Chickamauga Confederate Command Structure

[Rhea Cole]

It has been firmly established in this thread that Bragg was incapable of creating or managing an army. No amount of reshuffling the deck chairs was going to keep that ship afloat.

Knowing who was in & who was out & who was someplace else in the Army of Tennessee's command structure in 1863 requires a very squiggly spaghetti graph.

Frankly, given the characters involved, there is no lesson to be learned from theoretical remixes. Instead, why not look at what Sherman did to reorganize the Armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee & James into an army group with coherent command & control?

Another example worthy of study is the Army of the Tennessee & Army of Georgia that campaigned from Atlanta to Washington DC?

The theme that runs through both of those reorganizations was a firmly rooted in one of Grant's bedrocks. He demanded personal harmony among his commanders. Sherman observed that as Grant stood up the Army of the Tennessee.

The mutual respect that Grant demanded was in stark contrast with the juvenile squabbling, tattling & sucking up to mommy ( Davis ) that poisoned the command in Tennessee that was AS Johnston's legacy.

Professional military officers make the point that moving against Chattanooga without first reorganizing & preparing the army for a well planned campaign virtually guaranteed failure. Just reshuffling the name cards was never going to beat the A of the C at Chattanooga.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

It has been firmly established in this thread that Bragg was incapable of creating or managing an army. No amount of reshuffling the deck chairs was going to keep that ship afloat.

Knowing who was in & who was out & who was someplace else in the Army of Tennessee's command structure in 1863 requires a very squiggly spaghetti graph.

Frankly, given the characters involved, there is no lesson to be learned from theoretical remixes. Instead, why not look at what Sherman did to reorganize the Armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee & James into an army group with coherent command & control?

Another example worthy of study is the Army of the Tennessee & Army of Georgia that campaigned from Atlanta to Washington DC?

The theme that runs through both of those reorganizations was a firmly rooted in one of Grant's bedrocks. He demanded personal harmony among his commanders. Sherman observed that as Grant stood up the Army of the Tennessee.

The mutual respect that Grant demanded was in stark contrast with the juvenile squabbling, tattling & sucking up to mommy ( Davis ) that poisoned the command in Tennessee that was AS Johnston's legacy.

Professional military officers make the point that moving against Chattanooga without first reorganizing & preparing the army for a well planned campaign virtually guaranteed failure. Just reshuffling the name cards was never going to beat the A of the C at Chattanooga.

Well said, @Rhea Cole!

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

It has been firmly established in this thread that Bragg was incapable of creating or managing an army. No amount of reshuffling the deck chairs was going to keep that ship afloat.

Knowing who was in & who was out & who was someplace else in the Army of Tennessee's command structure in 1863 requires a very squiggly spaghetti graph.

Frankly, given the characters involved, there is no lesson to be learned from theoretical remixes. Instead, why not look at what Sherman did to reorganize the Armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee & James into an army group with coherent command & control?

Another example worthy of study is the Army of the Tennessee & Army of Georgia that campaigned from Atlanta to Washington DC?

The theme that runs through both of those reorganizations was a firmly rooted in one of Grant's bedrocks. He demanded personal harmony among his commanders. Sherman observed that as Grant stood up the Army of the Tennessee.

The mutual respect that Grant demanded was in stark contrast with the juvenile squabbling, tattling & sucking up to mommy ( Davis ) that poisoned the command in Tennessee that was AS Johnston's legacy.

Professional military officers make the point that moving against Chattanooga without first reorganizing & preparing the army for a well planned campaign virtually guaranteed failure. Just reshuffling the name cards was never going to beat the A of the C at Chattanooga.

I'm sure it was personal harmony when Grant tried to railroad Thomas out of command of the Army of the Cumberland. BTW mhy point isn't necessarily to disparage Grant. Just that all, or at least the majority and prefences and vendettas against other officers. Grant dealt with his fair share of disharmony, they just got to deal with it in an army that outnumbered it's enemy 2:1, and therefore was not also dealing with the stress of defeat as well. ALSO, Grant never had to deal with Polk LOL! No army commander should have Polk foisted on them.

