down the federal advance, because in real life there was no garrison left at Yorktown to slow down the federal advance.

And we know that in Lee's two separate instructions to Magruder to be careful not to get cut off on the Peninsula, Lee never mentioned anything about leaving a garrison at Yorktown.

This is why I simply disagree with your claim that McClellan might as well have been timid and slow with the Warwick line, because of some inevitability that he would have had to besiege a 3000 man garrison with his 60,000 or 70,000 or 80,000 man army.

There's a lot of goalpost moving here. Early April is not early May, and the situation has changed - the delay that leaving a garrison was designed to cause has already happened.

You might disagree that a small garrison would cause a major delay, and that's a very courageous position. Everyone who understood military affairs, Keyes for example, understood the delay that would result. I applaud your disagreeing with the professionals.

 

[Saphroneth]

I will note that no clear alternative has been presented to how McClellan could get past Yorktown quickly, in the event of a breakthrough elsewhere along the Warwick early in April.

It is quite possible that possession of the surrounds of Yorktown could have made the batteries to be in place a little quicker than historical, by permitting batteries to be established from a better position that was not available historically or by reducing the amount of total engineering work required. But that's not confimed (just a possibility) and it's also the same thing - delaying McClellan until the end of April instead of the first week of May is still delaying McClellan by several weeks.


But if Magruder, or DH Hill, or Johnston, or Lee, falls back after the piercing of the Warwick line in early or mid-April, but leaves Yorktown garrisoned, the question of what McClellan could do to avoid further delay upon that taking place has been studiously avoided. In fact, the assertion has effectively been made that McClellan would not be delayed because his enemy would rather abandon Yorktown than cause him that delay.

Which is... rather odd. After all, if any of those Confederate generals were uninterested in delaying McClellan, the option was open to them to simply abandon the Warwick line as a whole.

 

[Saphroneth]

But here's a different consideration. How soon, exactly, might McClellan think that Jackson can recombine with Longstreet, in November?

In other words, what is the earliest point at which McClellan might assume he was facing the whole of Lee's army?


Well, as of his replacement, McClellan's understanding was that Jackson's command was somewhere on the western side of Chester and Thornton's gaps. This is actually quite pessimistic - Jackson was considerably further north - but what it means is that basically McClellan thinks part of Jackson's command (as of the 7th) is around Luray and the rest is around Front Royal.

Luray to Madison Court House, by the shortest route, is about 35 miles (via Fishers Gap) but this gap isn't one Lee suggested Jackson use in his orders. It's possible that it was considered too vulnerable, which is why he directed Jackson to Swift Run Gap instead.

Thornton's Gap is about 40 miles, but even more vulnerable to interception; Swift Run Gap is safe from interception but about 50 miles.

This means that, in McClellan's estimation, the earliest that part of Jackson can possibly join Longstreet is probably arriving at Madison Court House around November 10 to 11 (marches of 7,8,9,10 or 8,9,10,11). From there to actually reach Culpeper is another day or two, but if Longstreet retires to Madison then (in McClellan's estimation, not reality) the linkup would begin around November 10-11.

The rest of Jackson could not join Longstreet via the same route for roughly another three days (Front Royal to Luray, then the same route).

This is of course assuming that McClellan gets no further scouting information over the course of that period. As it happens, Jackson's force marching via Fishers Gap would be fairly easy to observe with cavalry and so McClellan could reasonably know that this wasn't happening by about the 10th; there is however no way to easily disprove the Swift Run Gap move.

Consequently, around November 11 (by which time McClellan could be expected to have already taken or be taking Culpeper, probably without a fight if Longstreet retires on Madison as planned - otherwise Longstreet gets flattened) McClellan could reasonably expect:

- Jackson won't have arrived at Madison with any part of his corps before about this date, but may be reinforcing Longstreet starting now.
- Jackson cannot finish reinforcing Longstreet until about the 14th.

