Failed Lee

[atlantis]

Stonewall Jackson failed Lee during the Seven Days action. Was that failure the reason Lee was not able to achieve his objective of destroying the union army. Others also failed Lee at the time but wasn't Jacksons Failures then the most important ones in determining the outcome of the operation.
Question is Jackson the main culprit for the union army not being destroyed during the Seven Days.
Your Thoughts.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Stonewall Jackson failed Lee during the Seven Days action. Was that failure the reason Lee was not able to achieve his objective of destroying the union army. Others also failed Lee at the time but wasn't Jacksons Failures then the most important ones in determining the outcome of the operation.
Question is Jackson the main culprit for the union army not being destroyed during the Seven Days.
Your Thoughts.

The other guy got to play, too. Lee's tactics routinely cost the attackers (+/-) 40% casualties. Limited tactical results left regiments combat ineffective.

Malvern Hill cost Lee's army 5,600 vs 2,100 casualties. It was McClellan who did not exploit that lopsided victory. Had any of a long list of Union generals been in command things could have ended very differently.

Given his proclivity for aggressive tactics; a Malvern Hill - like debacle could have been the outcome of a wide awake Jackson's actions.

As it was, Lee's army suffered 19,000 vs 15,000 casualties. In very real terms the army in danger of being destroyed was Lee's.

Link:

Malvern Hill

The American Battlefield Trust's Battle of Malvern Hill page includes history articles, battle maps, photos, expert video, and preservation news related to this important 1862 Civil War battle in Virginia - the last battle of the Seven Days Campaign.

www.battlefields.org

Link;

The Seven Days Battles

Learn more about the Seven Days Battles in June and July of 1862 from historian William Miller.

www.battlefields.org

 

[JerryD]

No army on either side was ever "destroyed". Captured, yes, but not destroyed. I have heard many knowledgeable experts claim that it was unrealistic to think a Civil War army could be destroyed. They were just too large. So while Jackson certainly let Lee down during the Seven days, and the CSA might have had a greater victory if he had performed up to par, I dont think it can be claimed that but for his failures the AOP would have been destroyed.

 

[gary]

No maps or good guides hindered Jackson; along with physical exhaustion from the lack of sleep. Under those circumstances and conditions, it comes as no surprise that Jackson's performance was subpar.

Destruction of a an army was a rare thing in that war. So long as it could retreat it could survive (think Dunkirk).

 

[35th MA InfRegt]

No maps or good guides hindered Jackson; along with physical exhaustion from the lack of sleep. Under those circumstances and conditions, it comes as no surprise that Jackson's performance was subpar.

Destruction of a an army was a rare thing in that war. So long as it could retreat it could survive (think Dunkirk).

Quite. Defeat in battle usually has many causes. Jackson's subpar performance obviously contributed to the defeat, but I think Lee was expecting too much of him at the Seven Days.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Stonewall Jackson failed Lee during the Seven Days action. Was that failure the reason Lee was not able to achieve his objective of destroying the union army. Others also failed Lee at the time but wasn't Jacksons Failures then the most important ones in determining the outcome of the operation.
Question is Jackson the main culprit for the union army not being destroyed during the Seven Days.
Your Thoughts.

It was early in the war. Lee came up with tactics that would have worked if executed properly, BUT the troop movements that he ordered were far too complicated for the division commanders to implement in anything like a timely and accurate manner. This, in my opinion, was the reason for the lack of success, not Jackson's initial failure.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

The other guy got to play, too. Lee's tactics routinely cost the attackers (+/-) 40% casualties. Limited tactical results left regiments combat ineffective.

Malvern Hill cost Lee's army 5,600 vs 2,100 casualties. It was McClellan who did not exploit that lopsided victory. Had any of a long list of Union generals been in command things could have ended very differently.

Given his proclivity for aggressive tactics; a Malvern Hill - like debacle could have been the outcome of a wide awake Jackson's actions.

As it was, Lee's army suffered 19,000 vs 15,000 casualties. In very real terms the army in danger of being destroyed was Lee's.

Link:

Malvern Hill

The American Battlefield Trust's Battle of Malvern Hill page includes history articles, battle maps, photos, expert video, and preservation news related to this important 1862 Civil War battle in Virginia - the last battle of the Seven Days Campaign.

www.battlefields.org

Link;

The Seven Days Battles

Learn more about the Seven Days Battles in June and July of 1862 from historian William Miller.

www.battlefields.org

Casualties for Lee during the campaign

Gaines Mill - 7,993 of 57,018 14%
Glendale - 3,673 of 45,000 8%
Malvern Hill - 5,650 of 55,000 10.2%
Seven's day's battles as a whole - 20,204 of 112,200 18%

Please where are you getting 40%. It would be nice if you learned from previous discussions instead of bringing up false claims.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Casualties for Lee during the campaign

Gaines Mill - 7,993 of 57,018 14%
Glendale - 3,673 of 45,000 8%
Malvern Hill - 5,650 of 55,000 10.2%
Seven's day's battles as a whole - 20,204 of 112,200 18%

Please where are you getting 40%. It would be nice if you learned from previous discussions instead of bringing up false claims.