 

[Rhea Cole]

I'm sure it was personal harmony when Grant tried to railroad Thomas out of command of the Army of the Cumberland. BTW mhy point isn't necessarily to disparage Grant. Just that all, or at least the majority and prefences and vendettas against other officers. Grant dealt with his fair share of disharmony, they just got to deal with it in an army that outnumbered it's enemy 2:1, and therefore was not also dealing with the stress of defeat as well. ALSO, Grant never had to deal with Polk LOL! No army commander should have Polk foisted on them.

Apparently, the point that numerous military historians & authors of staff college papers focused on regarding Grant's insistence on harmony among his senior commanders has not resonated. I have no reply, there being no point in redundancy.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Well said, @Rhea Cole!

I recall how shocked I was when reading Thomas Lawrence Connelly's Army of the Heartland & Autumn of Glory. I had been taught that the demigod Lee & the heavenly host of CSA generals were superior in every way… Albeit, even as a child how these glorious cherubim had managed to loose the war had puzzled me. As the data changes, so must the conclusions, ?no?

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

Apparently, the point that numerous military historians & authors of staff college papers focused on regarding Grant's insistence on harmony among his senior commanders has not resonated. I have no reply, there being no point redundancy.

I get the argument about Grant valuing harmony, but my point is that he wasn't immune to playing favorites, marginalizing some, and pushing others out when it suited him, just like any other commander. The difference is he was in a much stronger position to get away with it. I think that context matters. Just as Lee was much better at promoting harmony in the ANV than most of the other CS field armies. I still maintain that no one should have Polk foisted on them. Maybe Grant's real genius was avoiding that particular burden!

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

Came across this quote in Wert's biography of Longstreet. It's a quote from Capt. Charles Blackford about the difference between the ANV and the AoT:

"The difference between this army and General Lee's is very striking. When the men move in the Army of Northern Virginia, they think they are doing the proper thing, whether it be backward or forward, and if all the success anticipated is not secured, at all events it is not Lee's fault. Down here the men seem to think the wrong thing is being done whatever it be and when success is secured they attribute it to anyone else but Bragg. Thus they give the whole credit to Longstreet."

For all Bragg's faults, he wasn't an awful strategist, but he had clearly lost the army after the Kentucky campaign. Polk and Bragg both needed to go before the Tullahoma campaign commenced and new blood given a chance to perform. Who that was others could speculate, but the removal of Polk would rid the army of the worst backbiter in it, and Bragg could possibly be given an assignment in a less important area. I still stand by that Bragg, if never rose to army command, was a solid corps commander.

 

[Luke Freet]

Working my way through Powell's Three Volume set on the Chickamauga campaign. It's been very good. He does a great job of explaining the absolute disorganized state of the Confederate Command structure. The addition of two extra corps in Buckner and Walker, and then Longstreet's additions. Then Bragg's constant breaking and reattaching divisions and demi-divisions. None of it did him any good during the battle. Most corps commanders were really just glorified division commanders. None ever had enough to put together a weighty attack until Longstreet gets the whole wing and organizes his 8 brigade 5 line deep assault column. Hood comes close on day 1 with his attack with Johnson and Law's divisions as well, but he didn't have anything left to exploit his gains. Was thinking Why Bragg didn't just keep Buckner and Walker as division commanders, bring Buckner in as a reserve division or something and then attach him to Longstreet when Longstreet arrives, and then Walker can just attach to Polk. That would give you three corps of three divisions each, which would of been much better for the battle. Something like this:

Army of Tennessee
Gen. Braxton Bragg​

1. Polk's Corps - LtG Leonidas Polk
   1. Cheatham's Division - MG Benjamin Cheatham
      1. Jackson's Brigade - BG John K. Jackson
      2. Smith's Brigade - BG Preston Smith
      3. Maney's Brigade - BG George Maney
      4. Wright's Brigade - BG Marcus Wright
      5. Strahl's Brigade - BG Otho Strahl
      6. Artillery Battalion - Maj. Melancthon Smith
   2. Hindman's Division - MG Thomas Hindman
      1. Anderson's Brigade - BG Patton Anderson
      2. Deas Brigade - BG Zachary Deas
      3. Manigault's Brigade - BG Arthur Manigault
      4. Walthall's Brigade - BG Edward Walthall
   3. Walker's Division - W.H.T. Walker
      1. Ector's Brigade - BG Matthew Ector
      2. Wilson's Brigade - Col. Claudius Wilson
      3. Gregg's Brigade - BG John Gregg
      4. McNair's Brigade - BG Evander McNair
      5. Gist's Brigade - BG S.R. Gist
      6. Artillery Battalion - Battalion Capt. Swett
2. Hill's Corps - LtG. D.H. Hill
   1. Stewart's Division - MG A.P. Stewart
      1. Bate's Brigade - BG William Bate
      2. Brown's Brigade - BG John Brown
      3. Clayton's Brigade - BG Henry Clayton
      4. Johnson's Brigade - BG Bushrod Johnson
      5. Artillery Battalion - Maj. Elridge
   2. Cleburne's Division - MG Patrick Cleburne
      1. Wood's Brigade - BG S.A.M. Wood
      2. Lidell's Brigade - BG St. John Liddell
      3. Polk's Brigade - BG Lucious Polk
      4. Deshler's Brigade - BG James Deshler
      5. Artillery Battalion - Maj. Hotchkiss
   3. Breckinridge's Division - MG John Breckinridge
      1. Orphan Brigade - BG Benjamin Helm
      2. Adam's Brigade - BG Daniel Adams
      3. Stovall's Brigade - BG Marcellus Stovall
      4. Artillery Battalion - Maj. Graves
3. Longstreet's Corps - LtG James Longstreet
   1. Hood's Division - MG John B. Hood
      1. Law's Brigade - BG Evander Law
      2. Texas Brigade - BG Jerome Robertson
      3. Benning's Brigade - BG Henry Benning
      4. Jenkin's Brigade - BG Micah Jenkins
      5. Anderson's Brigade - BG George Anderson
   2. McLaw's Division - MG Lafayette McLaws
      1. Kershaw's Brigade - BG Joseph Kershaw
      2. Humphrey's Brigade - BG Benjamin Humphreys
      3. Bryan's Brigade - BG Goode Bryan
      4. Wofford's Brigade - BG William T. Wofford
   3. Buckner's Division - MG Simon Buckner
      1. Gracies' Brigade - BG Archibald Gracie
      2. Preston's Brigade - BG William Preston
      3. Trigg's Brigade - Col. Robert Trigg
      4. Artillery Battalion - Maj. Leyden
   4. Corps Artillery Battlaion - Maj. Williams
4. Reserve Artillery
   1. Artillery Battalion
      1. Battalion - Maj. Robertson
5. Wheeler's Cavalry Corps - MG Joseph Wheeler
   1. Wharton's Division - BG John Wharton
      1. Crews Brigade - Col. Crews
      2. Harrison's Brigade - Col. Harrison
   2. Martin's Division - BG William Martin
      1. Morgan's Brigade - Col. Morgan
      2. Russell's Brigade - Coll. Russell
6. Forrest's Cavalry Corps - MG Nathan Forrest
   1. Armstrong's Brigade - BG Frank Armstrong
      1. Wheeler's Brigade - Col. Wheeler
      2. Dibrell's Brigade - Col. Dibrell
   2. Pegram's Division - BG John Pegram
      1. Davidson's Brigade - Col. Davidson
      2. Scott's Brigade - Col. Scott

It's just a guess, but Bragg has a thing for every corps having just two divisions. This was sorta the case for the Invasion of Kentucky, Stones River, and Tullahoma. When he go troops arriving from other departments, he just kept creating new corps to fit this mental model. Or maybe he thought that more corps would be better for maneuver operations that he intended to perform; smaller corps had less troops to deal with, and therefore were generally quicker on the march than larger ones.
Of course, this idea had severe problems, namely in the lack of staff officers to populate these new corps commands. Most cases, the corps commander would just take the staff from their old division and make them operate as the corps staff; the brigadier who took command of the division would then bring up their brigade staff to command the division. New officers were put in command over larger formations, their staff officers generally unfamiliar with anyone outside their old organization.

