Taking the Stone Wall

[Horse_Artillery_23]

The canal is certainly in the outer limits of the city ..however depending on which portion …. Buildings or "suburbs" extended past it. The painting of the opening attack on Marye's Heights of the 24th and 28th New Jersey regiments show the mill race in the foreground and buildings and fences beyond etc …. As for crossing it …. Everything I have ever seen (and I haven't seen everything) suggests they were under fire while crossing the canal. The 5th NY never really left the environs of the city "suburbs" and notes minne balls…… however the more you have me all looking at this …..even had the Federals captured the sunken road….then what? There's really nobody to exploit the breakthrough…..Just like the poor Pennsylvania Reserves had to learn the hard way further south.

The river and city make it impossible to bring proper artillery support forward….so that it can concentrate properly…..If the Civil War has taught me anything….it was an artillerymens war (and this is coming from a former Cavalryman ;-) )

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The canal is certainly in the outer limits of the city ..however depending on which portion …. Buildings or "suburbs" extended past it. The painting of the opening attack on Marye's Heights of the 24th and 28th New Jersey regiments show the mill race in the foreground and buildings and fences beyond etc …. As for crossing it …. Everything I have ever seen (and I haven't seen everything) suggests they were under fire while crossing the canal. The 5th NY never really left the environs of the city "suburbs" and notes minne balls…… however the more you have me all looking at this …..even had the Federals captured the sunken road….then what? There's really nobody to exploit the breakthrough…..Just like the poor Pennsylvania Reserves had to learn the hard way further south.

The river and city make it impossible to bring proper artillery support forward….so that it can concentrate properly…..If the Civil War has taught me anything….it was an artillerymens war (and this is coming from a former Cavalryman ;-) )

View attachment 589107

Also to draw a comparison to other situations that draw similar parallels…. Yet each yields a different result. Napoleon made similar assaults (with an equivalent sized army to the AoP) at Austerlitz and Borodino …. Each time the attack was up hill … and while Austerlitz produced a stunning victory, both were costly to Napoleons army.

Similarly Marye's Heights and the stone wall were not so different from Malvern Hill …..(Southwick also eluded to this) and while there was more room to coordinate attacks and less obstacles…. It was still stopped cold.

Taking the wall was possible…..but was it cost Burnside was willing to pay? Furthermore (and I don't dislike Burnside in the slightest) was Burnside capable of orchestrating the level tactical and strategic acuity to enact such a complex operation?

 

[Horse_Artillery_23]

I think that is certainly overstating it. I can think of an army that would be able to shell the stone wall effectually from about two miles away with 12 pounder rifle shells, which destroys the wall, and neutralizes the defending artillery. Once that's done then the job of the attackers is best done with a cloud of skirmishers in front and attacking infantry in line or column behind; if the skirmishers get established a couple of hundred yards from the wall they can suppress the defenders.


The thing about this is that there are ways to attack a defended position; they are difficult and complex and they can easily go wrong, but there are ways to do this properly and they involve mass - mass of skirmishers and then mass of the assault force. The skirmishers suppress the defenders as much as possible and then the assault force comes in a single body to try and push through.

It doesn't always work, but it doesn't always fail. This approach however is much more likely to work than the historical piecemeal assaults and it doesn't expose the force to any more risk.


That said, I do agree with the proposition that the obstacles make an attack difficult. I just think it's hyperbole to claim it was totally impossible. It is within the physical capabilities of men to attack through heavy fire, it's a question of morale and making that morale challenge as easy as possible.

One aspect I think the Federals lacked here was proper use of artillery. Certainly the guns on Stafford heights and around Falmouth were effective…..but only in providing supporting fire….. one of the great successes of the U.S. Army at Palo Alto in 1846 was the implementation of Major Ringgold's artillery tactics…..mobile artillery designed to move rapidly with infantry assault…..for all the reasons we all have collectively stated ….employing artillery in the space afforded would have been certain suicide for the artillery. At any rate light artillery in the assault itself would have provided the punch needed to not only pierce but also consolidate and hold off a counterattack….. obviously none of this was available when the assault happened.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

one of the great successes of the U.S. Army at Palo Alto in 1846 was the implementation of Major Ringgold's artillery tactics…..mobile artillery designed to move rapidly with infantry assault

This tactic seems to have been rendered obsolete by the introduction of rifled artillery and rifled muskets, as well as a lack of specialized training. I think the Union experience at First Bull Run also contributed to their unwillingness to attempt this. Notwithstanding some dubious theories about Lee's "real" plans to support the July 3 assault on Cemetery Ridge, I'm not sure this sort of thing was attempted or even seriously considered after 1861, by either side.

