McClellan What Would McClellan Have Done?

[Saphroneth]

Lee gave Magruder specific instructions in late March and early April, and he said nothing about leaving thousands of soldiers behind in Yorktown.

And yet, Magruder gave specific instructions to garrison Yorktown in the event of a breakthrough. Why do you think he did that?

 

[Saphroneth]

In fact, I'm now going to get hyperspecific.


McClellan breaks through the Warwick line on April 7, and Magruder's Army of the Peninsula falls back.
In compliance with Magruder's explicit instructions, Wilcox sends the 26th AL and 46th VA to be added to the Yorktown garrison.

What does McClellan do now, if he is doing things properly? He is now faced with a garrisoned Yorktown.

 

[DanSBHawk]

And yet, Magruder gave specific instructions to garrison Yorktown in the event of a breakthrough. Why do you think he did that?

We've already went over that. You say that Magruder meant it in any circumstance, and then you and your friend make excuses why it didn't really mean any circumstance such as those existing at the beginning of May.

Until you find evidence that Lee wanted to leave thousands of soldiers behind in Yorktown, this is all nonsense.

 

[Saphroneth]

We've already went over that. You say that Magruder meant it in any circumstance, and then you and your friend make excuses why it didn't really mean any circumstance such as those existing at the beginning of May.

Oddly enough, Magruder has every opportunity to change those orders in the course of the many weeks it would take McClellan to set up guns to bombard Yorktown. He doesn't have the opportunity to specifically issue those orders in the event of a breakthrough, because - well - the breakthrough means things happen faster.

But we really haven't "been over that". You are arguing that Magruder's orders don't exist, because they are inconvenient to you - because Magruder said "any circumstances", that is a direct quote, and he says it twice.

Now, what I think that means is that there is some circumstance (like, for example, Magruder's army being forced to fall back on that very same day) where Magruder's orders would result in Yorktown being garrisoned. Because that is what the orders say - those specific regiments are to be added to the garrison if they fall back.

 

[Saphroneth]

Until you find evidence that Lee wanted to leave thousands of soldiers behind in Yorktown, this is all nonsense.

McClellan breaks through the Warwick line the afternoon of 7th April; Wilcox, in compliance with direct and specific orders from Magruder, adds to the garrison of Yorktown.


There you go. We have a garrisoned Yorktown, regardless of Lee's preferences. (though incidentally I'm not sure you've demonstrated that Lee would go against literal centuries of military science and abandon a fort when holding it would benefit him.)

 

[DanSBHawk]

Oddly enough, Magruder has every opportunity to change those orders in the course of the many weeks it would take McClellan to set up guns to bombard Yorktown. He doesn't have the opportunity to specifically issue those orders in the event of a breakthrough, because - well - the breakthrough means things happen faster.

But we really haven't "been over that". You are arguing that Magruder's orders don't exist, because they are inconvenient to you - because Magruder said "any circumstances", that is a direct quote, and he says it twice.

Now, what I think that means is that there is some circumstance (like, for example, Magruder's army being forced to fall back on that very same day) where Magruder's orders would result in Yorktown being garrisoned. Because that is what the orders say - those specific regiments are to be added to the garrison if they fall back.

No, Magruder's orders certainly do exist. But you don't know what they mean other than it sends men to Yorktown in the event of "falling back." And falling back could mean almost anything from pulling the right of the line back to Blow's Mill to a complete evacuation of the Peninsula. And it could mean that Magruder did not understand what Lee wanted.

So again, until you come up with evidence that Lee wanted to leave thousands of soldiers behind at Yorktown, this is all nonsense.

 

[Saphroneth]

No, Magruder's orders certainly do exist. But you don't know what they mean other than it sends men to Yorktown in the event of "falling back." And falling back could mean almost anything from pulling the right of the line back to Blow's Mill to a complete evacuation of the Peninsula. And it could mean that Magruder did not understand what Lee wanted.

Okay, so what you mean is that - despite the fact that Magruder said to do this "under any circumstances" if they are "forced to retire" - you think that Magruder being forced to fall back from the Warwick line doesn't mean the addition of troops to the garrison.

If McClellan breaks through along the Warwick line, then the Department of the Peninsula is certainly being "forced to retire", and so Wilcox would action these orders - and put two regiments into Yorktown, as ordered.

