Taking the Stone Wall

[scooter748driver]

There is no glory in watching your fellow soldiers die ugly deaths at a young age.

Not at any age

 

[Jamieva]

That doesn't discount that the wall was taken.

No but it's an apples and oranges comparison.

 

[1SGDan]

No but it's an apples and oranges comparison.

Not really. In both cases the wall was defended. The number of apples was the only difference.

 

[scooter748driver]

Not really. In both cases the wall was defended. The number of apples was the only difference.

Yes. Really.

 

[1SGDan]

Yes. Really.

I think not. The goal of both operations was to move past the wall One did not and another did. In military speak one failed and one succeeded. Numbers are meaningless to that.Success can only be determined by pre-operational intent of the commanders involved.

 

[scooter748driver]

I think not. The goal of both operations was to move past the wall One did not and another did. In military speak one failed and one succeeded. Numbers are meaningless to that.Success can only be determined by pre-operational intent of the commanders involved.

The numbers are meaningless? Hmmmm...I think the numbers are what determined the failure and success to begin with. To say the numbers, aka the details, are meaningless...one might as well just say the North won the war and we can all move on to some other web site.

 

[1SGDan]

.I think the numbers are what determined the failure and success to begin with.

Numbers determine nothing. The history of warfare has shown us many times how an outnumbered or superior force has failed or succeeded.

 

[scooter748driver]

A couple of verses from Proverbs 26 come to my mind at this point so I'll say goodnight.

 

[PatW]

E. Porter Alexander's artillery at Marye's Heights was well-placed to sweep the field with canister, and had a lot to do with the repulse. Hunt's artillery at Pickett's charge returned the favor a few months later.

The problem is you are going to take a short range aimed volley. There is a good chance that it would stop your charge.

You might be able to take the wall, with high casualties. But now you stop to catch your breath, and get organized and you are swept with canister.

And hopefully, your supports will come up. And if they do, they might just jumble up with your guys and do more harm than good like the Mule Shoe.

A problem with positions like this is the defenders can respond more easily. Frequently, they can counter attack and expel the attackers. For something like the to work, the attackers need to have a series of things break their way.

 

[Horse_Artillery_23]

Could the Stone Wall have been taken by the AOP? Reading O'Reilly's book on Fredericksburg and came across this:
Nelson Miles brigade piled across Hanover Street and into the backyards of George Rowe and Thomas Proctor houses. A garden with a tight board fence delineated the property. The fence hid the enemy from our sight recalled a soldier of the 61st NY, but the distance to their nearest line of rifle pits was short. Miles estimated that the stone wall stood about forty yards beyond the wooden fence. Miles convinced himself he could capture the stone wall at the foot of Marye's Heights. 'We were then within 40 yards of the enemy and it only needed a spirited charge with the bayonet to close in.'

He needed Caldwell's and Zook's to support him however but both balked at the idea that there was no support.

'I only regret I did not make the attempt alone to carry the hill, had there been any support I should not have hesitated to give him the order' wrote Caldwell.

Very interesting discussion point! I am certainly one who leans on the "not possible" side of the coin...but...the fact that Caldwell is the one writing makes me suspicious! My experience with Caldwell is that falls way short of the mark quite often....hiding behind a haystack at Antietam while his brigade wad sorely needed..... sending his division in piecemeal at Gettysburg while they got cut to pieces. To me....jusy my humble opinion....Caldwell was just writing that to cover his own tush.

 

[JerryD]

Taking the wall was only part of the problem. If you did take it, then you have Marye's Heights above you. It was a forlorn hope.

 

[Caddo Militia]

In Fighting for the Confederacy, Gen. E. Porter Alexander described how he set up the artillery positions on Marye's Heights. "Very soon after my arrival I was directed to assist Gen. Lee's engineer officers in locating & constructing some pits for artillery at various points along the range of hills overlooking the town & valley of the river. The idea was that the enemy was likely to shell the town at any time, & our pits were to be located so as to fire upon their batteries, if they did. But, in selecting the positions, I persuaded the engineers always to advance the guns to the brows of the hills so as to be able to sweep the approaches to the hills if it became necessary, and this brought about an incident with Gen. Lee, which, in the end, I enjoyed immensely.