Glad you posted some numbers, Wizard.

 

[Belfoured]

Quite. Defeat in battle usually has many causes. Jackson's subpar performance obviously contributed to the defeat, but I think Lee was expecting too much of him at the Seven Days.

I cut Jackson less slack. His performance was poor. A lot of people have attributed that to fatigue. I have little doubt that played a role but if it was so crippling as to lead to his complete "paralysis" on June 30 his duty was to hand the reins over to, say, Ewell. On that date he significantly outnumbered Franklin in the White Oak sector. At a minimum he could have done enough to keep Franklin from deciding that he was free to send 10,000 desperately needed reinforcements to Sumner, Heintzelman, et al at the crossroads. He did virtually nothing and those reinforcements were important to the Federals narrowly holding on. In context people tend to ignore Jack's consistently mediocre track record as a tactician - First Kernstown, McDowell, Port Republic, Cedar Mountain, Brawner's Farm, 2BR Day 2, the pursuit of Pope the next day, the gap in his front at Fredericksburg, ...

I think Lee's expectations of Jackson were reasonable - certainly on June 30. I think Lee gets the ultimate blame for the muddle/confusion that effectively removed Magruder's division from the June 30 battle but I believe that Jackson blew his plan up (aided, of course, by Huger getting himself stalled by an axe competition on his approach). All opinion, of course ...

 

[Belfoured]

It was early in the war. Lee came up with tactics that would have worked if executed properly, BUT the troop movements that he ordered were far too complicated for the division commanders to implement in anything like a timely and accurate manner. This, in my opinion, was the reason for the lack of success, not Jackson's initial failure.

I think that may be a valid point regarding Jackson's activity on June 26/27, aggravated by mapping issues. As posted above, I don't think it applies to June 30. Jackson literally did nothing to cause Franklin to fear dispatching badly-needed reinforcements to the crossroads. As we know, the terms "bold", "aggressive", and "quick" are rarely applied to Franklin. Even his friend and sponsor McClellan - hardly known for those attributes himself - ripped Franklin in a letter to the wife in August 1862.

 

[35th MA InfRegt]

I cut Jackson less slack. His performance was poor. A lot of people have attributed that to fatigue. I have little doubt that played a role but if it was so crippling as to lead to his complete "paralysis" on June 30 his duty was to hand the reins over to, say, Ewell. On that date he significantly outnumbered Franklin in the White Oak sector. At a minimum he could have done enough to keep Franklin from deciding that he was free to send 10,000 desperately needed reinforcements to Sumner, Heintzelman, et al at the crossroads. He did virtually nothing and those reinforcements were important to the Federals narrowly holding on. In context people tend to ignore Jack's consistently mediocre track record as a tactician - First Kernstown, McDowell, Port Republic, Cedar Mountain, Brawner's Farm, 2BR Day 2, the pursuit of Pope the next day, the gap in his front at Fredericksburg, ...

I think Lee's expectations of Jackson were reasonable - certainly on June 30. I think Lee gets the ultimate blame for the muddle/confusion that effectively removed Magruder's division from the June 30 battle but I believe that Jackson blew his plan up (aided, of course, by Huger getting himself stalled by an axe competition on his approach). All opinion, of course ...

Fair enough. Tactics were never Jackson's forte.

 

[Belfoured]

Fair enough. Tactics were never Jackson's forte.

I've seen similarities between Stonewall and "Cump" (Sherman). Both were adept at operational maneuver. Once they arrived at the destination they would have been better off by handing the play-calling to a subordinate.

 

[Rhea Cole]

I've seen similarities between Stonewall and "Cump" (Sherman). Both were adept at operational maneuver. Once they arrived at the destination they would have been better off by handing the play-calling to a subordinate.

I do find it odd, the comparisons between Jackson & Sherman. Jackson was, by Lee's design, the commander of the smallest corps in the army. Sherman was a corps, army & the army group commander who campaigned from Chattanooga to Washington. Just saying that I have never been impressed with Jackson's executive ability… not that it is a profound insight or anything of the sort. I just can't see Jackson sitting in a telegraph office managing a 60 mile wide advance through enemy territory.