 

[Jamieva]

So reading Cozzens and Powell, I don't get that reasoning out of Bragg IMO. So when Walker and Breckinridge arrive from Atlanta on Aug. 2nd they are attached to Hill's Corps. But then Bragg becomes worried his organization is out of balance in that Hill has 4 corps and Polk only 2. On top of that Buckner is arriving from E. Tennessee with his division of 5,000 men. It seems that while Bragg was leary of Buckner's Kentucky heritage he thought highly of his military prowess (which was much misplaced). He decided to make him a corps commander. This then gave him Hill (3 divisions), Polk (2 Divisions), Buckner (2 Divisions).

Then on around August 30th Walthall's brigade returns from provost duty in Atlanta. Bragg decides that since the Federals have a reserve corps protecting their rear he needs one. Again there was no need true need to detach Liddell from Cleburne and make Walker a corps commander, he simply could of detached Walker to his rear and attached Walthall as a 4 brigade. All it does is denude the strength of a proven combat officer to promote guys you don't know how well they'll lead a division.

Powell hits the nail on the head with the following quote:

"The constant shuffling and re-shuffling of his army in the face of an impending threat, was not only time-consuming, but bad for morale. Armies are not created by simply slotting armies into tables of organization. Commanders function best when they have the confidence of their men, and men fight best for officers they trust and respect. In addition, the creation of new corps and a new division meant that a large number of officers were stepping into new roles with expanded authority. It's always been a truism of war that not every officer of regiments and brigades will be as effective at the next level of command. While these new troops needed to be integrated into the existing army structure, Bragg's changes were excessive and confusing. Unfotunately for the Army, this wouldn't be the last time that Bragg felt the need to reorganize his army."
(PG. 86 - THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN: A MAD IRREGULAR BATTLE VOL. I)

The AoP operated for a long time with a bunch of small and medium sized corps to I think limited effect, I don't find it suprising that they consolidated their commands to 3 Corps + Burnsides corps before the Overland Campaign. Lee always operated with divisions with 4-5 brigades. Grant and Sherman operated primarily with corps of 4 divisions of 3 brigades each. The Union also solved some of the reserve line issues by shortening the width of their brigade and putting half the regiments in a brigade in the 2nd line. So they can present all three brigades in front but each brigade has a second line of half their regiments behind them. I also think Bragg's reorganization after Chickamauga shows how ineffective the 2 brigade division scheme was, as most division at Chattanooga were 4 brigades with a few 3 brigade divisions thrown in there.

Powell nails it

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Came across this quote in Wert's biography of Longstreet. It's a quote from Capt. Charles Blackford about the difference between the ANV and the AoT:

"The difference between this army and General Lee's is very striking. When the men move in the Army of Northern Virginia, they think they are doing the proper thing, whether it be backward or forward, and if all the success anticipated is not secured, at all events it is not Lee's fault. Down here the men seem to think the wrong thing is being done whatever it be and when success is secured they attribute it to anyone else but Bragg. Thus they give the whole credit to Longstreet."

For all Bragg's faults, he wasn't an awful strategist, but he had clearly lost the army after the Kentucky campaign. Polk and Bragg both needed to go before the Tullahoma campaign commenced and new blood given a chance to perform. Who that was others could speculate, but the removal of Polk would rid the army of the worst backbiter in it, and Bragg could possibly be given an assignment in a less important area. I still stand by that Bragg, if never rose to army command, was a solid corps commander.

I'll buy that, Wizard. The Peter Principle was in effect, as was common during the war.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

I'll buy that, Wizard. The Peter Principle was in effect, as was common during the war.