One day when the pits were nearly finished, I was with a party working upon one on Marye's Hill, when Captain Sam Johnston, Gen. Lee's engineer in charge of the whole business, came up to tell me Gen. Lee was inspecting the line near by, & was blaming him for not locating the pits further back on the hill. He said, "you made me put them here. Now you come along and help me take the cussin."

So I rode with him & when I came up Gen. Lee said "Ah, Gen. Alexander, just see what a mistake Captain Johnston has made here in the location of his gun pits, putting them forward at the brow of the hill!" I said "Gen., I told him to put the pits there, where they could see all this canister and short range ground this side of the town. Back on the hill they can see nothing on this side of the river." "But", he says, "you have lost some feet of command you might have had back there." I answered that that was a refinement which would cut no figure in comparison with the increased view, but he rather sat on me & had the last word, though I knew I was right & did not give it up.

Well, when the battle came on, Burnside's most powerful effort was made at that exact point, & the guns there never fired a shot at their distant view, but thousands of rounds into infantry swarming over the canister & short range ground, & contributed greatly to the enemy's bloody repulse. And a few evenings afterward, visiting Gen. Lee's camp, I took the opportunity, when the general was near enough to hear, to say loudly to Johnston, "Sam, it was a mighty good thing those guns about Marye's were located on the brows of the hills when the Yankees charged them!" I was half afraid the general might think me impertinent, though I could not resist the temptation to have one little dig at him. But he took it in silence & never let on he was listening to us. I was however frequently put on location jobs afterward, &, thence to the close of the war, I never got but one more scolding (Oct. 7, 1864) which I will tell of when I get to it."​

 

[Saphroneth]

Okay, so looking at the Stone Wall (and Marye's Heights as a whole) as a tactical problem, using contemporary tools.

The first thing to note is that the frontage from the river (around Dr. Taylor's) to the unfinished railroad and Hazel Run is about 2.5 miles - that is, it's about 13,000 feet. This means that very roughly speaking a two-deep line is 13,000 men.

As things kick off, Anderson (7,600 CS PFD), McLaws (8,000) and Ransom (3,900) are in that sector, though McLaws and Ransom are concentrated at Marye's Heights itself. That means that the Heights are extremely dense - I believe there's a quote about a quintuple line at the wall.

Any attack that might succeed needs mass. Attacks need momentum and density if they're going to continue through the beaten zone to reach close quarters; if the Union troops can reach close quarters then they're likely to succeed, the problem is getting there (and of course mass exposes more men to Confederate fire, though the historical piecemeal attacks did that anyway). Honestly a better approach is going to be to cannonade the works along the rest of Marye's Heights, but let's say for now that destroying the works isn't an option and that all the artillery is doing is counter-battery; fortunately the Union has over 300 guns so they should be able to conduct effective counter-battery.


The first obstacle is the ditch canal. On the Confederate left the main canal is close to the Confederate main line of resistance; further south around Marye's Heights, though, the ditch canal is several hundred yards (400 yards or so at closest approach) from the Confederate main line of resistance, and so the canal is an obstacle that isn't covered by the full power of the Confederate defences. It can be passed and the Union units form up on the far side of it.

Taking for now that the Union main attack will be with about 40,000 effectives, while another division or so is facing Anderson to the north, the frontage from the Washington Monument to the Hazel Run is just over a mile (and so a two-deep line would consume about 7,000 effectives).

The Napoleonic-French doctrinally correct approach here would be to push forwards a thick line of skirmishers to engage the wall at all points (and take control of farmhouses near the wall), while brigade columns (probably consisting of columns of double companies at half or quarter distance) pushed forwards to strike the Confederate defences; these columns would be good targets for musketry, but they'd also have the momentum and speed to push through the beaten zone relatively quickly and in effect each one needs to be beaten individually (but at the same time) for the Confederates to succeed. One of these columns should follow the unfinished RR and come up on the southern side of the Heights themselves, then turn north and cut in behind the Confederate position.

Notional structure with 12 brigade columns advancing (4 divisions) behind the cover of 2 divisions of skirmishers. Since the columns are comparatively dense they have momentum and, importantly, they can follow the easier terrain.

