Failed Lee

atlantis

2nd Lieutenant
Joined
Nov 12, 2016
Stonewall Jackson failed Lee during the Seven Days action. Was that failure the reason Lee was not able to achieve his objective of destroying the union army. Others also failed Lee at the time but wasn't Jacksons Failures then the most important ones in determining the outcome of the operation.
Question is Jackson the main culprit for the union army not being destroyed during the Seven Days.
Your Thoughts.
 
I'm looking into Gaines' Mill at the moment, and Jackson managed to get completely lost and his corps arrived 3-4 hours late, and in pieces.

I cannot work out what Jackson actually did. The important commander was Trimble, who basically took command of the bulk of Ewell's division and Whitings division (by dint of seniority) and was responsible for the break-in.
They took the wrong road due to the guide they had, and the maps the ANV had were wrong.

The premise is a non starter for me cause "destryoing" a CW era army the size of Mac's is darn near impossible.
 
My first reaction is to retreat to Harrison's Landing, but I haven't studied the situation.

Well, yes. And of course that is what ended up happening.

But the point I'm making is this. It's correct that there is not a single case of a major field army being "destroyed" in a battle during the Civil War. No Cannae, to use the classic example. There are several reasons for this, but among them would be the fact that in every case of a severe defeat, the losing army had a line of retreat and space in which to retreat. So in the event of a defeat on the scale of, say, First or Second Manassas for the Union or Missionary Ridge or Nashville for the Confederacy, the losing army had the ability to run away to fight again another day.

In the Seven Days, however, that would have been quite difficult for the Army of the Potomac. The terrain was swampy, crisscrossed with rivers and creeks, with easy movement limited to a small number of roads. I've always had the feeling that, on the Peninsula and in front of Richmond, the divisions and corps of the Army of the Potomac are uncomfortably packed, like people on a crowded elevator.

So, hypothetically, if the Battle of Glendale had resulted in a Manassas-level defeat for the Union forces, it seems to me that Lee would have had the chance to inflict a decisive defeat that might have resulted in the effective destruction of the Army of the Potomac, because the Union forces would not have been able to easily run away. Perhaps Glendale, rather than Gettysburg, should be seen as Lee's great "missed opportunity" to win the war.
 
Well, yes. And of course that is what ended up happening.

But the point I'm making is this. It's correct that there is not a single case of a major field army being "destroyed" in a battle during the Civil War. No Cannae, to use the classic example. There are several reasons for this, but among them would be the fact that in every case of a severe defeat, the losing army had a line of retreat and space in which to retreat. So in the event of a defeat on the scale of, say, First or Second Manassas for the Union or Missionary Ridge or Nashville for the Confederacy, the losing army had the ability to run away to fight again another day.

In the Seven Days, however, that would have been quite difficult for the Army of the Potomac. The terrain was swampy, crisscrossed with rivers and creeks, with easy movement limited to a small number of roads. I've always had the feeling that, on the Peninsula and in front of Richmond, the divisions and corps of the Army of the Potomac are uncomfortably packed, like people on a crowded elevator.

So, hypothetically, if the Battle of Glendale had resulted in a Manassas-level defeat for the Union forces, it seems to me that Lee would have had the chance to inflict a decisive defeat that might have resulted in the effective destruction of the Army of the Potomac, because the Union forces would not have been able to easily run away. Perhaps Glendale, rather than Gettysburg, should be seen as Lee's great "missed opportunity" to win the war.
You may well be correct, @JeffBrooks. Perhaps regardless of whether McClellan tried to retreat to Harrison's Landing or northward to Whitehouse Landing, his army would have met a catastrophic defeat. I think back to your astute recognition though that not a single field army was completely destroyed in recent centuries.
 
Well, yes. And of course that is what ended up happening.

