- Joined
- May 18, 2005
- Location
- Spring Hill, Tennessee
WHARTON'S FAILED CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE?
Controversy and speculation must make for great reading—at least that would be the assumption. In Kenneth Noe's book--Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle--the author takes the stance that his understanding of the situation on October 8, 1862 is much clearer than those on the field that day. While discussing Wharton's reconnaissance that—according to him— "failed miserably," he states with limited and unreliable source material that the Thirty-third Ohio had pushed forward to the point at which Frank Cheatham's division was to launch their attack.[1]
According to Noe, Wharton's cavalry had just been brushed away from Benton Road north of Open Knob by artillery fire from Captain Stone's Indiana battery. From there, Noe explains that the cavalry swept east and then south down the New Mackville Highway and near the current park entrance. There, the cavalry chased two companies of the Thirty-third Ohio back up the ridge. He further adds that in the meantime McCook had sent the rest of the Thirty-third to support the two companies. He then used an account by Angus Waddle to support the idea that the Thirty-third Ohio fired a volley that emptied many saddles and "caused them [the rebel cavalry] to quickly disappear." The narrative is well written, and sounds reliable. However, in the same paragraph he described that Waddle was riding forward to give an order to the Thirty-third when a volley of musketry was fired that frightened his horse and he returned to the rear without delivering the order. But only a sentence or two later, he quotes Waddle stating that "A volley from our regiment emptied many of their saddles and caused them to quickly disappear."[2] How did Waddle witness the volley and its results if he turned back to the rear? Waddle's own accounts (taken from two different sources) are contrary to one another. The account in which Waddle mentioned that he turned back before delivering the order came from a letter written to his sister only three days after the battle. The other account which declares that the volley emptied saddles and forced the Rebel cavalry to retire is from his book Three Years in the Army of the Cumberland. It's clear that Waddle witnessed nothing other than his horse turning to the rear that day.[3] Lastly, it is noted that Waddle's accounts are the only ones used to support the theory that Wharton's reconnaissance failed in a two-page explanation by Noe as to why the whole Rebel attack was doomed from—nearly—the beginning. No other primary source accounts state or suggest such a theory.
From there, Noe goes on to describe how Wharton returned to General Polk and reported "the cavalryman's obviously exaggerated account." He then relates the portion of Polk's report that praised Wharton's accomplishment of driving back the Federal infantry several hundred yards. He then adds, "Wharton, of course, had not driven back the 33rd Ohio at all, they instead had forced him to the rear with a single volley."[4] The irony here is that there are no less than four accounts by Confederate commanders and/or soldiers that witnessed Wharton's foray that did in fact clear "an eminence of great importance" for Confederate success on the right. Being cavalry, it's clear that Wharton's mission would not have been to attack and drive the enemy in his front, but rather to disperse the enemy skirmishers and create a safe passage for the forthcoming infantry's attack position.
The first account was a member of Wharton's command. G. L. Mac Murphy was a member of Terry's Texas Rangers that helped clear the hill of Federal forces that afternoon. Mac Murphy related that his brigade, "made a charge at the enemy on a thick wooded hill so as to cover the advance of our Infantry, and it was successful that far but we could not sustain ourselves against the numbers brought to bear on us."[5] Wharton's force did successfully clear the hill, but faced superior numbers and retired as friendly infantry advanced. He continued his account describing the advance of Rebel infantry.
This account—clearly—does not coincide with the description that one volley from the Thirty-third Ohio dispersed the Rebel cavalry. First, neither Noe nor Haffendorfer believed that the Thirty-third Ohio was in such close proximity to Open Knob—referred to above as a "bald hill" with a battery on it. This description clearly indicates that Mac Murphy was referring to Open Knob and Parsons' battery. He also mentioned that the infantry began advancing after "the first fire." The first fire did not take place upon Maney's arrival. All accounts by Noe, Hafendorfer and Holman recognize that Donelson's brigade was the first to become engaged and participate in the initial infantry attacks. The contradiction comes when they fail to recognize that by all accounts—Federal and Confederate—the first attacks made by the Confederates fell on the Federal left—not the center as they describe.
A. B. Briscoe was also a member of the Rangers. His account is found in L. G. Biles book on the 8th Texas Cavalry regiment. After describing the movement through the infantry lines and crossing a wooden bridge that probably spanned Wilson's Creek, he states they charged in column of fours at "2 p.m."