This wouldn't necessarily work. The position is strong. But this is how it would be done if you were trying to do it properly (i.e. in accordance with principles of mass using tactical methods which already existed at the time).

 

[Horse_Artillery_23]

Could the Stone Wall have been taken by the AOP? Reading O'Reilly's book on Fredericksburg and came across this:
Nelson Miles brigade piled across Hanover Street and into the backyards of George Rowe and Thomas Proctor houses. A garden with a tight board fence delineated the property. The fence hid the enemy from our sight recalled a soldier of the 61st NY, but the distance to their nearest line of rifle pits was short. Miles estimated that the stone wall stood about forty yards beyond the wooden fence. Miles convinced himself he could capture the stone wall at the foot of Marye's Heights. 'We were then within 40 yards of the enemy and it only needed a spirited charge with the bayonet to close in.'

He needed Caldwell's and Zook's to support him however but both balked at the idea that there was no support.

'I only regret I did not make the attempt alone to carry the hill, had there been any support I should not have hesitated to give him the order' wrote Caldwell.

I don't know if this will add anything, but I was reminded of this account by Sergeant Thomas Southwick of the 5th NY. I am applying this in the context of properly deploying formations to assault the wall. Also, for personal reference, I attended the University of Mary Washington for my undergrad, which gave me ample time to explore the battlefield. Obviously, the landscape has changed dramatically since 1862; however, being able to locate the 1862 city limits allowed me to absorb the space and distance required to reach the wall. Not that it is news to anyone here, probably, but the actual distance between city limits and the wall is far less than what popular history or Hollywood has presented. In my humble opinion, the situation of the terrain and the elements that constituted it played just as much of a role in hampering the Federal assaults as the Confederate ordnance did in stopping it. Perhaps had the city not been there, and the landscape open, then possibly the Federal assaults would have been more mature in their coordination and maneuverability against the wall. Yet, even with this, they would still have to overcome Confederate rifle and artillery fire, which would have produced the same results most likely. Anyways, here's how Southwick described the condition to the city, lending credit to the idea that obstacles played a part.


"The streets were full of soldiers, the stores were broken, the contents scattered around. The city was larger than I had anticipated, with large, elegant brick edifices beautifully laid out and tastefully ornamented with balconies, piazzas, colonnades and verandas. There were spacious gardens attached to almost every home and handsome trellis-work arbors....Streets were wide and regularly laid out in blocks, which we passed rapidly, and reached the suburbs." - Suburbs is key in illustrating that the city didn't just abruptly end at a single line, but continued in various directions like anywhere else.

As to the wall, he stated, "The stone wall was a formidable defense, and our troops, after being twice repulsed during the day, lay flat upon the ground in front. The sharpshooters were skillful, and at every discharge from their unerring rifles the soul of a Federal patriot ascended to his Maker. The least movement was equivalent to certain death."

As to their final position at the edge of town, he wrote, "We drew up in line of battle in a turnip garden behind a high board fence. The ground was soft and sticky, and our feet were buried in the yielding clay. We tore down the boards of the fence and used them for a platform to stand upon.....we could see the flashing of the musketry two or three hundred yards in front and hear bullets whistle past our ears and we expected every moment to press forward and take active part in the fray."

 

[Saphroneth]

As to their final position at the edge of town, he wrote, "We drew up in line of battle in a turnip garden behind a high board fence. The ground was soft and sticky, and our feet were buried in the yielding clay. We tore down the boards of the fence and used them for a platform to stand upon.....we could see the flashing of the musketry two or three hundred yards in front and hear bullets whistle past our ears and we expected every moment to press forward and take active part in the fray."

This suggests that the space between the edge of town and the actual fight was a few hundred yards, I think? This suggests that it certainly should have been possible to cross the whole of the assault force over the canal before making the attack.

Unless the canal is past the edge of town, that is, in which case the canal is the actual obstacle.

 

[C.W. Roden]

The problem is you are going to take a short range aimed volley. There is a good chance that it would stop your charge.

You might be able to take the wall, with high casualties. But now you stop to catch your breath, and get organized and you are swept with canister.

