Chickamauga Confederate Command Structure

[Wizard of Cozz]

Working my way through Powell's Three Volume set on the Chickamauga campaign. It's been very good. He does a great job of explaining the absolute disorganized state of the Confederate Command structure. The addition of two extra corps in Buckner and Walker, and then Longstreet's additions. Then Bragg's constant breaking and reattaching divisions and demi-divisions. None of it did him any good during the battle. Most corps commanders were really just glorified division commanders. None ever had enough to put together a weighty attack until Longstreet gets the whole wing and organizes his 8 brigade 5 line deep assault column. Hood comes close on day 1 with his attack with Johnson and Law's divisions as well, but he didn't have anything left to exploit his gains. Was thinking Why Bragg didn't just keep Buckner and Walker as division commanders, bring Buckner in as a reserve division or something and then attach him to Longstreet when Longstreet arrives, and then Walker can just attach to Polk. That would give you three corps of three divisions each, which would of been much better for the battle. Something like this:

Army of Tennessee
Gen. Braxton Bragg​

1. Polk's Corps - LtG Leonidas Polk
   1. Cheatham's Division - MG Benjamin Cheatham
      1. Jackson's Brigade - BG John K. Jackson
      2. Smith's Brigade - BG Preston Smith
      3. Maney's Brigade - BG George Maney
      4. Wright's Brigade - BG Marcus Wright
      5. Strahl's Brigade - BG Otho Strahl
      6. Artillery Battalion - Maj. Melancthon Smith
   2. Hindman's Division - MG Thomas Hindman
      1. Anderson's Brigade - BG Patton Anderson
      2. Deas Brigade - BG Zachary Deas
      3. Manigault's Brigade - BG Arthur Manigault
      4. Walthall's Brigade - BG Edward Walthall
   3. Walker's Division - W.H.T. Walker
      1. Ector's Brigade - BG Matthew Ector
      2. Wilson's Brigade - Col. Claudius Wilson
      3. Gregg's Brigade - BG John Gregg
      4. McNair's Brigade - BG Evander McNair
      5. Gist's Brigade - BG S.R. Gist
      6. Artillery Battalion - Battalion Capt. Swett
2. Hill's Corps - LtG. D.H. Hill
   1. Stewart's Division - MG A.P. Stewart
      1. Bate's Brigade - BG William Bate
      2. Brown's Brigade - BG John Brown
      3. Clayton's Brigade - BG Henry Clayton
      4. Johnson's Brigade - BG Bushrod Johnson
      5. Artillery Battalion - Maj. Elridge
   2. Cleburne's Division - MG Patrick Cleburne
      1. Wood's Brigade - BG S.A.M. Wood
      2. Lidell's Brigade - BG St. John Liddell
      3. Polk's Brigade - BG Lucious Polk
      4. Deshler's Brigade - BG James Deshler
      5. Artillery Battalion - Maj. Hotchkiss
   3. Breckinridge's Division - MG John Breckinridge
      1. Orphan Brigade - BG Benjamin Helm
      2. Adam's Brigade - BG Daniel Adams
      3. Stovall's Brigade - BG Marcellus Stovall
      4. Artillery Battalion - Maj. Graves
3. Longstreet's Corps - LtG James Longstreet
   1. Hood's Division - MG John B. Hood
      1. Law's Brigade - BG Evander Law
      2. Texas Brigade - BG Jerome Robertson
      3. Benning's Brigade - BG Henry Benning
      4. Jenkin's Brigade - BG Micah Jenkins
      5. Anderson's Brigade - BG George Anderson
   2. McLaw's Division - MG Lafayette McLaws
      1. Kershaw's Brigade - BG Joseph Kershaw
      2. Humphrey's Brigade - BG Benjamin Humphreys
      3. Bryan's Brigade - BG Goode Bryan
      4. Wofford's Brigade - BG William T. Wofford
   3. Buckner's Division - MG Simon Buckner
      1. Gracies' Brigade - BG Archibald Gracie
      2. Preston's Brigade - BG William Preston
      3. Trigg's Brigade - Col. Robert Trigg
      4. Artillery Battalion - Maj. Leyden
   4. Corps Artillery Battlaion - Maj. Williams
4. Reserve Artillery
   1. Artillery Battalion
      1. Battalion - Maj. Robertson
5. Wheeler's Cavalry Corps - MG Joseph Wheeler
   1. Wharton's Division - BG John Wharton
      1. Crews Brigade - Col. Crews
      2. Harrison's Brigade - Col. Harrison
   2. Martin's Division - BG William Martin
      1. Morgan's Brigade - Col. Morgan
      2. Russell's Brigade - Coll. Russell
6. Forrest's Cavalry Corps - MG Nathan Forrest
   1. Armstrong's Brigade - BG Frank Armstrong
      1. Wheeler's Brigade - Col. Wheeler
      2. Dibrell's Brigade - Col. Dibrell
   2. Pegram's Division - BG John Pegram
      1. Davidson's Brigade - Col. Davidson
      2. Scott's Brigade - Col. Scott