 

[67th Tigers]

I'm looking into Gaines' Mill at the moment, and Jackson managed to get completely lost and his corps arrived 3-4 hours late, and in pieces.

I cannot work out what Jackson actually did. The important commander was Trimble, who basically took command of the bulk of Ewell's division and Whitings division (by dint of seniority) and was responsible for the break-in.

 

[atlantis]

Jackson IMHO would have done both himself and Lee a favor if he had used couriers. Riding back and forth between Lee and the valley he wore himself out and was in no condition to command on the eve of operations.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Jackson IMHO would have done both himself and Lee a favor if he had used couriers. Riding back and forth between Lee and the valley he wore himself out and was in no condition to command on the eve of operations.

atlantis cites an example of the command & control weakness of the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee ran into the same breakdown when attempting to envelop the 6th Corps at Chancellorsville. It is often cited as a preview of Gettysburg a few weeks later.

 

[jackt62]

Jackson was not the "main" culprit in allowing the Union army to escape. His performance, particularly at White Oak Swamp and subsequent failure to close up on the AotP at Glendale, was the most egregious of the Seven Days, but there were too many other "culprits" to share blame. Among them being an inexperienced ANV that was required to execute a complicated series of maneuvers with a fair share of mediocre southern commanders such as Huger, Magruder, and Holmes. Add to that the still primitive means of command and control that both sides had to contend with. And Lee himself was still struggling with coming to grips with effective battlefield tactics, as was particularly evident at Malvern Hill.

 

[JerryD]

Jackson IMHO would have done both himself and Lee a favor if he had used couriers. Riding back and forth between Lee and the valley he wore himself out and was in no condition to command on the eve of operations.

I've always had a hard time reconciling the "Jackson was exhausted" narrative with the facts. One good nights sleep should have revived Jackson no matter how exhausted he was, and looking at the schedule for this period it seems Jackson had ample time to sleep. It seems he was nearly catatonic for nearly the whole week. Given his well known health issues, I suspect something else was going on. Again, this is pure speculation on my part but when you look at his actions and the time he had available for rest, not to mention the time we know he was sleeping during battles, I have a hard time thinking a man of his relative age not being sufficiently revived after only a few hours sleep. Perhaps he was narcoleptic, or maybe he was fighting some kind of bug that caused him to be easily exhausted. But I suspect it was more a medical issue than simply he was simply exhausted. And if he was so exhausted, as others have mentioned, it was a severe lack of judgement on his part not to hand over command to his second in rank until such time as he was fit to command again.

 

[Belfoured]

I've always had a hard time reconciling the "Jackson was exhausted" narrative with the facts. One good nights sleep should have revived Jackson no matter how exhausted he was, and looking at the schedule for this period it seems Jackson had ample time to sleep. It seems he was nearly catatonic for nearly the whole week. Given his well known health issues, I suspect something else was going on. Again, this is pure speculation on my part but when you look at his actions and the time he had available for rest, not to mention the time we know he was sleeping during battles, I have a hard time thinking a man of his relative age not being sufficiently revived after only a few hours sleep. Perhaps he was narcoleptic, or maybe he was fighting some kind of bug that caused him to be easily exhausted. But I suspect it was more a medical issue than simply he was simply exhausted. And if he was so exhausted, as others have mentioned, it was a severe lack of judgement on his part not to hand over command to his second in rank until such time as he was fit to command again.

As I also indicated, his failures in the Seven Days, certainly on June 30, may have been on the bizarre end but it was not as though he had shown brilliant tactical skills before that or would do so afterwards. And, as we agree, if he was debilitated to that stage he had a duty to delegate to a subordinate such as Ewell, who was a different officer than the post-wounding Ewell.

 

[Belfoured]

I do find it odd, the comparisons between Jackson & Sherman. Jackson was, by Lee's design, the commander of the smallest corps in the army. Sherman was a corps, army & the army group commander who campaigned from Chattanooga to Washington. Just saying that I have never been impressed with Jackson's executive ability… not that it is a profound insight or anything of the sort. I just can't see Jackson sitting in a telegraph office managing a 60 mile wide advance through enemy territory.

The comparisons I refer to draw a distinction between maneuver at the operational level and tactical skill. Neither guy was proficient at the latter, as demonstrated on multiple occasions. Whether Jackson had Sherman's "executive" skills isn't really the issue as regards my point. One cannot question Jackson's demonstrated talent for maneuver away from the battlefield. The problems arose - repeatedly - when he became involved in combat.

Once we get to "executive" skills, it's hard to ignore Jackson's bizarre obsession with keeping his subordinates in the dark and his contentious relations with several. But that's a different issue.