Random Thoughts on Iuka

[Nathan Towne]

They could have, and risked Price withdrawing over Bear Creek in the night. The other suboptimal choice was for Rosecrans to attack unsupported on the Jacinto Road very late in the day.

Grant chalked up the confusion to fog of war, but was happy that Price had been bloodied. Rosecrans cast about for others to blame and, intended or not, that attitude pervaded his army and his fans.

Right, which was the risk, yes. This is why Rosecrans didn't have much choice other to push forward on the 19th. They were going to have to get into position to launch the attack and in order to do so were going to have to reach the connecting road, regardless, so, you can see how the logic begins to quickly develop on the point.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I have been writing battle summaries here for nearly 15 years and have often been questioned about my assessments but never insulted in a such an open fashion. I'll not argue with an egotistical blowhard.

Well, I am sorry. All that I will say on that is that it is important if you are going to come in with guns blazing that you need to know the facts first.

Thanks.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Since all this discussion predated me, when it started I had no idea what was being talked about. Moreover this whole thing of Bear Creek etc. Is not in Cozzens and as we know the confederates escaped via Fulton. I have no idea about the discussion with Ned or what's up with that. For a while I thought to let that just go, but before moving on to different topics I decided to take a look at what I missed and there are interesting discussions going on.

Can we find a map for this? It will help me understand what's being discussed if I know what we are talking about. I have this one, from Rosy's report. It doesn't show Bear Creek.

how about this one from Cozzens? Shows generally the area but no topography. Cozzens apparently didn't think a discussion of topography was necessary…

Maybe it's in the topographic maps shown by @tony_gunter?

I realize this is kind of like a rabbit hole but I'll stipulate here like an attorney would that Rosecrans acted on his own initiative without orders when he decided to push ahead single column and not notify his commander.

I think a discussion of this would have been very useful in Cozzens' book, which is why I keep coming back to that book being so unsatisfying. He dedicated just a single line to that momentum choice by Rosecrans, which essentially changed the plan.

Why is there a discussion about Bear Creek here? What's behind this?

Okay, let's try to put this Bear Creek nonsense to rest. Here is a modern terrain map of Iuka and the land to the east of Iuka. You can see how bad it gets as it descends into the Bear Creek bottomland. Bear Creek runs north-south along the border for at least 20 miles and empties into the Tennessee River. The closer you get to the Tennessee River, the more difficult the terrain. It's much easier terrain to navigate further south.

Now here's a historical map of the area. During this period of time, both sides worried that the other side would detach troops to aid either Buell or Bragg. The confederates worried that Rosecrans would cross the Tennessee River at Eastport and join Buell. The federals worried that Price would cross Bear Creek into Alabama and then cross the Tennessee River to join Bragg. That is the high-level worrying that's going on at the time. There really was a concern that Price would cross Bear Creek (somewhere) to go join Bragg.

But the actual battle plan for the Battle of Iuka was not really concerned about Price crossing Bear Creek. The possibility was acknowledged, but it was considered by the Union commanders as being a bad option for the confederates. The Union commanders considered that Ord attacking from the west while Rosecrans blocked the two southern roads would essentially "trap" Price and force him to fight. Both Grant and Rosecrans explicitly said that this was the plan:

Here's Grant in his official report: "This was the first I knew of the Fulton Road being left open to enemy for their escape. With it occupied no route would have been left them except east, with the difficult bottom of Bear Creek to cross, or northeast, with the Tennessee River in their front, or to conquer their way out"

Here's Rosecrans in his testimony to the Joint Committee: "...it would be probably be better that, with Stanley's division, I should join Hamilton's at Jacinto, and, moving with the two by the Tuscumbia road, should get possession of the rebels' line of retreat, south of Iuka, by seizing and holding both the Fulton and Jacinto roads, which at Iuka were only a mile and a half apart, and the ground there being highly favorable for the operation, while General Ord's entire force should attack Price in front, and thus put him completely in our power."