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

"Was thinking Why Bragg didn't just keep Buckner and Walker as division commanders, bring Buckner in as a reserve division or something and then attach him to Longstreet when Longstreet arrives, and then Walker can just attach to Polk." - Something like this probably was not done because of contingencies of the moment, OR because Bragg was not an outstanding commander on a grand scale.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

"Was thinking Why Bragg didn't just keep Buckner and Walker as division commanders, bring Buckner in as a reserve division or something and then attach him to Longstreet when Longstreet arrives, and then Walker can just attach to Polk." - Something like this probably was not done because of contingencies of the moment, OR because Bragg was not an outstanding commander on a grand scale.

I'll vote for Bragg not being an outstanding commander in this case.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

I'll vote for Bragg not being an outstanding commander in this case.

He definitely was not. But alot of things he chooses to do is inexplicably just shooting himself in the foot. For instance, he doesn't hold Buckner in high regard, on top of they don't get along very well. His solution is when Buckner arrives with his three E Tennessee brigades, he makes him a corps commander and detaches A.P. Stewart from Hardee/Hill's command to do so. He has no reason to do this, on top of the fact that his corps is 6 brigades, the size of a large division. He doesn't have enough forces to really drive home attack, and have the resevers to keep it going. It's a waste.

Longstreet in describing his attack on day 2 at Chickamauga that he had an 8 brigade assault column with Hindman's division on his left to protect it's flank, and Stewart's division on his right to protect that flank so that none of the brigades in the column would get siphoned off during the attack. He's only able to do this BECAUSE he has authority over multiple divisions and a total of 14 brigades in the attack, not counting Preston's 3 brigades on the far southern flank. If you go into Chickamauga with 3 corps commanders of 3 divisions, or something similar then each Corps commander has enough strength on their own to punch home an assault with out having two commanders of similar rank trying to agree on an assault.

 

[uaskme]

He definitely was not. But alot of things he chooses to do is inexplicably just shooting himself in the foot. For instance, he doesn't hold Buckner in high regard, on top of they don't get along very well. His solution is when Buckner arrives with his three E Tennessee brigades, he makes him a corps commander and detaches A.P. Stewart from Hardee/Hill's command to do so. He has no reason to do this, on top of the fact that his corps is 6 brigades, the size of a large division. He doesn't have enough forces to really drive home attack, and have the resevers to keep it going. It's a waste.

Longstreet in describing his attack on day 2 at Chickamauga that he had an 8 brigade assault column with Hindman's division on his left to protect it's flank, and Stewart's division on his right to protect that flank so that none of the brigades in the column would get siphoned off during the attack. He's only able to do this BECAUSE he has authority over multiple divisions and a total of 14 brigades in the attack, not counting Preston's 3 brigades on the far southern flank. If you go into Chickamauga with 3 corps commanders of 3 divisions, or something similar then each Corps commander has enough strength on their own to punch home an assault with out having two commanders of similar rank trying to agree on an assault.

Bragg sent A P Stewart to Buckner when he fell back across the TN River at London. This was before Bragg gave up Chattanooga. Bragg didn't know where the Federals would combine force. Had reason to believe it would be north of him. So, A P Stewart stayed with him thru Chickamauga. Stewart advanced with the direction of Bragg's order on the 20th to step off by Division. So he did not advance with Longstreet.