Briscoe's description aids us in understanding that Wharton did actually clear the wooded hill west of the bed of Chaplin River enabling Rebel infantry to cross over and form only a few hundred yards from Open Knob. The evidence doesn't stop there however. In addition to General Polk's description of Wharton's advance, this never before published portion of General Cheatham's long-lost report aids us even further. After describing the initial attack by Donelson's brigade, Cheatham described what had happened just before Donelson stepped off in the attack.
General Maney seconded Cheatham's mention of Wharton's accomplishment. Maney described moving by the flank to the north in order to cross the river on the north side of Walker's bend of Chaplin River about the same time that Wharton made his "gallant dash."[9]
Now that it's clear that Wharton did in fact clear the way for Rebel infantry, we must delve more deeply into the concept of the Confederate attack. Noe rightly states that it was to conduct a "surprise flanking movement against an unanchored Federal left."[11] He then goes on to suggest however, that Wharton failed through "a function of timing, topography, and perhaps fate." He declares that Wharton had only seen "a few mounted men—conceivably cavalry, but in fact were several generals with their staffs—on top of the Open Knob." He attributes optical illusion—which is prevalent among the terrain of Chaplin Hills—to Wharton's supposed failure to recognize the true location of the Federal's northern flank.[12] This argument seems logical until we address the guts of Polk's report that substantiate the fact that the Rebels knew that more Federal forces were still in route to the northern Federal flank.
Regarding the plan of attack and known positions of the Federal army at Perryville, General Polk's report seems clear when he stated that he was informed that a force was moving on Mackville Pike toward the enemy's left. Although he had received an order from Bragg to "assume the offensive" around one p.m., he recorded that "our chances of success were greater against the line in my front even when re-enforced than it would be by attacking it as it stood and exposing my flank to the approaching force…"[13] There were two brigades of Federal infantry that were approaching the battlefield at that time. The two brigades were under the command of Union Brigadier General William Terrill and Colonel John Starkweather. Prior to that time, the extreme left of the Federal forces were the regiments of Colonel George Webster. Rather than commence the attack against Webster's Federal brigade and possibly risk a counter-attack in flank, Polk chose to let the enemy force begin its deployment and strike it while in the act of deploying. Colonel Wharton's Rebel cavalry was still on the west side of Chaplin River and could report the enemy's whereabouts with ease. There was only one location that these supporting forces would naturally occupy. This was the extension of the ridge line that ran east toward Walker's Bend. Two unoccupied hill tops occupied the space that was south of Wilson's Creek and west of Chaplin River. The first—from east to west—was the wooded hill, followed by Open Knob a little further west. It was clear that this is where any additional enemy forces would deploy for tactical purposes. From the evidence, it appears that Polk did intend to allow these forces to begin their deployment—but strike them before they were completely in place.
Apparently, historians Hafendorfer and Noe believed that the Confederate high command was unaware of the arrival and deployment of these enemy troops on the field due to Wharton's "failed" reconnaissance. Thus, without knowledge of the arrival of this enemy force and its location on the battlefield, Donelson's brigade—according to Hafendorfer and Noe—stepped off in an attack against Harris' Federal brigade which had suddenly become the center of the enemy line rather than the flank. However, General Polk's words do not reflect this understanding. Polk wrote that he "waited until the re-enforcements got into position. The attack was then ordered."[14] Both historians of the battle fail to recognize that Polk's next statement and supporting statements from Maney's report clearly reveal that Wharton's cavalry then conducted the charge to clear the hill west of Chaplin River and nearest Open Knob of any enemy forces. "This movement placed in our possession a skirt of woods and an eminence of great importance to our success on our right. It was quickly followed by the brigades of General Cheatham…"[15] Even if Donelson's (possibly) poor eyesight or misunderstanding of the field started him on the wrong axis of advance, it is made clear by other reports that the correction to the axis of advance was made, and the assault on Open Knob against Terrill's brigade and Parsons' battery was successful. From the reports, it seems most probable that the extreme flank of the enemy was in fact recognized as Parsons' Federal battery and Terrill's brigade arriving atop "Chaplin's Hill" or Open Knob. Additionally, this misconception of the battlefield by modern historians was certainly concluded due to the lack of knowledge of the Hafley Cabins that were situated on the eastern slope of Open Knob and visible from the Rebel attack position.
[1] Noe, Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle, p. 192.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Noe, Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle, p. 192, (Endnotes, p. 418).