So you have Grant and Rosecrans, and every historian ever, all agreeing that the possibility of the confederates escaping directly due east from Iuka was of very little importance to the actual battle plan. Same with the possibility of the confederates escaping north from Iuka and being blocked by the Tennessee River.

This entire theory of Nathan's is more about this weird competitive vendetta he has against Ned Baldwin. It's all about posturing and claiming that he knows more than Ned. What Nathan has done here is simply gathered some sources that mention Bear Creek, and then tried to link them directly to the battle. But not one of them explicitly describes a specific route crossing Bear Creek directly east from Iuka. The easier crossings of Bear Creek would have been to the south of Iuka. And one of the sources Nathan repeatedly posts is from the 16th and has Grant writing of Price moving northeast from Bay Springs to cross Bear Creek. You can see by the map that this would not necessarily involve going anywhere near Iuka.

So the entire Bear Creek brouhaha is nonsense. Just a bunch of hot air and posturing and an out-of-control ego. Other posters, like 1SGDan, are much more informed on the Battle of Iuka. Nathan's theory flies in the face of the historical evidence and it lacks common sense.

 

[DanSBHawk]

They could have, and risked Price withdrawing over Bear Creek in the night. The other suboptimal choice was for Rosecrans to attack unsupported on the Jacinto Road very late in the day.

Grant chalked up the confusion to fog of war, but was happy that Price had been bloodied. Rosecrans cast about for others to blame and, intended or not, that attitude pervaded his army and his fans.

I can't imagine the confederates trying to escape over Bear Creek at night. If they really wanted to escape the night of the 19th I think they would have tried to bust out one of the southern roads.

 

[DanSBHawk]

One factor that should kept in mind with all this is that the confederates had a huge supply train to consider. Much of it was captured at Iuka. They weren't going to risk losing it in some muddy boggy mess, with steep terrain and possibly destroyed bridges.

 

[SSVilla]

Page 125 has the only mention but any hope to "drive the enemy toward the impassable defiles of Bear Creek" was pie in the sky fantasy as long as the Fulton road went uncovered.

The Pg. 125 mention referred to describes Rosecrans plans for a pursuit. Nothing at all appears in Cozzens about Bear Creek in the planning stage.

He must have thought it irrelevant because even though it was a consideration in the planning stage, once the Fulton road was uncovered any discussion of Bear Creek was unnecessary.

 

[SSVilla]

They could have, and risked Price withdrawing over Bear Creek in the night. The other suboptimal choice was for Rosecrans to attack unsupported on the Jacinto Road very late in the day.

Grant chalked up the confusion to fog of war, but was happy that Price had been bloodied. Rosecrans cast about for others to blame and, intended or not, that attitude pervaded his army and his fans.

This is actually something that shows a difference in the characters of the two commanders… a very interesting subject. How each of them handled the aftermath. Part of the reason for me trying to understand this battle is just to understand the origins of the rift between them.

Rosecrans is puzzling to me. I think his bitterness after the battle was that the attack from the west didn't come in on time, as he expressly wrote his wife Annie.

I weigh that heavily because that's when his feelings would have been the freshest. Till the end of time he'd believe that was the cause for the failure of his plan, not everything else that had already so complicated matters that he had to adjust his own plan leaving open an escape route for Price.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Okay, let's try to put this Bear Creek nonsense to rest. Here is a modern terrain map of Iuka and the land to the east of Iuka. You can see how bad it gets as it descends into the Bear Creek bottomland. Bear Creek runs north-south along the border for at least 20 miles and empties into the Tennessee River. The closer you get to the Tennessee River, the more difficult the terrain. It's much easier terrain to navigate further south.
View attachment 522460
Now here's a historical map of the area. During this period of time, both sides worried that the other side would detach troops to aid either Buell or Bragg. The confederates worried that Rosecrans would cross the Tennessee River at Eastport and join Buell. The federals worried that Price would cross Bear Creek into Alabama and then cross the Tennessee River to join Bragg. That is the high-level worrying that's going on at the time. There really was a concern that Price would cross Bear Creek (somewhere) to go join Bragg.
View attachment 522462