 

[Jamieva]

Because the confederates are pulling forces from all over after the fall of Chattanooga, you get an erector set of an army. They didn't have time to smooth out the structure they didnt to push rosecrans back asap

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

Bragg sent A P Stewart to Buckner when he fell back across the TN River at London. This was before Bragg gave up Chattanooga. Bragg didn't know where the Federals would combine force. Had reason to believe it would be north of him. So, A P Stewart stayed with him thru Chickamauga. Stewart advanced with the direction of Bragg's order on the 20th to step off by Division. So he did not advance with Longstreet.

I was describing Longstreets plan for Stewart which Bragg fumbled by ordering individual divisions to commense the attack. I can screenshot Powell where he talks about if necessary. But yes he steps off earlier then Longstreet would have preferred.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

Because the confederates are pulling forces from all over after the fall of Chattanooga, you get an erector set of an army. They didn't have time to smooth out the structure they didnt to push rosecrans back asap

I understand why it happened, but he could of brought the units into his existing command system NOT create a bunch of watered down corps.

 

[Stryker65]

I understand why it happened, but he could of brought the units into his existing command system NOT create a bunch of watered down corps.

He could have, if they all had arrived by that time. Longstreet certainly had not arrived yet -- G. T. Anderson's brigade had been diverted to Charleston, SC, and would not arrive until after the battle!

Additionally, with so many new divisions and only two LTGs (and one being freshly-minted), a set of demi-armies (the Wings) with subordinate corps underneath them would prevent one LTG from dealing with too many units at one time. Looking at the OoB you provided, you of course notice that every division has 4+ brigades -- combining even two divisions would give that temporary corps commander more than enough units to work with.

 

[Jamieva]

I understand why it happened, but he could have brought the units into his existing command system NOT create a bunch of watered down corps.

To quote Martin sheen as Lee …there is no time!

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

He could have, if they all had arrived by that time. Longstreet certainly had not arrived yet -- G. T. Anderson's brigade had been diverted to Charleston, SC, and would not arrive until after the battle!

Additionally, with so many new divisions and only two LTGs (and one being freshly-minted), a set of demi-armies (the Wings) with subordinate corps underneath them would prevent one LTG from dealing with too many units at one time. Looking at the OoB you provided, you of course notice that every division has 4+ brigades -- combining even two divisions would give that temporary corps commander more than enough units to work with.

Bragg initially has Hardee and Polk. Each at two divisions. Polk had Cheatham and Withers. Hardee had Stewart and Cleburne. Hardee requests transfer and Hill replaces him. Breckinridge was originally in Hardee's corps when he comes back he slates into that corps. Walker is transferring north with 3 brigades Ector, Gist, and Wilson. Bragg has Hill with 3 divisions and Polk with 2. The easiest move would of been to just slot him and his 3 brigades into Polks corps. Same with Buckner. Bragg could of kept Buckners division in reserve and then attach him to Longstreet when he arrives. Instead you get 2 extra corps (Buckner and Walker) you don't need, and 3 extra divisions (Liddell, Preston, and Johnsons provisional division) that obligations serve to provisional guys out of their normal command structure just before you fight a battle. Seems like a horrible way to lead. He creates a 5 corps 11 division army on the eve of battle. When he doesn't need more then 8-9 divisions and 3 corps imo. I'd argue the expanded command structure was as much at fault for a lot of Braggs command and control issues that were extremely detrimental during the battle.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

To quote Martin sheen as Lee …there is no time!

What do you mean by there was no time? He could have simply left walker and Buckners commands as divisions and integrated them into his two current corps or into Longstreet when he arrives.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

Of the 11 division commanders who fought at Chickamauga, five (Liddell, Preston, Gist, Johnson, Kershaw, and Law) had never really commanded in division command before. Technically Law did at Gettysburg, but the battle on the 2nd day was over before he even had a chance to affect it. Two others (Hindman and Preston) were new to the AoT. Of the 5 corps commanders, four (Hill, Buckner, Hood, and Walker) had never commanded a corps before. That's a tough command situation to go into a battle with.

