Should Lee have entrenched?

[Andy Cardinal]

Lee was certainly pleased that Little Mac did not attack on September 16, giving him another day for Jackson's command to reach Sharpsburg.

My question is should Lee have used that time as an opportunity to entrench or build breastworks? Field fortifications had been used during the Peninsula Campaign so there was precedent.

Secondly, why didn't Lee choose to entrench? It has been suggested that the armies had not yet reached the stage where entrenching was automatic.

 

[thomas aagaard]

The problem with field fortifications is that they pretty much lock your men in place.
It make is a lot harder to move forward and counter attack. (even if they are not an actual physical issue, it do make soldiers less willing to go forward)

 

[redbob]

While a small amount of entrenching/field fortifications had been done by this time of the war, it was the troops who increasingly saw the value of them and by 1864 when they were in the vicinity of the enemy; they would start preparing field fortifications as soon as they stopped. It has always amazed me the amount of dirt that the soldiers of that time could move using nothing but bayonets, mess plates and bare hands.

 

[rpkennedy]

Lee was certainly pleased that Little Mac did not attack on September 16, giving him another day for Jackson's command to reach Sharpsburg.

My question is should Lee have used that time as an opportunity to entrench or build breastworks? Field fortifications had been used during the Peninsula Campaign so there was precedent.

Secondly, why didn't Lee choose to entrench? It has been suggested that the armies had not yet reached the stage where entrenching was automatic.

Outside of using fences and walls for defense, most soldiers hadn't gotten to the point where digging in was a priority. Even at Gettysburg, outside of Culp's Hill, any defenses that the men put up were barricades made of fence rails. It wasn't until 1864 when real field entrenchments became the norm.

Ryan

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Outside of using fences and walls for defense, most soldiers hadn't gotten to the point where digging in was a priority. Even at Gettysburg, outside of Culp's Hill, any defenses that the men put up were barricades made of fence rails. It wasn't until 1864 when real field entrenchments became the norm.

Ryan

I agree that the soldiers themselves wouldn't have done it on their own. Lee would have to have ordered it done (or his subordinate commanders). Knowing the odds against him, especially on the 16th, that might have been the thing to do.

 

[gary]

If Lee's men in 1862 had the experience they had by 1864, they would have entrenched. No soldier on either side needed orders by this time.

 

[ErnieMac]

It's interesting (IMO) that after Lee assumed command of the Army of Northern Virginia, he spent the next several weeks fortifying Richmond. Lee certainly knew the value of entrenchments if anyone did. I personally am thinking along the same lines as @thomas aagaard - Lee was looking to resume his attack asap.

 

[MHB1862]

A more fluid fight is hard to imagine. The "front" changed hour by hour. Field works constructed on the 16th would probably have been useless on the Confederate left by 6:00 AM on the 17th.
Lee shifted troops around like mad as the fighting developed. Time and again, although outnumbered in gross terms, Lee managed to move units to the scene of greatest danger so that each Union attack was met be nearly equal numbers. Field works may have served to turn what, for Lee, by necessity was a rapidly moving fight into a static one where Union numbers could have more effectively been brought to bear. In my view, field works would have been more hindrance than help.

 

[MBuehner]

A more fluid fight is hard to imagine. The "front" changed hour by hour. Field works constructed on the 16th would probably have been useless on the Confederate left by 6:00 AM on the 17th.
Lee shifted troops around like mad as the fighting developed. Time and again, although outnumbered in gross terms, Lee managed to move units to the scene of greatest danger so that each Union attack was met be nearly equal numbers. Field works may have served to turn what, for Lee, by necessity was a rapidly moving fight into a static one where Union numbers could have more effectively been brought to bear. In my view, field works would have been more hindrance than help.

Positions changed because they were over run, which is what entrenchment might have prevented. If Lee wasnt forced to shift units all of the battlefield because he was holding his ground he would have been thrilled.