 

[repman66]

The canal is certainly in the outer limits of the city ..however depending on which portion …. Buildings or "suburbs" extended past it. The painting of the opening attack on Marye's Heights of the 24th and 28th New Jersey regiments show the mill race in the foreground and buildings and fences beyond etc …. As for crossing it …. Everything I have ever seen (and I haven't seen everything) suggests they were under fire while crossing the canal. The 5th NY never really left the environs of the city "suburbs" and notes minne balls…… however the more you have me all looking at this …..even had the Federals captured the sunken road….then what? There's really nobody to exploit the breakthrough…..Just like the poor Pennsylvania Reserves had to learn the hard way further south.

The river and city make it impossible to bring proper artillery support forward….so that it can concentrate properly…..If the Civil War has taught me anything….it was an artillerymens war (and this is coming from a former Cavalryman ;-) )

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The issue is any supporting cannons are well within musketry range - further look at the photos I posted above - even with British or later Krupp breach loading guns can you see the stone wall to friggen shoot at it? --- it's essentially hidden from view from Stafford Heights - you could maybe knock out some of the rifled guns on the crest but Alexander put Napoleons right down the crest near the infantry line.

The **** town gets in the way

 

[Saphroneth]

The issue is any supporting cannons are well within musketry range - further look at the photos I posted above - even with British or later Krupp breach loading guns can you see the stone wall to friggen shoot at it? --- it's essentially hidden from view from Stafford Heights - you could maybe knock out some of the rifled guns on the crest but Alexander put Napoleons right down the crest near the infantry line.

So maybe I'm not understanding your argument here, but if the Napoleons are "right down the crest near the infantry line" and in a position where they can shoot at the attackers, and any supporting gun positions would be "well within musketry range", surely the Federals should have been able to suppress the Napoleons with their own musketry? Whatever you consider musketry range to be, that is.

 

[67th Tigers]

A major problem was Hunt. He'd stripped the infantry formations of the much of their artillery, and all of their rifled artillery.

Sumner and Couch initially placed Dickenson's battery (4 rifles) in position but it was knocked to pieces. Arnold's battery then replaced it (6 rifles, initially only 1 section used), but they could not suppress the enemy batteries, and so Couch sent:

Hence Couch, unable to answer to two Confederate batteries tearing his troops apart, sent:

Sumner had no rifled batteries spare, and the message had to go up to Burnside, over to Hunt, who sent two batteries with 12 rifles (Kusserow's and Waterman's). We get the situation that for the bulk of the attacks, the only fire support on the field was 18 rifled guns firing at maybe 1,000 yards.

About 1600, 10 Napoleons (Hazard's and Frank's(-) batteries) were pushed forward, and Philips' battery (6 rifles) replaced them on the crest. That's the sum of the fire support brought down on Marye's Heights.

What should have happened is as many rifles, preferably 20 pdrs, should have been pushed forward into the first crest behind the Mill Race. They should have been able to line up about 8x 6 gun batteries, or 48 guns in a line there, and place another artillery line further left. These could have suppress the enemy batteries and shattered the defences at the base of Marye's Heights.

The fact that during the assaults, only 32 guns were used, and not all at once, is criminal.

 

[Horse_Artillery_23]

The issue is any supporting cannons are well within musketry range - further look at the photos I posted above - even with British or later Krupp breach loading guns can you see the stone wall to friggen shoot at it? --- it's essentially hidden from view from Stafford Heights - you could maybe knock out some of the rifled guns on the crest but Alexander put Napoleons right down the crest near the infantry line.

The **** town gets in the way

Exactly…there just isn't anywhere sane to deploy guns at the front in those conditions…as for seeing the wall itself..probably not once the battle was in its fury…. I'm going to scan Federal artillery accounts to see if anyone mentions anything…. Also out of curiosity….do we have any reports from the Confederates on how much damage the guns on Stafford Heights caused on the line?

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Could the Stone Wall have been taken by the AOP? Reading O'Reilly's book on Fredericksburg and came across this:
Nelson Miles brigade piled across Hanover Street and into the backyards of George Rowe and Thomas Proctor houses. A garden with a tight board fence delineated the property. The fence hid the enemy from our sight recalled a soldier of the 61st NY, but the distance to their nearest line of rifle pits was short. Miles estimated that the stone wall stood about forty yards beyond the wooden fence. Miles convinced himself he could capture the stone wall at the foot of Marye's Heights. 'We were then within 40 yards of the enemy and it only needed a spirited charge with the bayonet to close in.'

He needed Caldwell's and Zook's to support him however but both balked at the idea that there was no support.