That is what would happen if McClellan broke through on April 7. Wilcox has been ordered to put the 26th AL and 46th VA into Yorktown if they have to retire or if the army falls back. A breakthrough on April 7 would force the Confederate army to retire, and would mean they fall back.

Therefore, in the event of a breakthrough on April 7, you end up with a garrison for Yorktown.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Okay, so what you mean is that - despite the fact that Magruder said to do this "under any circumstances" if they are "forced to retire" - you think that Magruder being forced to fall back from the Warwick line doesn't mean the addition of troops to the garrison.


View attachment 502908

If McClellan breaks through along the Warwick line, then the Department of the Peninsula is certainly being "forced to retire", and so Wilcox would action these orders - and put two regiments into Yorktown, as ordered.

That is what would happen if McClellan broke through on April 7. Wilcox has been ordered to put the 26th AL and 46th VA into Yorktown if they have to retire or if the army falls back. A breakthrough on April 7 would force the Confederate army to retire, and would mean they fall back.

Therefore, in the event of a breakthrough on April 7, you end up with a garrison for Yorktown.

On March 25th, Magruder recommended to the Sec of War that if sufficient reinforcements could not be sent, then Yorktown should be abandoned in order to avoid the capture of the garrison. Are you claiming that Magruder couldn't scrape up 3000 men in late March to sacrifice to the Yorktown fortifications, or was it less important in late March to hold on to Yorktown? Reconcile this letter with the later Magruder letter in which you claim to know exactly what he means.

 

[Saphroneth]

On March 25th, Magruder recommended to the Sec of War that if sufficient reinforcements could not be sent, then Yorktown should be abandoned in order to avoid the capture of the garrison. Are you claiming that Magruder couldn't scrape up 3000 men in late March to sacrifice to the Yorktown fortifications, or was it less important in late March to hold on to Yorktown? Reconcile this letter with the later Magruder letter in which you claim to know exactly what he means.

View attachment 502917

You'll note that in this discussion Magruder specifies that the capture is certain after the enemy has penetrated the Warwick line and after communication is cut off by water.

Now, he specifies the ascent of the river by iron-clad steamers. This is a telling point, because it means that what he's worried about is the running of the York river batteries by an ironclad.



Thus, in the event that the Confederacy can't even promise 20,000 men as reinforcements (that is, if 20,000 men are simply not available) Magruder doesn't think Yorktown should be held. In that environment, where 20,000 men can't be had, the men are more important than the time.

But if those 20,000 men can be promised - whether or not they've already arrived - Magruder accepts that the time is more important than the men.

Since in early April the 20,000 men are available, we fall into the condition where the time is more important than the possibility of losing the men (i.e. the ability to assemble an army to resist the advance of the enemy is always what matters, but if there's not even 20,000 available to form it on top of his own force the 3,000 men would be lost for insufficient return; if an army of 20,000 can be added to his own with time, the 3,000 men being lost allows this force to be assembled.)

 

[DanSBHawk]

You'll note that in this discussion Magruder specifies that the capture is certain after the enemy has penetrated the Warwick line and after communication is cut off by water.

Now, he specifies the ascent of the river by iron-clad steamers. This is a telling point, because it means that what he's worried about is the running of the York river batteries by an ironclad.



Thus, in the event that the Confederacy can't even promise 20,000 men as reinforcements (that is, if 20,000 men are simply not available) Magruder doesn't think Yorktown should be held. In that environment, where 20,000 men can't be had, the men are more important than the time.

But if those 20,000 men can be promised - whether or not they've already arrived - Magruder accepts that the time is more important than the men.

Since in early April the 20,000 men are available, we fall into the condition where the time is more important than the possibility of losing the men (i.e. the ability to assemble an army to resist the advance of the enemy is always what matters, but if there's not even 20,000 available to form it on top of his own force the 3,000 men would be lost for insufficient return; if an army of 20,000 can be added to his own with time, the 3,000 men being lost allows this force to be assembled.)

You're missing the point. Magruder is specifically saying that Yorktown should be abandoned rather than let it become surrounded and the garrison captured.

 

[Saphroneth]

You're missing the point. Magruder is specifically saying that Yorktown should be abandoned rather than let it become surrounded and the garrison captured.

