McClellan What Would McClellan Have Done?

[Saphroneth]

The western seat the war was just as important as the eastern seat. I understand that to many the only thing that mattered was Virginia. Lee was one of those who mistakenly believed that as well.
Without control of the Mississippi and the southern states that provided support to Lee and Virginia was critical to the success of the Union.

I'd certainly agree that the West mattered, but any victory in the West by the Union is going to take years; the Union can score crippling blows in the East in a matter of a few months in a way that's simply not possible (for logistical reasons) in the West. As the CSA you want your best general and strongest army in the East, the alternative is a much quicker disaster than occurs otherwise.

 

[DanSBHawk]

For example, Magruder only "baffled" McClellan at Yorktown if you consider it to be the case that the fortifications and defences were so weak that they could have been easily rolled over by attacks and McClellan failed to order any. In fact McClellan did order attacks on the 5th, but for both columns their commander decided that the strength of the enemy defences was not amenable to attack in their sector; McClellan's estimates of total enemy strength in this period were basically correct.

In fact, McClellan wrote Lincoln on April 7th that he was possibly out-numbered. That's not even close to being correct.

 

[Saphroneth]

In fact, McClellan wrote Lincoln on April 7th that he was possibly out-numbered. That's not even close to being correct.

View attachment 501310

He's writing that intelligence indicates that Johnston's whole army will be arriving, not that they've arrived yet. That's why he says "I shall have the whole force of the enemy on my hands" not "I have the whole force of the enemy on my hands"; note that McClellan himself hadn't had all the units assigned to him at the time of this message arrive yet.

In fact this is an incorrect assessment on his part, because Johnston left units in central Virginia - those being what would become the core of AP Hill's division, along of course with Jackson's force from the Valley (and that of Ewell, at Culpeper). Since those units did not arrive at Yorktown, the "whole force of the enemy" did not arrive and he was not outnumbered at Yorktown, but there is no really solid reason why that couldn't have happened - exactly the same concentration happened in June at Richmond.

Given the ~100 regiments of all arms that were at Yorktown, plus the ~28 in Jackson and Ewell and the 4 minimum at Fredericksburg, that's about 130 regiments of all arms if all of Johnston's army had joined him at Yorktown; McClellan had about 127 regiments of all arms once all units assigned to him at the time of this message had arrived. (Richardson and Sedgwick, 25; 3rd Corps, 43; 4th Corps, 42; Sykes, 8.5; reserve and siege artillery, 3.5; cavalry and other HQ companies, about 5)

So yes, this assessment about the future didn't pan out - but it's not fundamentally ridiculous. And on the 7th McClellan gives the actual strength at Yorktown to Wool as about 30,000.

 

[jackt62]

The western seat the war was just as important as the eastern seat

As the saying goes, the Union won the war in the west, the Confederacy lost it in the east.

 

[67th Tigers]

In fact, McClellan wrote Lincoln on April 7th that he was possibly out-numbered. That's not even close to being correct.

View attachment 501310

No, he didn't. On the same day he stated Magruder had 30,000 at Yorktown, a moderate undercount.

He wrote that his intelligence was that Johnston was en route with his whole force. When they arrived, he might even be outnumbered. However, you'll note, they had not arrived yet. What's more, if Johnston's whole force had come to Yorktown, and McClellan not received reinforcement, McClellan would have been outnumbered. As it was, Johnston left a significant force behind (Jackson's and Ewell's divisions, plus Field's brigade), and McClellan got Franklin after the whole of Johnston's forces had arrived.

Simply counting infantry regiments on the Warwick would give the table below. If the 26.5 regts Johnston left behind were there, Walker's 6 regts or if some regiments had been transferred from Norfolk etc., then yes, McClellan would have been outnumbered. He never was, but the ratios were nowhere near what is claimed. The "whole force" would be ca. 122.5 infantry regiments, or roughly equal to the expeditionary force after Franklin arrived.

PS: I know you deny the numbers, and I invite you to look up unit histories and get arrival dates etc.