If you look at the initial positions in the morning on the left, it just begs for entrechment. There was absolutely no value for the Rebs in repeatedly storming the cornfield, and the casualties in some of the best Confederate units were appalling. If Lees men could have stood in their trenches and cut Hooker down like Cold Harbor, Lee would have secured his left and had ample fresh units to consider a counter attack. A stand up fight served no purpose other than displaying their bravery, which was expensive in blood.

 

[MBuehner]

But the answer to the question is it wasnt done because nobody really considered field fortifications thrown up in a short time either viable or useful at that stage of the war. A lot of generals thought it actually weakened troops elan. That was all obviously very wrong, but nobody knew it in 1862.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

But the answer to the question is it wasnt done because nobody really considered field fortifications thrown up in a short time either viable or useful at that stage of the war. A lot of generals thought it actually weakened troops elan. That was all obviously very wrong, but nobody knew it in 1862.

True enough for the soldiers and even the lower level.commamders. Lee knew the value of digging in though.

 

[ErnieMac]

I would like to suggest that significant portions of Lee's lines were entrenched in a manner of speaking. In the middle portion of the field the sunken road and stacked fence rails formed an entrenchment that was ably defended by D. H. Hill's Confederate troops. They did not dig into this position, but used the terrain and readily available materials to form a protective barricade. At Burnside's Bridge Antietam Creek, the stone wall running parallel to it and the rocky heights above provided a strong position for the Confederates. Robert Toombs' men used the position quite effectively.

In neither case did the Confederates dig in, but the used the terrain as an effective substitute. It was through a misunderstood order at the Sunken Road and overwhelming numbers at the Bridge that the Confederates were driven back. Only on Jackson's front did the ebb and flow of the battle proceed without an attempt on either side to prepare defenses.

 

[Ole Miss]

Lee by nature was an audacious man who believed his role was to plan the operation, share it with his senior commanders, oversee the preparation of the troops and then stand back and let his subordinates act. Once he was in command of the Army of Northern Virginia, he had an organization that he could mold and use for his purposes.

He always wanted to get at "those people" and entrenchments would have only hindered his assault. His combative nature was shown at 2nd Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, was it not?
Regards
David

 

[MBuehner]

True enough for the soldiers and even the lower level.commamders. Lee knew the value of digging in though.

Right but my point is there is a difference between spending days and even weeks building fortifications under the eye of trained engineers like Lee ordered in defense of Richmond, and field fortifications thrown up overnight. I think virtually nobody had much belief in impromptu field fortifications until soldiers started spontaneously digging in and proved their worth.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I basically agree with everything posted above. Knowing Lee's aggressive nature, I agree it would not have been something he necessarily wanted to do. However, given the disparity of numbers, especially on the 16th but also on the 17th, I think it might have been a move to consider.

I also agree with @ErnieMac about the use of terrain. However, there was no such terrain to take advantage of north of the Sunken road.

 

[MHB1862]

I would like to suggest that significant portions of Lee's lines were entrenched in a manner of speaking. In the middle portion of the field the sunken road and stacked fence rails formed an entrenchment that was ably defended by D. H. Hill's Confederate troops. They did not dig into this position, but used the terrain and readily available materials to form a protective barricade. At Burnside's Bridge Antietam Creek, the stone wall running parallel to it and the rocky heights above provided a strong position for the Confederates. Robert Toombs' men used the position quite effectively.

In neither case did the Confederates dig in, but the used the terrain as an effective substitute. It was through a misunderstood order at the Sunken Road and overwhelming numbers at the Bridge that the Confederates were driven back. Only on Jackson's front did the ebb and flow of the battle proceed without an attempt on either side to prepare defenses.

True enough at the Sunken Road although I would argue that had prepared defenses been constructed it is more likely they would have been built on the military crest rather than simply fortifying the road. The line, as defended, was vulnerable to converging fire from the higher ground in front of the road. It was this vulnerability that led to the 6th AL being withdrawn prematurely. Refusing their right would still have exposed Their line to a devastating flank fire from a higher elevation.

Completely agree that the improvised rifle pits in the quarry above the bridge and the high ground to the Confederate right of the bridge was decisive in the delaying action. Given reinforcements and replenished ammo Burnside might still be trying to take the position.