There are so many problems in the West. Davis and Johnston don't get along great, and yet Johnston gets command of "The West" which is really an administrative babysitting position without any real authority. After the Kentucky and Stones River campaigns, Bragg is not well, and Davis finally decides to relieve him and orders Johnston to take command. Johnston arrives, and instead of following Davis's orders can't do it because Bragg's wife isn't well and he can't add to his misery. Like you can't make this stuff up! IF the army had been able to get rid of Polk AND Bragg after Murfreesboro maybe the army wouldn't have sunk so low with it's morale and espirit de corps. Doesn't mean Johnston would have been significantly better commander, but he seemed to be better administratively. Instead we have Chickamauga, and then Bragg doesn't pursue, and the officer corps is in shambles, Davis comes out, tries to get Pemberton a position (again can't make this stuff up), and keeps Bragg in place (the same Bragg a few months earlier he tried to fire).

 

[Rhea Cole]

There are so many problems in the West. Davis and Johnston don't get along great, and yet Johnston gets command of "The West" which is really an administrative babysitting position without any real authority. After the Kentucky and Stones River campaigns, Bragg is not well, and Davis finally decides to relieve him and orders Johnston to take command. Johnston arrives, and instead of following Davis's orders can't do it because Bragg's wife isn't well and he can't add to his misery. Like you can't make this stuff up! IF the army had been able to get rid of Polk AND Bragg after Murfreesboro maybe the army wouldn't have sunk so low with it's morale and espirit de corps. Doesn't mean Johnston would have been significantly better commander, but he seemed to be better administratively. Instead we have Chickamauga, and then Bragg doesn't pursue, and the officer corps is in shambles, Davis comes out, tries to get Pemberton a position (again can't make this stuff up), and keeps Bragg in place (the same Bragg a few months earlier he tried to fire).

Mary Chestnut said that no matter how many times they failed, Davis kept the same incompetents in command. Lincoln, on the other hand, chord ch out the deadwood & promoted the winners.

As usual, Mrs C. was on the money.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

There are so many problems in the West. Davis and Johnston don't get along great, and yet Johnston gets command of "The West" which is really an administrative babysitting position without any real authority. After the Kentucky and Stones River campaigns, Bragg is not well, and Davis finally decides to relieve him and orders Johnston to take command. Johnston arrives, and instead of following Davis's orders can't do it because Bragg's wife isn't well and he can't add to his misery. Like you can't make this stuff up! IF the army had been able to get rid of Polk AND Bragg after Murfreesboro maybe the army wouldn't have sunk so low with it's morale and espirit de corps. Doesn't mean Johnston would have been significantly better commander, but he seemed to be better administratively. Instead we have Chickamauga, and then Bragg doesn't pursue, and the officer corps is in shambles, Davis comes out, tries to get Pemberton a position (again can't make this stuff up), and keeps Bragg in place (the same Bragg a few months earlier he tried to fire).

Yep. As you said, there was a need to get rid of BOTH Polk and Bragg to obtain any effectiveness. Joe Johnston would have been better than Bragg, for sure (despite the arguments some people have against him as being capable only of retreating). I wonder if there was any general at all who could have managed the limited Confederate resources well enough to at least stalemate the Union's efforts.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

Mary Chestnut said that no matter how many times they failed, Davis kept the same incompetents in command. Lincoln, on the other hand, chord ch out the deadwood & promoted the winners.

As usual, Mrs C. was on the money.

I don't think there is much doubt that Lincoln was the better leader (though he made mistakes as well, which he owned and fixed).

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

Yep. As you said, there was a need to get rid of BOTH Polk and Bragg to obtain any effectiveness. Joe Johnston would have been better than Bragg, for sure (despite the arguments some people have against him as being capable only of retreating). I wonder if there was any general at all who could have managed the limited Confederate resources well enough to at least stalemate the Union's efforts.