But he's saying that in a specific context - which is why he says that if the reinforcements are promised, "Yorktown should be held to the last, awaiting their arrival". That's regardless of whether they've yet arrived, you'll note.


Combined with Magruder's order to throw troops into Yorktown "under any circumstances" if they have to retire (which was at a point when the reinforcements were, indeed, promised) the combination of priorities seems fairly clear - holding Yorktown as a fort even if invested buys time, but that time is only useful if there's something to do with it. The specific thing to do with it is to muster reinforcements able to stop McClellan's army before it reaches Richmond.



I will point out here that you seem totally unwilling to consider the cost-benefit situation of what happens if Wilcox complies with Magruder's written orders and reinforces Yorktown while the rest of Magruder's army falls back. Is this in any way worse for the Confederates and better for the Union, and if so... why?

 

[DanSBHawk]

But he's saying that in a specific context - which is why he says that if the reinforcements are promised, "Yorktown should be held to the last, awaiting their arrival". That's regardless of whether they've yet arrived, you'll note.


Combined with Magruder's order to throw troops into Yorktown "under any circumstances" if they have to retire (which was at a point when the reinforcements were, indeed, promised) the combination of priorities seems fairly clear - holding Yorktown as a fort even if invested buys time, but that time is only useful if there's something to do with it. The specific thing to do with it is to muster reinforcements able to stop McClellan's army before it reaches Richmond.



I will point out here that you seem totally unwilling to consider the cost-benefit situation of what happens if Wilcox complies with Magruder's written orders and reinforces Yorktown while the rest of Magruder's army falls back. Is this in any way worse for the Confederates and better for the Union, and if so... why?

Again, you're dancing around the point. Magruder is saying that Yorktown should be abandoned rather than let it be surrounded and it's garrison captured.

 

[Saphroneth]

Or, to put it another way.



- McClellan breaks through on the 7th April.
- Magruder/Lee/whoever abandons Yorktown.
- McClellan can send troop/supply ships up the York on the 9th of April, and reaches the vicinity of Richmond (Bottom's Bridge) by about the 21st of April.

OR

- McClellan breaks through on the 7th April.
- Magruder/Lee/whoever leaves a garrison in Yorktown.
- McClellan spends weeks reducing Yorktown by bombardment.
- McClellan can send troop/supply ships up the York on the 6th of May, and reaches the vicinity of Richmond (Bottom's Bridge) by about the 17th of May.


One of these is obviously better for the Confederates, isn't it?

 

[Saphroneth]

Again, you're dancing around the point. Magruder is saying that Yorktown should be abandoned rather than let it be surrounded and it's garrison captured.

And yet, "under any circumstances". The situation had, apparently, changed by April 7 - sufficient for Magruder to issue an order which, if obeyed, could easily result in troops being surrounded in Yorktown if McClellan broke through the Warwick line.

Or Magruder's March argument has conditionals on it saying the situation under which Yorktown should be abandoned, and those conditionals are obviated by the actual situation on April 7.



But I refer you to the above, reiterated here:




- McClellan breaks through on the 7th April.
- Magruder/Lee/whoever abandons Yorktown.
- McClellan can send troop/supply ships up the York on the 9th of April, and reaches the vicinity of Richmond (Bottom's Bridge) by about the 21st of April.

OR

- McClellan breaks through on the 7th April.
- Magruder/Lee/whoever leaves a garrison in Yorktown.
- McClellan spends weeks reducing Yorktown by bombardment.
- McClellan can send troop/supply ships up the York on the 6th of May, and reaches the vicinity of Richmond (Bottom's Bridge) by about the 17th of May.


One of these is obviously better for the Confederates, isn't it?

 

[67th Tigers]

Not necessarily. That's why Johnston wrote that only McClellan could have hesitated to attack.

As I said earlier, this fictional scenario about the 3000 Yorktown garrison is really just an excuse for McClellan's failure to break through the Warwick line. It's just one more excuse in a litany of excuses for McClellan's failures.

This is "begging the question." You are working back from your beliefs to justify yourself.

The fact is, the Warwick Line was much stronger, both in terms of manpower and its' physical state, than you allow for. As Barnard observed, the fortifications were "essentially completed" and the further work was primarily auxiliaries. He stated that the idea of "an assault was mere hare-brained folly." The line was a strong, and uninterupted series of fortifications manned by a relatively strong force as of the 5th. You seize on his acknowledgement that it was not completely impossible that an assault would not succeed, merely incredibly unlikely, but then ignore the fact that because the Federal Army was on the march, it simply wasn't concentrated to make a major assault, as Barnard and other noted.