As some have noted, part of this was because of when and where reinforcements came from, but I still argue that incorporating those into 2 and then later 3 corps under Longstreet makes much more sense then what Bragg did. After the battle Bragg begins to clean house. I thought it interesting that in his first letter after the battle to President Davis. Bragg asks that Polk and D.H. Hill be relieved and offers up Buckner, Cleburne, or Hood for their spots. I never thought Cleburne ever got considered, but looks like Bragg really wanted him. But then when the reorganization does happen right before Chattanooga, Breckinridge, whom Bragg despises gets the command. Interesting stuff.

 

[Stryker65]

Bragg initially has Hardee and Polk. Each at two divisions. Polk had Cheatham and Withers. Hardee had Stewart and Cleburne. Hardee requests transfer and Hill replaces him. Breckinridge was originally in Hardee's corps when he comes back he slates into that corps. Walker is transferring north with 3 brigades Ector, Gist, and Wilson. Bragg has Hill with 3 divisions and Polk with 2. The easiest move would of been to just slot him and his 3 brigades into Polks corps. Same with Buckner. Bragg could of kept Buckners division in reserve and then attach him to Longstreet when he arrives. Instead you get 2 extra corps (Buckner and Walker) you don't need, and 3 extra divisions (Liddell, Preston, and Johnsons provisional division) that obligations serve to provisional guys out of their normal command structure just before you fight a battle. Seems like a horrible way to lead. He creates a 5 corps 11 division army on the eve of battle. When he doesn't need more then 8-9 divisions and 3 corps imo. I'd argue the expanded command structure was as much at fault for a lot of Braggs command and control issues that were extremely detrimental during the battle.

Let's look at the numbers.

Polk's Corps:
- Cheatham's Division: 6,599 PFD 8/20/63
- Withers'/Hindman's Division: 8,794 PFD 8/20/63
- Artillery: 794 PFD 8/20/63
Hardee's/Hill's Corps:
- Cleburne's Division: 7,485 PFD 8/20/63
- Stewart's Division: 6,418 PFD 8/20/63
- Artillery: 678 PFD 8/20/63

Add Breckinridge's Division: 4,721 PFD 8/20/63
Add Walker's Division: 3,242 (estimate) 9/19/63
Add Buckner's Division: 4,877 (estimate) 9/19/63

Based on this, you may immediately notice that Hindman's and Cleburne's divisions are huge -- the only two divisions exceeding 7,000 men. In an army in which most divisions constitute 5-6,000 men, Bragg may have decided that it would be best for all the divisions to be around the same number. Thus, he took one brigade away from Hindman's division (Walthall's) and two brigades away from Cleburne's division (Liddell's and Johnson's) to form a reserve -- the same reserve that the brigades most likely would have served, individually, in battle. I exclude Longstreet's Corps from these calculations because it had not arrived yet, and would not arrive for some time.

So now we have eight divisions. Now you wonder, why the corps, then? Let's say we add the divisions as they came. Both Polk's and Hill's corps would then have roughly 20,000 men, even with Walker's and the new division in reserve. No corps during the entire war had so many men, and that would most definitely be too much for one LTG to handle. Neither Polk nor Hill was a Jackson or Longstreet, and even if they were, Bragg hardly trusted them with that many men.

Here's my idea of what eventually came of this:
- Take the two smallest divisions (Walker's and the new one), and make a Reserve.
- Polk's and Hill's Corps, with only two divisions, still mustered roughly 12-14,000 men, as they had since Perryville. Why not keep them as is? Thus, remove the New largest division, Stewart's, add it to Buckner's understrength division, giving Buckner a command worthy of his rank.
- Longstreet's Corps was not projected to arrive in time; especially McLaws' Division. Give him Buckner's division so Longstreet doesn't get a corps of just one division, and actually commands a significant force.
- McNair's brigade was still arriving from Mississippi, as well as Gregg's brigade. Place them in a new division under a reliable brigadier (Bushrod Johnson), and hold them until a full reorganization can be done.

