Rosecrans

[DanSBHawk]

Oddly enough, Rosecrans received numerous reports about a movement of Virginia forces to Atlanta. You will be surprised at the wide variety of sources. The Army of the Cumberland's intel gathering was very comprehensive. Now you can read the reports for yourself.


This is a link to an Army Command & General Staff College thesis paper:

Intelligence Operations of the Army of the Cumberland During the Tullahoma & Chickamauga Campaigns. It includes Rosecrans' intelligence log.

Link:

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA211897.pdf

Let me know what you think.

Thanks, that's a good and well-reasoned paper. Here is a couple messages from the log that jumped out:

On the 4th of September, both Rosecrans and McCook speculated about confederate reinforcements from the east. I wonder if this was based on what Dodge sent. Dodge didn't say when he sent intel about Lee sending reinforcements. So maybe it was on the 4th.

But by the 8th until the 12th of September, Rosecrans was convinced that Bragg was on the run with an army that had been diminished by desertions. It's ironic that a certain other union general so often severely over-estimated enemy numbers and thought he was facing 200,000 confederates, while Rosecrans in this situation severely under-estimated and thought he was facing only 20,000 confederates.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Tullahoma was brilliant, but it did not result in any significant battle. I was also thinking of Corinth. I know he won the battle, but the first day was similar to Stones River where he seemed to be bordering on catastrophe.

It is interesting that you mention Corinth. In every one of his battles ( except Tullahoma ) Rosecrans met confederate Banzai charges & held his ground. He learned a vital lesson. Never even once did Rosecrans loose 1/3 rd to 1/2 half of his men in a futile head on attack.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Tullahoma was brilliant, but it did not result in any significant battle.

The weather had a lot to do with that.

 

[Rhea Cole]

The weather had a lot to do with that.

Indeed, according to TVA, it was a 500 year rain event.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Thanks, that's a good and well-reasoned paper. Here is a couple messages from the log that jumped out:
View attachment 546056
On the 4th of September, both Rosecrans and McCook speculated about confederate reinforcements from the east. I wonder if this was based on what Dodge sent. Dodge didn't say when he sent intel about Lee sending reinforcements. So maybe it was on the 4th.

But by the 8th until the 12th of September, Rosecrans was convinced that Bragg was on the run with an army that had been diminished by desertions. It's ironic that a certain other union general so often severely over-estimated enemy numbers and thought he was facing 200,000 confederates, while Rosecrans in this situation severely under-estimated and thought he was facing only 20,000 confederates.

I am not sure what you are looking for. You have picked out a direct discussions between Rosecrans & Halleck or Thomas & McCook. I have never seen anything indicating Dodge was reporting directly to Rosecrans. In any case, he would have only been one amongst many.

In any case, why would a message from Dodge be so significant when there was the detailed intel from one of Forrest's lieutenants & civilian scouts in Atlanta who saw Longstreet arrive?

 

[DanSBHawk]

I am not sure what you are looking for. You have picked out a direct discussions between Rosecrans & Halleck or Thomas & McCook. I have never seen anything indicating Dodge was reporting directly to Rosecrans. In any case, he would have only been one amongst many.

In any case, why would a message from Dodge be so significant when there was the detailed intel from one of Forrest's lieutenants & civilian scouts in Atlanta who saw Longstreet arrive?

Dodge was not normally reporting directly to Rosecrans. But when Dodge found some information that Bragg was being reinforced from the eastern armies shortly before Chickamauga, Grant told Dodge to inform Rosecrans. Dodge passed on the intel to Rosecrans, who basically told him to mind his own business.

It has no great significance other than my interest in Dodge's story.

 

[wausaubob]

Rosecrans' difficulties began when McClellan did not retain Rosy for an important command. Rosecrans was probably too independently minded for McClellan's taste. The problems got worse when Stanton took over the War Department. Then Halleck had a preference for people who had done a tour of duty in California. It was Stanton ultimately that overcame Lincoln's affection for Rosecrans and it was Stanton that used Grant to relieve Rosecrans.

I haven't said anything about Grant. Is it possible for you to discuss Rosecrans without complaining about Grant?

 

[wausaubob]

It wasn't personalities, they were friends before the war. What caused the bad blood between them is that Grant wrote an overly gracious report for Rosecrans' gaffe-filled antics at Iuka only to later find out that Rosecrans was blaming him for the confusion. Rosecrans followed that with a gaffe-filled defense of Corinth, and Grant was considering relieving him when Halleck rescued Grant by promoting Rosecrans instead.

Later, Rosecrans showed a tendency to be uncooperative across their respective department boundaries and I'm sure that didn't help.

The industrial accident, the long convalescence, and some amount of residual pain might have been factors limiting Rosecrans ability to get along with superiors.