But the actual battle plan for the Battle of Iuka was not really concerned about Price crossing Bear Creek. The possibility was acknowledged, but it was considered by the Union commanders as being a bad option for the confederates. The Union commanders considered that Ord attacking from the west while Rosecrans blocked the two southern roads would essentially "trap" Price and force him to fight. Both Grant and Rosecrans explicitly said that this was the plan:

Here's Grant in his official report: "This was the first I knew of the Fulton Road being left open to enemy for their escape. With it occupied no route would have been left them except east, with the difficult bottom of Bear Creek to cross, or northeast, with the Tennessee River in their front, or to conquer their way out"

Here's Rosecrans in his testimony to the Joint Committee: "...it would be probably be better that, with Stanley's division, I should join Hamilton's at Jacinto, and, moving with the two by the Tuscumbia road, should get possession of the rebels' line of retreat, south of Iuka, by seizing and holding both the Fulton and Jacinto roads, which at Iuka were only a mile and a half apart, and the ground there being highly favorable for the operation, while General Ord's entire force should attack Price in front, and thus put him completely in our power."

So you have Grant and Rosecrans, and every historian ever, all agreeing that the possibility of the confederates escaping directly due east from Iuka was of very little importance to the actual battle plan. Same with the possibility of the confederates escaping north from Iuka and being blocked by the Tennessee River.

This entire theory of Nathan's is more about this weird competitive vendetta he has against Ned Baldwin. It's all about posturing and claiming that he knows more than Ned. What Nathan has done here is simply gathered some sources that mention Bear Creek, and then tried to link them directly to the battle. But not one of them explicitly describes a specific route crossing Bear Creek directly east from Iuka. The easier crossings of Bear Creek would have been to the south of Iuka. And one of the sources Nathan repeatedly posts is from the 16th and has Grant writing of Price moving northeast from Bay Springs to cross Bear Creek. You can see by the map that this would not necessarily involve going anywhere near Iuka.

So the entire Bear Creek brouhaha is nonsense. Just a bunch of hot air and posturing and an out-of-control ego. Other posters, like 1SGDan, are much more informed on the Battle of Iuka. Nathan's theory flies in the face of the historical evidence and it lacks common sense.

What I provided were Rosecrans explicit comments regarding the conception of the plan, in real time, which clearly and definitively reveal the nature of the plan as it actually existed. That is incontrovertible.

Now, I am quite amused by your personal attack on me regarding Ned Baldwin, whom I like fine and respect. If I had a personal vendetta against him, it is odd that I would have recommended a number of his articles pertaining to the Red River Campaign just a week or two ago and why I would have passed on to him that he should write more on the campaign if he is up to it and had the time. It would also be strange as to why I would have informed people that they should all read his writings relating to the Snake Creek Gap operation, even though I think that the evidence demonstrates that he clearly overstated his case to some degree. It is also odd why I would have just referenced his brief article on Cedar Mountain the other night. On this topic, I would say that he was not familiar with the relevant record, which was revealed to him and we haven't heard anything from him since. If he holds such views, or wants to make a case here, he is entirely free to do so and I would respectfully engage with him, provided that he were respectful and did not flagrantly disregard the record when revealed to him or baselessly denigrate historical actors on extremely superficial grounds, or something like that, which I expressed and demonstrated was being done by certain users on this thread. I will also note that this is your latest theory as to my "motives," all of them silly and erroneous.

The facts are the facts, whether you like them, or not and absolutely nothing cited from Rosecrans testimony controverts the basic point in any way. To be sure, the routes to the south out of Iuka also needed to be covered. There is no doubt of that whatever. Covering them was vital to the attack being able to go forward which would deprive the Army of the West of the ability to pull back via Bear Creek, as well. That is how the plan was formulated and described in the contemporary record and without really any exception. We know that the plan considered the possibility of the Army of the West moving north out of Iuka, as well and that such was a real and serious concern, hence the necessity for the joint attack, the need to cut off all escape routes to the south and the need to crush in the flank of the Army of the West between them and Bear Creek.