Thanks to this, we then get slightly better corps-command-numbers:
Hill's Corps (Breckinridge's and Cleburne's divisions): Roughly 10,000
Polk's Corps (Cheatham's and Hindman's divisions): Roughly 12,000
Buckner's Corps (Preston's and Stewart's divisions): Roughly 11,000
Reserve Corps (Reserve and Walker's divisions): Roughly 6,000
the Provisional Division: Roughly 5,000

Splitting these into the Wings as given at the battle, we get:
Left Wing (Hindman, Buckner, Provisional, Longstreet arriving): Roughly 23,000, excluding the elements of Longstreet's command that were gradually reaching the field.
Right Wing (Hill, Reserve, Cheatham): Roughly 23,000.

By this, Bragg was able to effectively divide his forces by providing each senior LTG (Polk and Longstreet) enough corps or corps-sized structures to make their distribution in the field easier for them.

 

[Stryker65]

Bragg initially has Hardee and Polk. Each at two divisions. Polk had Cheatham and Withers. Hardee had Stewart and Cleburne. Hardee requests transfer and Hill replaces him. Breckinridge was originally in Hardee's corps when he comes back he slates into that corps. Walker is transferring north with 3 brigades Ector, Gist, and Wilson. Bragg has Hill with 3 divisions and Polk with 2. The easiest move would of been to just slot him and his 3 brigades into Polks corps. Same with Buckner. Bragg could of kept Buckners division in reserve and then attach him to Longstreet when he arrives. Instead you get 2 extra corps (Buckner and Walker) you don't need, and 3 extra divisions (Liddell, Preston, and Johnsons provisional division) that obligations serve to provisional guys out of their normal command structure just before you fight a battle. Seems like a horrible way to lead. He creates a 5 corps 11 division army on the eve of battle. When he doesn't need more then 8-9 divisions and 3 corps imo. I'd argue the expanded command structure was as much at fault for a lot of Braggs command and control issues that were extremely detrimental during the battle.

Let's say we do as you suggest. Then, we have:
Hill's Corps (Breckinridge, Cleburne, and Stewart's divisions): Roughly 18,000
Polk's Corps (Cheatham's, Hindman's, and Walker's divisions): Roughly 23,000
Buckner's Division: Roughly 5,000

This looks fine on paper, but remember that Hill and Polk were hardly commanders who could handle 20,000+ men by themselves (or do so while being trusted by Bragg). Additionally, since many of those troops would be shuttling up from Mississippi, the ending result might be good, but as troops arrived piecemeal and were rushed into line by Bragg, there was simply no time.

I don't disagree that the command issues were extremely detrimental during the battle, as you say, but I think that the transfer of five piecemeal brigades from Mississippi (Ector's, McNair's, Gregg's, Gist's, and Wilson's), three from East Tennessee (Preston's, Gracie's, and Trigg's), one from Virginia (Deshler's), and one from independent duties (J. K. Jackson's) right before a battle prevented full reorganization in the manner you suggest, especially since many of these brigades were closer to full strength than the regular AoT ones.

You may know, of course, that immediately following the battle Bragg did exactly what you said, and consolidated the units into three corps.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

Let's say we do as you suggest. Then, we have:
Hill's Corps (Breckinridge, Cleburne, and Stewart's divisions): Roughly 18,000
Polk's Corps (Cheatham's, Hindman's, and Walker's divisions): Roughly 23,000
Buckner's Division: Roughly 5,000

This looks fine on paper, but remember that Hill and Polk were hardly commanders who could handle 20,000+ men by themselves (or do so while being trusted by Bragg). Additionally, since many of those troops would be shuttling up from Mississippi, the ending result might be good, but as troops arrived piecemeal and were rushed into line by Bragg, there was simply no time.

You say that "Hill and Polk were hardly commander who could handle 20,000+ men" yet Bragg gives him command of an entire wing on day 2. The issue is that because of the way this was put together, and partly out of Polk's own incompetence he didn't work well with Hill on day 2. But the point is that if Bragg was able to give it to him on day 2, he should of just started out that way. Instead we get situations where Hindman is on the far south of the battle while Cheatham is at the north. Basically on day 1 Polk commands a division, so is basically a spectator and the Confederates are unable to reinforce Cheatham's attack in any meaningful way when it first went in.

