Random Thoughts on Iuka

[DanSBHawk]

Yes, which comprised two of the means of withdrawal of the Confederate Army. I have cited from Rosecrans Congressional testimony on numerous occasions. You should probably go a read the contemporary correspondence again.

Yes, I am well aware of the recorded discussions between Grant and Ord on that issue. I have covered them extensively. The above point referred to Rosecrans understanding of the situation on that point.

If you just read the relevant correspondence, you see what the issues were.

I have read it. And I don't agree with your interpretation.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I have read it. And I don't agree with your interpretation.

Well, you are always free to attempt to provide your take as to what Rosecrans was discussing in the correspondence provided in Post #256.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Please inform us what Rosecrams was discussing in the correspondence provided in Post #256.

There's no doubt that Grant and Rosecrans suspected that Price might go east during this time period into Alabama to eventually join up with Bragg. But it has very little to do with the actual Iuka battle plan.

In fact, in your one citation of the 16th, Grant is assuming Price is moving northeast from Bay Springs (not Iuka) to cross Bear Creek. Different routes, different roads altogether.

Whether it was because of the condition of the roads, or the lack of bridges, or the difficulty of the terrain east of Iuka, neither Grant nor Rosecrans was all that concerned about blocking a confederate escape east from Iuka. Their obvious assumption was that if the confederates wanted to escape east, they would go south on the Fulton Road and then east across Bear Creek. Blocking the three roads would leave the confederates only unfavorable options.

That was the plan. Block three roads. Nothing presented here in this thread really challenges that understanding of the battle plan. We have accurate and roughly contemporaneous descriptions of the battle plan by both Grant and Rosecrans. We know from them that the primary objectives of the battle plan was to cut off three roads.

 

[Nathan Towne]

There's no doubt that Grant and Rosecrans suspected that Price might go east during this time period into Alabama to eventually join up with Bragg. But it has very little to do with the actual Iuka battle plan.

In fact, in your one citation of the 16th, Grant is assuming Price is moving northeast from Bay Springs (not Iuka) to cross Bear Creek. Different routes, different roads altogether.

Whether it was because of the condition of the roads, or the lack of bridges, or the difficulty of the terrain east of Iuka, neither Grant nor Rosecrans was all that concerned about blocking a confederate escape east from Iuka. Their obvious assumption was that if the confederates wanted to escape east, they would go south on the Fulton Road and then east across Bear Creek. Blocking the three roads would leave the confederates only unfavorable options.

That was the plan. Block three roads. Nothing presented here in this thread really challenges that understanding of the battle plan. We have accurate and roughly contemporaneous descriptions of the battle plan by both Grant and Rosecrans. We know from them that the primary objectives of the battle plan was to cut off three roads.

That is not how the operation was described in the contemporary record actually, as was shown above. See Post #256.

Why would the Army of the West need to move south via the Fulton road in order to cross Bear Creek?

Why did you only mention Grant's correspondence on the 16th and not the voluminous correspondence from Rosecrans which was cited?

It is easy to just dig in on clearly erroneous positions, but it is really best to follow the evidence, rather than to fight against it.

 

[DanSBHawk]

That is not how the operation was described in the contemporary record actually, as was shown above. See Post #256.

Why would the Army of the West need to move south via the Fulton road in order to cross Bear Creek?

Why did you only mention Grant's correspondence on the 16th and not the voluminous correspondence from Rosecrans which was cited?

It is easy to just dig in on clearly erroneous positions, but it is really best to follow the evidence, rather than to fight against it.

I've looked at the Bear Creed evidence you've presented. And I've looked at more references to Bear Creek including the dispatch during the pursuit where Rosecrans suggested intentionally driving the confederates into the defiles of Bear Creek.

After considering the evidence, I disagree with your interpretation. The plan was to block three roads. There was no part of the plan that included blocking any route running directly east from Iuka.

 

[Nathan Towne]

The plan wasn't to "block" the route to the east. It was to hit the Confederate force, crushing in their left, in order to prevent them from pulling back to the east via Bear Creek.

 

[1SGDan]

The plan wasn't to "block" the route to the east. It was to hit the Confederate force, crushing in their left, in order to prevent them from pulling back to the east via Bear Creek.

The plan was to block both roads of escape and then crush the Confederate forces between the Ord's attacking forces from the north. The plan was foiled when Rosecrans could not cover both exit routes and the supporting attack never occurred as expected.

 

[Nathan Towne]

The plan was to block both roads of escape and then crush the Confederate forces between the Ord's attacking forces from the north. The plan was foiled when Rosecrans could not cover both exit routes and the supporting attack never occurred as expected.

That is not really correct. It is important to actually read the correspondence, as it is very enlightening that way.

See Post #256.

The plan was to get to the roads leading south from Iuka and in conjunction with Ord's forces strike the Army of the West, crushing in their left and depriving them of the ability to pull back either to the south, via the Jacinto or Fulton roads, via Bear Creek to the east, which was heavily emphasized as a grave threat, or due north towards the Tennessee river.

The way I see it, the operation failed due to the inability to accomplish these joint objectives, in which the Army of the Mississippi would have had to have reached the connecting road for cross support purposes on the Jacinto and Fulton roads and launched the attack in conjunction with (or rapidly following) Ord's attacks, crossing in the Confederate left and hence depriving them of the ability to cross Bear Creek via its defiles that night.