As for your last comment pertaining to my knowledge, I think that it can be fairly chalked up to constituting the last juiceless squeeze of the orange from a user who unfortunately had to be corrected, objectively speaking, repeatedly over the course of this thread.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I can't imagine the confederates trying to escape over Bear Creek at night. If they really wanted to escape the night of the 19th I think they would have tried to bust out one of the southern roads.

Maybe so, but that in no way alters the situation in terms of how it was understood and how the plan was conceived and presented.

 

[SSVilla]

Post battle blathering adds nothing to the actual events. Generally it includes aggrandizing a victory or dismissing a failure with excuses and shifting of blame.

For you analysis it adds nothing and I understand that, because you have a military focus, analyzing why military operations succeed or fail. For that focus all the other stuff is superfluous.

However, some of us are interested in the human factors and for those, things are always more complicated, like politics, rivalries, jealousies, motivations, repercussions, etc.

 

[DanSBHawk]

That map you included seems to have the north/south roads running through Iuka. In fact, the main north/south road was a mile or so to the east of Iuka. I *think* there was an east/west road that paralleled the railroad over Bear Creek that intersected that north/south road, so if Rosecrans interdicts the road from Fulton to Eastport, he interdicts retreat to the south or east.

Bear Creek is a substantial stream, bigger than a creek, smaller than a river. Crossing it under pursuit would have been non-trivial.

I'm not sure there was an east/west road from Iuka that paralleled the railroad in 1862. Here is a map from 1863 that is hand-drawn. It doesn't show any proper "road" crossing Bear Creek from Iuka. They'd have to go south to the road running east from Cartersville in order to stay on good roads. I speculated earlier in the thread that if Price wanted to go east across Bear Creek, he would have gone south on the Fulton Road, to the Cartersville Road and then turned east.

Also, this shows a "good ford" on the Cartersville Road, so there presumably would have been less of a concern about whether the bridges were still in place.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I'm not sure there was an east/west road from Iuka that paralleled the railroad in 1862. Here is a map from 1863 that is hand-drawn. It doesn't show any proper "road" crossing Bear Creek to Iuka. They'd have to go south to the road running east from Cartersville in order to stay on good roads. I speculated earlier in the thread that if Price wanted to go east across Bear Creek, he would have gone south on the Fulton Road, to the Cartersville Road and then turned east.

Also, this shows a "good ford" on the Cartersville Road, so there presumably would have been less of a concern about whether the bridges were still in place.

View attachment 522466

View attachment 522467

The trouble there is that the above is not a comprehensive map, as the Mill road and the connecting road and a litany of other roads which we know were present, just as we do regarding at least one road moving east out Iuka. This is known from the relevant correspondence in the OR, as well. Just more correspondence which certain users are not familiar with.

 

[Nathan Towne]

For you analysis it adds nothing and I understand that, because you have a military focus, analyzing why military operations succeed or fail. For that focus all the other stuff is superfluous.

However, some of us are interested in the human factors and for those, things are always more complicated, like politics, rivalries, jealousies, motivations, repercussions, etc.

It is telling that a certain user specifically only mentioned Grant's correspondence in their above comment. Notice that Rosecrans' correspondence was explicitly omitted.

*****As noted previously, Grant sent the following message to Halleck at 8:00 A.M. on September 16th:

"For ten days or more the enemy have been hovering in our front in reported large force. I have watched their moves closely until I could concentrate my forces. All are now in good shape. Hurlbut's division has come from Memphis to Bolivar and about 6,000 troops from Bolivar brought here. General Orice is southeast from us, near Bay Springs, moving northeast. It is reported that Van Dorn and Breckinridge are to join and attack. Form the best information they cannot reach here under four days. My view is they are covering a move to get General Price into East Tennessee. If I can I will attack Price before he crosses Bear Creek. If he can be beaten there, it will prevent either the design to go north or to unite forces and attack here."