And hopefully, your supports will come up. And if they do, they might just jumble up with your guys and do more harm than good like the Mule Shoe.

A problem with positions like this is the defenders can respond more easily. Frequently, they can counter attack and expel the attackers. For something like the to work, the attackers need to have a series of things break their way.

Exactly. And even if the AOP managed this in that manner they would have been so smashed up by the time they cleared out Lee's army that the "victory" would have completely wrecked them, just like the so-called Confederate "victory" at Frankly would do to the Army of Tennessee two years later.

 

[repman66]

With Marye's heights properly manned there was no army on earth in December, 1862, that would be able to storm them. You just cannot get enough firepower and mass to effectuate a storming.

1) Canal
2) Mud
3) Fences
4) Pre-sighted rifle and cannon ranges by the Confederates
5) The town.
6) The sunken Road

There wasn't enough room to properly form assault columns due to the fact that Union formations had to march up the roadways which made them excellent targets for Confederate rifled guns (Irish brigade lost 14 men to one shell here) which already began disordering their formations.

Then a canal with icy water must be crossed, again under fire, then the formations must be reassembled. There were still enough buildings and fences on the fairground to slow a charge.

Additionally, once Union soldiers DID gain a lodgment, their fire did not suppress the Confederate Defenders such that it spared the next assault column. Union skirmishes made life difficult for the 2nd line of Infantry and gunners but did not affect the main Confederate infantry line in the sunken road. That is because that road was packed - 4-6 deep - with men all reloading and passing rifled up to men who would step up, shoot, and sink down again. The reloaders were perfectly safe from incoming Federal infantry fire which did not suppress their ability to hit the assault columns at all.

It was an impregnable position and wasn't being taken.

Edit: One of my favorite series of photos showing battle smoke taken May 3, 1863

 

[Saphroneth]

With Marye's heights properly manned there was no army on earth in December, 1862, that would be able to storm them. You just cannot get enough firepower and mass to effectuate a storming.

I think that is certainly overstating it. I can think of an army that would be able to shell the stone wall effectually from about two miles away with 12 pounder rifle shells, which destroys the wall, and neutralizes the defending artillery. Once that's done then the job of the attackers is best done with a cloud of skirmishers in front and attacking infantry in line or column behind; if the skirmishers get established a couple of hundred yards from the wall they can suppress the defenders.


The thing about this is that there are ways to attack a defended position; they are difficult and complex and they can easily go wrong, but there are ways to do this properly and they involve mass - mass of skirmishers and then mass of the assault force. The skirmishers suppress the defenders as much as possible and then the assault force comes in a single body to try and push through.

It doesn't always work, but it doesn't always fail. This approach however is much more likely to work than the historical piecemeal assaults and it doesn't expose the force to any more risk.


That said, I do agree with the proposition that the obstacles make an attack difficult. I just think it's hyperbole to claim it was totally impossible. It is within the physical capabilities of men to attack through heavy fire, it's a question of morale and making that morale challenge as easy as possible.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

The last CWT Muster was very enlightening on this subject. The topography of Fredericksburg between the stone wall and the river is underappreciated.

 

[Horse_Artillery_23]

This suggests that the space between the edge of town and the actual fight was a few hundred yards, I think? This suggests that it certainly should have been possible to cross the whole of the assault force over the canal before making the attack.

Unless the canal is past the edge of town, that is, in which case the canal is the actual obstacle.

The canal is certainly in the outer limits of the city ..however depending on which portion …. Buildings or "suburbs" extended past it. The painting of the opening attack on Marye's Heights of the 24th and 28th New Jersey regiments show the mill race in the foreground and buildings and fences beyond etc …. As for crossing it …. Everything I have ever seen (and I haven't seen everything) suggests they were under fire while crossing the canal. The 5th NY never really left the environs of the city "suburbs" and notes minne balls…… however the more you have me all looking at this …..even had the Federals captured the sunken road….then what? There's really nobody to exploit the breakthrough…..Just like the poor Pennsylvania Reserves had to learn the hard way further south.

The river and city make it impossible to bring proper artillery support forward….so that it can concentrate properly…..If the Civil War has taught me anything….it was an artillerymens war (and this is coming from a former Cavalryman ;-) )