[4] Noe, Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle, p. 193.
[5] MacMurphy, G. L., Online Archive of Terry's Texas Rangers. Retrieved from http://www.terrystexasrangers.org/diaries/macmurphy_gl/index.html
[6] MacMurphy, G. L., Online Archive of Terry's Texas Rangers. Retrieved from http://www.terrystexasrangers.org/diaries/macmurphy_gl/index.html (Empahsis added.)
[7] L. B. Giles, Terry's Texas Rangers, L. G. Biles, 1911, p. 46.
[8] Maj. Gen. B. F. Cheatham, Report of Battle of Perryville, Location undisclosed.
[9] Brig. Gen. George Maney, Supplement to the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Part 3, Vol. 2, Broadfoot Publishing Co., Wilmington, NC, p. 667.
[10] Brig. Gen. George Maney, Supplement to the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Part 3, Vol. 2, Broadfoot Publishing Co., Wilmington, NC, p. 667.
[11] Noe, Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle, p. 193.
[12] Noe, Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle, p. 193.
[13] Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk, Report of the Battle of Perryville (OR, p. 1110.)
[14] Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk, Report of the Battle of Perryville (OR, p. 1110.)
[15] Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk, Report of the Battle of Perryville (OR, p. 1110.)
Controversy and speculation must make for great reading—at least that would be the assumption. In Kenneth Noe's book--Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle--the author takes the stance that his understanding of the situation on October 8, 1862 is much clearer than those on the field that day. While discussing Wharton's reconnaissance that—according to him— "failed miserably," he states with limited and unreliable source material that the Thirty-third Ohio had pushed forward to the point at which Frank Cheatham's division was to launch their attack.[1]
According to Noe, Wharton's cavalry had just been brushed away from Benton Road north of Open Knob by artillery fire from Captain Stone's Indiana battery. From there, Noe explains that the cavalry swept east and then south down the New Mackville Highway and near the current park entrance. There, the cavalry chased two companies of the Thirty-third Ohio back up the ridge. He further adds that in the meantime McCook had sent the rest of the Thirty-third to support the two companies. He then used an account by Angus Waddle to support the idea that the Thirty-third Ohio fired a volley that emptied many saddles and "caused them [the rebel cavalry] to quickly disappear." The narrative is well written, and sounds reliable. However, in the same paragraph he described that Waddle was riding forward to give an order to the Thirty-third when a volley of musketry was fired that frightened his horse and he returned to the rear without delivering the order. But only a sentence or two later, he quotes Waddle stating that "A volley from our regiment emptied many of their saddles and caused them to quickly disappear."[2] How did Waddle witness the volley and its results if he turned back to the rear? Waddle's own accounts (taken from two different sources) are contrary to one another. The account in which Waddle mentioned that he turned back before delivering the order came from a letter written to his sister only three days after the battle. The other account which declares that the volley emptied saddles and forced the Rebel cavalry to retire is from his book Three Years in the Army of the Cumberland. It's clear that Waddle witnessed nothing other than his horse turning to the rear that day.[3] Lastly, it is noted that Waddle's accounts are the only ones used to support the theory that Wharton's reconnaissance failed in a two-page explanation by Noe as to why the whole Rebel attack was doomed from—nearly—the beginning. No other primary source accounts state or suggest such a theory.
From there, Noe goes on to describe how Wharton returned to General Polk and reported "the cavalryman's obviously exaggerated account." He then relates the portion of Polk's report that praised Wharton's accomplishment of driving back the Federal infantry several hundred yards. He then adds, "Wharton, of course, had not driven back the 33rd Ohio at all, they instead had forced him to the rear with a single volley."[4] The irony here is that there are no less than four accounts by Confederate commanders and/or soldiers that witnessed Wharton's foray that did in fact clear "an eminence of great importance" for Confederate success on the right. Being cavalry, it's clear that Wharton's mission would not have been to attack and drive the enemy in his front, but rather to disperse the enemy skirmishers and create a safe passage for the forthcoming infantry's attack position.
The first account was a member of Wharton's command. G. L. Mac Murphy was a member of Terry's Texas Rangers that helped clear the hill of Federal forces that afternoon. Mac Murphy related that his brigade, "made a charge at the enemy on a thick wooded hill so as to cover the advance of our Infantry, and it was successful that far but we could not sustain ourselves against the numbers brought to bear on us."[5] Wharton's force did successfully clear the hill, but faced superior numbers and retired as friendly infantry advanced. He continued his account describing the advance of Rebel infantry.