'I only regret I did not make the attempt alone to carry the hill, had there been any support I should not have hesitated to give him the order' wrote Caldwell.

Miles probably could not have taken it by himself. By not trying he likely just saved the lives of many of his own soldiers.

 

[repman66]

This is my rudimentary map -- 1 is Stafford Heights with Federal Rifled guns --- which had an effect on confederate infantry reserves and the rifled guns located at 7 but could not visually see or target 5 which is the stone wall and the main Confederate position. 2 is the river. 3 is the town. 4 is the canal. 5, as stated, is the stone wall, 6 is Alexander's Napoleons (actually off to the side but around that distance. Finally, 7 are the Confederate rifled guns and infantry reserve.

The distance from 5 to 3 is no further than 500 yards and in some places 300-400 yards - well within minie range. (checked my sources and did google maps measurements).

The Confederates at 7 and the 2nd line (between 6 and 5 above) were suppressed by the volume of Federal infantry fire, but the men raced to the sunken road which was a perfect barricade. Being up to 6 or 8 men deep meant that the volume of fire was virtually indefinite. I blame most of Lee's 1,500 casualties on having the 2nd line exposed and having reinforcements have to go to the road instead of stuffing the road with men and ammunition pre-assault. Ironically, the weight of Federal fire aided the defense as it was much safer to "stick it out" than try and retreat.

When I first walked the ground (town has taken most of the field) I was struck by how very Boer like the selection of the position was (unwittingly) of course. The Sunken road is almost at the very base of the heights and is tucked back so that, while it controls the killing fields of the fairgrounds, you almost have to be in those fields to hit anything behind the wall.

Finally, there is no proper place to mass a division, or multi divisions for a clear storming effort. Deploying one brigade was a challenge. Artillery support was immediately under rifle and artillery fire. The ground to the east and west of the town is low, lower on the east but so low that it would be a struggle, sans pure mortars, to actually hit the road!

This position, despite being near the end of what I call the "early war" period with Confederate tactical mistakes, was as impregnable as it got.

Also, the 2,000 or so Confederates probably fired well over 200,000 rifle rounds! They had to be resupplied several times from several different sources.

Fearing that Cobb's brigade might exhaust its ammunition, General Longstreet had directed General Kershaw to take two regiments to its support. Arriving after the fall of Cobb, he assumed command, his troops taking position on the crest and at the foot of the hill, to which point General Ransom also advanced three other regiments."

General Kershaw took command of Cobb's brigade, which I had had supplied with ammunition from my wagons, and I repeated the supply during the day.

General Lee also ordered resupply - so those guys were just pumping lead the five hours they were in position.

 

[Saphroneth]

The distance from 5 to 3 is no further than 800 yards and in some places 600-700 - well within mini range.

Startling! I seem to recall you in the past calling the idea of trained British infantry sharpshooting at that distance completely ridiculous...

 

[Horse_Artillery_23]

View attachment 589140


This is my rudimentary map -- 1 is Stafford Heights with Federal Rifled guns --- which had an effect on confederate infantry reserves and the rifled guns located at 7 but could not visually see or target 5 which is the stone wall and the main Confederate position. 2 is the river. 3 is the town. 4 is the canal. 5, as stated, is the stone wall, 6 is Alexander's Napoleons (actually off to the side but around that distance. Finally, 7 are the Confederate rifled guns and infantry reserve.

The distance from 5 to 3 is no further than 500 yards and in some places 300-400 yards - well within minie range. (checked my sources and did google maps measurements).

The Confederates at 7 and the 2nd line (between 6 and 5 above) were suppressed by the volume of Federal infantry fire, but the men raced to the sunken road which was a perfect barricade. Being up to 6 or 8 men deep meant that the volume of fire was virtually indefinite. I blame most of Lee's 1,500 casualties on having the 2nd line exposed and having reinforcements have to go to the road instead of stuffing the road with men and ammunition pre-assault. Ironically, the weight of Federal fire aided the defense as it was much safer to "stick it out" than try and retreat.

When I first walked the ground (town has taken most of the field) I was struck by how very Boer like the selection of the position was (unwittingly) of course. The Sunken road is almost at the very base of the heights and is tucked back so that, while it controls the killing fields of the fairgrounds, you almost have to be in those fields to hit anything behind the wall.

Finally, there is no proper place to mass a division, or multi divisions for a clear storming effort. Deploying one brigade was a challenge. Artillery support was immediately under rifle and artillery fire. The ground to the east and west of the town is low, lower on the east but so low that it would be a struggle, sans pure mortars, to actually hit the road!

This position, despite being near the end of what I call the "early war" period with Confederate tactical mistakes, was as impregnable as it got.