ON day 2, Breckinridge and Cleburne finally make their attacks, and when Hill asks for help from Walker there is a whole issue over command between Hill a corps commander, Walker a Corps commander, and Polk a corps commadner commanding the wing. While Polk is the wing commander, this is a bad organzation model that severely hampered operations. IF Walker was just another division in Polk's corps he could of simply moved him in, but instead Polk operates as a wing commander, while Hill directs the assault, but Hill can't just call on Walker to support him instead he has to go back through Polk and then to Walker, by the time they agree on something Breckinridge's advantage was lost.

I'm not here to argue that simplifying it would have solved everything. Polk is in way over his head, but that doesn't lessen the command and control issues directly related to the organization of the army.

Lastly on this point you say, "but as troops arrived piecemeal and were rushed in line, there was simply no time." But that's kinda the point i'm trying to make. I would argue that as the troops arrive piecemeal, they could be shunted to either Hill's corps or Polk's corps, OR kept as a reserve and then given to the appropiate corps commander as the battle progressed, BUT by making Walker and Buckner corps commanders AND by splitting apart brigades and shuffling around troops he denudes the striking power of some of his best divisions. You also put people in division command just before a battle who've never done operated at that level before.

I don't disagree that the command issues were extremely detrimental during the battle, as you say, but I think that the transfer of five piecemeal brigades from Mississippi (Ector's, McNair's, Gregg's, Gist's, and Wilson's), three from East Tennessee (Preston's, Gracie's, and Trigg's), one from Virginia (Deshler's), and one from independent duties (J. K. Jackson's) right before a battle prevented full reorganization in the manner you suggest, especially since many of these brigades were closer to full strength than the regular AoT ones.

You may know, of course, that immediately following the battle Bragg did exactly what you said, and consolidated the units into three corps.

Again this all perfectly illustrates what I'm saying I believer. Walker's initial division is Gist, Wilson, and Ector. When Walker arrives there is no need to make him the "Reserve Corps" Just keep his division as the reserve division under Bragg's personal command for a few days and then he can push him to whatever sector is most threatened. Then when McNair and Gregg arrive they can just add to Walker's division, and now you have stout 5 brigade division under a hard hitting commander. When Longstreet does arrive IF you haven't directed Walker to either Polk or Hill he can simply attach first to Hood and then to Longstreet when Longstreet gets their. OR, combine Buckner and Walker into one reserve corps, with Buckner in nominal/temporary command until battle arises with the understanding his divisions may get divided up and he'll revert back to command of his division when that happens.

At Chickamauga according to Powell's appendices you have the following:
Polk's Corps (Cheatham, Hindman)(8 brigades) - 13.2k
Hill's Corps (Cleburne, Breckinridge)(6 brigades) - 9.2k
Walker's Corps (Gist, Liddell)(5 brigades) - 8k
Buckner's Corps (Stewart, Preston)(6 brigades) - 9.5k
Longstreets Corps (Law, Johnson, McLaws) (8 brigades) - 11k

If you keep it as I proposed you'd have
Polk's Corps (Cheatham, Hindman, Walker)(14 brigades) - 21.9K
Hill's Corps (Stewart, Cleburne, Breckinridge)(11 brigades) - 18.5k
Buckner Reserve Division (3 brigades) - 4.9K
Longstreet (5 brigades AT Battle)(9 brigades overall) - 6.8k at battle/14.2K overall

IMO shuffling a division from one corps to another makes more sense with 2-3 corps commanders than having corps organizations strung divided up over the battle with 5 different corps. You also now are down to 9 divisions all under divisions commanders who've commanded divisions before, except if you want to count Law with Hood promoted on day 1.