…meantime our Infantry advanced across an open field unperceived when the enemy finding out the movement fell back behind a battery on a bald hill overlooking the wooded hill they had just left, our Infantry advanced steadily to the foot of the hill, the enemy laying upon the top of it at that place I saw the most desperate fight at close quarters it has ever been my lot to witness The distance could not have exceeded 30 yards when the firing first began and after the first fire our troops commenced advancing, the enemy falling back, I became separated from the regiment on the wooded hill spoken of above, and got with the Infantry cheering them and doing all I could to add success to our cause.[6]
This account—clearly—does not coincide with the description that one volley from the Thirty-third Ohio dispersed the Rebel cavalry. First, neither Noe nor Haffendorfer believed that the Thirty-third Ohio was in such close proximity to Open Knob—referred to above as a "bald hill" with a battery on it. This description clearly indicates that Mac Murphy was referring to Open Knob and Parsons' battery. He also mentioned that the infantry began advancing after "the first fire." The first fire did not take place upon Maney's arrival. All accounts by Noe, Hafendorfer and Holman recognize that Donelson's brigade was the first to become engaged and participate in the initial infantry attacks. The contradiction comes when they fail to recognize that by all accounts—Federal and Confederate—the first attacks made by the Confederates fell on the Federal left—not the center as they describe.
A. B. Briscoe was also a member of the Rangers. His account is found in L. G. Biles book on the 8th Texas Cavalry regiment. After describing the movement through the infantry lines and crossing a wooden bridge that probably spanned Wilson's Creek, he states they charged in column of fours at "2 p.m."
After crossing, each squadron formed left front into line, which made us present five lines, one behind the other, and in this order we charged up the hill, into the woods and among the Yankees. This whole movement was made in a sweeping gallop and as if on parade. How different from the way we were handled at Shiloh! The Yankees were brushed back from the hill and woods and when the bugle sounded the recall and we returned, our own infantry and artillery had crossed the creek and were taking position on the hills from which we had driven the enemy.[7]
Briscoe's description aids us in understanding that Wharton did actually clear the wooded hill west of the bed of Chaplin River enabling Rebel infantry to cross over and form only a few hundred yards from Open Knob. The evidence doesn't stop there however. In addition to General Polk's description of Wharton's advance, this never before published portion of General Cheatham's long-lost report aids us even further. After describing the initial attack by Donelson's brigade, Cheatham described what had happened just before Donelson stepped off in the attack.
… Maney with his Brigade, which had been moved across the creek to my right, came forward in the woods from which the Enemy's skirmishers had been driven a few moments previously by a furious and gallant charge of Col. Wharton's Cavalry…[8]
General Maney seconded Cheatham's mention of Wharton's accomplishment. Maney described moving by the flank to the north in order to cross the river on the north side of Walker's bend of Chaplin River about the same time that Wharton made his "gallant dash."[9]
There had been considerable firing, but the movement of our cavalry appeared a success in clearing the woods, and deeming it important to appropriate the advantage of any confusion which might exist with the enemy, in consequence, I pressed on with all rapidity practicable, turning to the left after crossing the creek bed and following the sound of the action. In passing through the wood, I encountered much of our cavalry, which had been engaged in the dash just made, and knowing that when deployed my command was to constitute the extreme right of our infantry line, and being unable at the moment to find the commanding officer, I instructed the cavalry whether in squads or companies to pass rapidly to the right, so as not to enfilade my infantry movement, and to take position for the protection of my right flank. Meeting COL. Wharton a few moments afterwards, I mentioned my action and wishes with respect to his cavalry and requested his personal efforts in carrying them out, which was promptly given.[10]
Now that it's clear that Wharton did in fact clear the way for Rebel infantry, we must delve more deeply into the concept of the Confederate attack. Noe rightly states that it was to conduct a "surprise flanking movement against an unanchored Federal left."[11] He then goes on to suggest however, that Wharton failed through "a function of timing, topography, and perhaps fate." He declares that Wharton had only seen "a few mounted men—conceivably cavalry, but in fact were several generals with their staffs—on top of the Open Knob." He attributes optical illusion—which is prevalent among the terrain of Chaplin Hills—to Wharton's supposed failure to recognize the true location of the Federal's northern flank.[12] This argument seems logical until we address the guts of Polk's report that substantiate the fact that the Rebels knew that more Federal forces were still in route to the northern Federal flank.