Date (April or May)	US Inf Regts	CS Inf Regts	Odds
5​	54​	25.5​	2.1​
6​	73.3​	27.5​	2.7​
7​	73.3​	38.5​	1.9​
8​	73.3​	39.5​	1.9​
9​	73.3​	47.5​	1.5​
10​	73.3​	47.5​	1.5​
11​	77.3​	47.5​	1.6​
12​	77.3​	47.5​	1.6​
13​	77.3​	52.5​	1.5​
14​	77.3​	57.5​	1.3​
15​	77.3​	57.5​	1.3​
16​	89.3​	70.5​	1.3​
17​	108.3​	71.5​	1.5​
18​	108.3​	79.5​	1.4​
19​	108.3​	82.5​	1.3​
20​	108.3​	86.5​	1.3​
21​	112.3​	90​	1.2​
22​	112.3​	90​	1.2​
23​	112.3​	90​	1.2​
24​	124.3​	90​	1.4​
25​	124.3​	90​	1.4​
26​	124.3​	90​	1.4​
27​	124.3​	90​	1.4​
28​	124.3​	90​	1.4​
29​	124.3​	90​	1.4​
30​	124.3​	90​	1.4​
1​	124.3​	90​	1.4​
2​	124.3​	90​	1.4​
3​	124.3​	90​	1.4​

 

[jackt62]

To bring this thread back to some semblance of objectivity and leaving aside the issue of McClellan's (over) estimates of enemy strength, there are legitimate grounds for considering his options for any post-Antietam campaign, given that his successors failed miserably in theirs. Would the AotP have still been in a better place even given a further pursuit of Longstreet by McClellan, whether superficial or not?

 

[121st PA Vols]

In both cases these are related more to the fortifications than anything...


...and this, I think (the whole post), is part of why McClellan threads tend to "devolve". It's because - well, what am I supposed to do? To go into the details about what McClellan's actual situation and options were would take up a whole thread each, easily, but people are quite happy to present them as if they were fact.

For example, Magruder only "baffled" McClellan at Yorktown if you consider it to be the case that the fortifications and defences were so weak that they could have been easily rolled over by attacks and McClellan failed to order any. In fact McClellan did order attacks on the 5th, but for both columns their commander decided that the strength of the enemy defences was not amenable to attack in their sector; McClellan's estimates of total enemy strength in this period were basically correct.

But the idea that Magruder "baffled" McClellan is presented here as fact.

What you call "devolve" is my real effort and intention to be brief, siting a few egs only.
I did not go into the 'campaign' of....Lincoln wanting the direct rout straight at Richmond, Mac shelving Urbana, the unusual rain thru most of the campaign and it's impact, Longstreet not showing for Johnston's attack, the defenses of Yorktown damming to flood the area, guarding the only points Mac could attack, etc, etc.
I mentioning a few key points to reveal McClellan's behavior for the sake of pertinent but brief conversation. We all can or have read the same literature and throw it back and forth at each other. I was being brief for the sake of being brief knowing it was a glimpse only into the topic.

 

[DanSBHawk]

No, he didn't. On the same day he stated Magruder had 30,000 at Yorktown, a moderate undercount.

He wrote that his intelligence was that Johnston was en route with his whole force. When they arrived, he might even be outnumbered.

​

Wrong. He wrote that his force is possibly less than that of the enemy, not will be possibly less...

I don't know why you two would be defending McClellan giving Wool and Lincoln two wildly different estimates of the enemy numbers on the same day. That would imply that McClellan was lying to Lincoln.

 

[67th Tigers]

Wrong. He wrote that his force is possibly less than that of the enemy, not will be possibly less...

... if Johnston arrives with his whole force.

"I shall have" is a future tense.

I don't know why you two would be defending McClellan giving Wool and Lincoln two wildly different estimates of the enemy numbers on the same day. That would imply that McClellan was lying to Lincoln.

He didn't.

 

[JeffBrooks]

McClellan's horse was named Dan Webster.

(No, it's not relevant to the question, but neither are most of the other posts in this thread, so I figured I might as well post it.)