 

[wausaubob]

Stanton hounded Rosecrans, demanding he advance toward Atlanta.

The intelligence about Longstreet heading for Atlanta had been passed onto Rosecrans. A civilian who passed into Union lines had seen Longstreet's men detraining in Atlanta.

One of Forrest's lieutenants defected. He provided highly detailed, accurate intel on Bragg's intentions, strength & dispositions.

Acting on intel reports, Rosecrans ordered his corps to concentrate along Chickamauga Creek.

Keep in mind that the Army of the Cumberland inflicted more KIA & wounded than it received. When Rosecrans successfully withdrew into the works defending Chattanooga, Chickamauga became a hollow tactic victory.

Note: Rosecrans' intel log for the period leading up to Chickamauga still exists. There is no reason to guess what Rosecrans did & did not know.

But based on what he had achieved in Tennessee, and the fact that Burnside's force had made it to Knoxville, Rosecrans had a record that would stand Stanton's ill will. Rosecrans should have stated the Confederate armies in other theaters are either inactive, or passing through the faulty parole system. He should have called Stanton out.

 

[wausaubob]

McPherson got there after the battle was over, and then participated in the pursuit.

Therefore McPherson had a good deal of second hand information about Corinth II.

 

[J C J Barefoot]

Rosecrans' difficulties began when McClellan did not retain Rosy for an important command. Rosecrans was probably too independently minded for McClellan's taste. The problems got worse when Stanton took over the War Department. Then Halleck had a preference for people who had done a tour of duty in California. It was Stanton ultimately that overcame Lincoln's affection for Rosecrans and it was Stanton that used Grant to relieve Rosecrans.

Didn't know Halleck leaned toward soldiers with California tours. Was he stationed there and if so in what capacity? Thanks.

 

[Stryker65]

Didn't know Halleck leaned toward soldiers with California tours. Was he stationed there and if so in what capacity? Thanks.

He was the chief of staff for the Military Governor of California from 1847-1854. Official title was "Military Secy. of State," but in military lingo that's just COS to the regional US Army commander.

 

[wausaubob]

He was the chief of staff for the Military Governor of California from 1847-1854. Official title was "Military Secy. of State," but in military lingo that's just COS to the regional US Army commander.

Halleck's intellectual attainments were important in California. My recollection is that he was mainly responsible for writing the state's constitution.

 

[Stryker65]

Halleck's intellectual attainments were important in California. My recollection is that he was mainly responsible for writing the state's constitution.

Always the administrator...

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

I just realized my comment (#48) was dumb. Little George was popular. I guess I meant he and Bragg were both self-absorbed, talented to a degree, perfectionist, can "whip up" an army, and unable to follow up victories.

Self criticism is healthy. Good for you.

 

[Belfoured]

He was the chief of staff for the Military Governor of California from 1847-1854. Official title was "Military Secy. of State," but in military lingo that's just COS to the regional US Army commander.

In addition, starting c. 1854 he was deeply involved as Manager in operating the lucrative New Almaden Quicksilver (Mercury) Mine outside SF. The Mine became the subject of litigation over a fraudulent ownership claim by Castillo (IIRC), based on an alleged grant from Spain. An injunction stopped its operation in 1858. The US asserted that the claim was fraudulent and was represented by Edwin Stanton. The Mining Company was represented by Halleck's SF law firm. The claim was ultimately rejected by the SCOTUS in 1863. Obviously, Halleck had gone back to his original occupation by then.

 

[J C J Barefoot]

He was the chief of staff for the Military Governor of California from 1847-1854. Official title was "Military Secy. of State," but in military lingo that's just COS to the regional US Army commander.

Many thanks.

 

[Belfoured]

Self criticism is healthy. Good for you.

Ironically not a specialty of the guy he referred to.

 

[TallTallMan]

Self criticism is healthy. Good for you.

Better than the knowitallism in a good chunk of this forum!

 

[David Moore]

Thanks, that's a good and well-reasoned paper. Here is a couple messages from the log that jumped out:
View attachment 546056
On the 4th of September, both Rosecrans and McCook speculated about confederate reinforcements from the east. I wonder if this was based on what Dodge sent. Dodge didn't say when he sent intel about Lee sending reinforcements. So maybe it was on the 4th.

But by the 8th until the 12th of September, Rosecrans was convinced that Bragg was on the run with an army that had been diminished by desertions. It's ironic that a certain other union general so often severely over-estimated enemy numbers and thought he was facing 200,000 confederates, while Rosecrans in this situation severely under-estimated and thought he was facing only 20,000 confederates.

The first quote has a transcription error by the author of the dissertation. It should be Is it not possible instead of It is not possible.