Also, the 2,000 or so Confederates probably fired well over 200,000 rifle rounds! They had to be resupplied several times from several different sources.



General Lee also ordered resupply - so those guys were just pumping lead the five hours they were in position.

I particularly appreciate your focus on "mass"…. While my last name isn't Hardee or Casey….I do enjoy working through maneuvers in my head …. I suppose not matter how you look at it … the space available to the Federals isn't conducive to effectively execute the necessary maneuvers to win…

I need to look into this more for myself to see if it has any truth….but I've seen some comments here on the 2nd battle in 63…… Hooker created a Light Division….they took the wall….I'm sure the lessons learned from the Dec battle played a part into the attack

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

This might sound cynical, and from coming from a southern guy doubly so, but I would have burned the whole town, every single last building to the ground or made the attempt. Would have changed the Confederate position entirely. I would have focused on just that and shelling.

Destroying the town of Fredericksburg would not have affected the Confederate positions at all.

 

[repman66]

I particularly appreciate your focus on "mass"…. While my last name isn't Hardee or Casey….I do enjoy working through maneuvers in my head …. I suppose not matter how you look at it … the space available to the Federals isn't conducive to effectively execute the necessary maneuvers to win…

I need to look into this more for myself to see if it has any truth….but I've seen some comments here on the 2nd battle in 63…… Hooker created a Light Division….they took the wall….I'm sure the lessons learned from the Dec battle played a part into the attack

The Federals were losing, again, to only part of Barksdale's brigade when a truce allowed the Federals to scout a flank and attacked over ground which would have been manned and, more importantly, sighted for artillery in December '62 but McClaws didn't have enough manpower to extend.

 

[Horse_Artillery_23]

Destroying the town of Fredericksburg would not have affected the Confederate positions at all.

Destroying the town of Fredericksburg would not have affected the Confederate positions at all.

I agree …. If anything it would have hindered the AoP even more. The buildings left standing were much more useful anyways. There are multiple instances (Warren's brigade in particular) where regiments used the shelter of buildings to hide from Confederate artillery…..Either Alfred Davenport or Tom Southwick…both of the 5th NY (sorry I know I'm citing them ALOT here!) recalled Confederate Minnie balls wounding men in the ranks….the 5th remained east of the mill race….in other words troops moving up the slope toward the wall were theoretically taking fire while still navigating obstacles….making coordination just that much more difficult. I'm curious to know/research when other brigades first noted taking fire while pressing toward the wall.

I have attached the Stanley map present in Pohanka's book Vortex of Hell

 

[67th Tigers]

I agree …. If anything it would have hindered the AoP even more. The buildings left standing were much more useful anyways. There are multiple instances (Warren's brigade in particular) where regiments used the shelter of buildings to hide from Confederate artillery…..Either Alfred Davenport or Tom Southwick…both of the 5th NY (sorry I know I'm citing them ALOT here!) recalled Confederate Minnie balls wounding men in the ranks….the 5th remained east of the mill race….in other words troops moving up the slope toward the wall were theoretically taking fire while still navigating obstacles….making coordination just that much more difficult. I'm curious to know/research when other brigades first noted taking fire while pressing toward the wall.

Where did those rounds come from? The reports from the batteries say that the town still contained rebel sharpshooters who were shooting them down from behind...

 

[Horse_Artillery_23]

Destroying the town of Fredericksburg would not have affected the Confederate positions at all.

Destroying the town of Fredericksburg would not have affected the Confederate positions at all.

I agree …. If anything it would have hindered the AoP even more. The buildings left standing were much more useful anyways. There are multiple instances (Warren's brigade in particular) where regiments used the shelter of buildings to hide from Confederate artillery…..Either Alfred Davenport or Tom Southwick…both of the 5th NY (sorry I know I'm citing them ALOT here!) cited Confederate Minnie balls wounding men in the ranks….the 5th remained east of the mill race

I agree …. If anything it would have hindered the AoP even more. The buildings left standing were much more useful anyways. There are multiple instances (Warren's brigade in particular) where regiments used the shelter of buildings to hide from Confederate artillery…..Either Alfred Davenport or Tom Southwick…both of the 5th NY (sorry I know I'm citing them ALOT here!) recalled Confederate Minnie balls wounding men in the ranks….the 5th remained east of the mill race….in other words troops moving up the slope toward the wall were theoretically taking fire while still navigating obstacles….making coordination just that much more difficult. I'm curious to know/research when other brigades first noted taking fire while pressing toward the wall.

I have attached the Stanley map present in Pohanka's book Vortex of Hell

Where did those rounds come from? The reports from the batteries say that the town still contained rebel sharpshooters who were shooting them down from behind...