 

[rpkennedy]

** Johnston attacking him (Seven Pines), not McClellan attacking Johnston, while catching his army straddling the Chickahominy. Sidebar: this is a great eg of a man (Johnston) seizing the opportunity to act completely out of character. Johnston attacking!??!

If the attacks had been better coordinated, Keyes' Fourth Corps would have been all but destroyed on May 31st. Now, with significant reinforcements on the way, I don't know that Johnston would have been able to hold his position but knocking out 1 of the 5 corps in front of Richmond would have been a major blow.

Ryan

 

[1SGDan]

And AAWWWWAAAAYYYYYYYY we go - get the headlamps as we descend into the eternal, unending "explanation" of everything McClellan didn't do.

Countless long posts trying to explain away Mac's failures. None of which really mean anything since his record is clear. He was relieved twice. A great resume Mac!

 

[1SGDan]

Dear me, are you interested in actual discussion or are you interested in loudly proclaiming that your viewpoint is correct

No I am interested in actual history not long winded explanations (excuses) of failure that can't be hidden.

 

[Sbc]

President Lincoln relieved George McClellan as AotP commander on November 5, 1862. Many of Lincoln's cabinet had long advocated such a step, and Lincoln's displeasure with McClellan's desultory pursuit of Lee's army after the battle of Antietam was the final straw. But in the aftermath of McClellan's relief, his 2 subsequent commanders (Burnside and Hooker) failed abysmally in offensive campaigns against the ANV. The battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville met sanguinary ends along the Rappahannock River and halted any possibility of Union success from the winter of 1862 to the spring of 1863. So the question is thus: if Lincoln had retained McClellan in command of the AotP, would the outcome have been any less successful than that of his successors Burnside and Hooker? Is there reason to believe that McClellan, dispute his flaws, would have attained greater results? Given that the administration was steadfast in its belief that the overland route was the only feasible military path, what would McClellan have done?

The administration would insist on the overland approach. Contrast little Mac after a bloody battle and the ultimate victor Grant. One fritters away time while the other attempts to advance and out flank Lee. Who would you want in command?

 

[121st PA Vols]

If the attacks had been better coordinated, Keyes' Fourth Corps would have been all but destroyed on May 31st. Now, with significant reinforcements on the way, I don't know that Johnston would have been able to hold his position but knocking out 1 of the 5 corps in front of Richmond would have been a major blow.

Ryan

rpkennedy, I'm out of my 'Gettysburg' element here but will say this action was part of our group study (vets) of what not to do, meaning separating major elements by a river and isolating forward.
As you say, the 4th would not just have been defeated but likely destroyed. Also felt the 3rd would have been imperiled against the Chickahominy.

 

[DanSBHawk]

... if Johnston arrives with his whole force.

"I shall have" is a future tense.

And "is" is present tense. Your attempt at jumbling together two different sentences is noted. It's reminiscent of the discussion of the Johnston "Only McClellan" quote and that whole exercise in deliberate miscomprehension.

 

[JeffBrooks]

And "is" is present tense. Your attempt at jumbling together two different sentences is noted. It's reminiscent of the discussion of the Johnston "Only McClellan" quote and that whole exercise in deliberate miscomprehension.

I believe Churchill called it "terminological inexactitude".

 

[67th Tigers]

And "is" is present tense. Your attempt at jumbling together two different sentences is noted. It's reminiscent of the discussion of the Johnston "Only McClellan" quote and that whole exercise in deliberate miscomprehension.

"is possibly"

We're discussing the whole force, which for both sides won't arrive until some time in the future. Remember, neither side was fully at Yorktown yet. McClellan only had 5 divisions there, with 3 more stuck en route and unable to reach the Warwick. Similarly, part of Johnston's command (Early's division) had reached Yorktown, but DH Hill's division is still en route, Toombs won't start moving there until the next day, and the remaining three divisions were not sent until after the council in Richmond. The last two rebel divisions are left up north, but might not have been.