Under these circumstances and assuming that he has no current information about Jackson's position, McClellan might be willing to attack - but I doubt it. His supply situation at Culpeper is likely to be tenuous, as the rail line to Culpeper can't at this point sustain his whole force long-term.


Consequently, the situation is that McClellan can know with a reasonable degree of certainty that there's no significant force between him and Fredericksburg. He knows where Longstreet's force is, and it's at Madison (Stuart may be able to prevent McClellan's cavalry confirming this, but Stuart's cavalry was being run pretty ragged in early November and couldn't guard two spots to raise doubt about where Longstreet is); his worst-case estimate for Jackson's position is either doing the same thing (going to Madison) or going after a supply line McClellan has defended with, at minimum, an entire corps posted in mountain gaps.

And the greatest barriers to an overland advance are the difficulty of getting established in supply over the Rapidan, and how you supply close to Richmond. Neither of them is a problem at this moment.


It's even in keeping with stereotypical McClellan - he has an opportunity to win a great strategic victory and all he has to do is not fight the enemy... he just has to change his base.

 

[DanSBHawk]

There's a lot of goalpost moving here. Early April is not early May, and the situation has changed - the delay that leaving a garrison was designed to cause has already happened.

You might disagree that a small garrison would cause a major delay, and that's a very courageous position. Everyone who understood military affairs, Keyes for example, understood the delay that would result. I applaud your disagreeing with the professionals.

There is no goalpost moving. It was suggested that a garrison left in Yorktown would give the confederates more time to evacuate the peninsula. That would apply to whenever the confederates evacuated.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I will note that no clear alternative has been presented to how McClellan could get past Yorktown quickly, in the event of a breakthrough elsewhere along the Warwick early in April.

It is quite possible that possession of the surrounds of Yorktown could have made the batteries to be in place a little quicker than historical, by permitting batteries to be established from a better position that was not available historically or by reducing the amount of total engineering work required. But that's not confimed (just a possibility) and it's also the same thing - delaying McClellan until the end of April instead of the first week of May is still delaying McClellan by several weeks.


But if Magruder, or DH Hill, or Johnston, or Lee, falls back after the piercing of the Warwick line in early or mid-April, but leaves Yorktown garrisoned, the question of what McClellan could do to avoid further delay upon that taking place has been studiously avoided. In fact, the assertion has effectively been made that McClellan would not be delayed because his enemy would rather abandon Yorktown than cause him that delay.

Which is... rather odd. After all, if any of those Confederate generals were uninterested in delaying McClellan, the option was open to them to simply abandon the Warwick line as a whole.

None of this excuses McClellan's timidity in front of the Warwick line.

 

[Saphroneth]

There is no goalpost moving. It was suggested that a garrison left in Yorktown would give the confederates more time to evacuate the peninsula. That would apply to whenever the confederates evacuated.

The reason the garrison left in Yorktown would give the Confederates more time to react is the time taken to set up the guns in order to most effectively reduce and capture it.

That work had been done, pretty much, by early May. It certainly had not been done by 5th April!

So the situation on 5th April is completely different in that specific respect to the situation on 3rd May.


This is why, in early April, Magruder was saying things about "under any circumstances". At that point, a strong Yorktown garrison is a massive upside to him.

By early May, with heavy guns ready to bombard the town, there is no upside. But that's because of the guns.

None of this excuses McClellan's timidity in front of the Warwick line.

What it means is that breaking through the Warwick line early doesn't speed up the timeline; given that, why should McClellan risk thousands of casualties against positions that were described by a contempoary witness as "one of the strongest in the world" - for no benefit in time?

 

[67th Tigers]

There is no goalpost moving. It was suggested that a garrison left in Yorktown would give the confederates more time to evacuate the peninsula. That would apply to whenever the confederates evacuated.

So, goalpost moving.

The reason there would be a delay is because siege artillery needs to be brought up to make a breach etc. If the siege artillery is already been brought up creating said delay, then it has already happened.

None of this excuses McClellan's timidity in front of the Warwick line.