 

[1SGDan]

That is incorrect. You are another in a line of people who has a view which they have read in the literature before and has not actually read the correspondence.

See Post #256.

The plan was to get to the roads leading south from Iuka and in conjunction with Ord's forces strike the Army of the West, crushing in their left and depriving them of the ability to pull back either to the south, via the Jacinto or Fulton roads, via Bear Creek to the east, which was heavily emphasized as a grave threat, or due north towards the Tennessee river.

The way I see it, the operation failed due to the inability to accomplish these joint objectives, in which the Army of the Mississippi would have had to have reached the connecting road for cross support purposes on the Jacinto and Fulton roads and launched the attack in conjunction with (or rapidly following) Ord's attacks, crossing in the Confederate left and hence depriving them of the ability to cross Bear Creek via its defiles that night.

Really this is exactly what I said. Rosecrans underestimated the time to seal both roads and Ord's supporting attack never happened. The goal was to crush the Confederates between the two or force the enemy to move east away from Corinth. That neither happened does not negate the original plan. The plan failed by poor prior reconnaissance by Rosecrans and the inability to coordinate distance forces to the same objective.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Really this is exactly what I said. Rosecrans underestimated the time to seal both roads and Ord's supporting attack never happened. The goal was to crush the Confederates between the two or force the enemy to move east away from Corinth. That neither happened does not negate the original plan. The plan failed by poor prior reconnaissance by Rosecrans and the inability to coordinate distance forces to the same objective.

The object of the plan was to prevent the Confederates from being able to pull back to the east, (or to the south or north).

 

[DanSBHawk]

I'm going to continue to go with the opinions of Grant and Rosecrans, and with every historian that has studied this battle.

Escaping to the north, or directly to the east, were not viewed as favorable options for the confederates. Blocking the two southern roads while Ord attacked from the west, was viewed by Grant and Rosecrans as leaving the confederates with no good options.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Lol. ^Everything which I have said comes directly from what was explicitly stated in the contemporary correspondence. People will be able to read Post #256 and they can start from there.

 

[DanSBHawk]

People can take all of the evidence into account. Not just selected bits.

 

[tony_gunter]

Obviously I disagree with your interpretation of the evidence.

Grant and Rosecrans knew what the plan was. I've already cited Grant's report. Here's Rosecrans in his 1865 testimony to the Joint Committee: "(I) should get possession of the rebels' line of retreat, south of Iuka, by seizing and holding both the Fulton and Jacinto roads,..."

View attachment 521712

"The ground there being highly favorable"

lol … there's no worse ground for an attacking force in the entire area. What everyone here keeps calling the Fulton Road was actually a connecting ridge road that zig-zagged atop a tall ridge.

 

[Nathan Towne]

People can take all of the evidence into account. Not just selected bits.

They certainly should do so. I agree that people should not just look at selected pieces of evidence. You need to look at all of the evidence, not just the pieces which you have selected.

"The ground there being highly favorable"

lol … there's no worse ground for an attacking force in the entire area. What everyone here keeps calling the Fulton Road was actually a connecting ridge road that zig-zagged atop a tall ridge.

I am not sure who is doing that. I certainly haven't done that. I have put considerable thought into the road network and have some additional perceptions on it which I will offer/get into at some point. I certainly have never stated such.

 

[1SGDan]

Iuka - Victory as Failure | South & Western Theaters

Introduction In a recent thread another poster posed the question of why the battle of Iuka was considered a Union victory. Before responding I decided to review the battle in an effort to justify or dispel the outcome as a Union victory. What I discovered was actually a surprising mix of...

civilwartalk.com

I did a lot of research on this battle and feel quite confident in my knowledge of it. Pleas see the above.

 

[1SGDan]

As seen on this map leaving the second road (Fulton) was left uncovered when the plan was altered by time and distance. Price used it for his escape. Had it been sealed as the original plan called for Price would have been in serious trouble even without Ord's attack.

 

[Nathan Towne]

View attachment 521847

As seen on this map leaving the second road (Fulton) was left uncovered when the plan was altered by time and distance. Price used it for his escape. Had it been sealed as the original plan called for Price would have been in serious trouble even without Ord's attack.

I will print out your entire piece when I get the chance to, but in terms of how the operation was described as it was formulated, your above statement is not one which is reconcilable with the record.

I have covered the operation in a number of places and it is just simply the fact that the conception of the operation was to prevent the Army of the West from being able to pull back either to the east via Bear Creek or to the south via the roads which headed south out of Iuka (or to the north). This is not something which can really be controverted when one actually looks at the contemporary record.

I have that map. There are better maps available though.

 

[1SGDan]

he conception of the operation was to prevent to Army of the West from being able to pull back either to the east via Bear Creek or to the south via the roads which headed south out of Iuka (or to the north).

This is exactly what I have described. I have no idea why you find fault when I am saying exactly the same thing.

 

[Nathan Towne]

This is exactly what I have described. I have no idea why you find fault when I am saying exactly the same thing.

I have not been feeling well of late, but I am going to print out your piece today and read it and offer my feedback.