Regarding the plan of attack and known positions of the Federal army at Perryville, General Polk's report seems clear when he stated that he was informed that a force was moving on Mackville Pike toward the enemy's left. Although he had received an order from Bragg to "assume the offensive" around one p.m., he recorded that "our chances of success were greater against the line in my front even when re-enforced than it would be by attacking it as it stood and exposing my flank to the approaching force…"[13] There were two brigades of Federal infantry that were approaching the battlefield at that time. The two brigades were under the command of Union Brigadier General William Terrill and Colonel John Starkweather. Prior to that time, the extreme left of the Federal forces were the regiments of Colonel George Webster. Rather than commence the attack against Webster's Federal brigade and possibly risk a counter-attack in flank, Polk chose to let the enemy force begin its deployment and strike it while in the act of deploying. Colonel Wharton's Rebel cavalry was still on the west side of Chaplin River and could report the enemy's whereabouts with ease. There was only one location that these supporting forces would naturally occupy. This was the extension of the ridge line that ran east toward Walker's Bend. Two unoccupied hill tops occupied the space that was south of Wilson's Creek and west of Chaplin River. The first—from east to west—was the wooded hill, followed by Open Knob a little further west. It was clear that this is where any additional enemy forces would deploy for tactical purposes. From the evidence, it appears that Polk did intend to allow these forces to begin their deployment—but strike them before they were completely in place.
Apparently, historians Hafendorfer and Noe believed that the Confederate high command was unaware of the arrival and deployment of these enemy troops on the field due to Wharton's "failed" reconnaissance. Thus, without knowledge of the arrival of this enemy force and its location on the battlefield, Donelson's brigade—according to Hafendorfer and Noe—stepped off in an attack against Harris' Federal brigade which had suddenly become the center of the enemy line rather than the flank. However, General Polk's words do not reflect this understanding. Polk wrote that he "waited until the re-enforcements got into position. The attack was then ordered."[14] Both historians of the battle fail to recognize that Polk's next statement and supporting statements from Maney's report clearly reveal that Wharton's cavalry then conducted the charge to clear the hill west of Chaplin River and nearest Open Knob of any enemy forces. "This movement placed in our possession a skirt of woods and an eminence of great importance to our success on our right. It was quickly followed by the brigades of General Cheatham…"[15] Even if Donelson's (possibly) poor eyesight or misunderstanding of the field started him on the wrong axis of advance, it is made clear by other reports that the correction to the axis of advance was made, and the assault on Open Knob against Terrill's brigade and Parsons' battery was successful. From the reports, it seems most probable that the extreme flank of the enemy was in fact recognized as Parsons' Federal battery and Terrill's brigade arriving atop "Chaplin's Hill" or Open Knob. Additionally, this misconception of the battlefield by modern historians was certainly concluded due to the lack of knowledge of the Hafley Cabins that were situated on the eastern slope of Open Knob and visible from the Rebel attack position.
[1] Noe, Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle, p. 192.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Noe, Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle, p. 192, (Endnotes, p. 418).
[4] Noe, Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle, p. 193.
[5] MacMurphy, G. L., Online Archive of Terry's Texas Rangers. Retrieved from http://www.terrystexasrangers.org/diaries/macmurphy_gl/index.html
[6] MacMurphy, G. L., Online Archive of Terry's Texas Rangers. Retrieved from http://www.terrystexasrangers.org/diaries/macmurphy_gl/index.html (Empahsis added.)
[7] L. B. Giles, Terry's Texas Rangers, L. G. Biles, 1911, p. 46.
[8] Maj. Gen. B. F. Cheatham, Report of Battle of Perryville, Location undisclosed.
[9] Brig. Gen. George Maney, Supplement to the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Part 3, Vol. 2, Broadfoot Publishing Co., Wilmington, NC, p. 667.
[10] Brig. Gen. George Maney, Supplement to the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Part 3, Vol. 2, Broadfoot Publishing Co., Wilmington, NC, p. 667.
[11] Noe, Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle, p. 193.
[12] Noe, Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle, p. 193.
[13] Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk, Report of the Battle of Perryville (OR, p. 1110.)
[14] Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk, Report of the Battle of Perryville (OR, p. 1110.)
[15] Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk, Report of the Battle of Perryville (OR, p. 1110.)
Bringing the