-17 OR 2:220

Of course, the results of Mower's reconnaissance were not known to Grant yet at the time in which this message was sent.

Rosecrans to Grant on the 17th (not timestamped):

"Hamilton has sent out Mizner with a regiment of infantry and all our cavalry, under Mizner, toward Barnett's, on the Jacinto and Iuka road. The only thing we can do to prevent Price passing through the defiles of Bear Creek east is to push that division on him and follow it with all of Stanley's force while Ross makes a strong demonstration on his front. This is safe for a day or two if we can keep spies from running to Breckinridge and Van Dorn and Price and you can hold your hand against them. I can pursue with my entire force, which, including Du Bois and Danville, will be about 13,000 men of all arms."

-17 OR 2: 222

Also on September 17th Rosecrans, concerned that they may have already missed their opportunity, wrote the following to Grant:

"Mizner's dispatch just in reports that the cannonading of our reconnoitering party ceased at 4.40 last evening, and that about 8 o'clock last evening a very large fire was seen in the direction of Iuka; the distance is 20 miles. Mizner has gone to feel of them since 4 a.m. My suspicions are that some houses and stores have been burned in Iuka, the place abandoned, and that Price has crossed the defiles of Bear Creek, and will pass the Tennessee before it rises- at the Shoals, if possible; if not, will proceed at once to above Decatur, near Whitesburg."

-17 OR 2: 222-223

After this message had been sent, Rosecrans messaged from Jacinto later on the 17th (not timestamped) stating that Hamilton was sure that Price was still at Iuka.

17 OR 2: 223

He then forwarded the message from Hamilton to Grant at 9:30 P.M.

-17 OR 2: 224

In yet another message, sent on the 17th, Rosecrans expressed his concern regarding a move from Price, stating that had he not been pursued via their reconnoitering force, he would have probably left Iuka destined for the Tennessee Valley.

-17 OR 2: 223-224

In another message to Grant on the 17th (also not timestamped), probably sent after the above message, but certainly after hearing from Hamilton, returned to the concern expressed above, albeit expressing his hope that Grant was covering against a move directly towards Eastport on his front, stating:

"As Price is an old woodpecker it would be well to have a watch set to see if he might not take a course down the Tennessee, toward Eastport, in hopes to find the means of crossing. Have you any lookout toward Hamburg Landing?

-17 OR 2: 224

Of course, as noted above, it was imperative to prevent a move across Bear Creek to the east for the same reason.

Finally, from the Reports section of the Official Records, as it was reprinted in Grant's first report of the operation dated September 20th. The original copy is not contained in the correspondence, as is the case with many messages and orders, of course.

It was also not timestamped and is dated September 18th from Rosecrans to Grant. It read:

"One of my spies, in from Reardon's, on the Bay Springs Road, tells of a continuous movement since last Friday of forces eastward. They say Van Dorn is to defend Vicksburg, Breckinridge to make his way to Kentucky, and Price to attack Iuka or to go to Tennessee. If Price's forces are at Iuka the plan I propose is to move up as close as we can to-night and conceal our movements; Ord to advance from Burnsville, commence the attack, and draw their attention that way, while I move in on the Jacinto and Fulton roads, massing heavily on the Fulton road, and crushing in their left and cutting off their retreat eastward. I propose to leave in ten minutes for Jacinto, from whence I will dispatch you, by line of vedettes, to Burnsville. Will await a few minutes to hear from you before I start. What news from Burnsville?"

-17 OR 1: 66

As can be seen, the Fulton road was just one way out. It was just one way out. Rosecrans and Grant has been in communication regarding the situation quite steadily and continuously, to that point.

Additionally, all of this makes perfect logical sense from the perspective that one has to account for the purpose of the movement to Iuka in the first place.

So, as far as the notion that the High Command were cognizant of the Army of the West being able to fall back to the east across Bear Creek and that such recognition was fundamental to the conception of the plan, it is really all but incontrovertible as far as that is concerned. One only need to read the relevant correspondence.