So, in McClellan's opinion, 8 of his divisions might be a smaller force than Johnston's and Magruder's 10 divisions (spoiler alert, it actually was). Once they are all on the field, McClellan would be outnumbered. However, for both sides the whole force is not on the field. In fact, Johnston and Magruder had the equivalent of 3 divisions vs 5 Federal divisions on the 7th. This matches McClellan's estimate they had 30,000 (i.e. 3 divisions). In reality, the rebel force at Yorktown etc. peaked at 8 divisions (organised as 4 grand divisions of 2 divisions), opposed at that time by 8 Federal divisions with a 9th (Franklin) en route.

In short: it is reported Johnston's army is coming. In McClellan's opinion, that force in total plus Magruder might be larger than the detachment of the Federal army on the Peninsula. In that case he'd be outnumbered when they arrive unless additional forces were sent.

 

[67th Tigers]

The administration would insist on the overland approach. Contrast little Mac after a bloody battle and the ultimate victor Grant. One fritters away time while the other attempts to advance and out flank Lee. Who would you want in command?

McClellan threads have a pattern. They often quickly get derailed by a Gish gallop of accusations against McClellan. It's very easy to make a variety of short accusations, and the refutation often requires a lot of fact-checking which takes time and energy. Usually, this is then followed by a refusal to even read the evidence in question. Ultimately, someone will say something along the line of the above - Grant would have done better. This unfortunately doesn't go well for Grant because, as you will observe, he was actually far less aggressive than claimed (for example, never attacking two days consecutively), and the result of the Overland Campaign was a stalemate that, in the mid-term, favoured the rebels.

How long was Grant before Richmond and Petersburg making effectively no progress and asking for reinforcements? Let's remember, McClellan had a plan to capture Richmond that would have taken a couple of months, assuming the "Army of Virginia" could only keep Jackson busy. Grant had no conception of how to attack Petersburg other than surround it with a huge force and starve it out. Hence he took no significant action for just about nine months, complaining he was too weak and needed huge reinforcements which were busy chasing Early. If McClellan had sat before Richmond for nine months, imagine the uproar!

 

[Saphroneth]

This is actually why I mentioned the bit about attacks happening on consecutive days and the % of troops actually sent in on an attack on the 17th. Compare with Grant's major attacking battles in the Overland - Spotsylvania CH in particular - and what you don't see is Grant acting like people say McClellan "should" have done.


McClellan at Antietam, actual:

Leading elements (2 divisions) arrive late on the 15th. No attack is launched because the enemy is clearly in a defensive position.
Gets forces into position on the 16th
Launches 3/4 of his available brigades in actual attacks (close in, firefight, get repulsed) on the 17th
Pauses to reorg on the 18th
Launches further offensive moves on the 19th, Lee has evacuated


Grant at Spotsylvania, actual:

Leading elements arrive on the 8th. A battle is fought, which sees the Union troops repulsed from a defensive position.
9th is getting forces into position.
10th sees a major attack. Does this involve 3/4 of Grant's brigades going in on actual attacks? Perhaps but I don't think so (I count 9th Corps and two divisions of 2nd Corps - Mott and Barlow - which I can identify as not having launched an attack to within firefight range, except a brief skirmish on the 9th Corps front; not all of 5th Corps went in, and Upton's assault was 12 hand-picked regiments out of 48 in the corps). This looks like it's roughly 1/3 to 1/2 of Grant's army going in on actual attacks.
Pauses to reorg on the 11th
Then a major offensive move on the 12th


Really you don't actually see Grant launching a higher % of his force into battle within a couple of days of reaching the enemy, and you don't see Grant launch major attacks on consecutive days. The attack on the 12th might see 3/4 of Grant's brigades being launched on actual attacks, but I haven't counted them so I wouldn't want to say one way or the other.

What this should serve to demonstrate is not "McClellan Good, Grant Bad" but that both generals are operating with an understanding of the limits of what you can do quickly and the extent to which soldiers and armies need time to rest and recuperate. Grant is perhaps a little more willing to launch chancy attacks, which at times benefits him when the enemy has made a mistake (and fair enough) and at times simply results in a repulse.