A Confederate ….. let me go back and get the exact wording of the account for you (give me an hour or so) (but it only talks about the wounding of his friend…so don't to get to excited over it)….. rebel sharpshooters are certainly present, especially in the opening attacks…..the men of Kimball's brigade mention the sharpshooters frequently…and enemy skirmishers.. the 5th NY accounts are much later in the day so I would need to examine if any of those dispositions changed.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

I agree …. If anything it would have hindered the AoP even more. The buildings left standing were much more useful anyways. There are multiple instances (Warren's brigade in particular) where regiments used the shelter of buildings to hide from Confederate artillery…..Either Alfred Davenport or Tom Southwick…both of the 5th NY (sorry I know I'm citing them ALOT here!) cited Confederate Minnie balls wounding men in the ranks….the 5th remained east of the mill race



A Confederate ….. let me go back and get the exact wording of the account for you (give me an hour or so) (but it only talks about the wounding of his friend…so don't to get to excited over it)….. rebel sharpshooters are certainly present, especially in the opening attacks…..the men of Kimball's brigade mention the sharpshooters frequently…and enemy skirmishers.. the 5th NY accounts are much later in the day so I would need to examine if any of those dispositions changed.

Rebel sharpshooters occupied buildings in the town BEFORE the Union troops crossed the river in massive numbers.

 

[Horse_Artillery_23]

Sergeant Thomas Southwick - (A Duryea Zouave)

"When we reached the scene of the conflict, it was quite dark, for the sun was setting when we entered the city, and the position of the enemy could only be inferred by the sheets of flame that belched occasionally from the mouths of the guns."

We drew up in line of battle in a turnip garden behind a high board fence. The ground was soft and sticky and our feet were buried in the yielding clay. We tore down the boards of the fence and used them for a platform to stand upon. The 140th NY was directly in front and the 146th to our rear. We could see flashing of the musketry two or three hundred yards in front and hear the bullets whistle past our ears and we expected every moment to press forward and take an active part."

"When we halted in this position, the firing was disconnected, but soon became more rapid and fierce, for the rebels had emerged in the darkness from their hiding places and were making a vigorous assault upon our forces in front. Our troops were slowly pressed back, and the enemy, having obtained its object, again returned to the shelter of its stone wall and rifle pits"

Lt. Porter Farley - (Farley Diary, Dec 13th, 1862)

"The guns spitting flame in the darkness looked like fireflies across the low meadow opposite us. It was a splendid sight."
In this case, he is most likely speaking of artillery discharges, but perhaps it could be a mix of the two.


Private Charles Wilson (via his Pension File at the National Archives) - while in the position at the edge of town, "was struck in the face by a bullet that divided his upper lip, fractured his jaw, and exited from the back of his neck." - clearly shot from the front

Keep in mind the 5th New York experiences the battle differently due to their later arrival.... I scanned through the different reports and sources I have for French's division who opened the assault... they are all pretty uniform in noting heavy artillery fire in the vicinity of the mill race, the presence of sharpshooters....and clearly state the Confederate fire from the stone wall was held until the formations advanced closer (this conforms with Confederate accounts)

For my own interest, I plan on looking at how this trend changes throughout the day with each attack. Two of the primary things I want to examine further, based on the frequency with which they are mentioned... 1. when/ which type of fire did the Federals receive in each attack..... 2. The status of the "mud" ...... Kimball's men who made the first attack complained about getting slowed up by mud...imagine how that situation only became worse as the day progressed.

 

[Horse_Artillery_23]

Rebel sharpshooters occupied buildings in the town BEFORE the Union troops crossed the river in massive numbers.

Agreed… their location is not in question.

 

[Horse_Artillery_23]

Where did those rounds come from? The reports from the batteries say that the town still contained rebel sharpshooters who were shooting them down from behind...

This reminds me of another POTENTIAL link.....I need to go back and refresh myself... However, back in 2012, I published an article on the Florida Brigade..... While doing the research, I came across something of a mystery..... I am not sure how well-known or unknown this is... but along with Barksdale's Mississippians, there were also detachments of Florida troops ( IF MY MEMORY is correct, I THINK it was parts of the 5th and 8th regiments)......whatever the specifics....these troops are reported as missing and never appear again in the records... Speculation suggests they were counted amongst prisoners and incorrectly ID by the Federals as Mississippians.....similarly, no Federal accounts mention any capture of them in the way of identifying them specifically. Florida accounts just note their disappearance and never make clear if they returned... complete speculation...but perhaps they become part of this from behind. Urban combat....even in 1862....is a different dynamic....making anything theoretically possible.