That was really my principal point that way and one only need look at the record that way. Whether that assessment was accurate, or not, is really something of a separate discussion, although I do believe that there is evidence to indicate that it probably was. That is a serious potential discussion though.*****

 

[TallTallMan]

As I said, I haven't read the book. But Cozzens had an article in Smithsonian when the book came out, and I thought the article was overly negative and conspiratorial about Grant and the others. It certainly didn't make me want to go out and buy the book.

I don't remember the book being like that, but it is too pro-Custer. I think his military background makes him biased towards the US. Still a more scholarly book than Dee Brown's. There needs to be a balance.

 

[DanSBHawk]

It is telling that a certain user specifically only mentioned Grant's correspondence in their above comment. Notice that Rosecrans correspondence was explicitly omitted. I will have to post again due to the inaccurate statements being made.

*****As noted previously, Grant sent the following message to Halleck at 8:00 A.M. on September 16th:

"For ten days or more the enemy have been hovering in our front in reported large force. I have watched their moves closely until I could concentrate my forces. All are now in good shape. Hurlbut's division has come from Memphis to Bolivar and about 6,000 troops from Bolivar brought here. General Orice is southeast from us, near Bay Springs, moving northeast. It is reported that Van Dorn and Breckinridge are to join and attack. Form the best information they cannot reach here under four days. My view is they are covering a move to get General Price into East Tennessee. If I can I will attack Price before he crosses Bear Creek. If he can be beaten there, it will prevent either the design to go north or to unite forces and attack here."

-17 OR 2:220

Of course, the results of Mower's reconnaissance were not known to Grant yet at the time in which this message was sent.

Rosecrans to Grant on the 17th (not timestamped):

"Hamilton has sent out Mizner with a regiment of infantry and all our cavalry, under Mizner, toward Barnett's, on the Jacinto and Iuka road. The only thing we can do to prevent Price passing through the defiles of Bear Creek east is to push that division on him and follow it with all of Stanley's force while Ross makes a strong demonstration on his front. This is safe for a day or two if we can keep spies from running to Breckinridge and Van Dorn and Price and you can hold your hand against them. I can pursue with my entire force, which, including Du Bois and Danville, will be about 13,000 men of all arms."

-17 OR 2: 222

Also on September 17th Rosecrans, concerned that they may have already missed their opportunity, wrote the following to Grant:

"Mizner's dispatch just in reports that the cannonading of our reconnoitering party ceased at 4.40 last evening, and that about 8 o'clock last evening a very large fire was seen in the direction of Iuka; the distance is 20 miles. Mizner has gone to feel of them since 4 a.m. My suspicions are that some houses and stores have been burned in Iuka, the place abandoned, and that Price has crossed the defiles of Bear Creek, and will pass the Tennessee before it rises- at the Shoals, if possible; if not, will proceed at once to above Decatur, near Whitesburg."

-17 OR 2: 222-223

After this message had been sent, Rosecrans messaged from Jacinto later on the 17th (not timestamped) stating that Hamilton was sure that Price was still at Iuka.

17 OR 2: 223

He then forwarded the message from Hamilton to Grant at 9:30 P.M.

-17 OR 2: 224

In yet another message, sent on the 17th, Rosecrans expressed his concern regarding a move from Price, stating that had he not been pursued via their reconnoitering force, he would have probably left Iuka destined for the Tennessee Valley.

-17 OR 2: 223-224

In another message to Grant on the 17th (also not timestamped), probably sent after the above message, but certainly after hearing from Hamilton, returned to the concern expressed above, albeit expressing his hope that Grant was covering against a move directly towards Eastport on his front, stating:

"As Price is an old woodpecker it would be well to have a watch set to see if he might not take a course down the Tennessee, toward Eastport, in hopes to find the means of crossing. Have you any lookout toward Hamburg Landing?

-17 OR 2: 224

Of course, as noted above, it was imperative to prevent a move across Bear Creek to the east for the same reason.

Finally, from the Reports section of the Official Records, as it was reprinted in Grant's first report of the operation dated September 20th. The original copy is not contained in the correspondence, as is the case with many messages and orders, of course.