On Jackson's front an could be offered that the use of the West Woods as cover for McLaws counterattack was either incredibly serendipitous or outstanding tactics on the part of McLaws et. al. against a dangerously poor deployment by Sedgewick's Division. It has never been clear to me if that was Sedgewick's or Sumner's blunder. Regardless of where the fault lies a huge blunder it was. The gun line on Hauser's ridge ought to have been a clue to one of them that an advance in brigade front with little separation between brigades belied the notion that a left wheel could roll up the Confederate left. Of course, hindsight is 20/20.

 

[rpkennedy]

True enough at the Sunken Road although I would argue that had prepared defenses been constructed it is more likely they would have been built on the military crest rather than simply fortifying the road. The line, as defended, was vulnerable to converging fire from the higher ground in front of the road. It was this vulnerability that led to the 6th AL being withdrawn prematurely. Refusing their right would still have exposed Their line to a devastating flank fire from a higher elevation.

Completely agree that the improvised rifle pits in the quarry above the bridge and the high ground to the Confederate right of the bridge was decisive in the delaying action. Given reinforcements and replenished ammo Burnside might still be trying to take the position.

On Jackson's front an could be offered that the use of the West Woods as cover for McLaws counterattack was either incredibly serendipitous or outstanding tactics on the part of McLaws et. al. against a dangerously poor deployment by Sedgewick's Division. It has never been clear to me if that was Sedgewick's or Sumner's blunder. Regardless of where the fault lies a huge blunder it was. The gun line on Hauser's ridge ought to have been a clue to one of them that an advance in brigade front with little separation between brigades belied the notion that a left wheel could roll up the Confederate left. Of course, hindsight is 20/20.

It was Sumner's formation, IIRC. French's men also started out in that formation before turning to the south and attacking the western part of the Sunken Road.

Ryan

 

[MHB1862]

It was Sumner's formation, IIRC. French's men also started out in that formation before turning to the south and attacking the western part of the Sunken Road.

Ryan

That is my recollection as well but I do not recall an OR after action report confirming that supposition.
Sounds like a research goal for me.

Off topic, I know, but as a what if, I wonder what would have happened if French had not assumed Greene's remnants were Sedgewick and pressed on to the West Woods instead of veering off to the left? Would the Sunken Road fight not have happened? Would the added weight of French and Richardson have dislodged McLaws et. al. and achieved the goal of sweeping down on Sharpsburg from the north? Would Harvey Hill and Anderson have advanced against the left of French and Richardson in response? Obviously this is all idle speculation but interesting to consider.

 

[MHB1862]

Lee by nature was an audacious man who believed his role was to plan the operation, share it with his senior commanders, oversee the preparation of the troops and then stand back and let his subordinates act. Once he was in command of the Army of Northern Virginia, he had an organization that he could mold and use for his purposes.

He always wanted to get at "those people" and entrenchments would have only hindered his assault. His combative nature was shown at 2nd Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, was it not?
Regards
David

Your description of Lee's MO as army commander is spot on in nearly every other battle. Yet at Sharpsburg he exercised more tactical control than on any other field. Again and again he took direct aggressive action to exert personal control over the battle. Without that intervention the fight could have gone very differently.

 

[rpkennedy]

That is my recollection as well but I do not recall an OR after action report confirming that supposition.
Sounds like a research goal for me.

Off topic, I know, but as a what if, I wonder what would have happened if French had not assumed Greene's remnants were Sedgewick and pressed on to the West Woods instead of veering off to the left? Would the Sunken Road fight not have happened? Would the added weight of French and Richardson have dislodged McLaws et. al. and achieved the goal of sweeping down on Sharpsburg from the north? Would Harvey Hill and Anderson have advanced against the left of French and Richardson in response? Obviously this is all idle speculation but interesting to consider.

In the ORs, Sumner just mentions that the divisions were formed in 3 lines. He doesn't mention whose idea the formation was but my guess is that it was his own.

Ryan