 

[Stryker65]

Walker's initial division also included Gregg's brigade, IIRC, according to records of the Army of Relief around that time. McNair's brigade was detached from French's division. As I've said before, with the expanded structure of more than just five divisions in the army, the use of divisions with 4+ brigades was no longer necessary. I think Bragg, at this point, had the idea of bi-troop management (or whatever it's called), in which every corps would have two divisions of two brigades, which, based on the numbers for the brigades, was highly useful. It definitely creates problems, but instead of plugging in brigades left and right or having to deploy five in order to deploy a division, it creates an easier division to work with, both for the division and corps commanders.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

Walker's initial division also included Gregg's brigade, IIRC, according to records of the Army of Relief around that time. McNair's brigade was detached from French's division. As I've said before, with the expanded structure of more than just five divisions in the army, the use of divisions with 4+ brigades was no longer necessary. I think Bragg, at this point, had the idea of bi-troop management (or whatever it's called), in which every corps would have two divisions of two brigades, which, based on the numbers for the brigades, was highly useful. It definitely creates problems, but instead of plugging in brigades left and right or having to deploy five in order to deploy a division, it creates an easier division to work with, both for the division and corps commanders.

Do you have any sources I can read where I can read this "bi-troop management?" I'm not sure the many positives outside of less troops means they're really like big brigades but the problem is by not having a 2nd line they have no reserves to call upon wjen making attacks.

 

[Stryker65]

Do you have any sources I can read where I can read this "bi-troop management?" I'm not sure the many positives outside of less troops means they're really like big brigades but the problem is by not having a 2nd line they have no reserves to call upon wjen making attacks.

I came up with that idea, based on the fact that Bragg appeared to have halved the larger divisions and split them into divisions of two brigades. For example, the forming of Johnson's and Liddell's divisions out of Cleburne's, Hindman's, and Walker's divisions.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

I came up with that idea, based on the fact that Bragg appeared to have halved the larger divisions and split them into divisions of two brigades. For example, the forming of Johnson's and Liddell's divisions out of Cleburne's, Hindman's, and Walker's divisions.

So reading Cozzens and Powell, I don't get that reasoning out of Bragg IMO. So when Walker and Breckinridge arrive from Atlanta on Aug. 2nd they are attached to Hill's Corps. But then Bragg becomes worried his organization is out of balance in that Hill has 4 corps and Polk only 2. On top of that Buckner is arriving from E. Tennessee with his division of 5,000 men. It seems that while Bragg was leary of Buckner's Kentucky heritage he thought highly of his military prowess (which was much misplaced). He decided to make him a corps commander. This then gave him Hill (3 divisions), Polk (2 Divisions), Buckner (2 Divisions).

Then on around August 30th Walthall's brigade returns from provost duty in Atlanta. Bragg decides that since the Federals have a reserve corps protecting their rear he needs one. Again there was no need true need to detach Liddell from Cleburne and make Walker a corps commander, he simply could of detached Walker to his rear and attached Walthall as a 4 brigade. All it does is denude the strength of a proven combat officer to promote guys you don't know how well they'll lead a division.

Powell hits the nail on the head with the following quote:

"The constant shuffling and re-shuffling of his army in the face of an impending threat, was not only time-consuming, but bad for morale. Armies are not created by simply slotting armies into tables of organization. Commanders function best when they have the confidence of their men, and men fight best for officers they trust and respect. In addition, the creation of new corps and a new division meant that a large number of officers were stepping into new roles with expanded authority. It's always been a truism of war that not every officer of regiments and brigades will be as effective at the next level of command. While these new troops needed to be integrated into the existing army structure, Bragg's changes were excessive and confusing. Unfotunately for the Army, this wouldn't be the last time that Bragg felt the need to reorganize his army."
(PG. 86 - THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN: A MAD IRREGULAR BATTLE VOL. I)

The AoP operated for a long time with a bunch of small and medium sized corps to I think limited effect, I don't find it suprising that they consolidated their commands to 3 Corps + Burnsides corps before the Overland Campaign. Lee always operated with divisions with 4-5 brigades. Grant and Sherman operated primarily with corps of 4 divisions of 3 brigades each. The Union also solved some of the reserve line issues by shortening the width of their brigade and putting half the regiments in a brigade in the 2nd line. So they can present all three brigades in front but each brigade has a second line of half their regiments behind them. I also think Bragg's reorganization after Chickamauga shows how ineffective the 2 brigade division scheme was, as most division at Chattanooga were 4 brigades with a few 3 brigade divisions thrown in there.