If you mean stalemate as in win a war of attrition, then I don't think any Confederate could do that. If by stalemate you mean do well enough cause Lincoln to lose the 64' election, then I think that was possible. There were in my mind 4 Generals who were clearly above others when it came to army command. Grant, Lee, Sherman, and Thomas. I think Rosecrans gets a bad rap, and if given a little more time I'd of like to seen how he handled Chattanooga if not removed. The issue for the South is Lee is the only general who could consistently get his units coordinated in attacks (outside of Gettysburg), and also keep morale and espirit de corps high in his army. I'd argue his Lee during the Overland was some of his best work, even with some mistakes he made, Grant as well. What was great about Grant and Lee was their ability to improvise through their mistakes. The South unfortunately didn't have another Lee. Maybe Richard Taylor, but he was way to young and was never going to get army command early enough to make any difference. The only other one in my mind would be Beauregard. For all his warts he did really good work in Charleston and then later South of Petersburg. While he did have outlandish grandiose plans at times, when push came to shove he was solid. He would of been best bet to command AoT in my opinion. South had 3 main armies Army of Mississippi, Army of Tennessee, and Army of Northern Virginia. South then needed to use their interior lines to keep one small at any one time that would need to retreat if pushed. Another on the defensive and to hold ground, and a third reinforced to possibly counterattack. They never really outside of sending forces to Army of Relief and then later Longstreet to AoT ever really used their interior lines to great success. I think that was their greatest fault from their perspective. Obviously the North had a lot to do with it. The Norther had talented commanders and way more resources. Ultimately wearing down the South.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

If you mean stalemate as in win a war of attrition, then I don't think any Confederate could do that. If by stalemate you mean do well enough cause Lincoln to lose the 64' election, then I think that was possible. There were in my mind 4 Generals who were clearly above others when it came to army command. Grant, Lee, Sherman, and Thomas. I think Rosecrans gets a bad rap, and if given a little more time I'd of like to seen how he handled Chattanooga if not removed. The issue for the South is Lee is the only general who could consistently get his units coordinated in attacks (outside of Gettysburg), and also keep morale and espirit de corps high in his army. I'd argue his Lee during the Overland was some of his best work, even with some mistakes he made, Grant as well. What was great about Grant and Lee was their ability to improvise through their mistakes. The South unfortunately didn't have another Lee. Maybe Richard Taylor, but he was way to young and was never going to get army command early enough to make any difference. The only other one in my mind would be Beauregard. For all his warts he did really good work in Charleston and then later South of Petersburg. While he did have outlandish grandiose plans at times, when push came to shove he was solid. He would of been best bet to command AoT in my opinion. South had 3 main armies Army of Mississippi, Army of Tennessee, and Army of Northern Virginia. South then needed to use their interior lines to keep one small at any one time that would need to retreat if pushed. Another on the defensive and to hold ground, and a third reinforced to possibly counterattack. They never really outside of sending forces to Army of Relief and then later Longstreet to AoT ever really used their interior lines to great success. I think that was their greatest fault from their perspective. Obviously the North had a lot to do with it. The Norther had talented commanders and way more resources. Ultimately wearing down the South.

I do believe that you and I AGREE wholeheartedly. The hypothetical stalemate mentioned would have been the AOT holding off Sherman's army, battling them to a stalemate. The question was whether there was ANY Confederate general who could have done the job, considering the AOT's limited (inferior) resources.

 

[Rhea Cole]

I don't think there is much doubt that Lincoln was the better leader (though he made mistakes as well, which he owned and fixed).

Agreed: The advantage Lincoln had over Davis can be summed up by my blacksmithing guru's mantra. "Be humble, be teachable." Lincoln was ignorant, recognized that, studied hard & learned from his mistakes.

Rosecrans said that he didn't fire "…that chuckle head…," Crittinden was because he was, "… such a a fine gentleman…" with Davis that attitude bordered on a mental disorder. ¡Dios mío! He brought Pemberton with him to Chattanooga seeking a place for him. Vicksburg veterans threatened to down arms & march off in mass.

I don"t get it.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

I do believe that you and I AGREE wholeheartedly. The hypothetical stalemate mentioned would have been the AOT holding off Sherman's army, battling them to a stalemate. The question was whether there was ANY Confederate general who could have done the job, considering the AOT's limited (inferior) resources.

Additionally, you sound just like me on Beauregard. His grandiose plans often seemed ridiculous, but when it came down to practical management of an army, Beauregard was highly effective. It is unfortunate for the Confederacy that President Davis had negative personal feelings toward Beauregard, and underutilized him.