It was also not timestamped and is dated September 18th from Rosecrans to Grant. It read:

"One of my spies, in from Reardon's, on the Bay Springs Road, tells of a continuous movement since last Friday of forces eastward. They say Van Dorn is to defend Vicksburg, Breckinridge to make his way to Kentucky, and Price to attack Iuka or to go to Tennessee. If Price's forces are at Iuka the plan I propose is to move up as close as we can to-night and conceal our movements; Ord to advance from Burnsville, commence the attack, and draw their attention that way, while I move in on the Jacinto and Fulton roads, massing heavily on the Fulton road, and crushing in their left and cutting off their retreat eastward. I propose to leave in ten minutes for Jacinto, from whence I will dispatch you, by line of vedettes, to Burnsville. Will await a few minutes to hear from you before I start. What news from Burnsville?"

-17 OR 1: 66

As can be seen, the Fulton road was just one way out. It was just one way out. Rosecrans and Grant has been in communication regarding the situation quite steadily and continuously, to that point.

Additionally, all of this makes perfect logical sense from the perspective that one has to account for the purpose of the movement to Iuka in the first place.

So, as far as the notion that the High Command were cognizant of the Army of the West being able to fall back to the east across Bear Creek and that such recognition was fundamental to the conception of the plan, it is really all but incontrovertible as far as that is concerned. One only need to read the relevant correspondence.

That was really my principal point that way and one only need look at the record that way. Whether that assessment was accurate, or not, is really something of a separate discussion, although I do believe that there is evidence to indicate that it probably was. That is a serious potential discussion though.*****

And as already noted, not a single one of these sources explicitly describes Price's route across Bear Creek as proceeding directly east from Iuka.

 

[TallTallMan]

Lincoln goes more with your name as the TallTallMan.

Very appropriate. I thought you'd changed it because it suited you better. I never asked you what you liked about Warren. I don't know him much. The hero of little Round top?

View attachment 522430

I think he was a nice, honest guy, underrated, and I feel bad he had to endure slander for so long.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Deleted

If Price's route east was to be the Fulton Road down to the Clarkesville road to go east, then simply blocking the Fulton road is blocking their retreat eastward.

We know that both Grant and Rosecrans considered that blocking the two southern roads was in fact blocking the confederate escape.

 

[Nathan Towne]

If Price's route east was to be the Fulton Road down to the Clarkesville road to go east, then simply blocking the Fulton road is blocking their retreat eastward.

We know that both Grant and Rosecrans considered that blocking the two southern roads was in fact blocking the confederate escape.

Completely and utterly wrong, obviously and objectively so. Price's route to the east was not down the Fulton road. Reading for comprehension.

Furthermore, Rosecrans explicitly covered the avenue of movement to the north, as well, so your view is even dumber than you even realize. Tell us more about how Rosecrans blundered into the Confederate position, as well and your other comical views which any first grader can discern are fraudulent after reading all of the evidence.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Completely and utterly wrong, obviously and objectively so. Price's route to the east was not down the Fulton road. Reading for comprehension.

Furthermore, Rosecrans explicitly covered the avenue of movement to the north, as well, so your view is even dumber than you even realize. Tell us more about how Rosecrans blundered into the Confederate position, as well and your other comical views which any first grader can discern are fraudulent after reading all of the evidence.

I've read the evidence, and when it comes to deciding who is more credible on knowing the battle plan - either you, or Grant and Rosecrans - I'm going to have to go with Grant and Rosecrans.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I've read the evidence, and when it comes to deciding who is more credible on knowing the battle plan - either you, or Grant and Rosecrans - I'm going to have to go with Grant and Rosecrans.

That is certainly where I go, with the relevant contemporary record which lines up on one side against Dan Hawk on the other.

I recognize that you have expressed your unfounded view that the relevant record is to be ignored and disregarded though, per usual.

In order to preempt you putting up a selective quotation from Grant's second report, we already know what was stated in the relevant record at the time.