What timidity? McClellan's senior commanders, Heintzelman, Keyes and Barnard made combat estimates that they couldn't mount a simple open assault. McClellan accepted their combat estimates on the basis of them being obviously correct after conducting his own recces.

You start from a position of assuming the Warwick Line could have been carried by an open assault. Given what we know, that is doubtful. If the Warwick Line could not have been carried with an open assault with any reasonable chance of success, then there is no timidity, but rather prudence.

McClellan lived in the real world. His army is facing a well garrisoned, strong line. He has to overcome it without resorting to fantasies of the enemy being numerically weak, and the fortifications he can see with his own eyes not existing.

 

[Saphroneth]

When evaluating whether an unmade attack should have been made, we should try to evaluate it the same way (as far as possible) we evaluate one that was actually made. That means, among other things, looking at the likely cost, chance of success, and likely gain.

If an assault on the Warwick was easy, then it would simply have happened. McClellan had already issued the orders to attack to both columns on April 5; what actually happened was that both the commanders in question saw (and were bombarded by artillery from) a position strong enough that a simple assault was something they judged as impractical.

This means that an assault attempt is going to be costly, even if it succeeds and especially if it fails. So, what's the expected gain for this likely-costly attack?

Well, it's not several weeks - those weeks are gained only if the Confederates abandon Yorktown when the Warwick line is breached elsewhere. That's up to them - the Union benefit is only gained if the Confederates choose to give it to them.

 

[DanSBHawk]

If an assault on the Warwick was easy, then it would simply have happened.

Not necessarily. That's why Johnston wrote that only McClellan could have hesitated to attack.

As I said earlier, this fictional scenario about the 3000 Yorktown garrison is really just an excuse for McClellan's failure to break through the Warwick line. It's just one more excuse in a litany of excuses for McClellan's failures.

 

[Saphroneth]

Not necessarily. That's why Johnston wrote that only McClellan could have hesitated to attack.

Okay, so why did Keyes hesitate to attack? He had orders to make a bayonet charge.

As I said earlier, this fictional scenario about the 3000 Yorktown garrison is really just an excuse for McClellan's failure to break through the Warwick line. It's just one more excuse in a litany of excuses for McClellan's failures.

Okay, so - again - what benefit does it give Lee, or the Confederates, to not do this? Why would they help McClellan in this way?

You haven't come up with a way for Yorktown to be quickly overcome, in fact you've done your level best to avoid the question. But Yorktown and the Warwick line existed for a reason.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Okay, so - again - what benefit does it give Lee, or the Confederates, to not do this? Why would they help McClellan in this way?

Until you can show evidence that Lee wanted to leave a garrison in Yorktown to be surrounded, all of this is just your own fantasy.

 

[Saphroneth]

Until you can show evidence that Lee wanted to leave a garrison in Yorktown to be surrounded, all of this is just your own fantasy.

We can show evidence that Magruder did - because, well, he said "under any circumstances" which means there must have been some circumstances where he was willing to do it. And we can show evidence that Keyes had thought of it, because he mentions it specifically as why breaking through the Warwick line wouldn't be sufficient.


But are you seriously saying that you've never heard of the military concept of a fort defending the entrance to a river, or a mountain pass? It's not "just [my] own fantasy" if it's referring to a fort being used in the way forts have been used for thousands of years.

 

[DanSBHawk]

We can show evidence that Magruder did - because, well, he said "under any circumstances" which means there must have been some circumstances where he was willing to do it. And we can show evidence that Keyes had thought of it, because he mentions it specifically as why breaking through the Warwick line wouldn't be sufficient.


But are you seriously saying that you've never heard of the military concept of a fort defending the entrance to a river, or a mountain pass? It's not "just [my] own fantasy" if it's referring to a fort being used in the way forts have been used for thousands of years.

Lee gave Magruder specific instructions in late March and early April, and he said nothing about leaving thousands of soldiers behind in Yorktown.

This is all fantasy on your part.