But the point I'm making is this. It's correct that there is not a single case of a major field army being "destroyed" in a battle during the Civil War. No Cannae, to use the classic example. There are several reasons for this, but among them would be the fact that in every case of a severe defeat, the losing army had a line of retreat and space in which to retreat. So in the event of a defeat on the scale of, say, First or Second Manassas for the Union or Missionary Ridge or Nashville for the Confederacy, the losing army had the ability to run away to fight again another day.

In the Seven Days, however, that would have been quite difficult for the Army of the Potomac. The terrain was swampy, crisscrossed with rivers and creeks, with easy movement limited to a small number of roads. I've always had the feeling that, on the Peninsula and in front of Richmond, the divisions and corps of the Army of the Potomac are uncomfortably packed, like people on a crowded elevator.

So, hypothetically, if the Battle of Glendale had resulted in a Manassas-level defeat for the Union forces, it seems to me that Lee would have had the chance to inflict a decisive defeat that might have resulted in the effective destruction of the Army of the Potomac, because the Union forces would not have been able to easily run away. Perhaps Glendale, rather than Gettysburg, should be seen as Lee's great "missed opportunity" to win the war.

The only way a Civil War army was "destroyed" was either by surrender or as after the fall of Little Rock, a collapse of morale leading to mass desertion. A.S. Johnston lost (+/-) 40% of his army without a shot being fired when after Donelson fell he ordered the precipitant retreat to Corinth.
 
You may well be correct, @JeffBrooks. Perhaps regardless of whether McClellan tried to retreat to Harrison's Landing or northward to Whitehouse Landing, his army would have met a catastrophic defeat. I think back to your astute recognition though that not a single field army was completely destroyed in recent centuries.

Well, we would have to define terms. What do we mean when we say "destroyed"? Napoleon inflicted such heavy defeats on the Austrian army at Austerlitz, the Prussian army at Jena-Auerstedt, and the Russian army at Friedland that he might rightly claim to have "destroyed" the enemy armies. They certainly weren't in any condition to continue resistance the next day and the losing side quickly sought peace on whatever terms Napoleon was willing to give them. And that was less than six decades prior to the American Civil War.

By this standard, was the Army of Tennessee "destroyed" at Nashville? Or, to keep the thread on track, could the Union army have been "destroyed" at some point in the Seven Days?
 
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By this standard, was the Army of Tennessee "destroyed" at Nashville? Or, to keep the thread on track, could the Union army have been destroyed at some point in the Seven Days?
Maybe a criterion could be:

A destroyed army cannot in a foreseeable future be restored
to something coming close to it´s former condition -
as it lost too much key personnel and cohesion.

Along these lines the AoT should be considered as "destroyed" - in essence the army couldn´t return to it´s former capabilities - and in all foreseeable future there was no possibility to achieve that again.

If the AoP would have been caught before being able to escape from the Peninsula and in the process would have broken up - probably most of the equipment would have been lost and a lot of prisoners would have been taken - leaving maybe just small remnants to disperse through the lines.
I´d guess this army then would also have been considered as "destroyed".

Another question would be if the Union wouldn´t have been well able to soon field another rather capable army….

(somethings the Prussians after Jena and the Austrians after Austerlitz probably couldn´t have done -
whereas the Russians after Friedland probably could….)
 
Well, we would have to define terms. What do we mean when we say "destroyed"? Napoleon inflicted such heavy defeats on the Austrian army at Austerlitz, the Prussian army at Jena-Auerstedt, and the Russian army at Friedland that he might rightly claim to have "destroyed" the enemy armies. They certainly weren't in any condition to continue resistance the next day and the losing side quickly sought peace on whatever terms Napoleon was willing to give them. And that was less than six decades prior to the American Civil War.

By this standard, was the Army of Tennessee "destroyed" at Nashville? Or, to keep the thread on track, could the Union army have been "destroyed" at some point in the Seven Days?
Well stated. In my opinion the closest thing to destruction of an army during the Civil War was indeed the slaughter of Bragg's army, with its remains escaping only because of Forrest's superhuman rear guard action. Even at Appomattox, Lee's army was not that close to total destruction.
 

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