A quick assault "breaking the line" would have been a long-shot. Indeed, something neither Grant nor Sherman, both supposedly successful generals, ever achieved. However, if the incredibly unlikely event occurred, and the Warwick Line was breached, then Magruder intended to leave a garrison in Yorktown, because it was the militarily correct thing to do. Keeping possession of Yorktown denies the Federals the use of the York River. This, in turn, prevents an advance up the Peninsula because supply wagons have a finite range. Thus, in exchange for a few thousand men (which might be rescued), the entire Federal Army can be halted for a month or so.

 

[Saphroneth]

Which is why I pointed it out - it's obvious which one of these McClellan would prefer, and it's obvious which one Lee and the Confederates would prefer.




- McClellan breaks through on the 7th April.
- Magruder/Lee/whoever abandons Yorktown.
- McClellan can send troop/supply ships up the York on the 9th of April, and reaches the vicinity of Richmond (Bottom's Bridge) by about the 21st of April.

OR

- McClellan breaks through on the 7th April.
- Magruder/Lee/whoever leaves a garrison in Yorktown.
- McClellan spends weeks reducing Yorktown by bombardment.
- McClellan can send troop/supply ships up the York on the 6th of May, and reaches the vicinity of Richmond (Bottom's Bridge) by about the 17th of May.

 

[DanSBHawk]

This is "begging the question." You are working back from your beliefs to justify yourself.

The fact is, the Warwick Line was much stronger, both in terms of manpower and its' physical state, than you allow for. As Barnard observed, the fortifications were "essentially completed" and the further work was primarily auxiliaries. He stated that the idea of "an assault was mere hare-brained folly." The line was a strong, and uninterupted series of fortifications manned by a relatively strong force as of the 5th. You seize on his acknowledgement that it was not completely impossible that an assault would not succeed, merely incredibly unlikely, but then ignore the fact that because the Federal Army was on the march, it simply wasn't concentrated to make a major assault, as Barnard and other noted.

A quick assault "breaking the line" would have been a long-shot. Indeed, something neither Grant nor Sherman, both supposedly successful generals, ever achieved. However, if the incredibly unlikely event occurred, and the Warwick Line was breached, then Magruder intended to leave a garrison in Yorktown, because it was the militarily correct thing to do. Keeping possession of Yorktown denies the Federals the use of the York River. This, in turn, prevents an advance up the Peninsula because supply wagons have a finite range. Thus, in exchange for a few thousand men (which might be rescued), the entire Federal Army can be halted for a month or so.

I'm interested in actual history, not fantasy scenarios.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Which is why I pointed it out - it's obvious which one of these McClellan would prefer, and it's obvious which one Lee and the Confederates would prefer.

- McClellan breaks through on the 7th April.
- Magruder/Lee/whoever abandons Yorktown.
- McClellan can send troop/supply ships up the York on the 9th of April, and reaches the vicinity of Richmond (Bottom's Bridge) by about the 21st of April.

OR

- McClellan breaks through on the 7th April.
- Magruder/Lee/whoever leaves a garrison in Yorktown.
- McClellan spends weeks reducing Yorktown by bombardment.
- McClellan can send troop/supply ships up the York on the 6th of May, and reaches the vicinity of Richmond (Bottom's Bridge) by about the 17th of May.

Perhaps Lee was more concerned about the size of his army and he wasn't willing to throw away a few thousand men based on some hypothetical timetable.

 

[Saphroneth]

Perhaps Lee was more concerned about the size of his army and he wasn't willing to throw away a few thousand men based on some hypothetical timetable.

Okay, so - to be clear - you think that a few thousand men were more valuable to Lee than the possibility of about a month's advantage. Is that correct?

 

[DanSBHawk]

Okay, so - to be clear - you think that a few thousand men were more valuable to Lee than the possibility of about a month's advantage. Is that correct?

To be clear - you're talking about a hypothetical scenario. Lee was capable of coming to his own conclusions, and he did not give Magruder any instructions to leave a Yorktown garrison to be surrounded.